# Metrolink Wreck



## WhoozOn1st

A Metrolink/UP freight collision - on TV it looks like a cornfield meet (head-on) - just about an hour before this post has shut down the coast rail route for the time being. Injuries. Tonday's remaining Surfliners, northbound 785, and southbound 798 and 796, can forget it.


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## -Jamie-

I don't know if it's on the net yet, but a Metrolink hit a frieght train in Chattsworth about an hour ago. It's pretty bad (rather horrific acctually). The impact caused the first car to basically peel open like a sardine can. The engine is now inside the car. 2 confirmed dead so far, I'm sure there will be many more. There are at least 5 freight cars that are stacked up perpendicular to the track. The Starlight will probably need to be bustituted for days before this gets cleaned up.


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## WhoozOn1st

As Jamie said in another post, 2 dead so far. 23 injured, 10 critical. It appears the Metrolink locomotive telescoped into the first bi-level passenger car. Local TV stations are all over it.


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## Karch

WhoozOn1st said:


> As Jamie said in another post, 2 dead so far. 23 injured, 10 critical. It appears the Metrolink locomotive telescoped into the first bi-level passenger car. Local TV stations are all over it.


Near Stony Park in Chatsworth,, Commuter train 111 left Union Station around 1530 heading to Moorpark.

This will block the Coast Starlight until they clear. Guessing Bus Bridge.


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## Karch

Karch said:


> WhoozOn1st said:
> 
> 
> 
> As Jamie said in another post, 2 dead so far. 23 injured, 10 critical. It appears the Metrolink locomotive telescoped into the first bi-level passenger car. Local TV stations are all over it.
> 
> 
> 
> Near Stony Park in Chatsworth,, Commuter train 111 left Union Station around 1530 heading to Moorpark.
> 
> This will block the Coast Starlight until they clear. Guessing Bus Bridge.
Click to expand...

Live Feed

http://www.knbc.com/videostream/10954229/detail.html


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## WhoozOn1st

Chatworth is at the west end of the San Fernando Valley. Outbound it's the last Metrolink/Surfliner stop before trains go over (and through - 3 tunnels) the Santa Susanna pass. Thanks for the link, Karch. Now I can watch channel 4 online and another channel on the TV.


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## Karch

WhoozOn1st said:


> Chatworth is at the west end of the San Fernando Valley. Outbound it's the last Metrolink/Surfliner stop before trains go over (and through - 3 tunnels) the Santa Susanna pass. Thanks for the link, Karch. Now I can watch channel 4 online and another channel on the TV.


There is double track just south of Stoney Park Curve. The track goes to single track and enters a series of tunnels just before the curve.

Its unclear if the NB Metrolink hit the SB Freight, or vice versa.

Not sure if the collision occured in the double track or single track section.

Google Map view.

http://maps.google.com/maps?f=q&hl=en&...mp;t=h&z=17


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## WhoozOn1st

In the Google Earth view, the Metrolink train was traveling from the Chatworth station (below bottom of pic) and the double track onto the single track. The curve leads out of the San Fernando Valley and into the Santa Susanna pass. the UP freight was apparently exiting the pass inbound, and about to pass the Chatsworth station. The tunnels are AFTER the curve outbound, and this could be seen in some aerial TV shots.

Though the TV stations are sticking with the official total of 2 dead so far, there are more sheets than that on the ground by the trains.


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## Karch

Karch said:


> WhoozOn1st said:
> 
> 
> 
> Chatworth is at the west end of the San Fernando Valley. Outbound it's the last Metrolink/Surfliner stop before trains go over (and through - 3 tunnels) the Santa Susanna pass. Thanks for the link, Karch. Now I can watch channel 4 online and another channel on the TV.
> 
> 
> 
> There is double track just south of Stoney Park Curve. The track goes to single track and enters a series of tunnels just before the curve.
> 
> Its unclear if the NB Metrolink hit the SB Freight, or vice versa.
> 
> Not sure if the collision occured in the double track or single track section.
> 
> Google Map view.
> 
> http://maps.google.com/maps?f=q&hl=en&...mp;t=h&z=17
Click to expand...

Reviewing aerial footage suggests the accident ended up here.

http://maps.google.com/maps?f=q&hl=en&...mp;t=h&z=19

Single track section, just a bit after the double track.

Looks like the death count will go higher.


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## AlanB

> A Metrolink commuter train believed to be carrying up to 350 people collided with a freight train Friday, killing two people and injuring an unknown number of others.
> Firefighters put out a fire under part of the wreckage and pulled people from a Metrolink car, which was partly torn open and left lying on its side. Several other cars in the Metrolink train remained upright.


From MSNBC.


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## nsaspook

AlanB said:


> A Metrolink commuter train believed to be carrying up to 350 people collided with a freight train Friday, killing two people and injuring an unknown number of others.
> Firefighters put out a fire under part of the wreckage and pulled people from a Metrolink car, which was partly torn open and left lying on its side. Several other cars in the Metrolink train remained upright.
> 
> 
> 
> From MSNBC.
Click to expand...


KTLA has a live feed. http://www.ktla.com/pages/livevideo_channelb


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## WhoozOn1st

Now reports of a second fatal Metrolink accident, about an hour after the one at Chatsworth. This one more typical: Train/car, with driver killed, at Corona (Riverside Line, I think). Can't get metrolink website; undoubtedly overloaded.


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## Joel N. Weber II

Meanwhile, the California high speed rail folks probably still think those Metrolink coaches are ridiculously overbuilt, and probably still want their high speed trainsets to have permission to be built to lesser crashworthiness standards. The Implementation Plan goes into some detail about wanting an exemption to the usual US crashworthiness standards.


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## WhoozOn1st

This Emergency Alert is all that currently shows on the Metrolink website:

http://metrolinktrains.com/emergency/


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## WhoozOn1st

Beginning Saturday I'll post links to local coverage of this calamity at the "L.A. Rail News Updates" topic in the Forum Members Gathering section. TV does a great job on getting pictures, but the commentary, speculation, and general rail ignorance leave much to be desired. Print media have a luxury that live TV coverage doesn't: Time. Deadlines, sure, but newspapers don't have to wing it on the air as the cameras roll. Time to track down facts and gain some perspective, without airing calls from notoriously unreliable witnesses as events unfold.

L.A. Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa is on the wreck scene, and said - unofficially - that the death toll could reach 10-15. If it goes over 11 it will be the worst in Metrolink history. Eleven were killed in a push mode wreck several years ago, and the guy held responsible for it - parked his SUV on the tracks - recently received 11 life terms for first-degree murder.


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## Guest_Spokker_*

Joel N. Weber II said:


> Meanwhile, the California high speed rail folks probably still think those Metrolink coaches are ridiculously overbuilt, and probably still want their high speed trainsets to have permission to be built to lesser crashworthiness standards. The Implementation Plan goes into some detail about wanting an exemption to the usual US crashworthiness standards.


Uh, the high speed trains won't operate with freights so I don't know what you're crowing about here.


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## SUNSETLIMITED01

This is such a tragedy and I don't get how a commuter train wrecks a freight train.


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## WhoozOn1st

Now taking bets on how long it takes Amtrak to issue a service alert regarding this disaster. I'm sure they're pretty preoccupied with Hurricane Ike, and REALLY didn't need this additional headache.


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## RTOlson

What a horrible accident. All of the passengers, train employees and their families are in my thoughts.

While details are obviously forthcoming, the L.A. Daily News is reporting that Metrolink dispatches for that part of the track.



> A Metrolink dispatcher oversees that portion of the tracks and would have control over when the trains switch from one track to another, [Metrolink spokeswoman Denise] Tyrrell said.


I wonder what this means for the upcoming investigation.


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## Guest_Spokker_*

RTOlson said:


> I wonder what this means for the upcoming investigation.


Someone must have run a red.


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## montereyan

Joel N. Weber II said:


> Meanwhile, the California high speed rail folks probably still think those Metrolink coaches are ridiculously overbuilt, and probably still want their high speed trainsets to have permission to be built to lesser crashworthiness standards. The Implementation Plan goes into some detail about wanting an exemption to the usual US crashworthiness standards.


The California High Speed Rail trains will run on dedicated tracks - i.e. no sharing with freights. So there's no need to meet the FRA standards, which exist because of passenger rail sharing tracks with freights.


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## PRR 60

The LA Times is now reporting at least 15 fatalities. I hope and pray I'm wrong, but the total destruction of the first car of the Metrolink train makes me feel that the final toll will be much worse. I honestly don't know how anyone could have survived in that car. Words cannot describe how sickening this accident is.


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## Karch

PRR 60 said:


> The LA Times is now reporting at least 15 fatalities. I hope and pray I'm wrong, but the total destruction of the first car of the Metrolink train makes me feel that the final toll will be much worse. I honestly don't know how anyone could have survived in that car. Words cannot describe how sickening this accident is.


It was reported by an early responder to the scene that the signal tower was red on the Metrolink side. That, and its the Metrolink leaving double track to single track.. ... got any guesses?

I am sure there will be a full investigation to study the equipment, orders, and crew.


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## AlanB

Karch said:


> It was reported by an early responder to the scene that the signal tower was red on the Metrolink side. That, and its the Metrolink leaving double track to single track.. ... got any guesses?


Well seeing as how the Metrolink train had passed the signal, it would be red. The question is, "was it red before the Metrolink train passed it?" And a first responder wouldn't know, since they responded to the accident, not before it.


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## TuTall223

I stopped on my way home. My brother rides that train to Simi Valley & I could not reach him. I finally found out he did not go in to work today. I walked though the tunnel thinking he might be on the train. The last two cars still inside the tunnel with FRED still flashing. The last four frieght cars did not derail. All cars forward of that were derailed in some form. Cars showed signs of buckling, and load shifts balloning sidewalls of rear cars. Both trains were moving at a good rate of speed, and because of the curve the Engineers probaly did not see the other train until seconds before impact. Really bad crash. God Bless the lost souls.


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## Guest_Spokker_*

Amtrak has finally announced what their plans are.



> Pacific Surfliner Service & Coast Starlight Railroad closure due to collision
> September 12, 2008
> 
> 7:00 p.m. PDT
> 
> An incident involving a Metrolink commuter train and a freight train near Chatsworth, California, has resulted in a temporary closure of the railroad route used by Amtrak Pacific Surfliner trains and the Amtrak Coast Starlight, north of Los Angeles.
> 
> Amtrak extends condolences to those involved in the commuter train incident and has offered any available assistance.
> 
> Pacific Surfliner Service and related Thruway Motorcoaches
> 
> There will no service by Amtrak Pacific Surfliners and their connecting Thruway Motorcoach buses on September 13, between San Luis Obispo and Goleta, California, and Los Angeles, pending restoration of the route. No alternate transportation is available.
> 
> Amtrak Pacific Surfliners and their connecting Thruway Motorcoaches will operate normally between Los Angeles and points south to San Diego.
> 
> Coast Starlight, Trains 11 & 14
> 
> The Coast Starlight will originate and terminate in Santa Barbara on September 13, with alternate transportation provided between Santa Barbara and Los Angeles.
> 
> Amtrak regrets any inconvenience. This information is correct as of the above time and date. Information is subject to change as conditions warrant. Passengers are encouraged to call 800-USA-RAIL or visit Amtrak.com for schedule information and train status updates.


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## amtrakwolverine

Guest_Spokker_* said:


> RTOlson said:
> 
> 
> 
> I wonder what this means for the upcoming investigation.
> 
> 
> 
> Someone must have run a red.
Click to expand...

i think the same thing. sense its a head on someone must of ran a signal.


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## rtabern

Hey guys... I got caught up in the mess tonight!

I caught #11 this morning in Emeryville and was supposed to be heading down to Van Nuys to visit my best friend from high school.

We pulled into SLO (already 2 hours late) and they told us we would be sitting there until Amtrak could figure out what to do with the train.

We sat probably 40 minutes or so and they announced they were going thru to Santa Barbara and were terminating the train there.

I guess they did provided buses, but I didnt want to mess with it and just had my friend drive up and meet me in the depot in Santa Barbara.

NOT FUN, but I feel for the people who were hurt and killed and my prayers are with them.

I just hope Ike clears so I can make #422 on 9/17 out of LA-LA-LAND.


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## WhoozOn1st

'Total destruction': At least 17 dead in Metrolink crash

The death toll stands at 17 as this is posted, and is expected to rise further.

More Los Angeles Times:

A sharp left turn, then muffled screams

Probe to examine many possibilities

Deadly Metrolink crash forces Amtrak cancellations today

Families of passengers gather at Chatsworth high to hope

Survivors recount harrowing moment when trains collided

Passengers at Union Station wonder how, when they will get home

Photos

Map

Resources

Ventura County Star:

Commuter disaster

Train transportation stopped; passengers left to consider 'what if"

Man recounts crash

Orange County Register:

SoCal train wreck toll rises to 17, with 135 hurt


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## access bob

AlanB said:


> Karch said:
> 
> 
> 
> It was reported by an early responder to the scene that the signal tower was red on the Metrolink side. That, and its the Metrolink leaving double track to single track.. ... got any guesses?
> 
> 
> 
> Well seeing as how the Metrolink train had passed the signal, it would be red. The question is, "was it red before the Metrolink train passed it?" And a first responder wouldn't know, since they responded to the accident, not before it.
Click to expand...

considering the Metrolink train would be a "timetabled" train and the freight would be an extra, the freight "Should" have been waiting for the Metrolink train. that of course does not mean either train could pass a restrictive signal.

doesn't help the victims our hearts go out to them.

has anyone heard anything about the conditions of the engine crews of either train???

Bob


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## Dutchrailnut

Class of trains went out the window years ago, the Schedule is basicly for passenger use only.

Stopping a freight train for that 4 mile section when it got there earelier than the metro Link would have been stupid, getting it going and passing the 4 mile single track section would have taken over 13 minutes, Keeping the freight moving will take it thru in 6 minutes.

holding the passenger train for less than 6 minutes would have done no harm to passengers or schedule.

note how that passenger train hit after the freight train already passed 3.8 miles of single track


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## MrFSS

WhoozOn1st said:


> AlanB said:
> 
> 
> 
> For ease of everyone to not have to look in two places, please let's keep all posts releated to the crash in the crash topic created in the Amtrak forum.  And yes, I realize that technically it's not an Amtrak issue, but for now it's important enough to warrant a little special treatment.
> 
> 
> 
> Your wish is my request, Alan.
> 
> With Pacific Surfliners and Coast Starlight crippled indefinitely, I think it's very much an Amtrak issue.
Click to expand...

No clue, yet, on how long it might be before that line is open, again?


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## gswager

AlanB said:


> Karch said:
> 
> 
> 
> It was reported by an early responder to the scene that the signal tower was red on the Metrolink side. That, and its the Metrolink leaving double track to single track.. ... got any guesses?
> 
> 
> 
> Well seeing as how the Metrolink train had passed the signal, it would be red. The question is, "was it red before the Metrolink train passed it?" And a first responder wouldn't know, since they responded to the accident, not before it.
Click to expand...

I agree with Alan about the signal. Once the head locomotive (or a head cab car) has passed the sensor on track which is located next to the signal, it automatically turned to red.


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## JackGraham

I'm actually on train 11 right now. We're on a siding outside if Hayward at 1030a. We are still about 90 minutes late I think. Was about an hour forty late getting into Redding where I got on at 4am. Rumor is we'll be bussed from SBA to LAX. I have no idea how I'll get to OSD. HOpe they'll bus me because they last Surfliner is 10:10. A tight connection in good times, no way we'll make it tonight.


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## -Jamie-

Ok, how is it possible that we're hearing trains this morning here in Moorpark? We've heard 3 so far (that we've noticed).

EDIT: Now it seems to be a constant flow. One every 5 minutes or less. The track couldn't be open already, could it? Ok, now I'm really confused. We have the scanner on and someone was just asking dispatch what track Metrolink was supposed to come in on. What the frig? There's no Metrolink service on Saturday even when the lines are running normal!


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## AlanB

-Jamie- said:


> Ok, how is it possible that we're hearing trains this morning here in Moorpark? We've heard 3 so far (that we've noticed).


Perhaps they're bringing in work trains to clear the wreckage once the resuce efforts are done, as well as supplies to rebuild the tracks in this vital section of track. Maybe there are even a few spurs that service freight customers in Moorpark and surrounding areas that they can still reach, since it's before the derailment site.


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## WhoozOn1st

gswager said:


> Once the head locomotive (or a head cab car) has passed the sensor on track which is located next to the signal, it automatically turned to red.


Locomotive in this case, as the train was operating in pull mode, as do all trains departing Union Station.


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## -Jamie-

We're going to go drive down High Street in a minute and see if we can find anything out. I'll update from my phone if I need to.


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## had8ley

access bob said:


> AlanB said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Karch said:
> 
> 
> 
> It was reported by an early responder to the scene that the signal tower was red on the Metrolink side. That, and its the Metrolink leaving double track to single track.. ... got any guesses?
> 
> 
> 
> Well seeing as how the Metrolink train had passed the signal, it would be red. The question is, "was it red before the Metrolink train passed it?" And a first responder wouldn't know, since they responded to the accident, not before it.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> considering the Metrolink train would be a "timetabled" train and the freight would be an extra, the freight "Should" have been waiting for the Metrolink train. that of course does not mean either train could pass a restrictive signal.
> 
> doesn't help the victims our hearts go out to them.
> 
> has anyone heard anything about the conditions of the engine crews of either train???
> 
> Bob
Click to expand...

