FY 2025 Ridership Expansion and Fiscal Recovery

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Septa9739

Lead Service Attendant
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Dec 12, 2022
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With the release of the October MPR, the 2025 fiscal year is well underway. Last year Amtrak (on average) reached full ridership recovery compared to the twelve months before COVID. With that benchmark exceeded, this year I will being comparing data to last year. This requires a change in reporting. Most routes show ridership between 96% and 104% of 2024 levels, so I will report monthly winners (above 105%) and losers (below 95%). The routes that haven’t hit pre-COVID ridership are close, or are known problems (read Acela, Hiawatha, Keystone, California…). Otherwise the report is pretty good on the whole. The Northeast Regional had a 1,000,000 passenger month (I believe it’s first ever) and drug the NECSL to beat 2024. The SSSL had a big surprise: all four Virginia services lost ridership compared to 12 months ago. Maybe there is a ceiling after all. The LDSL exceeded the October FY 2020 (CY 2019) ridership level. Notable the Auto Train lost ridership as its COVID boom likely subsides. With that:
Winners


  1. Northeast Regional 1,065,400 (108%)
  2. Vermonter 11,500 (108%)
  3. Keystone 113,200 (105%)
  4. Empire South 131,400 (114%)
  5. Pacific Surfliner 172,600 (106%)
  6. Cascades 89,300 (121%)
  7. Capitol Corridor 97,900 (106%)
  8. Missouri River Runner 19,600 (108%)
  9. Pennsylvanian 22,400 (115%)
  10. Pere Marquette 7,800 (108%)
  11. Piedmont 39,300 (111%)
  12. Cardinal 9,600 (110%)
  13. Capitol Limited 14,500 (137%)
  14. California Zephyr 29,100 (109%)
  15. Texas Eagle 29,500 (106%)
  16. Sunset Limited 8,200 (121%)
  17. Coast Starlight 31,200 (116%)
  18. Palmetto 35,300 (105%)
Losers:


  1. Downeaster 52,100 (95%)
  2. Springfield Shuttle 48,200 (85%)
  3. Hiawatha 53,500 (88%) Attribute to Borealis
  4. Wolverine 37,100 (93%)
  5. Adirondack 8,400 (92%) Continual issues
  6. Roanoke 30,800 (93%)
  7. Richmond 12,000 (94%)
  8. Silver Star 27,500 (86%)
  9. Silver Meteor 22,200 (94%)
  10. Auto Train 17,700 (86%)
Finally, a note on revenue. The operating loss was $16,100,000. This is not great, but about $25,000,000 better than expected. In FY 2020, the year Amtrak would have made money, October was about $23,000,000 in the black. October is one of the strongest ridership months of the year, so we should expect losses to increase from here. Long Distance operating ratios are slowly crossing 50% and are looking more normal in the NEC (200%ish Acela and 135ish on the NER). Improvement was made on both revenue and expenses.
 
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With the release of the October MPR, the 2025 fiscal year is well underway. Last year Amtrak (on average) reached full ridership recovery compared to the twelve months before COVID. With that benchmark exceeded, this year I will being comparing data to last year. This requires a change in reporting. Most routes show ridership between 96% and 104% of 2024 levels, so I will report monthly winners (above 105%) and losers (below 95%). The routes that haven’t hit pre-COVID ridership are close, or are known problems (read Acela, Hiawatha, Keystone, California…). Otherwise the report is pretty good on the whole. The Northeast Regional had a 1,000,000 passenger month (I believe it’s first ever) and drug the NECSL to beat 2024. The SSSL had a big surprise: all four Virginia services lost ridership compared to 12 months ago. Maybe there is a ceiling after all. The LDSL exceeded the October FY 2020 (CY 2019) ridership level. Notable the Auto Train lost ridership as its COVID boom likely subsides. With that:
Winners


  1. Northeast Regional 1,065,400 (108%)
  2. Vermonter 11,500 (108%)
  3. Keystone 113,200 (105%)
  4. Empire South 131,400 (114%)
  5. Pacific Surfliner 172,600 (106%)
  6. Cascades 89,300 (121%)
  7. Capitol Corridor 97,900 (106%)
  8. Missouri River Runner 19,600 (108%)
  9. Pennsylvanian 22,400 (115%)
  10. Pere Marquette 7,800 (108%)
  11. Piedmont 39,300 (111%)
  12. Cardinal 9,600 (110%)
  13. Capitol Limited 14,500 (137%)
  14. California Zephyr 29,100 (109%)
  15. Texas Eagle 29,500 (106%)
  16. Sunset Limited 8,200 (121%)
  17. Coast Starlight 31,200 (116%)
  18. Palmetto 35,300 (105%)
Losers:


