DC Metro Red Line to return to Automatic Train Operation

[afigg]

For five years after the fatal crash caused by malfunctions in the automatic train operation sensors, the DC Metro trains have been manually operated by the train operators. Which has led to less than smooth operation much of the time when the train comes to a stop at the platform (lurch, then lurch again) . WMATA announced that the Red Line will be to return to automatic operation in October. Returning the other lines to ATO is years away, but this is progress.

Washington Post: Computer-driven trains returning to Metro’s Red Line five years after deadly rail crash. Excerpt:

Five years after a fatal crash on Metro’s Red Line, the transit agency said it will soon take a major step in recovering from the disaster by bringing back computer-driven trains, restoring a money-saving, smooth-ride feature that was part of Metrorail from its inception but failed catastrophically in 2009, causing nine deaths.

Starting early next month, in a process known as automatic train operation, computers will take over driving a half-dozen Red Line trains daily during non-peak hours, Metro General Manager Richard Sarles said. By March, all Red Line trains will be driven by computers, a move Sarles called “a milestone accomplishment.”

Drivers will remain in the train cabs, Metro officials said, and work is continuing on the Orange, Blue, Green and Yellow lines, with computer-driven trains scheduled to be operating in the entire subway system in three years.

NBC4: Metro Will Go Back to Computer-Driven Trains.

Both articles have the same quote from a family member of one of those killed in the 2009 collision speaking against ATO and, in full luddite mode, having computers run anything. It is a bit late for that.

 

[neroden]

The Red Line crash was caused by an infamous failure to design fail-safe; effectively, the train assumed there was no other train on the track unless it got a positive signal that there was. Which is fail-unsafe.

I assume that this has been fixed in the new design. It is normal to design signal systems to fail safe -- to assume total lack of authority to move until the track is "proved empty".