A timetabled train has no rights in CTC territory~everyone proceeds on signal indication alone. From the BLE site it sounds like Train #111 went about a mile after passing the stop indication. The BLE site also indicated that the two crew members and the Metrolink engineer (running engine first) perished. May they rest in peace.


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## AlanB

had8ley said:


> The BLE site also indicated that the two crew members and the Metrolink engineer (running engine first) perished. May they rest in peace.


Two crew members? Are you referring to the conductors? Or are your referring to the engineer/conductor on the UP train? And by the way, there are reports that indicate that the UP train had 4 people on it and at least so far no public statements about their whereabouts.


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## had8ley

AlanB said:


> had8ley said:
> 
> 
> 
> The BLE site also indicated that the two crew members and the Metrolink engineer (running engine first) perished. May they rest in peace.
> 
> 
> 
> Two crew members? Are you referring to the conductors? Or are your referring to the engineer/conductor on the UP train? And by the way, there are reports that indicate that the UP train had 4 people on it and at least so far no public statements about their whereabouts.
Click to expand...

The report said both people (engineer, conductor) on the UP train perished. There was no mention of additional people on the freight train.


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## -Jamie-

There are no Metrolink trains parked in the storage lot (usually there are 4) but there are a lot of freight cars parked in there. Also, the parking lot at the station is still mostly full. Just a sad reminder of all the people who didn't make it home last night.


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## Alice

From the LA Times:

http://link.latimes.com/r/8PYSZD/XGZGY/4MC...1Z8L/2PA4J/B7/t

"Metrolink officials say train engineer ignored signal telling him to stop. Death

toll stands at 18, but officials expect count to rise. There are more than 135 injured

passengers."


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## AlanB

Alice said:


> "Metrolink officials say train engineer ignored signal telling him to stop. Deathtoll stands at 18, but officials expect count to rise. There are more than 135 injured
> 
> passengers."


Sad to have it confirmed, but not exactly unexpected either. 

Yet one more argument for PTC!


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## -Jamie-

AlanB said:


> -Jamie- said:
> 
> 
> 
> Ok, how is it possible that we're hearing trains this morning here in Moorpark? We've heard 3 so far (that we've noticed).
> 
> 
> 
> Perhaps they're bringing in work trains to clear the wreckage once the resuce efforts are done, as well as supplies to rebuild the tracks in this vital section of track. Maybe there are even a few spurs that service freight customers in Moorpark and surrounding areas that they can still reach, since it's before the derailment site.
Click to expand...

I think you were right. It was probably a mix of supply trains going in and moving out the undamaged freight cars to the yard here in MPK. Just was looking at the live feed on KNBC and it looks like they have that whole corner of track ripped out with new prebuilt sections ready to be installed. I could see there was at least 1 UP engine still there as well as the last 2 passenger cars. There was 1 UP engine parked in the yard here with all the freight cars. Not sure if it was involved or just used to move the cars.


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## wayman

had8ley said:


> AlanB said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> had8ley said:
> 
> 
> 
> The BLE site also indicated that the two crew members and the Metrolink engineer (running engine first) perished. May they rest in peace.
> 
> 
> 
> Two crew members? Are you referring to the conductors? Or are your referring to the engineer/conductor on the UP train? And by the way, there are reports that indicate that the UP train had 4 people on it and at least so far no public statements about their whereabouts.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> The report said both people (engineer, conductor) on the UP train perished. There was no mention of additional people on the freight train.
Click to expand...

"Officials said there were 222 people on the Metrolink train and three Union Pacific employees aboard the freight train." (AP update)


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## -Jamie-

Death toll now up to 23 and they have yet to get to the lower level of the car. Quite possible that the number will double. Metrolink service to resume on Monday between LAUS and Chattsworth with a bustitution from Chattsworth to Moorpark.


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## RTOlson

The revelation that the Metrolink engineer apparently ignored the signal is tragic. Still, I hope the investigation is through and considers all other factors (e.g., equipment malfunction) that may have contributed to the accident. I have no immediate reason to disbelief what Metrolink is telling us, but the engineer is apparently dead and thus unable to defend allegations against him.

I just want to make sure there are answers for what happened Friday and that agencies take whatever reasonable steps needed to prevent this disaster from happening again.

This incident also has me wondering about the FRA standards for passenger cars. I know their reputation as being tough compared to other nations, but did the standards work as they were supposed to? Hearing about the locomotive being pushed into the first passenger car during a collision at the equivalent of 80 mph makes me curious. Perhaps there are mitigating factors or the simple fact that all the energy from these two monster vehicles had to go somewhere.


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## Neil_M

RTOlson said:


> This incident also has me wondering about the FRA standards for passenger cars. I know their reputation as being tough compared to other nations, but did the standards work as they were supposed to? Hearing about the locomotive being pushed into the first passenger car during a collision at the equivalent of 80 mph makes me curious. Perhaps there are mitigating factors or the simple fact that all the energy from these two monster vehicles had to go somewhere.


You can have all the collision standards you want. The best way to make it work is not collide 2 trains head on.


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## Guest

A couple of brief quotes from CNN...



> The NTSB will make a final determination of the crash's cause. Higgins, the agency's spokeswoman, said data recorders have been recovered from both trains, along with a video recorder from the freight train.
> Higgins said that out of the trains' five crew members, four survived. Authorities will interview the surviving crew members, Higgins said.
> 
> Tyrrell said a review of "a number of programs," including the signal system, showed the commuter train's engineer failed to heed a stop signal, Tyrrell said.





> Tyrrell said the engineer, whom she didn't identify, was a subcontractor employed by another company.


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## wayman

Guest said:


> A couple of brief quotes from CNN...
> 
> 
> 
> Tyrrell said a review of "a number of programs," including the signal system, showed the commuter train's engineer failed to heed a stop signal, Tyrrell said.
Click to expand...

Basic railroad question. As I understand it, the Metrolink was proceeding from a double-track section onto a single-track section; the freight was in the single-track section proceeding towards the double-track section. Obviously, in the double-track section the freight would be proceeding onto track A while the Metrolink waits on track B. So the switch should be set so the single-track section connects to track A, not track B. When the Metrolink runs the signal from track B proceeding onto the single-track section--presumably at speed--shouldn't it have derailed on the switch? (Of course, maybe it did; such details won't be reconstructed until later.)


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## WhoozOn1st

Channel 2 News in L.A. just aired a report about two teenage "train enthusiasts" in Moorpark who knew the Metrolink engineer (perished), and one said he was texting with the engineer moments before the collision. Distraction?

I checked the station's website, but apparently the aired report has not been posted online yet. I'll look again later, but here's the link:

CBS 2

EDIT: If the report is accurate, and what the kid said is true, I'm guessing the NTSB will want to talk with those boys.


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## amtrakwolverine

WhoozOn1st said:


> Channel 2 News in L.A. just aired a report about two teenage "train enthusiasts" in Moorpark who knew the Metrolink engineer (perished), and one said he was texting with the engineer moments before the collision. Distraction?
> I checked the station's website, but apparently the aired report has not been posted online yet. I'll look again later, but here's the link:
> 
> CBS 2
> 
> EDIT: If the report is accurate, and what the kid said is true, I'm guessing the NTSB will want to talk with those boys.


if its true then both the metrolink driver and the boys are at fault. the driver should not have been texting while driving. same thing if it was a car. the boys could be be charged with causing the wreck and be charged with negligent homicide.


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## had8ley

wayman said:


> Guest said:
> 
> 
> 
> A couple of brief quotes from CNN...
> 
> 
> 
> Tyrrell said a review of "a number of programs," including the signal system, showed the commuter train's engineer failed to heed a stop signal, Tyrrell said.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> Basic railroad question. As I understand it, the Metrolink was proceeding from a double-track section onto a single-track section; the freight was in the single-track section proceeding towards the double-track section. Obviously, in the double-track section the freight would be proceeding onto track A while the Metrolink waits on track B. So the switch should be set so the single-track section connects to track A, not track B. When the Metrolink runs the signal from track B proceeding onto the single-track section--presumably at speed--shouldn't it have derailed on the switch? (Of course, maybe it did; such details won't be reconstructed until later.)
Click to expand...

When you run through a power switch, or even a dogged or rigid switch, the rail bends enough to allow a trailing (forward) movement. Where the problem lies is when you try to make a reverse movement after having run through the switch because you have created a gap in the switch points allowing the cars to head in different directions and start derailing.


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## Dutchrailnut

http://www.ktla.com/pages/content_landing_...amp;feedID=1198

Apparently, phone records also confirm according to an LA radio station.


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## WhoozOn1st

Here's the Channel 2 story, now posted:

Engineer sent text message before crash

It contains a picture of the text message sent by Metrolink engineer Rob Sanchez.


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## Joel N. Weber II

Was the Metrolink conductor supposed to be verifying that the engineer was obeying the signals?

Also, if there had been NEC style cab signals installed along the right of way and in the locomotives of both trains, would this have caused the freight to slow down at some point when the Metrolink train proceeded too far if some sort of automatic train stop hadn't stopped the passenger train?


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## Joel N. Weber II

Neil_M said:


> You can have all the collision standards you want. The best way to make it work is not collide 2 trains head on.


Sure. But it's also foolishly arrogant to assume that you will ever build a system that's 100.0000000% reliable at preventing collisions.


----------



## AlanB

Joel N. Weber II said:


> Was the Metrolink conductor supposed to be verifying that the engineer was obeying the signals?
> Also, if there had been NEC style cab signals installed along the right of way and in the locomotives of both trains, would this have caused the freight to slow down at some point when the Metrolink train proceeded too far if some sort of automatic train stop hadn't stopped the passenger train?


Unless Metrolink has different rules on their track, west of the Mississippi the engineer doesn't call out signals to the conductor by radio. Of course even if Metrolink does require that, or had this happened east of the Mississippi, the engineer most likely would have called out the wrong signal aspect and therefore the conductor wouldn't have assumed that anything was wrong.

The real questions that remain are, was the signal not operating properly, was the sun in the engineer's eyes preventing him from properly seeing it, was he otherwise distracted (ie. texting), or did he just somehow missread the signal?

As for the second part of your question, had this been the NEC, both trains would have been halted by the PTC aspects of the NEC cab signals long before any collision.


----------



## WhoozOn1st

AlanB said:


> was the sun in the engineer's eyes preventing him from properly seeing [the signal]


Doubtful. First, sun still pretty high in the sky here around time of collision. Second, even if low enough to be at an angle to interfere with vision it would already be blocked by the mountains into which the train was heading.

Not impossible, but pretty unlikely.


----------



## Guest_Spokker_*

Apparently texting his young teenage rail buddies was more important than preparing to navigate his heavy locomotive through a winding tunnel.

What a wild and crazy guy!


----------



## Joel N. Weber II

AlanB said:


> As for the second part of your question, had this been the NEC, both trains would have been halted by the PTC aspects of the NEC cab signals long before any collision.


Didn't the second worst Amtrak accident ever involve a freight locomotive on the NEC that had the cab signal equipment installed, but with the cab signal equipment in the freight locomotive somewhat broken and disabled?


----------



## AlanB

Joel N. Weber II said:


> AlanB said:
> 
> 
> 
> As for the second part of your question, had this been the NEC, both trains would have been halted by the PTC aspects of the NEC cab signals long before any collision.
> 
> 
> 
> Didn't the second worst Amtrak accident ever involve a freight locomotive on the NEC that had the cab signal equipment installed, but with the cab signal equipment in the freight locomotive somewhat broken and disabled?
Click to expand...

Yes, that is correct IIRC. However cab signals should not be confused with PTC. They do work to together, but they aren't the same thing. Cab signals simply show the engineer the aspect of the last signal that they passed. PTC looks at that cab signal and in conjunction with a computer, software, and other trackside equipment, decides whether or not the engineer is obeying the cab signal. If it decides that the engineer is not obeying that signal, then it triggers an emergency stop.

AFAIK the PTC overlay was not yet in place at the time of that accident. PTC was instituted because of that accident.


----------



## Joel N. Weber II

AlanB said:


> Cab signals simply show the engineer the aspect of the last signal that they passed.


I don't think that's exactly correct. The track circuits on the NEC can show a signal indication change as soon as the signal changes; updates do not have to wait for the train to reach the next signal mast. IIRC, this is very clearly explained in the paper that jis mentioned and I found a link to about the ACESS overlay.

If the cab signal was showing the current aspect of the signal most recently passed, it would almost always be indicating that the block is occupied (by the train which is recieving the signal via the track circuit) and signal for an immediate stop, so it can't be that.


----------



## WhoozOn1st

AlanB said:


> Unless Metrolink has different rules on their track, west of the Mississippi the engineer doesn't call out signals to the conductor by radio. Of course even if Metrolink does require that, or had this happened east of the Mississippi, the engineer most likely would have called out the wrong signal aspect and therefore the conductor wouldn't have assumed that anything was wrong.


Apparently Metrolink engineers do call signals to conductors. Here's a post on the L.A. Times' "Bottleneck Blog." It's by Steve Hymon, the guy who writes the "Road Sage" columns to which I often link at the "L.A. Rail News Updates" topic.

Metrolink crash: How trains navigate the tracks


----------



## Joel N. Weber II

I apparently meant ACSES, and this thread has some of the details I was thinking of.


----------



## amtrakwolverine

Joel N. Weber II said:


> AlanB said:
> 
> 
> 
> Cab signals simply show the engineer the aspect of the last signal that they passed.
> 
> 
> 
> I don't think that's exactly correct. The track circuits on the NEC can show a signal indication change as soon as the signal changes; updates do not have to wait for the train to reach the next signal mast. IIRC, this is very clearly explained in the paper that jis mentioned and I found a link to about the ACESS overlay.
> 
> If the cab signal was showing the current aspect of the signal most recently passed, it would almost always be indicating that the block is occupied (by the train which is recieving the signal via the track circuit) and signal for an immediate stop, so it can't be that.
Click to expand...

cab signals show what the upcoming signal is before the train gets to it.


----------



## Joel N. Weber II

WhoozOn1st said:


> Metrolink crash: How trains navigate the tracks


And the first comment there is about radio interoperability. While I understand that is a real issue for police / fire radios in most parts of the country, I thought there was a standardized set of railroad frequencies, and that the freight train would have had a radio that could operate on whatever frequency Metrolink's dispatching uses for that area.


----------



## AlanB

Joel N. Weber II said:


> WhoozOn1st said:
> 
> 
> 
> Metrolink crash: How trains navigate the tracks
> 
> 
> 
> And the first comment there is about radio interoperability. While I understand that is a real issue for police / fire radios in most parts of the country, I thought there was a standardized set of railroad frequencies, and that the freight train would have had a radio that could operate on whatever frequency Metrolink's dispatching uses for that area.
Click to expand...

That commentor has no idea what he's talking about. The freight train by FRA rules must be able to talk with the Metrolink dispatcher on the Metrolink frequency. If he can't, then he can't operate the train on those tracks.

And yes, there are 96 AAR defined frequencies typically used by Amtrak, freight RR's, and many commuter RR's.


----------



## AlanB

AlanB said:


> Joel N. Weber II said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> WhoozOn1st said:
> 
> 
> 
> Metrolink crash: How trains navigate the tracks
> 
> 
> 
> And the first comment there is about radio interoperability. While I understand that is a real issue for police / fire radios in most parts of the country, I thought there was a standardized set of railroad frequencies, and that the freight train would have had a radio that could operate on whatever frequency Metrolink's dispatching uses for that area.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> That commentor has no idea what he's talking about. The freight train by FRA rules must be able to talk with the Metrolink dispatcher on the Metrolink frequency. If he can't, then he can't operate the train on those tracks.
> 
> And yes, there are 96 AAR defined frequencies typically used by Amtrak, freight RR's, and many commuter RR's.
Click to expand...

Whoops, I read that too fast. He's talking about the UP dispatcher being able to talk with the Metrolink dispatcher. That's a totally different thing. He's probably correct, they wouldn't be able to talk to one another by radio, and frankly they wouldn't want to either. It would be far easier for them to just pick up a phone and call one another.

The UP engineer however had to be able to communicate on the Metrolink frequency. And therefore the Metrolink dispatcher could have called the freight train on the radio to order it to stop immediately assuming that the dispatcher realized that the Metrolink train had run the signal.


----------



## WhoozOn1st

Just Googled "Metrolink wreck," and this topic came up third on the list. Problem is, the link actually goes here:

Empire Builder-Sleepers sold out

What gives with Google??

EDIT: One digit difference between URLs.

http://discuss.amtraktrains.com/index.php?showtopic=24352 (this topic)

http://discuss.amtraktrains.com/index.php?showtopic=24342 (Empire Builder sleepers)

Submitted a form to Google.


----------



## AlanB

WhoozOn1st said:


> Just Googled "Metrolink wreck," and this topic came up third on the list. Problem is, the link actually goes here:
> Empire Builder-Sleepers sold out
> 
> What gives with Google??


Well I can't speak as to why Google presented you with that link, when you asked for a search on the tragedy. But Google spends several hours each day indexing this site. As a general rule, the Google bots make an average of 10,000 hits on this site each day.


----------



## jis

KISS_ALIVE said:


> cab signals show what the upcoming signal is before the train gets to it.


The cab signaling system on the NEC actually shows what the state of the signal just passed would be had you not passed it yet. The aspect that is displayed is transmitted from the signal that you are approaching but reflecting what the corresponding aspect would be of the signal that you just passed - i.e. the governing aspect for the block that you are in.

Unless this were the case, as soon as you enter a block at the end of which is a stop signal the ATC would try to stop your train dead on the track way before you got to the signal.