  1. Downeaster 52,100 (95%)
  2. Springfield Shuttle 48,200 (85%)
  3. Hiawatha 53,500 (88%) Attribute to Borealis
  4. Wolverine 37,100 (93%)
  5. Adirondack 8,400 (92%) Continual issues
  6. Roanoke 30,800 (93%)
  7. Richmond 12,000 (94%)
  8. Silver Star 27,500 (86%)
  9. Silver Meteor 22,200 (94%)
  10. Auto Train 17,700 (86%)
Finally, a note on revenue. The operating loss was $16,100,000. This is not great, but about $25,000,000 better than expected. In FY 2020, the year Amtrak would have made money, October was about $23,000,000 in the black. October is one of the strongest ridership months of the year, so we should expect losses to increase from here. Long Distance operating ratios are slowly crossing 50% and are looking more normal in the NEC (200%ish Acela and 135ish on the NER). Improvement was made on both revenue and expenses.
Interesting fact about the Autotrain is that this is the first month it ran in the red this year albeit only a $100,000 lost. Also the Downeaster still made money even with the loss in passengers. The Springfield shuttle is also a big money loser, $1.9 million loss for the month of October.
 
Isn't that not accounting for state subsidies?
That loss for the Springfield shuttle includes state subsidies. What is also interesting is that Amtrak showed a $16.7 million loss for October overall while the State Supported routes had a loss of $14.9 million. I have stated in the past that all state supported routes should at least show a "break even" on Amtrak's books. Some state supported Amtrak routes do "break even" or turn a profit but many are perennial loss leaders. The Springfield shuttle has been one of the worse, Chicago- St Louis, Illinois Zephyr, San Joaquins and Heartland flyer are right behind. Amtrak needs to re-work these state contracts.

The numbers reported in the report include state subsidies.

Sometimes Amtrak seems to not bill appropriately. Most SSSL trains will run a narrow loss to Amtrak by the end of the year.
State Supported Amtrak routes lost $234.4 million in total for fiscal year 2024. Only the Berkshire Flyer broke even. The next closest route to break even was the Ethan Allen Express at a $800K loss for the year. The Keystone Service was the biggest lost leader at $41 million for the 2024 year.
 
State Supported Amtrak routes lost $234.4 million in total for fiscal year 2024. Only the Berkshire Flyer broke even. The next closest route to break even was the Ethan Allen Express at a $800K loss for the year. The Keystone Service was the biggest lost leader at $41 million for the 2024 year.
Yeah, I don’t know what the deal is with the keystone. The loss is down about $25,000,000 from last year. Last year’s loss was larger than the entire operating expense in 2019, running the same service levels. The progress this year was about $3,000,000 dollars revenue $22,000,000 dollars expense. @Acela150 mentioned in the past that there were operational issues like Philly conductors having to overnight in Harrisburg (which I would say is an Amtrak expense). Maybe he has more or better info, but my suspicion is that Amtrak was somehow funneling operating money to capital work on the line, because expenses climbed sharply, then decreased sharply.
 
That loss for the Springfield shuttle includes state subsidies. What is also interesting is that Amtrak showed a $16.7 million loss for October overall while the State Supported routes had a loss of $14.9 million.

This is an often misunderstood concept. PRIIA 209 does not entirely place all of Amtrak’s costs on the state. It is a State-Federal cost sharing program. State subsidies are included in revenue. The loss on the state supported business line as a whole is covered by Federal subsidies - specifically from the National Network account.
 
Is the Keystone subsidized in a way that just accounts for the Philadelphia-Harrisburg segment, or the New York segment as well? I've noticed that Keystone trains are generally cheaper than NE Regional trains between NY and PHL (and faster, too).
 
Is the Keystone subsidized in a way that just accounts for the Philadelphia-Harrisburg segment, or the New York segment as well? I've noticed that Keystone trains are generally cheaper than NE Regional trains between NY and PHL (and faster, too).
I think it’s just Philly - Harrisburg. I believe on the books if you ride NYP - PHL on a Keystone it’s credited as a Northeast Regional trip. Also if your travel on a Keystone train includes travel on the NEC north of Philly the ticket becomes a reserved seat. Trips within the Philly - Harrisburg Keystone corridor are normally unreserved seats.

Another odd ball thing with the Keystone line as well as the Springfield line is that they are considered part of the NEC as far as the Infrastructure but part of the National Network (state supported business line) as far as operations. So the money for work on those two lines on the Biden infrastructure bill comes from the NEC slice, but any operational subsidies would come from the National Network.
 
For all SSSL trains that use the NEC, the trip is credited to the NEC if the trip originates and terminates on the NEC. If it touches an off NEC segment it goes to the State supported train. The fare difference is an incentive for PHL-NYP passengers to use the Keystone and keep seats available for passengers south of WAS.
 
This is an often misunderstood concept. PRIIA 209 does not entirely place all of Amtrak’s costs on the state. It is a State-Federal cost sharing program. State subsidies are included in revenue. The loss on the state supported business line as a whole is covered by Federal subsidies - specifically from the National Network account.
I can see why one would misunderstand the concept when many state supported lines break even or make money. I think the goal should be for Amtrak to break even on all state supported lines.
 
