WI city may cite UP for stalled trains

[CHamilton]

City to pursue fines against railroad for stalled trains

Between Feb. 18 and 23 Union Pacific trains sat motionless across streets five times, sometimes for hours.

Mayor Greg Hoffman has been in communication with the railroad discussing what could be done about the situation, and as of Tuesday night, he said he hadn’t heard of any recent blockages.

But the city felt it still might be wise to review the relevant ordinances. On Tuesday night, the City Council agreed with the Public Works Committee’s motion earlier that day to pursue levying fines against the railroad for any subsequent offenses.

“We will wait for the next occurrence,” said Chippewa Falls City Attorney Robert Ferg, adding that the police department will then be able to issue a municipal citation.

The citation would include a court date, at which time the railroad could agree to pay the fine or fight it in a trial, Ferg explained.

Despite the discussion, the ordinance remained unchanged, stating that “no person shall stop and leave standing any railroad train, locomotive or car upon or across any street in the city longer than five minutes.”

 

[Devil's Advocate]

Is there any history to indicate if this actually works? My guess is that any fine large enough to be meaningful would be fought until the city agreed to settle for far less while anything small enough to be paid immediately wouldn't be large enough to impact future operations.

 

[neroden]

Most ordinances of this sort were found legal some time back. (Five minutes was the magic number, I believe, according to the federal regulations, though I might be wrong and it might be ten minutes or something.)

 

[SubwayNut]

I've heard five before too, I remember (I know I was sitting with some AUers and others knowledgeable) sitting the Ocean View Leaving Chicago when it was on the Cardinal in 2011 and stopping over a grade crossing on a wide boulevard (with a median, there were cars definitely driving over it) to offload a passenger with a medical emergency. People in the car were definately talking about it we'd be there for over five minutes because of that blocking a grade crossing rule.

 

[Ryan]

Hey, I was on that train!

(definitely one of the "some AUers" and not in the "knowledgeable" contingent)

That was a darn good time.

 

[Paulus]

These laws are all preempted by the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970.

 

[neroden]

These laws are all preempted by the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970.

Nope, post-1970 court cases. I don't have the references on hand, but "don't block crossings by sitting still for hours" ordinances were found to *not* be overridden by preemption. Based on the intent of the FRSA to improve safety, IIRC.

Since then, the usual claim of the railroad is "We only *intended* to stop the train for four minutes, but then something came up, and the crew outlawed, etc...."

It sounds like UP has stopped blocking the crossings for hours-at-a-time, so expect a claim like that.

 

[Paulus]

These laws are all preempted by the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970.

Nope, post-1970 court cases. I don't have the references on hand, but "don't block crossings by sitting still for hours" ordinances were found to *not* be overridden by preemption. Based on the intent of the FRSA to improve safety, IIRC.

Since then, the usual claim of the railroad is "We only *intended* to stop the train for four minutes, but then something came up, and the crew outlawed, etc...."

It sounds like UP has stopped blocking the crossings for hours-at-a-time, so expect a claim like that.

Nope. As long as it is covered by some form of FRA regulation (such as train speed, HOS, air brakes, switching, etc.) time limits are preempted; there is no need to claim an intention of only stopping for a few minutes. You'd basically need to prove that the railroad in question was engaged in mustache twirling villainy and even then I'm not too certain since you cannot require anything that the FRA does not already require (as that would be explicitly preempted regulation of the railroad).

The FRSA includes a preemption provision that, among other things, allows state and local governments to regulate only those matters on which the Secretary of Transportation has not yet regulated. The Secretary regulates train speeds, which depend on the classification of the tracks. CSX Transportation, Inc. v. City of Plymouth, 283 F.3d 812 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that state law imposing a limitation on the duration at which a crossing may be blocked by a train, which is related to train speed, was preempted); see also CSX Transportation, Inc. v. City of Mitchell, 105 F. Supp. 2d 949 (S.D.Ind. 1999) (granting summary judgment to railroad and enjoining city from enforcing law prohibiting railroad from blocking crossing for more than 10 minutes); Drieson v. Iowa, Chicago & Eastern Railroad Corporation, 777 F. Supp. 2d 1143 (N.D. Iowa 2011) (partial summary judgment for railroad; federal regulations governing the movement of trains, including blocked crossings as they pertained to air brake testing requirements, preempted state and local laws).

In Plymouth, the attorney general argued that the crux of the state statute was not train speed, but “the time that trains may block highway traffic.” The court of appeals was unpersuaded by this contention, explaining that “the amount of time a moving train spends at a grade crossing is mathematically a function of the length of the train and the speed at which the train is traveling.” The court concluded that the statute would require the railroad to modify either the speed at which its trains travel or their length, and would also restrict the railroad’s performance of federally mandated air brake tests. The court also concluded that numerous federal regulations covered the speed at which trains may travel and, thus, the federal regulations “substantially subsume the subject matter of the relevant state law.” Plymouth, 283 F. 3d at 817.

Congress intended that the ICCTA and the FRSA coexist. While the Surface Transportation Board must adhere to federal policies encouraging “safe and suitable working conditions in the railroad industry,” the ICCTA and its legislative history contain no evidence that Congress intended for the Surface Transportation Board to supplant the Federal Railroad Administration’s authority over rail safety under the FRSA. Tyrrell v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co., 248 F.3d 517 (6th Cir. 2001). Rather, the agencies’ complementary exercise of their statutory authority accurately reflects Congress’s intent for the ICCTA and the FRSA to be construed in pari materia. Tyrell, supra.

All glory to the hypnolink

 

[SarahZ]

All glory to the hypnolink