The signal aspect is continuously transmitted so even if the signal aspect changes while you are in the middle of the block that will be reflected in the cab, and the corresponding speed enforced as soon as the change occurs (subject to the usual warning etc.).

For a very good explanation of the entire system on the NEC (current and planned evolution), the original PRR system, the 9 aspect overlay and the ACSES overlay on top of that including ACSES I (using track mounted transponders) and ACSES II (which adds the use of transmission based control), take a look at _Full PTC Today with Off the Shelf Technology: Amtrak’s ACSES Overlay on Expanded ATC" by Hoelscher and Light_.


----------



## WhoozOn1st

AlanB said:


> WhoozOn1st said:
> 
> 
> 
> Just Googled "Metrolink wreck," and this topic came up third on the list. Problem is, the link actually goes here:
> Empire Builder-Sleepers sold out
> 
> What gives with Google??
> 
> 
> 
> Well I can't speak as to why Google presented you with that link, when you asked for a search on the tragedy. But Google spends several hours each day indexing this site. As a general rule, the Google bots make an average of 10,000 hits on this site each day.
Click to expand...

See above edit, Alan. Bots not so swift?

EDIT (again): Google has right topic, wrong link for it. Try it: Google search result page


----------



## sechs

montereyan said:


> Joel N. Weber II said:
> 
> 
> 
> Meanwhile, the California high speed rail folks probably still think those Metrolink coaches are ridiculously overbuilt, and probably still want their high speed trainsets to have permission to be built to lesser crashworthiness standards. The Implementation Plan goes into some detail about wanting an exemption to the usual US crashworthiness standards.
> 
> 
> 
> The California High Speed Rail trains will run on dedicated tracks - i.e. no sharing with freights. So there's no need to meet the FRA standards, which exist because of passenger rail sharing tracks with freights.
Click to expand...

That's not true.

For example, it is currently planned for high-speed rail to share Caltrain's tracks into San Francisco. Caltrain is required to accommodate Union Pacific's customers on the Peninsula line. This sometimes means that, not only is there a freight on the tracks, but also that it sometimes runs during the day.

I once has the unusual experience of passing a short UP train (two engines, a tank car, and a gondola, as I recall) going the same direction as my train, having them pass us at a station stop, and then passing them again -- during my commute home. I waived at the engineer and conductor on the second go.


----------



## Joel N. Weber II

It would also be clever if the next generation corridor equipment planning that is in the bill that, IIRC, Congress has almost managed to pass, would take into consideration equipment that would operate at 250 MPH that can operate anywhere in the country that has catenary. But maybe I'm actually thinking of the generation after the next generation.

Regardless of whether California needs to mix freight or not, somewhere in the country, being able to run a high speed capable train on track shared with freight will be useful. In the greater Boston area, for example, if the North South Rail Link gets built so that an underground Central Station or North Station provides a connection to the Green Line in addition to the Orange Line, Amtrak might want to bypass Back Bay, in which case bringing the Fairmount Line back to four tracks (which it apparently once had) might be a good idea; two tracks could be used to make the various commuter stops, and two tracks could be used for trains that don't stop along the Fairmount Line, both freight and Amtrak (it's going to be very hard to find any other good way to get rail freight from Conley Terminal where the container ships get unloaded to the rest of the rail system, and keeping the freight off the platform tracks will make high level platforms possible without having to worry about the width of the freight cars).

I'm not sure how this is going to work nationally with platform height compatibility, since while I was trying to find the ACSES paper I stumbled across something saying that trains that operate faster than 125 MPH are not allowed to have internal stairs for low level platforms, and presumably California is not planning for northeast platform height (and really, northeast platform height is dumb for bi-level long distance trains).


----------



## GG-1

Aloha

When I first heard about this my first concern was about family and friends, then I wondered how could there be sufficient impact to drive the metrolink engine telescoping into the car. After seeing the pictures I now understand that something caused the Metrolink engine to go "on the ground" and the UP engine ripped open the car.

I feel sad that, again, the investigators are being second guessed, please lets just pray for the people and await the full investigation.

Mahalo

Eric


----------



## Guest_TransAtlantic_*

sechs said:


> montereyan said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Joel N. Weber II said:
> 
> 
> 
> Meanwhile, the California high speed rail folks probably still think those Metrolink coaches are ridiculously overbuilt, and probably still want their high speed trainsets to have permission to be built to lesser crashworthiness standards. The Implementation Plan goes into some detail about wanting an exemption to the usual US crashworthiness standards.
> 
> 
> 
> The California High Speed Rail trains will run on dedicated tracks - i.e. no sharing with freights. So there's no need to meet the FRA standards, which exist because of passenger rail sharing tracks with freights.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> That's not true.
> 
> For example, it is currently planned for high-speed rail to share Caltrain's tracks into San Francisco. Caltrain is required to accommodate Union Pacific's customers on the Peninsula line. This sometimes means that, not only is there a freight on the tracks, but also that it sometimes runs during the day.
> 
> I once has the unusual experience of passing a short UP train (two engines, a tank car, and a gondola, as I recall) going the same direction as my train, having them pass us at a station stop, and then passing them again -- during my commute home. I waived at the engineer and conductor on the second go.
Click to expand...

The line up the peninsula will not be high-speed - it will be a high-speed trainset using a shared right-of-way, just as they do beyond the limits of the high-speed portions of the lines in France...


----------



## tp49

KISS_ALIVE said:


> WhoozOn1st said:
> 
> 
> 
> Channel 2 News in L.A. just aired a report about two teenage "train enthusiasts" in Moorpark who knew the Metrolink engineer (perished), and one said he was texting with the engineer moments before the collision. Distraction?
> I checked the station's website, but apparently the aired report has not been posted online yet. I'll look again later, but here's the link:
> 
> CBS 2
> 
> EDIT: If the report is accurate, and what the kid said is true, I'm guessing the NTSB will want to talk with those boys.
> 
> 
> 
> if its true then both the metrolink driver and the boys are at fault. the driver should not have been texting while driving. same thing if it was a car. the boys could be be charged with causing the wreck and be charged with negligent homicide.
Click to expand...

I'd hardly think the boys would be found at fault. There is a serious lack of an unlawful act on thier part requisite to even remotely find them culpable and I don't think they would even face any civil liability for "causing the wreck.". However, it does to me show fault on the part of the Metrolink engineer. However, since Metrolink basically admitted liability this point is moot.

Also, it is not illegal in California to send text messages while driving (though it should be and the bill passed the legislature and is waiting for the Governor's signature).


----------



## Tony

AlanB said:


> Of course even if Metrolink does require that, or had this happened east of the Mississippi, the engineer most likely would have called out the wrong signal aspect and therefore the conductor wouldn't have assumed that anything was wrong.


If the Metrolink engineer didn't see the signal (because he was distracted texting?), he would not have called out anything, right?


----------



## Tony

tp49 said:


> I'd hardly think the boys would be found at fault. There is a serious lack of an unlawful act on thier part requisite to even remotely find them culpable and I don't think they would even face any civil liability for "causing the wreck.". However, it does to me show fault on the part of the Metrolink engineer. However, since Metrolink basically admitted liability this point is moot.


I am not as sure. The boys themselves have admitted, and willing provided the evidence, that they knew they were intentionally distracting (by texting with) an engineer who was in control of a moving train.

Is there really that much difference between some boys throwing something physical in front of a moving train and thus causing its accident, or some boys throwing something electronic?

If the some boys shined something like a search light, intentionally, into the eyes of a moving train's engineer, causing him to be temporarily blinded, would those boys be responsible?

That doesn't forgive, or lessen, the Metrolink engineer's own responsibility. It just raises some interesting questions about the "train enthusiast" boys.


----------



## AlanB

Tony said:


> tp49 said:
> 
> 
> 
> I'd hardly think the boys would be found at fault. There is a serious lack of an unlawful act on thier part requisite to even remotely find them culpable and I don't think they would even face any civil liability for "causing the wreck.". However, it does to me show fault on the part of the Metrolink engineer. However, since Metrolink basically admitted liability this point is moot.
> 
> 
> 
> I am not as sure. The boys themselves have admitted, and willing provided the evidence, that they knew they were intentionally distracting (by texting with) an engineer who was in control of a moving train.
> 
> Is there really that much difference between some boys throwing something physical in front of a moving train and thus causing its accident, or some boys throwing something electronic?
> 
> If the some boys shined something like a search light, intentionally, into the eyes of a moving train's engineer, causing him to be temporarily blinded, would those boys be responsible?
> 
> That doesn't forgive, or lessen, the Metrolink engineer's own responsibility. It just raises some interesting questions about the "train enthusiast" boys.
Click to expand...

I'm pretty sure that TP49 is correct, especially since I know what he does for a living.

But here's the big difference between the things that you mentioned and what the boys did, time and avoidability. The engineer can't avoid a thrown rock or a search light or anything else like that. A text message doesn't go away with time. It's like an email; it stays there until you decide to read it. The engineer had a choice; he could have avoided reading that message until he was stopped at a station or off duty. He had the luxury of time.

He choose not to avail himself of that luxury. Additionally, and at least according to the preliminary and not fully confirmed info, the engineer wasn't reading the text message at the time he passed the red signal, he was sending his own reply. That takes the onus off of the boys totally. The boys weren’t holding a gun to his head and saying “you had better reply right now or I’m going to shoot you.”

If all of this is true, the engineer made a horribly bad choice. But it was his choice, he wasn’t forced to do it and he could have avoided replying, and even reading. He’s now paid the ultimate price for that choice.


----------



## AlanB

Tony said:


> AlanB said:
> 
> 
> 
> Of course even if Metrolink does require that, or had this happened east of the Mississippi, the engineer most likely would have called out the wrong signal aspect and therefore the conductor wouldn't have assumed that anything was wrong.
> 
> 
> 
> If the Metrolink engineer didn't see the signal (because he was distracted texting?), he would not have called out anything, right?
Click to expand...

Again with the realization that we are at present doing nothing more than speculating, it's hard to say what the engineer did. They will know however what he did from the recorder and the conductor's testimony.

I personally see two possibilities; the first one however is less likely. 1) The engineer didn't see the signal and didn't call it out. In that case however, the conductor assuming that he wasn't somehow distracted, should have immediately realized that something was wrong and contacted the engineer. Failing to establish contact or not getting a good answer, the conductor should have pulled the emergency cord to stop the train until he could figure out what was wrong.

2) The engineer did see the signal, but misread it and called out the wrong aspect. That would allay any fears or intervention by the conductor.


----------



## jackal

Wow. Sad. Scary, too, since this is the line I ride most frequently when I visit California (my grandparents live in Simi). Got the note this morning (morning Singapore time, anyway--we're 16 hours ahead of PDT!) from my grandmother by email and have just now sat down to do a little more investigation (I figured there'd be good discussion on AU...).



AlanB said:


> Tony said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> AlanB said:
> 
> 
> 
> Of course even if Metrolink does require that, or had this happened east of the Mississippi, the engineer most likely would have called out the wrong signal aspect and therefore the conductor wouldn't have assumed that anything was wrong.
> 
> 
> 
> If the Metrolink engineer didn't see the signal (because he was distracted texting?), he would not have called out anything, right?
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> Again with the realization that we are at present doing nothing more than speculating, it's hard to say what the engineer did. They will know however what he did from the recorder and the conductor's testimony.
> 
> I personally see two possibilities; the first one however is less likely. 1) The engineer didn't see the signal and didn't call it out. In that case however, the conductor assuming that he wasn't somehow distracted, should have immediately realized that something was wrong and contacted the engineer. Failing to establish contact or not getting a good answer, the conductor should have pulled the emergency cord to stop the train until he could figure out what was wrong.
> 
> 2) The engineer did see the signal, but misread it and called out the wrong aspect. That would allay any fears or intervention by the conductor.
Click to expand...

My completely uneducated guess is that it was #1. Railroad crews do get very familiar with their territories, but if the conductor was talking to a passenger or otherwise occupied, I doubt he would have realized that the engineer missed a signal. I doubt he misread the signal--it's pretty easy to tell clear (green) from anything else, and if it was anything else, then he would more than likely have known to pay more attention to what he was doing. I wonder if dispatch got any signal call-outs on tape--if he called out clear, the thought occurs to me that he may have realized that he missed the signal but called "clear" out anyway as a sort of "cover up" for missing the signal, banking on the fact that it was actually clear (a bet he lost). We won't know until the results of the tapes are released (or if someone finds it on railroadradio.net--not likely, as the only main SoCal receiver is in the Inland Empire).

If he did simply miss the signal, how far after the last control point or other signal (absolute or intermediate) did this happen? I get the impression that it happened pretty quickly. I suppose if I were home, I could grab out my Altamont timetable, figure out the milepost of that last tunnel and then trace back to the milepost of the previous signal...but my timetable is about 14,623 air miles behind me...(though only 6,665 as the crow flies!) 

Still, when the engineer and conductor felt the train cross a switch without an appropriate signal indication called out, someone should have reacted (although, of course, trains cross lots of unsignaled switches to random sidings and spurs all the time, so again, it may not have really been noticed--unless, of course, something did happen and the locomotive did derail!).

In any case, I strongly agree that it's high time for PTC. The newer implementations are vastly cheaper than CTC, and there is no reason it could not be effectively implemented nationwide on all types of track. And there's no excuse for not installing it on lines used by passenger trains--_especially_ in high-traffic regions with commuter trains (like SoCal).

As an aside, until PTC gets implemented, an appropriate solution would be to return a fireman/assistant engineer to the cab of the train. There really does need to be two sets of eyes looking out the front of the train (either two sets of human eyes or one set of human eyes plus a set of computerized PTC eyes). Frankly, I hope the STB/NTSC/FRA (or whoever deals with this type of thing) recommends or makes a rule to this effect. (Amtrak does it; why shouldn't Metrolink?)

One more question: I assume it is a good thing that this train was in pull mode. Had the train been in push mode, what do you think would have happened? I assume the death toll would have been _much_ higher.



Guest_TransAtlantic_* said:


> sechs said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> montereyan said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Joel N. Weber II said:
> 
> 
> 
> Meanwhile, the California high speed rail folks probably still think those Metrolink coaches are ridiculously overbuilt, and probably still want their high speed trainsets to have permission to be built to lesser crashworthiness standards. The Implementation Plan goes into some detail about wanting an exemption to the usual US crashworthiness standards.
> 
> 
> 
> The California High Speed Rail trains will run on dedicated tracks - i.e. no sharing with freights. So there's no need to meet the FRA standards, which exist because of passenger rail sharing tracks with freights.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> That's not true.
> 
> For example, it is currently planned for high-speed rail to share Caltrain's tracks into San Francisco. Caltrain is required to accommodate Union Pacific's customers on the Peninsula line. This sometimes means that, not only is there a freight on the tracks, but also that it sometimes runs during the day.
> 
> I once has the unusual experience of passing a short UP train (two engines, a tank car, and a gondola, as I recall) going the same direction as my train, having them pass us at a station stop, and then passing them again -- during my commute home. I waived at the engineer and conductor on the second go.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> The line up the peninsula will not be high-speed - it will be a high-speed trainset using a shared right-of-way, just as they do beyond the limits of the high-speed portions of the lines in France...
Click to expand...

Are you sure of this? If it's restricted to non-ATS CTC speeds (79mph), that would add an extra hour to the trip between L.A. and SFO. Maybe they're planning on adding some sort of PTC on that stretch, which would allow it to hit some higher speeds (90? 110? 125? 150?).


----------



## WhoozOn1st

Los Angeles Times:

Metrolink blames engineer

Technology exists to keep trains apart

Ventura County Star:

Metrolink takes full blame

As is often the case, the online headlines differ from the print headlines that I use for the links.


----------



## Tony

AlanB said:


> If all of this is true, the engineer made a horribly bad choice. But it was his choice, he wasn’t forced to do it and he could have avoided replying, and even reading. He’s now paid the ultimate price for that choice.


While I agree, it does take two to carry on an active conversation using instant messaging. I still believe that both sides of the conversation share the consequences of doing just that. It is clear that the "boys" knew they were carrying on an active conversation with an engineer of a moving train. It is unclear if the term being used in the news reports of "boys" means a minor, but that might be irrelevant because a minor can't themselves subscribe to cell phone service.


----------



## Dutchrailnut

Bottom line is those boys are not required, to know that its against railroad rules, to use electronic devices other than those supplied by railroad.

Mr sanchez however should know and is/was 100% responcible.

He earned himself the reputation of having killed more passengers than Ricky Gates, only difference Ricky Gates is alive and served a prison term.

violating rules is not much difference if you violate rule G (alcohol or substance) or using a device not allowed.


----------



## Guest_sweet tea_*

Tony said:


> AlanB said:
> 
> 
> 
> If all of this is true, the engineer made a horribly bad choice. But it was his choice, he wasn’t forced to do it and he could have avoided replying, and even reading. He’s now paid the ultimate price for that choice.
> 
> 
> 
> While I agree, it does take two to carry on an active conversation using instant messaging. I still believe that both sides of the conversation share the consequences of doing just that. It is clear that the "boys" knew they were carrying on an active conversation with an engineer of a moving train. It is unclear if the term being used in the news reports of "boys" means a minor, but that might be irrelevant because a minor can't themselves subscribe to cell phone service.
Click to expand...

texting≠instant messaging, and it does not carry the expectation of an immediate response.

if you place a call to your surgeon buddy to invite him to dinner and he answers the phone despite the fact that he's got a patient open in front of him, would you think it was your fault for calling him or his for answering?

texting is even less blame-worthy than a regular phone call could have been, since the whole point is that you can read the message when you have a minute, rather than having to chose between answering the call or letting it go to voice mail. if someone wants to tell me something during a time i can't answer the phone, i prefer them to text me, so i don't have to worry that it's an emergency.

if the engineer really was responding to them, then yes, that's grade-A poor judgment.