I can see why one would misunderstand the concept when many state supported lines break even or make money. I think the goal should be for Amtrak to break even on all state supported lines.
According to the September year end monthly report for FY24 none of the state supported routes broke even in FY24, on a Fully Allocated Cost basis, even after state payments were factored in. Berkshire Flyer and Chicago - St. Louis came the closest. The SSBL lost $251.5 million overall contributing to Amtrak’s total loss of $705.2 million. The overall losses would be covered by Federal subsidies.

Only losses associated with operating Amtrak’s three main business lines can be covered by Federal subsidies. Any ancillary activities (such as competitively operating regional rail services) has to be revenue positive. This actually puts Amtrak at a disadvantage as a commuter operator because they have to be fairly conservative in their pricing to ensure they get a positive return. Private competitors can underbid closer to costs to get their foot in the door.

From management commentary I read in one of their financial reports online Amtrak does anticipate that retaining its remaining commuter contracts and gaining any new ones will be challenging with the growth of Herzog, Keolis, Alstom, etc. who have the ability to bid low and risk losing money in order to get the contract. Amtrak cannot take those risks because it cannot by law spend federal subsidies on activities outside the three primary business lines (nor should they.) I would anticipate an eventual exit by Amtrak from those activities.
 
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According to the September year end monthly report for FY24 none of the state supported routes broke even in FY24, on a Fully Allocated Cost basis, even after state payments were factored in. Berkshire Flyer and Chicago - St. Louis came the closest. The SSBL lost $251.5 billion overall contributing to Amtrak’s total loss of $705.2 billion. The overall losses would be covered by Federal subsidies.

Only losses associated with operating Amtrak’s three main business lines can be covered by Federal subsidies. Any ancillary activities (such as competitively operating regional rail services) has to be revenue positive. This actually puts Amtrak at a disadvantage as a commuter operator because they have to be fairly conservative in their pricing to ensure they get a positive return. Private competitors can underbid closer to costs to get their foot in the door.

From management commentary I read in one of their financial reports online Amtrak does anticipate that retaining its remaining commuter contracts and gaining any new ones will be challenging with the growth of Herzog, Keolis, etc. who have the ability to bid low and risk losing money in order to get the contract. Amtrak cannot take those risks because it cannot by law spend federal subsidies on activities outside the three primary business lines.
Prior to 2020 (Covid) that was not entirely the case. In fiscal 2019, 9 routes made money. 9 routes came in under 1 million in losses for the year. Another 7 had losses under 3 million. 6 routes had losses over 3 million. It has always been a mixed bag. Interesting about the commuter contracts. I remember when Amtrak ran Boston commuter trains. They were much better than Keolis. What benefit does a company like Keolis get by operating at a loss? Are they a money laundering outfit?
 
Prior to 2020 (Covid) that was not entirely the case. In fiscal 2019, 9 routes made money. 9 routes came in under 1 million in losses for the year. Another 7 had losses under 3 million. 6 routes had losses over 3 million. It has always been a mixed bag. Interesting about the commuter contracts. I remember when Amtrak ran Boston commuter trains. They were much better than Keolis. What benefit does a company like Keolis get by operating at a loss? Are they a money laundering outfit?

Well I’m not saying they’re operating at a loss. I’m saying when bidding on a contract they can be more aggressive than Amtrak would be with low bidding and take more of a risk if they think they can lower costs and find efficiencies over time once they get their foot in the door because it’s their own money (or their shareholders money) they are risking. Amtrak cannot risk federal money so they have to be a bit more conservative in their commuter services pricing. Some of these private contractors are also non union while Amtrak is a union outfit which is also a factor.
 
Amtrak cannot risk federal money so they have to be a bit more conservative in their commuter services pricing. Some of these private contractors are also non union while Amtrak is a union outfit which is also a factor.
You can turn this argument both ways.

You can say that if a private enterprise goes bankrupt, it is ultimately at the expense of its shareholders and creditors and of nobody else, whereas if Amtrak runs a greater deficit than allowed, it may get a stern rap on the fingers but will probably get bailed out by the taxpayer in the end, which might make them slightly more willing to take calculated risks.
 
Well I’m not saying they’re operating at a loss. I’m saying when bidding on a contract they can be more aggressive than Amtrak would be with low bidding and take more of a risk if they think they can lower costs and find efficiencies over time once they get their foot in the door because it’s their own money (or their shareholders money) they are risking. Amtrak cannot risk federal money so they have to be a bit more conservative in their commuter services pricing. Some of these private contractors are also non union while Amtrak is a union outfit which is also a factor.
Are there non-union commuter contracts in the U.S.? I have never heard of one.
 
According to the September year end monthly report for FY24 none of the state supported routes broke even in FY24, on a Fully Allocated Cost basis, even after state payments were factored in. Berkshire Flyer and Chicago - St. Louis came the closest. The SSBL lost $251.5 billion overall contributing to Amtrak’s total loss of $705.2 billion. The overall losses would be covered by Federal subsidies.
Just an editorial note that those losses are millions not billions. Billions would put Amtrak on par with the defense budget.
 
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