-- someone who texts, calls, IMs, etc. regularly.


----------



## Dan O

Dutchrailnut said:


> He earned himself the reputation of having killed more passengers than Ricky Gates, only difference Ricky Gates is alive and served a prison term.violating rules is not much difference if you violate rule G (alcohol or substance) or using a device not allowed.


I think there is a distinction between using illegal drugs and having impaired judgment versus texting. One ie illegal all the time. The other may be against the rules to do while driving or being an engineer on a train. The engineer appears to have used poor judgment and it cost his live and many others. It was an accident and these types of accidents (doing something that distracts oneself) happen frequently while driving cars, etc. I'd hazard to guess most people have done similar (cell phone/adjust radio/adjust air conditioning/reprimand kids/etc) and the great majority of the time had no adverse results.

Dan


----------



## -Jamie-

Tony said:


> AlanB said:
> 
> 
> 
> If all of this is true, the engineer made a horribly bad choice. But it was his choice, he wasn’t forced to do it and he could have avoided replying, and even reading. He’s now paid the ultimate price for that choice.
> 
> 
> 
> While I agree, it does take two to carry on an active conversation using instant messaging. I still believe that both sides of the conversation share the consequences of doing just that. It is clear that the "boys" knew they were carrying on an active conversation with an engineer of a moving train. It is unclear if the term being used in the news reports of "boys" means a minor, but that might be irrelevant because a minor can't themselves subscribe to cell phone service.
Click to expand...

They're being referred to as "boys" because they're all around 15.


----------



## tp49

Tony said:


> AlanB said:
> 
> 
> 
> If all of this is true, the engineer made a horribly bad choice. But it was his choice, he wasn’t forced to do it and he could have avoided replying, and even reading. He’s now paid the ultimate price for that choice.
> 
> 
> 
> While I agree, it does take two to carry on an active conversation using instant messaging. I still believe that both sides of the conversation share the consequences of doing just that. It is clear that the "boys" knew they were carrying on an active conversation with an engineer of a moving train. It is unclear if the term being used in the news reports of "boys" means a minor, but that might be irrelevant because a minor can't themselves subscribe to cell phone service.
Click to expand...

News reports have indicated that the "boys" are juveniles in the 15-16 year old age range.

These are the reasons I believe the District Attorney would not charge, let alone investigate these juveniles. First, looking at the statutes they commited no crime. It is not a crime to send a text message. There is also nothing in the Manslaughter statute that would be applicable here either as there is no "unlawful act" to stick on them.

Second, there is a problem with the exact certainty of the evidence. The only thing they have is the juvenile's cell phone with a time stamp of when the message was received by the juvenile. Phones don't necessarily receive a text message immediately after it is sent. There can be a lag of up to a couple of minutes.

Third, as stated by others here, the engineer did not have to reply to the message. This goes along with my second point as it is possible that the engineer sent the text message while dwelling at Chatsworth and wasn't replying while operating

the train.

From a civil standpoint I don't see any liability on the juvenile's part either. They sent a text message which does not require an immediate response. They did nothing unlawful or even remotely negligent. There is also an issue of fairness. As an example your friend is driving on his way home from work. You send him a text message asking him if he's going to happy hour with you. As he looks away to read to read it traffic stops, he looks back up at traffic to see it stopped but it's too late and he rear-ends the car in front of him. Are you responsible for the wreck? No, because your friend could have waited until he was stopped at the light or got home to read it.

However, again in the civil instance Metrolink already publicly conceded that they are fully liable thus the point of liability is moot and will not even be considered.


----------



## WhoozOn1st

tp49 said:


> However, again in the civil instance Metrolink already publicly conceded that they are fully liable thus the point of liability is moot and will not even be considered.


It may be too soon to say that the issue of liability is moot, Metrolink's early "mea culpa" (based on blaming the engineer) notwithstanding. The NTSB investigation has hardly begun. In any case, legal issues are clearly on the minds of Metrolink's leaders. The agenda of today's special SCRRA (Southern California Regional Rail Authority) meeting:

1. Call to Order

CLOSED SESSION

2. Closed Session

(a THREAT TO PUBLIC PUBLIC SERVICES AND FACIILITIES – Pursuant to Government Code Section 54957) - (Consultation with Metrolink’s Chief Safety Officer)

(b CONFERENCE WITH LEGAL COUNSEL -ANTICIPATED LITIGATION: (Subdivision (b of Government Code Section 54956.9 : (multiple potential cases) - Anticipated litigation arising out of the September 12, 2008 collision between a Metrolink train and a Union Pacific freight train on the Ventura County Line, near the city of Chatsworth, CA.

3. Chief Executive Officer’s Report

4. Board Member Comments

5. Adjournment

The Board Executive Committee Special meeting, scheduled for September 16, 2008 is CANCELLED

________________________

The entire current Emergency Alert is here: Metrolink Emergency Alert


----------



## Joel N. Weber II

WhoozOn1st said:


> It may be too soon to say that the issue of liability is moot, Metrolink's early "mea culpa" (based on blaming the engineer) notwithstanding. The NTSB investigation has hardly begun.


There's a limit to how much impact the NTSB investiagtion has to the question of what the courts will decide about who has to pay the injured parties. Or at least, there is with small airplanes, but I'd assume trains are similar. This article says:



> Even though the Safety Board's report is not admissible in court, the IIC's deposition is, and anything you tell the IIC can be discovered during deposition.


(Earlier in that article, it states that IIC standards for Investigator-in-Charge.)


----------



## lrdc9_metroplitan_sub

Tony said:


> AlanB said:
> 
> 
> 
> Of course even if Metrolink does require that, or had this happened east of the Mississippi, the engineer most likely would have called out the wrong signal aspect and therefore the conductor wouldn't have assumed that anything was wrong.
> 
> 
> 
> If the Metrolink engineer didn't see the signal (because he was distracted texting?), he would not have called out anything, right?
Click to expand...

I thought only CSX had the engineer "call-out" the signal?


----------



## AlanB

lrdc9_metroplitan_sub said:


> Tony said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> AlanB said:
> 
> 
> 
> Of course even if Metrolink does require that, or had this happened east of the Mississippi, the engineer most likely would have called out the wrong signal aspect and therefore the conductor wouldn't have assumed that anything was wrong.
> 
> 
> 
> If the Metrolink engineer didn't see the signal (because he was distracted texting?), he would not have called out anything, right?
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> I thought only CSX had the engineer "call-out" the signal?
Click to expand...

All CSX crews, as well as NS crews routinely call signals.

BNSF and UP usually do not.


----------



## access bob

AlanB said:


> lrdc9_metroplitan_sub said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Tony said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> AlanB said:
> 
> 
> 
> Of course even if Metrolink does require that, or had this happened east of the Mississippi, the engineer most likely would have called out the wrong signal aspect and therefore the conductor wouldn't have assumed that anything was wrong.
> 
> 
> 
> If the Metrolink engineer didn't see the signal (because he was distracted texting?), he would not have called out anything, right?
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> I thought only CSX had the engineer "call-out" the signal?
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> All CSX crews, as well as NS crews routinely call signals.
> 
> BNSF and UP usually do not.
Click to expand...


tonight on the news they had a representative of the NTSB on TV that said they will be reviewing the tapes since the engineer had to call out the signals on the radio.

not sure how accurate that was, they also said the conductor was very seriously injured and have not yet been able to talk to him.

Bob


----------



## -Jamie-

There's supposed to be a news conference held by the NTSB at 7:00pm PST tonight on KNBC's website. Here's the direct link to the feed: http://www.knbc.com/videostream/10954229/detail.html


----------



## BlueJeanGirl

AlanB said:


> All CSX crews, as well as NS crews routinely call signals.
> BNSF and UP usually do not.


For Amtrak crews operating on the following, at least in southern CA:

BNSF and UP require anything but a "clear"/"proceed" be called by the engineer and acknowledged by the conductor or another member of the operating crew.

SCRRA and SDNR require all signals be called by the engineer, anything but "clear,"/"proceed" must be acknowledged by the conductor or another member of the operating crew.

FWIW AMTK 784 met Metrolink 111 at our usual time and place on Friday. We were the last train to go through that area.

Has anyone else heard the report that a passenger on 111 claims they left CWT on a clear?

~BJG

:::whose trains were annulled Saturday and Sunday, but working Monday:::


----------



## TVRM610

Is it not possible that the dispatcher could have lined this up incorrectly? This whole thing seems quite fishy... as has been stated the signal should have received a stop indication, AND the switch should have been lined against him. I'm pretty sure that trailing a switch should have been noticeable as well... if not by the engineer then at least to a dispatcher that the switch was broken.

I heard a report that a dispatcher did try to warn them.

As for the kids texting the engineer... the kids are 150% innocent in this case. There is no way they should ever be convicted of anything. I honestly think that the texting has nothing to do with the crash. I happen to know for a fact that many RR employees often text while "on duty" and in fact I'm not even sure it is against RR rules on all railroads..


----------



## Guest_Spokker_*

TVRM610 said:


> I happen to know for a fact that many RR employees often text while "on duty"


Oh, great.


----------



## VentureForth

BlueJeanGirl said:


> AlanB said:
> 
> 
> 
> All CSX crews, as well as NS crews routinely call signals.
> BNSF and UP usually do not.
> 
> 
> 
> For Amtrak crews operating on the following, at least in southern CA:
> 
> BNSF and UP require anything but a "clear"/"proceed" be called by the engineer and acknowledged by the conductor or another member of the operating crew.
> 
> SCRRA and SDNR require all signals be called by the engineer, anything but "clear,"/"proceed" must be acknowledged by the conductor or another member of the operating crew.
> 
> FWIW AMTK 784 met Metrolink 111 at our usual time and place on Friday. We were the last train to go through that area.
> 
> Has anyone else heard the report that a passenger on 111 claims they left CWT on a clear?
> 
> ~BJG
> 
> :::whose trains were annulled Saturday and Sunday, but working Monday:::
Click to expand...

Seems like a funny rule - and one that didn't seem to really affect the outcome of this tragedy. What's the consequence of missing a call? Other than certain infringement on an active main, and the horrific result imminent of a red light.

As mentioned several times already, making the call can be responded to by a conductor. But if you miss a call - or two or three - how can the conductor know that you missed the signal?

There's been all sorts of talk about PTC, but what about something simpler? How about just fault detector technology that only broadcasts when you pass a caution or stop signal above a certain speed? It could be localized enough to prevent being heard too far away. That way the conductor AND the conflicting train would be aware of the potential for collision and could at least attempt to do something about it.

Some questions...

1) Is there a deadman's switch in the Metrolink cab?

2) If there was a medical anomole, could the engineer still have had the deadman's switch actuated?

3) A report indicated that the engineer's cell phone couldn't be found - not unreasonable for the amount of damage that ensued, but isn't Metrolink sort of admitting culpability a bit prematurely?

4) I heard Metrolink was going 42 MPH at impact, and I presume that the freight had a full green proceed. Any indications how fast it was going?

5) If the conductor on Metrolink DID feel that there was an anomole with regards to not calling signals, is there an emergency brake in the Bombardier bi-levels?


----------



## AlanB

VentureForth said:


> As mentioned several times already, making the call can be responded to by a conductor. But if you miss a call - or two or three - how can the conductor know that you missed the signal?


The conductor has to know the route as well as the engineer. Basically that means if he looks out the window he has to know exactly where he is based upon the landmarks. Therefore he'd know if the train had gone by a signal without it being called. You also get to the point where you just kind of know that it takes X long to get to the next signal. So again, if you haven't heard something, then you start to wonder.



VentureForth said:


> There's been all sorts of talk about PTC, but what about something simpler? How about just fault detector technology that only broadcasts when you pass a caution or stop signal above a certain speed? It could be localized enough to prevent being heard too far away. That way the conductor AND the conflicting train would be aware of the potential for collision and could at least attempt to do something about it.


Interesting idea, not sure why it hasn't been suggested before. I'll have to think about that more. Although there are other advantages to PTC beyond the "we just missed the signal."



VentureForth said:


> 1) Is there a deadman's switch in the Metrolink cab?


Yes, there has to be. All modern engines have one.



VentureForth said:


> 2) If there was a medical anomole, could the engineer still have had the deadman's switch actuated?


AFAIK you can't operate the loco without it being activated. Therefore it had to be operational when the trains collided.



VentureForth said:


> 3) A report indicated that the engineer's cell phone couldn't be found - not unreasonable for the amount of damage that ensued, but isn't Metrolink sort of admitting culpability a bit prematurely?


Yes, which is why some are questioning the timing of things. Even the NTSB is saying "let's slow down here and wait for the investigation."



VentureForth said:


> 4) I heard Metrolink was going 42 MPH at impact, and I presume that the freight had a full green proceed. Any indications how fast it was going?


I saw one unconfirmed report that said the freight was going about 20 MPH.



VentureForth said:


> 5) If the conductor on Metrolink DID feel that there was an anomole with regards to not calling signals, is there an emergency brake in the Bombardier bi-levels?


Every passenger car in the US has an emergency brake cord.


----------



## access bob

VentureForth said:


> BlueJeanGirl said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> AlanB said:
> 
> 
> 
> All CSX crews, as well as NS crews routinely call signals.
> BNSF and UP usually do not.
> 
> 
> 
> For Amtrak crews operating on the following, at least in southern CA:
> 
> BNSF and UP require anything but a "clear"/"proceed" be called by the engineer and acknowledged by the conductor or another member of the operating crew.
> 
> SCRRA and SDNR require all signals be called by the engineer, anything but "clear,"/"proceed" must be acknowledged by the conductor or another member of the operating crew.
> 
> FWIW AMTK 784 met Metrolink 111 at our usual time and place on Friday. We were the last train to go through that area.
> 
> Has anyone else heard the report that a passenger on 111 claims they left CWT on a clear?
> 
> ~BJG
> 
> :::whose trains were annulled Saturday and Sunday, but working Monday:::
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> Seems like a funny rule - and one that didn't seem to really affect the outcome of this tragedy. What's the consequence of missing a call? Other than certain infringement on an active main, and the horrific result imminent of a red light.
> 
> As mentioned several times already, making the call can be responded to by a conductor. But if you miss a call - or two or three - how can the conductor know that you missed the signal?
> 
> There's been all sorts of talk about PTC, but what about something simpler? How about just fault detector technology that only broadcasts when you pass a caution or stop signal above a certain speed? It could be localized enough to prevent being heard too far away. That way the conductor AND the conflicting train would be aware of the potential for collision and could at least attempt to do something about it.
> 
> Some questions...
> 
> 1) Is there a deadman's switch in the Metrolink cab?
> 
> 2) If there was a medical anomole, could the engineer still have had the deadman's switch actuated?
> 
> 3) A report indicated that the engineer's cell phone couldn't be found - not unreasonable for the amount of damage that ensued, but isn't Metrolink sort of admitting culpability a bit prematurely?
> 
> 4) I heard Metrolink was going 42 MPH at impact, and I presume that the freight had a full green proceed. Any indications how fast it was going?
> 
> 5) If the conductor on Metrolink DID feel that there was an anomole with regards to not calling signals, is there an emergency brake in the Bombardier bi-levels?
Click to expand...



1.) YES

2.) unlikely but it is probably still possible, but highly unlikely

3.) they will search for the phone, if it is there they probably will eventually find it, Metrolink either knows something and is trying to get it over with, or someone is speaking without talking to their legal dept.

4.) I have heard reported that the closing speed was approx 80MPH so that 42 would sound reasonable, however they have recovered both Metrolink data recorders and the UP data recorder and cab video recorderer so exact readings will be able to be determined.

apparently the UP crew survived, did they "bail out" has anyone heard

5.) Yes the conductor could stop the train in an emergency, however apparently the time would have been very short and they still would have had to contact the freight. check out google earth for the view of the accident site.

Bob


----------



## WhoozOn1st

Los Angeles Times:

Investigators focus on whether signal was broken or missed

Metrolink's grim national record (comparisons with other commuter lines)


----------



## Steve4031

I don't know how to do links. Someone should check out cnn's website. There was a report on there about texting between the engineer and a teenaged train enthusiast.


----------



## Steve4031

That was old news. Sorry about that.


----------



## Highballer

In the accounts I have read, the MetroLink engineer had worked for Amtrak for 10 years. But it sounded like he was working for a contractor who provides engineers to MetroLink. Is that right? And if so, why doesn't MetroLink employ its own engineers?


----------



## VentureForth

That's fairly typical. Herzog is a big subcontractor that provides the manpower for both the Trinity Railway Express and the New Mexico Rail Runner. A governed body typically doesn't know how to operate a train, but a specialized group that does it for a living can provide the man power necessary in a turn-key fashion more cost effectively than the city or governing body trying to do it themselves. Note that the engineer didn't work for Amtrak, but for another subcontractor, Veolia.


----------



## WhoozOn1st

Highballer said:


> In the accounts I have read, the MetroLink engineer had worked for Amtrak for 10 years. But it sounded like he was working for a contractor who provides engineers to MetroLink. Is that right? And if so, why doesn't MetroLink employ its own engineers?


As far as I know (which isn't always very far, and I could be wrong), Metrolink has always had contractors for its operations and maintenance. I believe that for the majority of its existence Amtrak was the operations/maintenance contractor. There was some sort of dispute - probably financial, as usual - and Metrolink switched contractors. However, many of the Amtrak people who were running the trains made the switch to the new contractor and continued their Metrolink duties. Don't know about the maintenance side, but wouldn't be surprised if the situation is similar.


----------



## VentureForth

Another concern is from this 2003 Metrolink collision with BNSF. Two people died in that wreck and the deaths were attributed to non-yeilding workstation tables causing severe blunt force trauma to the abdomen. I argued this with the folks at the New Mexico Rail Runner when they were choosing rolling stock, but they pretty decided that the risk was outweighed by the potential.

I wonder how much of this may be applicable here. This is from the 2003 Report:



> A review of the pathology reports on the two fatalities indicated that both persons received severe blunt impact trauma injuries to the chest and upper abdomen. These two fatally injured persons were found near seats 58 and 61 and 66 and 70, respectively, on the upper level of the lead railcar. They were apparently sitting next to each other on the right side of the aisle (relative to the direction of travel) in seats numbered 60 and 61, with both persons facing the direction of travel. (See figures 7 and 8.) These seats are about in the middle of the railcar and are a paired seating set arranged in an opposing (face-to-face) layout with another paired seating set (seat numbers 56 and 57), with a workstation table between them. The workstation table was found to have been pushed forward relative to its normal service location and was partially resting against the seatback of the opposite seat pair set. Although the table pedestal had not fully separated from its attachment to the floor, its attachment joint with the floor was bent and partially separated.13 No one was identified as having been occupying seats 56 or 57 at the time of the collision.


----------



## jackal

AlanB said:


> VentureForth said:
> 
> 
> 
> There's been all sorts of talk about PTC, but what about something simpler? How about just fault detector technology that only broadcasts when you pass a caution or stop signal above a certain speed? It could be localized enough to prevent being heard too far away. That way the conductor AND the conflicting train would be aware of the potential for collision and could at least attempt to do something about it.
> 
> 
> 
> Interesting idea, not sure why it hasn't been suggested before. I'll have to think about that more. Although there are other advantages to PTC beyond the "we just missed the signal."
Click to expand...

How much cheaper is it to install ATS versus the more sophisticated systems? A completely new system as described by VentureForth would take years of development and many more years to be tested and approved by the FRA. ATS is an existing system that would provide some of this functionality--I think, since I'm actually not terribly familiar with ATS and ATC beyond what's written in GCOR (which didn't really make a lot of sense to me, since I have no idea how it works--just a bunch of rules about cutting out the high speed whistle **** or something like that).



AlanB said:


> VentureForth said:
> 
> 
> 
> 1) Is there a deadman's switch in the Metrolink cab?
> 
> 
> 
> Yes, there has to be. All modern engines have one.
> 
> 
> 
> VentureForth said:
> 
> 
> 
> 2) If there was a medical anomole, could the engineer still have had the deadman's switch actuated?
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> AFAIK you can't operate the loco without it being activated. Therefore it had to be operational when the trains collided.
Click to expand...

Modern control stands do not have a dead man's switch (something you have to maintain pressure on in order to keep the train from stopping). They have an alerter, which flashes if there has been no input on the control stand (throttle/dynamics, at least--depending on the engine, the air brakes may not count as input) within a certain amount of time, typically around maybe 30 seconds or so. The alerter flashes, and then after 10 or 20 seconds, if it remains unacknowledged, it starts beeping. Only after another 10 or 20 seconds of beeping (I forget the actual times) does it finally put the train into a penalty brake application (a full service application which cannot be reset until the train is stopped). The train can probably go a whole minute without an alert/alive engineer before it finally begins stopping.


----------



## the_traveler

Call me stupid, but if the engineer ran the red signal, wouldn't the switch be set for the other train to pass on the other track. If so, how did the Metrolink train get through that (closed) switch? :huh:


----------



## PRR 60

the_traveler said:


> Call me stupid, but if the engineer ran the red signal, wouldn't the switch be set for the other train to pass on the other track. If so, how did the Metrolink train get through that (closed) switch? :huh:


The switch at the end of the passing track section would have been lined to permit the oncoming UP Freight train to move to the opposite track while the Metrolink train waited for it to clear before the switch was re-lined and the signal cleared. Assuming the Metrolink train ignored the red signal approaching the end of the double track and that switch, the switch would have been lined opposite to the Metrolink's movement in a trailing point direction (the switch diverts moves left and right in the direction opposite to the movement of the Metrolink train). Moving in the trailing point direction, the Metrolink train would force the switch over to permit the train to pass. The force needed to do that is relatively small compared to the force from the train. The engineer of the Metrolink train may not have even noticed the switch being forced over.

Railroaders out there: please correct me if I'm wrong.


----------



## Mark

My question is what was the previous signal aspect? If the Metrolink train was traveling at 40-50mph is it reasonable to believe that his previous signal was a "Clear"? Then the next one, (prior to the accident), indicated "Medium Approach" or something like that? The speed may be a key indicator as to a possible malfunction. For example: If the Metrolink received a "Clear" then the next signal, (prior to the accident), should not have been a "Stop" unless the freight crew entered that section against their signal.

On the other hand the Metrolink would have been traveling according to a published timetable with scheduled stops. Receiving a "Stop" signal for that block may have been very irregular for that time of day so it is possible that the Engineer of the Metrolink missed it.

M


----------



## Joel N. Weber II

Highballer said:


> In the accounts I have read, the MetroLink engineer had worked for Amtrak for 10 years. But it sounded like he was working for a contractor who provides engineers to MetroLink. Is that right? And if so, why doesn't MetroLink employ its own engineers?


There are very few commuter rail systems in the US that don't hire some company (sometimes Amtrak, but often not) to actually be the railroad. The only ones I can think of where the state is the railroad operate into Manhattan.


----------



## guest

PRR 60 said:


> the_traveler said:
> 
> 
> 
> Call me stupid, but if the engineer ran the red signal, wouldn't the switch be set for the other train to pass on the other track. If so, how did the Metrolink train get through that (closed) switch? :huh:
> 
> 
> 
> The switch at the end of the passing track section would have been lined to permit the oncoming UP Freight train to move to the opposite track while the Metrolink train waited for it to clear before the switch was re-lined and the signal cleared. Assuming the Metrolink train ignored the red signal approaching the end of the double track and that switch, the switch would have been lined opposite to the Metrolink's movement in a trailing point direction (the switch diverts moves left and right in the direction opposite to the movement of the Metrolink train). Moving in the trailing point direction, the Metrolink train would force the switch over to permit the train to pass. The force needed to do that is relatively small compared to the force from the train. The engineer of the Metrolink train may not have even noticed the switch being forced over.
> 
> Railroaders out there: please correct me if I'm wrong.
Click to expand...


You're right- its in the reports. I believe an NTSB agent described the switch as being 'bent like a banana' instead of straight... sounds to me like the switch gave way to prevent a derailment. Not a smart switch- mechanically designed to prevent derailment at all costs perhaps?

Oddly, if the switch had derailed the Metroliner- could that have been a saving grace, reducing fatalities and giving time for dispatch to say "there's a derailment ahead" to the freight crew?


----------



## chuljin

. Enough said.

My thoughts are with the unfortunate victims and their families.


----------



## -Jamie-

One thing that really bugged me about the news report I watched last night was the fact that the reported that the engineer did not call out the last two signals (a flashing yellow and a red). I watched the press conference earlier last night and the lady from the NTSB made it perfectly clear that although there was no recording of him calling them out, that it was a possibility that the area was a "dead zone" in which case there would be no recording. They wouldn't know for sure until they could check past records and also interview the conductor. I hate when the media jumps the gun and releases inaccurate or incomplete information.


----------



## Tony

Mark said:


> For example: If the Metrolink received a "Clear" then the next signal, (prior to the accident), should not have been a "Stop" unless the freight crew entered that section against their signal.


Now that is a VERY interesting point! I would certainly like to know that answer too. I am sure that the NTSB will look into that.


----------



## Green Maned Lion

AlanB said:


> VentureForth said:
> 
> 
> 
> 1) Is there a deadman's switch in the Metrolink cab?
> 
> 
> 
> Yes, there has to be. All modern engines have one.
Click to expand...

I was under impression modern ones DON'T have them (especially since they can be very easily defeated, as demonstrated in _Silver Streak_), but that they instead have something called an Alerter that sounds an alarm at intervals, requiring the engineer to punch a button demonstrating him to be alive and well.



guest said:


> Oddly, if the switch had derailed the Metroliner- could that have been a saving grace, reducing fatalities and giving time for dispatch to say "there's a derailment ahead" to the freight crew?


Metroliners are a different train.


----------



## Green Maned Lion

WhoozOn1st said:


> Los Angeles Times:
> Investigators focus on whether signal was broken or missed
> 
> Metrolink's grim national record (comparisons with other commuter lines)


I dunno about their records, but those numbers include suicides, which is not fair.


----------



## AlanB

jackal said:


> AlanB said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> VentureForth said:
> 
> 
> 
> 1) Is there a deadman's switch in the Metrolink cab?
> 
> 
> 
> Yes, there has to be. All modern engines have one.
> 
> 
> 
> VentureForth said:
> 
> 
> 
> 2) If there was a medical anomole, could the engineer still have had the deadman's switch actuated?
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> AFAIK you can't operate the loco without it being activated. Therefore it had to be operational when the trains collided.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> Modern control stands do not have a dead man's switch (something you have to maintain pressure on in order to keep the train from stopping). They have an alerter, which flashes if there has been no input on the control stand (throttle/dynamics, at least--depending on the engine, the air brakes may not count as input) within a certain amount of time, typically around maybe 30 seconds or so. The alerter flashes, and then after 10 or 20 seconds, if it remains unacknowledged, it starts beeping. Only after another 10 or 20 seconds of beeping (I forget the actual times) does it finally put the train into a penalty brake application (a full service application which cannot be reset until the train is stopped). The train can probably go a whole minute without an alert/alive engineer before it finally begins stopping.
Click to expand...




Green Maned Lion said:


> AlanB said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> VentureForth said:
> 
> 
> 
> 1) Is there a deadman's switch in the Metrolink cab?
> 
> 
> 
> Yes, there has to be. All modern engines have one.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> I was under impression modern ones DON'T have them (especially since they can be very easily defeated, as demonstrated in _Silver Streak_), but that they instead have something called an Alerter that sounds an alarm at intervals, requiring the engineer to punch a button demonstrating him to be alive and well.
Click to expand...

Guys, I wasn't making a distinction between the more modern alerter and the old style pressure switch. I wasn't even sure if the OP knew that there are two different types of dead man controls. And just for the record, subway cars and LIRR, MN MU cars still do require constant pressure on the controller to operate the train.

The bottom line is that no train operating in the US operates without some form of dead man protection.


----------



## AlanB

Mark said:


> My question is what was the previous signal aspect? If the Metrolink train was traveling at 40-50mph is it reasonable to believe that his previous signal was a "Clear"? Then the next one, (prior to the accident), indicated "Medium Approach" or something like that? The speed may be a key indicator as to a possible malfunction. For example: If the Metrolink received a "Clear" then the next signal, (prior to the accident), should not have been a "Stop" unless the freight crew entered that section against their signal.


First, the engineer actually passed two signals that warned him he would have to stop at the signal right before the single track section, at least according to what Metrolink has said. It remains unconfirmed by the NTSB. But in theory, he had plenty of warning.

Next, if I understand things correctly (and those more familiar with the line please correct me if I'm wrong), after passing the second yellow signal, he made a station stop at Chatsworth. After that stop, with the signal in question in sight, the engineer accelerated the train through that signal, the switch set against him, and reached at least 40 MPH.

So the only real question is, was that last signal operating correctly?



Mark said:


> On the other hand the Metrolink would have been traveling according to a published timetable with scheduled stops. Receiving a "Stop" signal for that block may have been very irregular for that time of day so it is possible that the Engineer of the Metrolink missed it.


According to one retired engineer and a few other people interviewed, it was actually very common to meet that freight train there or shortly thereafter. So the engineer should have been expecting a meet to occur.


----------



## Tony

AlanB said:


> Next, if I understand things correctly (and those more familiar with the line please correct me if I'm wrong), after passing the second yellow signal, he made a station stop at Chatsworth. After that stop, with the signal in question in sight, the engineer accelerated the train through that signal, the switch set against him, and reached at least 40 MPH.
> So the only real question is, was that last signal operating correctly?


Wow, this is becoming even more unbelievable. They didn't change crews at the Chatsworth station, did they? Was the engineer trying to beat the freight train "at the pass"? Was this a suicide?


----------



## access bob

AlanB said:


> Mark said:
> 
> 
> 
> My question is what was the previous signal aspect? If the Metrolink train was traveling at 40-50mph is it reasonable to believe that his previous signal was a "Clear"? Then the next one, (prior to the accident), indicated "Medium Approach" or something like that? The speed may be a key indicator as to a possible malfunction. For example: If the Metrolink received a "Clear" then the next signal, (prior to the accident), should not have been a "Stop" unless the freight crew entered that section against their signal.
> 
> 
> 
> First, the engineer actually passed two signals that warned him he would have to stop at the signal right before the single track section, at least according to what Metrolink has said. It remains unconfirmed by the NTSB. But in theory, he had plenty of warning.
> 
> Next, if I understand things correctly (and those more familiar with the line please correct me if I'm wrong), after passing the second yellow signal, he made a station stop at Chatsworth. After that stop, with the signal in question in sight, the engineer accelerated the train through that signal, the switch set against him, and reached at least 40 MPH.
> 
> So the only real question is, was that last signal operating correctly?
> 
> 
> 
> Mark said:
> 
> 
> 
> On the other hand the Metrolink would have been traveling according to a published timetable with scheduled stops. Receiving a "Stop" signal for that block may have been very irregular for that time of day so it is possible that the Engineer of the Metrolink missed it.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> According to one retired engineer and a few other people interviewed, it was actually very common to meet that freight train there or shortly thereafter. So the engineer should have been expecting a meet to occur.
Click to expand...


this fact that there was a signal at the far end of the station makes it even more difficult to understand how the engineer passed the signal. It seems to me that the signal malfunction consideration must be seriously considered.

signals rarely malfunction and usually fail in the most restrictive position (a dark signal must be assumed to be it's most restrictive position)

the engineer is supposed to visually verify that the switch is set for his train also.

there is also the fact that the train stopped at Chatsworth, should not the conductor who probably stepped off the train to set out the train step or assist passengers. and did he check the signal also before giving the highball. it was only a 3 car change so he should not have had any trouble seeing the signal.

so it does appear very strange that all of these things needed to malfunction for the operator to by pass the signal,

Bob


----------



## Karl

Sympathies to all involved.

The comment about the switch being desinged to prevent de railing even if run set for the opposite track makes sense as there are likely hundreds of cases of trains running past a switch for every incident where a train runs a switch AND a collision with an opposing train occurs. Likely there would be more fatalities overall if the trains derailed EVERY time they ran a switch.

PTC should be a priority for all passenger trains. If nothing else the passenger train could get stopped and the engineer be on the radio trying to get the attention of an oncoming freight.

Is the section of track where this wreck occured cab signal territory. I think UP has cab signals in much of the original UP main, do they have it system wide? Could a GPS be connected to a cab signal system to alert the engineer and condutor as an interem patch?


----------



## AlanB

access bob said:


> this fact that there was a signal at the far end of the station makes it even more difficult to understand how the engineer passed the signal. It seems to me that the signal malfunction consideration must be seriously considered.signals rarely malfunction and usually fail in the most restrictive position (a dark signal must be assumed to be it's most restrictive position)
> 
> the engineer is supposed to visually verify that the switch is set for his train also.
> 
> there is also the fact that the train stopped at Chatsworth, should not the conductor who probably stepped off the train to set out the train step or assist passengers. and did he check the signal also before giving the highball. it was only a 3 car change so he should not have had any trouble seeing the signal.
> 
> so it does appear very strange that all of these things needed to malfunction for the operator to by pass the signal,
> 
> Bob


Bob,

All good questions that we'll most likely have to wait for the investigation to answer. A few things are known though already. Equipment at the switch clocked the train at 42 MPH as it passed through the switch. The dispatcher's board showed that signal at danger and the two prior signals set appropriately for the signal at danger. The dispatcher's board showed the switch set correctly for the freight train and against the Metrolink train. And finally it is confirmed that the Metrolink train bent the switch points as it went through the switch set against it.

According to one poster on a blog, who does appear to know what he's talking about (but still this is unconfirmed), the signal in question is visible from the station to the engineer. No word on whether someone on the platform can see it. Even then the conductor would probably be more concerned with making sure all the passengers detraining had gotten off. The signal, CP Topenga, is about 4,000 ft from the Chatsworth station.


----------



## AlanB

Karl said:


> PTC should be a priority for all passenger trains. If nothing else the passenger train could get stopped and the engineer be on the radio trying to get the attention of an oncoming freight.


Karl,

I'm not sure about your other question, but if that line had PTC, then both the commuter train and the freight train would need to be equiped with it. Therefore as soon as the Metrolink violated the signal, both the Metrolink and the UP train would have gone into emergency. Having their train suddenly braking would get the attention of the UP crew. :lol: But there would be no need to radio them to warn them, they'd be stopping long before a human could pick up the radio.


----------



## Joel N. Weber II

AlanB said:


> Karl said:
> 
> 
> 
> PTC should be a priority for all passenger trains. If nothing else the passenger train could get stopped and the engineer be on the radio trying to get the attention of an oncoming freight.
> 
> 
> 
> Karl,
> 
> I'm not sure about your other question, but if that line had PTC, then both the commuter train and the freight train would need to be equiped with it. Therefore as soon as the Metrolink violated the signal, both the Metrolink and the UP train would have gone into emergency. Having their train suddenly braking would get the attention of the UP crew. :lol: But there would be no need to radio them to warn them, they'd be stopping long before a human could pick up the radio.
Click to expand...

If that line had NEC style signaling and only the passenger train had automatic stop integrated with the cab signal system, it appears that that probably would have been sufficient to prevent this particular accident, but the system would certainly be most effective if the freight train also had automatic stop; the second worst Amtrak accident ever probably could have been prevented by automatic stop in the freight locomotive, and in that case what was in the passenger locomotive basically didn't matter.


----------



## Joel N. Weber II

Karl said:


> The comment about the switch being desinged to prevent de railing even if run set for the opposite track makes sense as there are likely hundreds of cases of trains running past a switch for every incident where a train runs a switch AND a collision with an opposing train occurs.


I thought it was actually pretty rare for a derailment to cause a death, though.


----------



## GG-1

AlanB said:


> access bob said:
> 
> 
> 
> this fact that there was a signal at the far end of the station makes it even more difficult to understand how the engineer passed the signal. It seems to me that the signal malfunction consideration must be seriously considered.signals rarely malfunction and usually fail in the most restrictive position (a dark signal must be assumed to be it's most restrictive position)
> 
> the engineer is supposed to visually verify that the switch is set for his train also.
> 
> there is also the fact that the train stopped at Chatsworth, should not the conductor who probably stepped off the train to set out the train step or assist passengers. and did he check the signal also before giving the highball. it was only a 3 car change so he should not have had any trouble seeing the signal.
> 
> so it does appear very strange that all of these things needed to malfunction for the operator to by pass the signal,
> 
> Bob
> 
> 
> 
> Bob,
> 
> All good questions that we'll most likely have to wait for the investigation to answer. A few things are known though already. Equipment at the switch clocked the train at 42 MPH as it passed through the switch. The dispatcher's board showed that signal at danger and the two prior signals set appropriately for the signal at danger. The dispatcher's board showed the switch set correctly for the freight train and against the Metrolink train. And finally it is confirmed that the Metrolink train bent the switch points as it went through the switch set against it.
> 
> According to one poster on a blog, who does appear to know what he's talking about (but still this is unconfirmed), the signal in question is visible from the station to the engineer. No word on whether someone on the platform can see it. Even then the conductor would probably be more concerned with making sure all the passengers detraining had gotten off. The signal, CP Topenga, is about 4,000 ft from the Chatsworth station.
Click to expand...

Aloha

I normally like to trim quotes but was afraid to here.

Question

Whether or not, a red signal, was visible from the station, could the Metrolink train accelerate to the estimated speed of 42 mph in the estimated distance of 4000 feet?

Mahalo


----------



## PRR 60

The signal in question is 5000 feet east of the Chatsworth platform. At that distance, in a bright sun, with several trees partially overhanging the right-of-way, the signal might not be readily visible from the train stopped at the platform nearly a mile away.

Regardless, the train should have been under an restricted signal as it sat in the station. The engineer should have been expecting the stop signal and the wait for the eastbound freight to clear. Why didn't he? I think I'll let the NTSB do their job and figure that out.


----------



## AlanB

Joel N. Weber II said:


> AlanB said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Karl said:
> 
> 
> 
> PTC should be a priority for all passenger trains. If nothing else the passenger train could get stopped and the engineer be on the radio trying to get the attention of an oncoming freight.
> 
> 
> 
> Karl,
> 
> I'm not sure about your other question, but if that line had PTC, then both the commuter train and the freight train would need to be equiped with it. Therefore as soon as the Metrolink violated the signal, both the Metrolink and the UP train would have gone into emergency. Having their train suddenly braking would get the attention of the UP crew. :lol: But there would be no need to radio them to warn them, they'd be stopping long before a human could pick up the radio.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> If that line had NEC style signaling and only the passenger train had automatic stop integrated with the cab signal system, it appears that that probably would have been sufficient to prevent this particular accident, but the system would certainly be most effective if the freight train also had automatic stop; the second worst Amtrak accident ever probably could have been prevented by automatic stop in the freight locomotive, and in that case what was in the passenger locomotive basically didn't matter.
Click to expand...

But the point of PTC is that all locos that operate on that section of the tracks must have ATS and the PTC equipment. That's one reason that many commuter lines haven't installed it for themselves, because they'd also have to end up paying for the freight co's to equip their locos too.

And the second worst Amtrak accident only had cab signals in place, which weren't working correctly on the freight train. AFAIK there was no PTC in either loco, freight or Amtrak.


----------



## Guest_George Harris_*

Description and some other information from employee timetables with a little from other sources:

This line is the ex Southern Pacific Coast Line. Now the ownership is split between UP and Metrolink. The accident location is on Metrolink owned track.

Union Pacific’s Santa Barbara subdivision is regarded as running north-south and is mostly single track, ABS with CTC from Santa Barbara south. The maximum speed limit is 79P/60F, but there are numerous speed restrictions down to 40 mph. Only 18 miles allows 79 mph, mostly in 2 and 3 mile long segments other than one 9 mile long section just north of Santa Barbara. All is single track except for 3.1 miles at San Luis Obispo and 3.6 miles (365.0 to 368.6) at Santa Barbara. There are 5 sidings between Santa Barbara and Las Posas. Stations are located at:

248.7 San Luis Obispo

355.8 Elwood (begin CTC – not a station)

358.2 Goleta

367.4 Santa Barbara

?-?.? Carpinteria

394.8 Ventura (mileage at north end siding)

399.6 Montalvo (mileage at north end of siding)

404.0 Oxnard (mileage at north end of siding)

412.5 Camarillo (mileage at north end of siding)

423.1 Las Posas – end Union Pacific ownership

Milepost Equation: 423.1 Union Pacific = 426.4 Metrolink

Metrolink ownership covers the rest of the line to Los Angeles Union Station.

The Metrolink Ventura Subdivision is defined as running east-west, with the west end being CP Las Posas at milepost 426.4. The east end is at CP Burbank Junction, milepost 462.8. It is single track with four sidings between Las Posas and CP Raymer at milepost 453.1 and double track from there the rest of the way to CP Burbank Jct. All turnouts at ends of sidings and the end of double track at CP Raymer are shown as allowing 45P/40F, which suggests that they are number 20 turnouts. Allowed speed in sidings is 45P/40F. Stations are at:

427.1 Moorpark

437.9 Simi valley

445.5 Chatsworth

449.3 Northridge

455.0 Van Nuys

460.6 Burbank-Bob Hope Airport

The remainder of the trip to LA is on the Valley Subdivision which is now mileposted out from Los Angeles Union Station.

Zooming into the accident vicinity, Chatsworth is in the middle of a 11,300 foot siding that extends from milepost 444.4, CP Topanga to milepost 446.8, CP De Soto. (The mileposted length of siding will always be longer than the timetable length, as the timetable length is maximum clear length and the milepost length runs from point of switch to point of switch.) The next siding west is a 7,625 foot siding extending from milepost 439.2, CP Santa Susana to milepost 440.8. CP Davis. In the 3.6 miles between these sidings are three tunnels:

Tunnel No. 26, 7,369 feet long, mileposts 441.2 to 442.6,

Tunnel No. 27, 924 feet long, mileposts 442.9 to 443.1,

Tunnel No. 28, 537 feet long, mileposts 443.9 to 444.0.

Speed Limits:

Freight train speed limits are 60 mph between mileposts 429.8 and 437.7 and 40 mph for the remainder of the subdivision east of that point. Between Simi Valley and Chatsworth, passenger train speed limits are:

60 mph – 437.7-438.0

70 mph – 438.0-440.0

60 mph – 440.0-440.9

50 mph – 440.9-442.6

40 mph – 442.6-444.5

70 mph – 444.5-453.1 (remaining single track to begin double track portion)

The 40 mph speed restriction includes the two easternmost tunnels and the curve between tunnel 28 and the turnout at CP Topanga. I have no information on the degree of curve of this curve or its approximate radius, but given the speed limit and that it turns roughly 90 degrees in the 0.4 miles between the end of tunnel 28 and the turnout at Topanga, it is likely to be about a 3 degree to 4 degree curve. ( that is, somewhere between 1200 feet and 2000 feet in radius)

Unless the Metrolink engineer was speeding, the speed of both trains had to be 40 mph or less. That some of the witness statements talk about 60 mph does not suggest that the train was really going that fast. Passenger estimates of train speed are notorious for their inaccuracy in both directions.


----------



## tp49

In an interesting development reporterd in the LA Times it seems that the Metrolink spokeswoman resigned on Monday under pressure (read either she resign or she be fired.) I would bet that legal most likely didn't like her statement proclaiming the Metrolink train at fault, at least until the conclusion of the NTSB's investigation. The article also stated that when LA's mayor heard of the plan to make that statement he declined to participate in it.

The statement while refreshing was quite premature and and unnecessarily exposed Metrolink to liability considering the investigation barely started at that point and was nowhere near completion. Though there is blame to go around since the chief executive of Metrolink authorized the statement. I found it interesting (but not surprising) that the spokeswoman was forced out.

LA Times Article.


----------



## PRR 60

tp49 said:


> In an interesting development reporterd in the LA Times it seems that the Metrolink spokeswoman resigned on Monday under pressure (read either she resign or she be fired.) I would bet that legal most likely didn't like her statement proclaiming the Metrolink train at fault, at least until the conclusion of the NTSB's investigation. The article also stated that when LA's mayor heard of the plan to make that statement he declined to participate in it.
> The statement while refreshing was quite premature and and unnecessarily exposed Metrolink to liability considering the investigation barely started at that point and was nowhere near completion. Though there is blame to go around since the chief executive of Metrolink authorized the statement. I found it interesting (but not surprising) that the spokeswoman was forced out.
> 
> LA Times Article.


There is, of course, a more cynical way to look at that original statement by the Metrolink PR person. She took blame for the accident on behalf of Metrolink, and then immediately passed the blame to the engineer and the engineer's employer Veolia. This without any knowledge that the signals were working properly (a Metrolink issue), or whether the engineer had been worked to the point of fatigue (a Metrolink problem), or whether there were any medical issues involved, or any of dozens of factors that could have contributed to the tragedy. In short, the statement that a signal had been passed may be factual, but solely blaming the engineer may or may not be.

The cause of the accident will be determined. If it runs true to form it will be complex with multiple factors contributing. Blaming the engineer prior to knowing all the facts was not just premature, it was the easy way out. If the Metrolink spokesperson did that on her own, she should have been fired outright. If the Metrolink CEO authorized it, they both should be fired.


----------



## amtrakwolverine

PRR 60 said:


> tp49 said:
> 
> 
> 
> In an interesting development reporterd in the LA Times it seems that the Metrolink spokeswoman resigned on Monday under pressure (read either she resign or she be fired.) I would bet that legal most likely didn't like her statement proclaiming the Metrolink train at fault, at least until the conclusion of the NTSB's investigation. The article also stated that when LA's mayor heard of the plan to make that statement he declined to participate in it.
> The statement while refreshing was quite premature and and unnecessarily exposed Metrolink to liability considering the investigation barely started at that point and was nowhere near completion. Though there is blame to go around since the chief executive of Metrolink authorized the statement. I found it interesting (but not surprising) that the spokeswoman was forced out.
> 
> LA Times Article.
> 
> 
> 
> There is, of course, a more cynical way to look at that original statement by the Metrolink PR person. She took blame for the accident on behalf of Metrolink, and then immediately passed the blame to the engineer and the engineer's employer Veolia. This without any knowledge that the signals were working properly (a Metrolink issue), or whether the engineer had been worked to the point of fatigue (a Metrolink problem), or whether there were any medical issues involved, or any of dozens of factors that could have contributed to the tragedy. In short, the statement that a signal had been passed may be factual, but solely blaming the engineer may or may not be.
> 
> The cause of the accident will be determined. If it runs true to form it will be complex with multiple factors contributing. Blaming the engineer prior to knowing all the facts was not just premature, it was the easy way out. If the Metrolink spokesperson did that on her own, she should have been fired outright. If the Metrolink CEO authorized it, they both should be fired.
Click to expand...

sounds like a cover up. i bet theres more going on behind the scenes then metrolink is letting on. shes basically saying its the engineers fault case closed lets move on.


----------



## VentureForth

Tony said:


> AlanB said:
> 
> 
> 
> Next, if I understand things correctly (and those more familiar with the line please correct me if I'm wrong), after passing the second yellow signal, he made a station stop at Chatsworth. After that stop, with the signal in question in sight, the engineer accelerated the train through that signal, the switch set against him, and reached at least 40 MPH.
> So the only real question is, was that last signal operating correctly?
> 
> 
> 
> Wow, this is becoming even more unbelievable. They didn't change crews at the Chatsworth station, did they? Was the engineer trying to beat the freight train "at the pass"? Was this a suicide?
Click to expand...

Very interesting point. Why not allow the freight to pass while the train is still at Chatsworth? So the train has to stay in the station for a couple extra minutes, but we're talking about a couple thousand feet from the station to the turnout. I would imagine that it would be better all the way around if the sum of the stops along a route were in stations rather than at signals. Really, this train should have never left Chatsworth until that Freight had passed - especially if this is a common occurance.

As for my previous deadman switch question, an Alerter is hardly a deadman's switch (as I understand it). As Alan mentioned and as is my experience, I figured that positive pressure on the throttle at all times AND a seat switch would be bare minimums to the safe operation of a passenger train. It would certainly make texting much more difficult (if that were indeed the case). I don't know what they use on the F59PH, PHI, F40PH and the Cab Cars. I presume they are all different. Which loco was in this wreck?


----------



## amtrakwolverine

> Which loco was in this wreck?


F-59PH 855


----------



## WhoozOn1st

Make the rails safer

L.A. Times editorial.


----------



## Walt

PRR 60 said:


> This without any knowledge that the signals were working properly (a Metrolink issue), ...


Well, to be fair, the Metrolink spokeswoman didn't make her comment until after "Higgins (Kitty Higgins, an NTSB board member) also said tests at the crash site showed the signals are working properly and there were no obstructions that may have prevented the engineer from seeing the red light."


----------



## VentureForth

But you don't make a statement that admits culpability. Even my auto insurance carrier tells me that. This article shows that the knee jerk reaction to that statement could actually jeapordize life. Besides, there are already rules restricing cell phone use. Unlikely that a harsher rule would actually be harder to break.


----------



## Walt

VentureForth said:


> But you don't make a statement that admits culpability. Even my auto insurance carrier tells me that. This artile shows that the knee jerk reaction to that statement could actually jeapordize life. Besides, there are already rules restricing cell phone use. Unlikely that a harsher rule would actually be harder to break.


Well, it is difficult to toggle between on specific example, and an overall general rule.

All I was defending, was the claim that the Metrolink spokeswoman had no knowledge if the signals were working or not. Whereas, a member of the NTSB had already announced the results of their initial testing that showed that the signals were indeed working. It might have been wrong for the NTSB to release those results. It might be that the NTSB was missquoted. It might be the NTSB was repeating someone else's claim.

As to cell phone usage, at least conductors on Amtrak use theirs all the time. I know that when I was stuck on a non-moving train for 24 hours due to a freight train derailment up ahead, *ALL* of the info the conductor got duing those 24 hours, came from the calls he made on his cell phone.


----------



## Crescent ATN & TCL

Walt said:


> VentureForth said:
> 
> 
> 
> But you don't make a statement that admits culpability. Even my auto insurance carrier tells me that. This artile shows that the knee jerk reaction to that statement could actually jeapordize life. Besides, there are already rules restricing cell phone use. Unlikely that a harsher rule would actually be harder to break.
> 
> 
> 
> Well, it is difficult to toggle between on specific example, and an overall general rule.
> 
> All I was defending, was the claim that the Metrolink spokeswoman had no knowledge if the signals were working or not. Whereas, a member of the NTSB had already announced the results of their initial testing that showed that the signals were indeed working. It might have been wrong for the NTSB to release those results. It might be that the NTSB was missquoted. It might be the NTSB was repeating someone else's claim.
> 
> As to cell phone usage, at least conductors on Amtrak use theirs all the time. I know that when I was stuck on a non-moving train for 24 hours due to a freight train derailment up ahead, *ALL* of the info the conductor got duing those 24 hours, came from the calls he made on his cell phone.
Click to expand...

I can understand using a cellphone for work related purposes but not for anything else.


----------



## MrFSS

Crescent ATN & TCL said:


> Walt said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> VentureForth said:
> 
> 
> 
> But you don't make a statement that admits culpability. Even my auto insurance carrier tells me that. This artile shows that the knee jerk reaction to that statement could actually jeopardize life. Besides, there are already rules restricting cell phone use. Unlikely that a harsher rule would actually be harder to break.
> 
> 
> 
> Well, it is difficult to toggle between on specific example, and an overall general rule.
> 
> All I was defending, was the claim that the Metrolink spokeswoman had no knowledge if the signals were working or not. Whereas, a member of the NTSB had already announced the results of their initial testing that showed that the signals were indeed working. It might have been wrong for the NTSB to release those results. It might be that the NTSB was missquoted. It might be the NTSB was repeating someone else's claim.
> 
> As to cell phone usage, at least conductors on Amtrak use theirs all the time. I know that when I was stuck on a non-moving train for 24 hours due to a freight train derailment up ahead, *ALL* of the info the conductor got duing those 24 hours, came from the calls he made on his cell phone.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> I can understand using a cellphone for work related purposes but not for anything else.
Click to expand...

All I have is a cell phone - no land line, so I use mine only for personal stuff.


----------



## tp49

PRR 60 said:


> tp49 said:
> 
> 
> 
> In an interesting development reporterd in the LA Times it seems that the Metrolink spokeswoman resigned on Monday under pressure (read either she resign or she be fired.) I would bet that legal most likely didn't like her statement proclaiming the Metrolink train at fault, at least until the conclusion of the NTSB's investigation. The article also stated that when LA's mayor heard of the plan to make that statement he declined to participate in it.
> The statement while refreshing was quite premature and and unnecessarily exposed Metrolink to liability considering the investigation barely started at that point and was nowhere near completion. Though there is blame to go around since the chief executive of Metrolink authorized the statement. I found it interesting (but not surprising) that the spokeswoman was forced out.
> 
> LA Times Article.
> 
> 
> 
> There is, of course, a more cynical way to look at that original statement by the Metrolink PR person. She took blame for the accident on behalf of Metrolink, and then immediately passed the blame to the engineer and the engineer's employer Veolia. This without any knowledge that the signals were working properly (a Metrolink issue), or whether the engineer had been worked to the point of fatigue (a Metrolink problem), or whether there were any medical issues involved, or any of dozens of factors that could have contributed to the tragedy. In short, the statement that a signal had been passed may be factual, but solely blaming the engineer may or may not be.
> 
> The cause of the accident will be determined. If it runs true to form it will be complex with multiple factors contributing. Blaming the engineer prior to knowing all the facts was not just premature, it was the easy way out. If the Metrolink spokesperson did that on her own, she should have been fired outright. If the Metrolink CEO authorized it, they both should be fired.
Click to expand...


I agree that she should not have made the statement she made. I'm sure Metronlink's legal team was none too happy when it was made knowing that the statement would most definitely be used in any civil action against them.

I gathered that the CEO did not authorize the exact statement that was made but instead was for a more neutrally worded one.


----------



## Guest_Spokker_*

Found this post on another forum of a transit advocacy organization. It's a summary of some coverage on a news station here in Los Angeles.



> Just listened to the great coverage of Eric Leonard on KFI 640 while I was driving home.
> Good news first: It looks like Metrolink will face $0 liability for the accident. The contractor, a French company, is assuming full liability according to their agreement.
> 
> The NTSB spokeswoman said that they were only able to partially analyze one of the Metrolink data recorders so far. These are the numbers:
> 
> Freight Train/Metrolink
> 
> Speed 25/42 MPH
> 
> Time after applying emergency brakes 2/0 seconds
> 
> Sight distance 1,000 feet
> 
> Metrolink -- Speed when passed red light (last signal of system of three --
> 
> 50+ MPH, then slowed down to 42 MPH -- did not apply brakes.
> 
> The engineer was diabetic.
> 
> Another interesting note: There was a suicide on the same line a few days ago. A terminally ill man stepped in front of the train and smiled at the engineer just before he was killed by the train. They don't know if it's the same engineer since the records are currently protected. They say this could have devastated Robert Sanchez if he was the same engineer.
> 
> If Robert Sanchez was able to brake, the collision could still happen, but chances are that the effects would be much less devastating.
> 
> They didn't rule out suicide. Hijacking is currently ruled out because they didn't find a second body in the completely crashed engineer's compartment.
> 
> Metrolink was also criticized for having very old trains with weak chassises.
> 
> The throttle on the Metrolink trains they say is not dead-man's throttle but it's quasi-dead-man's throttle. The engineer needs to periodically touch the throttle; otherwise, it will gradually lower and come to zero within a minute or two.
> 
> Something happened between Metrolink's Engineer and Conductor September 2, 2008, (might have been suicide talk) -- they were working together since April -- Conductor had nothing but praise for Engineer.


----------



## Guest_George Harris_*

PRR 60 said:


> The signal in question is 5000 feet east of the Chatsworth platform. At that distance, in a bright sun, with several trees partially overhanging the right-of-way, the signal might not be readily visible from the train stopped at the platform nearly a mile away.
> Regardless, the train should have been under an restricted signal as it sat in the station. The engineer should have been expecting the stop signal and the wait for the eastbound freight to clear. Why didn't he? I think I'll let the NTSB do their job and figure that out.


While the signal was west of the station in the railroad sense of the track being designated as eastbound/westbound, if you look at a map of the area you will see that the track is oriented almost precisely north south at this location, so the signal was due north of the train. Sun in the eyes seems unlikely. Also, aerial phot, maybe a fewy years old shows no trees. Usually line of sight to signals is considered most important. I am not going to speculate on cause otherwise.


----------



## Dutchrailnut

very interesting youtube video of train traveling same route from Chatworth to crash scene. The crash happed at the 3 containers 25 seconds past the homeboard.

http://nl.youtube.com/watch?v=CNuzZI-7h4U&...feature=related


----------



## sam.dirksen

Guest_George Harris_* said:


> PRR 60 said:
> 
> 
> 
> The signal in question is 5000 feet east of the Chatsworth platform. At that distance, in a bright sun, with several trees partially overhanging the right-of-way, the signal might not be readily visible from the train stopped at the platform nearly a mile away.
> Regardless, the train should have been under an restricted signal as it sat in the station. The engineer should have been expecting the stop signal and the wait for the eastbound freight to clear. Why didn't he? I think I'll let the NTSB do their job and figure that out.
> 
> 
> 
> While the signal was west of the station in the railroad sense of the track being designated as eastbound/westbound, if you look at a map of the area you will see that the track is oriented almost precisely north south at this location, so the signal was due north of the train. Sun in the eyes seems unlikely. Also, aerial phot, maybe a fewy years old shows no trees. Usually line of sight to signals is considered most important. I am not going to speculate on cause otherwise.
Click to expand...

This Youtube video http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cCiZjjCeovM shows a northbound Metrolink arriving and departing Chatsworth, taken from a mid-platform perspective. Beginning at 1:10 into the clip, the signals at the north end of the passing siding can be seen in the distance. I'm not claiming that this demonstrates that the signal could have been read by an engineer at the platform from 5000 feet away - I'm content to leave that task to professional investigators - but it does appear to confirm that there was a line of sight from the platform to the signal as of the date that the video was made.

Sam


----------



## VentureForth

This is all very interesting. The engineer should have been able to see BOTH yellows and a red while sitting at the station (note, that the station only being about a mile from the switch, he could have been texting the kids while stopped at Chatsworth, if that, indeed was the case). I cross a track near my home almost daily and can see almost two miles in each direction and have no difficulty reading the signals. He should have never left the station until the freight passed, and the conductor should have known that the freight was coming and wondering why his train was going so fast.


----------



## Walt

CNN is quoting the NTSB this morning, as having determined that the Metrolink engineer apparently didn't even apply the brakes at all before the collision.


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## Dutchrailnut

Note the info from downloads, specificly the 50 mph then slowing to 42 (the track speed was 40 over in that curve.

The NTSB spokeswoman said that they were only able to partially analyze one of the Metrolink data recorders so far. These are the numbers:

Freight Train*****Metrolink

Speed 25*****42 MPH

Time after applying emergency brakes 2****0 seconds

Sight distance 1,000 feet

Metrolink -- Speed when passed red light (last signal of system of three signals

50+ MPH, then slowed down to 42 MPH -- did not apply brakes.


----------



## WhoozOn1st

Los Angeles Times:

Metrolink balked at safety upgrade's cost

Engineer led solitary life marked by tragedy

Rail safety and the human error excuse (Op-ed piece)


----------



## Guest_George Harris_*

WhoozOn1st said:


> Los Angeles Times:
> Metrolink balked at safety upgrade's cost
> 
> Engineer led solitary life marked by tragedy
> 
> Rail safety and the human error excuse (Op-ed piece)


Bird cage liners, all of them


----------



## GG-1

Guest_George Harris_* said:


> WhoozOn1st said:
> 
> 
> 
> Los Angeles Times:
> Metrolink balked at safety upgrade's cost
> 
> Engineer led solitary life marked by tragedy
> 
> Rail safety and the human error excuse (Op-ed piece)
> 
> 
> 
> Bird cage liners, all of them
Click to expand...

Mahalo George

I couldn't think of a polite comment


----------



## Guest_Yerry_*

Yup. . . bird cage liner.

And today I ran into a MSNBC item about signals; it had some transportation PROFESSOR saying that any stop indication can be un-done by something as simple as a burned out light bulb.

Good thing us non-prof types know that a dark signal means "stop and proceed after getting permission by radio."


----------



## amtrakwolverine

according to google news



> The Metrolink train's usual routine is reportedly to wait until the Union Pacific freight train clears the track.


and



> The NTSB has determined Sanchez ran a red light that could have prevented the collision and did not apply the brakes. The agency said the tracks and signals were working properly and that human error was to blame.


the AP press said that a lady who bread her dogs with the driver said he had diabetes but he did not eat right and he had been sent home before for failing to control his diet. he could have passed out and ran the light.

sounds like a repeat of this wreck http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hinton_train_collision

the engineer of the CN train had high blood pressure he had diabetes he had a problem with his colon and he was a alcoholic. they say he collapsed and may of even died on the way to the toilet while his assistant slept.


----------



## VentureForth

You know, as a private pilot, I have to get a physical exam at least every three years. That's if I don't carry passengers or do anything more than just tool around at 1000 feet to go sightseeing. To exercise my commercial pilot license (for sightseeing, flight instruction, etc), I have to pass a medical exam every year. If I flew corporate jets or airliners, I would have to be checked out every SIX MONTHS.

Are locomotive engineers required to pass a medical exam? If so, how often? A Metrolink driver should get checked every six months - they are no less liable for the 222 passengers on their train than a regional jet carrying 70.

Psychologial evaluations should be a part of that. If this guy was truly on edge with the suicide of his boyfriend a couple years ago and the suicide of a pedestrian on his train just a month or so ago, as macabre as it sounds, it shouldn't be discounted that the thought could have crossed this guy's mind.

To bring this back to Amtrak, does Amtrak have a policy of two souls in the cab for LD trains? Maybe they should think about that.


----------



## frj1983

WhoozOn1st said:


> Make the rails safer
> L.A. Times editorial.


"And Metrolink, which has the second-worst commuter-rail fatality record in the nation, and not coincidentally shares an unusually high proportion of its tracks with freight trains, should receive one of the federal grants for a test installation."

While I'm not going to say anything about Metrolink having "the second-worst rail fatality record in the nation," I do find myself amused by the second phrase in the above sentence...the Editors have obviously not been to Chicago! Don't most Commuter Train Systems run on busy freight tracks? Or were they perhaps thinking of Europe?

Having only been to New York once, I'm not entirely sure how the Commuter Train System functions there, so I'll plead ignorance with regard to that!


----------



## WICT106

One should not underestimate the ability of the mass media to misinform the general public. Positive Train control ? These people obviously know nothing about railroad operation.


----------



## Guest

Highballer said:


> In the accounts I have read, the MetroLink engineer had worked for Amtrak for 10 years. But it sounded like he was working for a contractor who provides engineers to MetroLink. Is that right? And if so, why doesn't MetroLink employ its own engineers?


well yes. most of them went to the other company when amtrak lost or gave up the contract with metrolink.


----------



## Guest_Spokker_*

VentureForth said:


> Are locomotive engineers required to pass a medical exam? If so, how often?


No, just reds. 
I'll be honest, this guy didn't exactly look like the pinnacle of health. Based on the pictures that have been coming out, he looked like he was about to drop dead at any moment.



> Psychologial evaluations should be a part of that. If this guy was truly on edge with the suicide of his boyfriend a couple years ago and the suicide of a pedestrian on his train just a month or so ago, as macabre as it sounds, it shouldn't be discounted that the thought could have crossed this guy's mind.


He was a disturbed loner. Guy can't talk to neighbors. Prefers to communicate with teenagers. Prefers to hang out with a 77-year-old woman (who herself blew him off last Christmas). Steals Xbox consoles. Not exactly the kind of guy I want operating a train.
This guy was and continues to be a creep.


----------



## Guest_George Harris_*

> This guy was and continues to be a creep.


 Thank you Spokker for this excellent thorughly researched psychological analysis. Useful for armchair analyists that a peculiarity of US law is that it is impossible to legally slander or libel the dead. 
Part 2: Our wonderful California senators have now decided that they have a solution that should be made law. This considering, if I am quoting correctly, Dianne Feinstein said on TV something to the effect that she was shocked that freight trains and passenger trains operated on the same tracks. Hey stupid, they have for the last 180 years.


----------



## Guest_Spokker_*

Guest_George Harris_* said:


> This guy was and continues to be a creep.
> 
> 
> 
> Thank you Spokker for this excellent thorughly researched psychological analysis. Useful for armchair analyists that a peculiarity of US law is that it is impossible to legally slander or libel the dead.
Click to expand...

The guy was a saint.


----------



## Guest_Spokker_*

So you're a parent, and you find out your boy has been exchanging text messages with a 44-year-old man. You're telling me you're not going to give the guy a knock on his door and put a stop to it?

I heard a great line on the radio the other day. A guy said, "The only 44-year-old man allowed to text my son is ME."

Then I would put a stop to all this railfanning nonsense. The Southern California rail network is not a life-sized model trainset for these kids. It's supposed to be a professional operation intended to get people where they need to go. If you're loitering at a station without a ticket you need to go home.

I'm not slandering this engineer at all. My opinion is that he's a creep. Most people are starting to adopt that opinion as well. This whole thing is screwed up. And you people sit there and anyone who criticizes Metrolink, the engineer, railfans, or anyone associated with trains "knows nothing about the railroad."


----------



## GG-1

Aloha

Several of the last few post are over the edge of good tast. As a moderator I am going to refer these to the others to insure am unbiased review.

But Please all of us stay with known fcats and let the professionals reach a conclusion. Some time prople in my professionan rush to get scoops and may not always have correct information. Being first sometimes becoms so ??? that checking stories gets forgotten. Wish this was not true but it happens. Let us not compount the loss of truth.

Mahalo


----------



## Guest_George Harris_*

GG-1: I think we have gotten way too far afield in dealing with the person and personality of the engineer, plus, it is truly kicking a man while he is down. Who his friends are and aren't, his social life, state of mind, etc. are completely irrelevant to the issue. Whether he was distracted by extraneous matters or was incapacitated due to some health issue will come out in the analysis, and to guess about it here is completely useless. Whether or not "he was a disturbed loner" or "My opinion is that he was a creep" or he had thousands of friends and a large family is completely irrelevant to anything concerning the subject at hand, and in my opinion should dissapear from the thread.

And, to another question: No, Metrolink does not empolyee its own engineers or other train crew members. Veolia has a contract to operate the trains. Amtrak had the contract in years past. When the contract operator changed from Amtrak to Veolia, the employees running Metrolink trains had to change employers if they wanted to keep doing it. That and that alone is the reason for this man and a lot of others to have that particular change in employers.


----------



## WhoozOn1st

She told the truth, and lost her job

An L.A. Times Op-ed piece about former Metrolink spokeswoman Denise Tyrell. The online headline is very different.


----------



## nr272

Guest_Spokker_* said:


> So you're a parent, and you find out your boy has been exchanging text messages with a 44-year-old man. You're telling me you're not going to give the guy a knock on his door and put a stop to it?
> I heard a great line on the radio the other day. A guy said, "The only 44-year-old man allowed to text my son is ME."


Why, presumably they were talking about trains?


----------



## sky12065

nr272 said:


> Guest_Spokker_* said:
> 
> 
> 
> So you're a parent, and you find out your boy has been exchanging text messages with a 44-year-old man. You're telling me you're not going to give the guy a knock on his door and put a stop to it?
> I heard a great line on the radio the other day. A guy said, "The only 44-year-old man allowed to text my son is ME."
> 
> 
> 
> Why, presumably they were talking about trains?
Click to expand...


I can understand the statement "The only 44-year-old man allowed to text my son is ME." But if I still had a minor male child, I would certainly make an exception for grandfathers, uncles and a number of other close family male freinds and relatives that I trust!


----------



## sechs

WhoozOn1st said:


> She told the truth, and lost her job


It's really hard to take this woman's side when she wasn't doing her job.

We only know it's the truth in hindsight, and there are still questions as to what exactly occurred. And, she wasn't terminated; she quit.


----------



## Guest_Spokker_*

Guest_George Harris_* said:


> Whether or not "he was a disturbed loner" or "My opinion is that he was a creep" or he had thousands of friends and a large family is completely irrelevant to anything concerning the subject at hand, and in my opinion should dissapear from the thread.


It's completely relevant.

He either dropped dead due to his poor health, killed himself due to his tragic life, or got distracted by text messages. But go ahead and bury your head in the sand. "It was just a mistake..."


----------



## Guest_Spokker_*

nr272 said:


> Guest_Spokker_* said:
> 
> 
> 
> So you're a parent, and you find out your boy has been exchanging text messages with a 44-year-old man. You're telling me you're not going to give the guy a knock on his door and put a stop to it?
> I heard a great line on the radio the other day. A guy said, "The only 44-year-old man allowed to text my son is ME."
> 
> 
> 
> Why, presumably they were talking about trains?
Click to expand...

So if you had a son or daughter that was into trains and they were exchanging messages 44-year-old engineers ON DUTY you would be perfectly okay with it? You wouldn't rush out and at least meet the guy?

You'd think a guy should get some friends his own age.


----------



## Joel N. Weber II

VentureForth said:


> You know, as a private pilot, I have to get a physical exam at least every three years. That's if I don't carry passengers or do anything more than just tool around at 1000 feet to go sightseeing. To exercise my commercial pilot license (for sightseeing, flight instruction, etc), I have to pass a medical exam every year. If I flew corporate jets or airliners, I would have to be checked out every SIX MONTHS.


I thought a pilot is actually allowed to excercise the priviliges of the instructor's certificate without a current medical if the circumstances of the instruction are such that the student is fully qualified to act as pilot in command (that is, the student has a valid pilot's license and medical for the type of flight being conducted).


----------



## tp49

sechs said:


> WhoozOn1st said:
> 
> 
> 
> She told the truth, and lost her job
> 
> 
> 
> It's really hard to take this woman's side when she wasn't doing her job.
> 
> We only know it's the truth in hindsight, and there are still questions as to what exactly occurred. And, she wasn't terminated; she quit.
Click to expand...

She resigned under pressure. She would have been terminated had she not resigned.


----------



## GG-1

Aloha

Again I have set aside several post for review by the Moderating Team.

I am very sad to see all this name calling and bickering andjudgemental comments from some that are jumping to conclusions.

Let us please wait fror the investigation to finish.

Mahalo


----------



## Dutchrailnut

tp49 said:


> sechs said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> WhoozOn1st said:
> 
> 
> 
> She told the truth, and lost her job
> 
> 
> 
> It's really hard to take this woman's side when she wasn't doing her job.
> 
> We only know it's the truth in hindsight, and there are still questions as to what exactly occurred. And, she wasn't terminated; she quit.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> She resigned under pressure. She would have been terminated had she not resigned.
Click to expand...

The top honco of Metrolink board has admitted it was him that authorized the release of information and that the spokes woman had not done it on her own account.

It was during a emergency vboard meeting on sunday that the board tried to retract what they had released after a scalding by NTSB.

It realy appears the Metrolink board is biggest bunch of bunglers in rail history, and after this is over they should all be replaced.


----------



## VentureForth

Joel N. Weber II said:


> VentureForth said:
> 
> 
> 
> You know, as a private pilot, I have to get a physical exam at least every three years. That's if I don't carry passengers or do anything more than just tool around at 1000 feet to go sightseeing. To exercise my commercial pilot license (for sightseeing, flight instruction, etc), I have to pass a medical exam every year. If I flew corporate jets or airliners, I would have to be checked out every SIX MONTHS.
> 
> 
> 
> I thought a pilot is actually allowed to excercise the priviliges of the instructor's certificate without a current medical if the circumstances of the instruction are such that the student is fully qualified to act as pilot in command (that is, the student has a valid pilot's license and medical for the type of flight being conducted).
Click to expand...

Within the context of this forum, I wasn't going to delve into that level of detail. We could talk about safety pilot requirements, etc., but in general my point was that different levels of being a pilot require different levels of medical exam requirements, the most stringent being a hired person with charge of protecting hundreds of lives requiring such an exam every 6 months. And in those cases, there are ALWAYS two people in the cockpit BOTH with that level of medical exam.

As for moderating this thread, I respectfully request that you consider that we are talking about safety of passenger rail. Whether that safety is human factor or mechanical factor, one cannot be addressed without the consideration of the other. As the conversation starts eliminating mechanical factors as a root cause, there is a lot of room to consider human error.

I am not berating Mr. Sanchez (May God rest his soul!), but in my professional opinion, an individual who is put in the charge of the safety of people should be subject to a medical exam every six months that includes blood testing for drugs, alcohol, cholesterol, and sugar. Perhaps there is a problem with government operating passenger trains. Maybe they can't be as intrusive into a person's medical record as a private employer. However, to be put in charge of so many people should require a certain level of waiver to privacy, or else a candidate should look for another line of work.


----------



## WhoozOn1st

L.A. Times:

'Railfans' create virtual memorial for engineer

Cellphones banned for train crews


----------



## MrFSS

WhoozOn1st said:


> L.A. Times:
> 'Railfans' create virtual memorial for engineer
> 
> Cellphones banned for train crews


Patrick - do they have that line back open for regular service, yet?


----------



## WhoozOn1st

MrFSS said:


> do they have that line back open for regular service, yet?


Yes. A day later than planned. Route was ready on Tuesday, 9-16-08, but the NTSB took it over for testing as part of its investigation into the wreck. Part of this involved running two UP locomotives and a Metrolink train face to face (point of impact), then slowly backing them to determine the point at which the trains would have been visible to each other, and how much time the crews had to react (about 4 seconds).

Metrolink Ventura County Line resumed truncated rail service from Chatsworth to Union Station (Chatsworth, Northridge, Van Nuys, Burbank airport, downtown Burbank, Glendale, LAUS) on Monday, 9-15-08. Buses were used to convey passengers from the Moorpark and Simi Valley stops. Passengers who would normally board at Montalvo (me), Oxnard, and Camarillo had to find alternative transportation.

Because Amtrak's Pacific Surfliners and Coast Starlight were not running on the 16th, my Tuxedo Run, for which I had made reservations online prior to the wreck, was delayed by a day. Actually, the Starlight was beginning and ending at Santa Barbara, with buses connecting from L.A. No good for me, because although I coulda gotten the Starlight connecting bus at Oxnard, without the Surfliners running (or the Starlight south of SBA) I'd have no way home from Santa Barbara.

I called Amtrak early Tuesday morning for confirmation of the situation, and to make sure that whenever the trains resumed running there would be no problems with my reservations. Then Amtrak called ME, and we went over essentially the same ground. Difficult to say for sure, but I thought the agent sounded relieved that I was aware of the situation and didn't mind waiting for resumption of service. I'm easy! 

Full route service on Metrolink's Ventura County Line was back by Tuesday afternoon, with Amtrak following suit on Wednesday. Coast Starlight Train 11 may have made it to L.A. on the 16th, but not sure.


----------



## MrFSS

WhoozOn1st said:


> I'm easy!


But not cheap!!


----------



## GG-1

VentureForth said:


> As for moderating this thread, I respectfully request that you consider that we are talking about safety of passenger rail. Whether that safety is human factor or mechanical factor, one cannot be addressed without the consideration of the other. As the conversation starts eliminating mechanical factors as a root cause, there is a lot of room to consider human error.


Aloha

As one of the moderators here I agree with what you just said. When a message includes "name calling" and personal disparaging remarks, that message does not belong here. If a message contains both types of content then what I feel most comfortable doing is hiding that message until other moderators review such message. This way we, and you can be confortable about what content to expect while allowing the free expression of Ideas and opinions. The participants here are from all ages and backgrounds our goal is free interchange of thoughts, while retaining proper decorum.

Last night I said, and I did, hide 7 messages, that I thought transcended our acceptable standards, which includes our fellow users. This morning I see that others in the team have agreed about the removal of 3 of them. If we ere, I hope we always ere on the side of community, that can always be adjusted, but if we leave something offensive how do we undo the offense?

I may have written this poorly, and other moderators may add or change what I have said, however I hope that all understand the goals we try to achieve.

Mahalo

Eric


----------



## Green Maned Lion

Guest_Spokker_* said:


> So you're a parent, and you find out your boy has been exchanging text messages with a 44-year-old man. You're telling me you're not going to give the guy a knock on his door and put a stop to it?
> I heard a great line on the radio the other day. A guy said, "The only 44-year-old man allowed to text my son is ME."
> 
> Then I would put a stop to all this railfanning nonsense. The Southern California rail network is not a life-sized model trainset for these kids. It's supposed to be a professional operation intended to get people where they need to go. If you're loitering at a station without a ticket you need to go home.
> 
> I'm not slandering this engineer at all. My opinion is that he's a creep. Most people are starting to adopt that opinion as well. This whole thing is screwed up. And you people sit there and anyone who criticizes Metrolink, the engineer, railfans, or anyone associated with trains "knows nothing about the railroad."


Dude, I don't know the extent of the relationship this engineer had with these kids. I've had a lot of fairly close relationships with people considerably older than me in my life. None of them were what I'd call inappropriate. Perhaps this dude always wished he had kids and wanted to be a friend and somewhat paternal figure towards these admiring teenagers. Nothing wrong with that. Or he could have been a grown kid- I can qualify sometimes- and had a friendship with them that way. Its not inappropriate there, either.

Give one iota of actual improper conduct between them and I'd take your point of view more seriously. Age, in and of itself, is not an issue in relationships that are both platonic and have no power influence. Which the engineer did not.

Should an engineer be text messaging whilst in the position of operating a train? No bloody way. Is there _malem in sie_ problems with him reading and sending text messages during a station stop, if he keeps on schedule and pays proper attention? Nope.

Could he be a creep? Sure he could. But you haven't demonstrated any evidence whatsoever to indicate that other than some observation and a mountain of semiplausible conjecture infused with a healthy dose of confirmation bias.

Its sort of seeing a married man spending time working late overtime with his young assistant as an indication of who he is. Sure, they could be spending time in there doing things that aren't good. Or they could simply be dedicatedly working their asses off on some project. Unless you observe what they do in the office after hours, you can gossip all you want, but you simply don't know.

Please, for the benefit of your own credibility, don't portray gossip as fact.


----------



## Joel N. Weber II

GG-1 said:


> The participants here are from all ages and backgrounds our goal is free interchange of thoughts, while retaining proper decorum.


This is a difficult task, and I think overall the moderating team does a very good job of handling the challenges that are sometimes presented by people posting here. I certainly can't think of another site that I can argue is clearly better run with respect to these types of challenges.


----------



## Joel N. Weber II

Green Maned Lion said:


> Dude, I don't know the extent of the relationship this engineer had with these kids. I've had a lot of fairly close relationships with people considerably older than me in my life. None of them were what I'd call inappropriate. Perhaps this dude always wished he had kids and wanted to be a friend and somewhat paternal figure towards these admiring teenagers. Nothing wrong with that. Or he could have been a grown kid- I can qualify sometimes- and had a friendship with them that way. Its not inappropriate there, either.


I can think of multiple platonic friendships I've had in my adult life with people who are maybe 20-30 years older than me, and I've learned quite a bit from talking with people whose experience in some areas exceeds mine; among other things, it's how I learned a good chunk of what I know about IP routing, machine shops, and ham radio. (Where I've been interested in learning more, I've also done a lot of reading.) I think that sort of friendship can provide an effective education in areas that classes in American schools don't tend to cover well, and it's something that should be encouraged.


----------



## amtrakwolverine

heres some more info on the wreck


----------



## WhoozOn1st

L.A. Times:

NTSB tries to sort it all out

Metrolink makes do as 'stepchild' agency

Delays in meal breaks sought. This article is about the lobbying activities of Veolia Transportation, the Metrolink contractor which employed Train 111 engineer Robert M. Sanchez.


----------



## access bob

Guest_Spokker_* said:


> So you're a parent, and you find out your boy has been exchanging text messages with a 44-year-old man. You're telling me you're not going to give the guy a knock on his door and put a stop to it?
> I heard a great line on the radio the other day. A guy said, "The only 44-year-old man allowed to text my son is ME."
> 
> Then I would put a stop to all this railfanning nonsense. The Southern California rail network is not a life-sized model trainset for these kids. It's supposed to be a professional operation intended to get people where they need to go. If you're loitering at a station without a ticket you need to go home.
> 
> I'm not slandering this engineer at all. My opinion is that he's a creep. Most people are starting to adopt that opinion as well. This whole thing is screwed up. And you people sit there and anyone who criticizes Metrolink, the engineer, railfans, or anyone associated with trains "knows nothing about the railroad."



Other side of same coin, Many years ago I was one of those kids, no radio or text messaging but I hung around the rails, and took photos with my old brownie (some photos now cherished classics) and got to know some of those "Creeps" , Many the time an Engineer would lean out of the cab and have a kind word with the "kid on the platform" some I got to "know" only because of them having compatible schedules with mine. but never once did any of them do or say anything inappropriate..

What I learned was that it was a hard job, and they were mostly dedicated to keeping those trains moving. once in a while a non safety rule was bent, but as I got older I got more interested.

I went off to college and got my degree in transportation engineering and among other jobs help design some of the improvements in the North East Corridor for the Acela high speed trains.. even today when I need some obscure fact I often turn to the railfans because they usually have the answer.

who knows if some of those guys (and it was all guys then) ever got into trouble, but I try to stay friendly with the railfans and unless they are doing something illegal or dangerous I leave them alone. sometimes talking to them but mostly just being professional. But if they hadn't taken an interest in that pest of a kid I doubt I would have spent the years as a professional transportation engineer that I have.

as for critizing, I critizize those who jump to conclusions, because too many times I've found the first conclusion is often the wrong one. So lets give these kids a break and not pass judgement on Mr Sanchez until we know the facts. Heck these kids could be doing drugs and robbing little old ladies instead they are recording a part of our history. 50 years from now who knows what those photos will be worth, and wouldn't it have been helpful if one of those cameras would have recorded what actually happened at Chatsworth???

if they are being safe and staying out of the way I say take all the photos you want. and if an employee is courteous or kind to them without compromising safety I say that is a good thing. why do we always want to believe the worst in somebody?

sorry that just had to be said.

Bob


----------



## AlanB

GG-1 said:


> Last night I said, and I did, hide 7 messages, that I thought transcended our acceptable standards, which includes our fellow users. This morning I see that others in the team have agreed about the removal of 3 of them. If we ere, I hope we always ere on the side of community, that can always be adjusted, but if we leave something offensive how do we undo the offense?


And as of now, the other 4 have been returned to view, although two did receive a small edit.


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## WhoozOn1st

Metrolink woes: Let us count the ways

A Times op-ed piece overlooked earlier today.


----------



## Guest_George Harris_*

WhoozOn1st said:


> Metrolink woes: Let us count the ways
> A Times op-ed piece overlooked earlier today.


Another bird cage liner long on arm waving and short on real information. Not that I consider Vieolia that great or the idea of split shifts wonderful, but none the less, far more heat than light in the article.


----------



## WhoozOn1st

Guest_George Harris_* said:


> WhoozOn1st said:
> 
> 
> 
> Metrolink woes: Let us count the ways
> A Times op-ed piece overlooked earlier today.
> 
> 
> 
> Another bird cage liner long on arm waving and short on real information. Not that I consider Vieolia that great or the idea of split shifts wonderful, but none the less, far more heat than light in the article.
Click to expand...

Providing information is not the primary intent, purpose, or function of an opinion piece or editorial. The forms are meant to advocate points of view, not provide the objective coverage that is the goal of news reporting. I clearly label such pieces when posting links to them. In this case it was an op-ed piece, which derives from the traditional newspaper format of printing outside views on the page OPposite the EDitorials. Such pieces are always credited to one or more individuals, while editorials are unsigned and typically reflect the views of the publisher, as distilled through a board composed of the publication's senior editors.

Failure to recognize the difference between reporting news and advocating ideas represents a fundamental misunderstanding of the basic principles and forms of journalism.


----------



## Guest_George Harris_*

WhoozOn1st said:


> Failure to recognize the difference between reporting news and advocating ideas represents a fundamental misunderstanding of the basic principles and forms of journalism.


I have no problem with the presentation of opinion, just the presentation of opinion from the obviously uninformed when they pronounce solutions with minimal understanding of the situation.


----------



## Alice

Guest_George Harris_* said:


> WhoozOn1st said:
> 
> 
> 
> Failure to recognize the difference between reporting news and advocating ideas represents a fundamental misunderstanding of the basic principles and forms of journalism.
> 
> 
> 
> I have no problem with the presentation of opinion, just the presentation of opinion from the obviously uninformed when they pronounce solutions with minimal understanding of the situation.
Click to expand...

I agree about your description of many opinion pieces. However, I still read them because that is what other people read and often believe, and then vote accordingly. On anything important to me, I write a letter to the editor, as I wish more people with specific knowledge would.

In other words, I hope some of you write a letter to the LA Times (or wherever) before cleaning your "birdcages" ...


----------



## Green Maned Lion

George, it is often interesting to read the point of view of the uninformed. What the great unwashed masses think is a valuable thing to know. If you know the information to be false, then you are ahead of the group.


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## WhoozOn1st

More L.A. Times birdcage liner for Mr. Harris:

Years of use prove rail controls work

EDIT: Also an *EDITORIAL*: Asleep at the switch?


----------



## WhoozOn1st

Associated Press, via Ventura County Star:

Metrolink crash spurs Congress into action

A quote from the article:

"We regulate in this country by counting tombstones. If you don't have enough people dead, nothing gets done. The pressure isn't there to do it."

-- Barry Sweedler, former director of NTSB's office of safety recommendations.


----------



## PetalumaLoco

Apparently Conan O'Brien was going to make a joke about headon train wrecks when NBC's Los Angeles station interupted the program...


----------



## WhoozOn1st

L.A. Times:

Accord reached on rail bill

"The measure had stalled before Sept. 12, when a Metrolink commuter train crashed into a Union Pacific freight train, killing 25 people and injuring 135."

EDIT: In the accompanying AP video, the Metrolink trains shown are 1) engaged in testing for the NTSB investigation, 2) arriving inbound at Downtown Burbank station, 3) arriving outbound at Chatsworth and, 4) running inbound toward Chatsworth after exiting the Santa Susana pass. Note bridle path beside tracks. Quite a few residents of the area (west end of the San Fernando Valley) keep horses, and even more have pools.


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## GG-1

Aloha

Well finally I am reading what appears to be a honest report about the crash. the link is here

Mahalo


----------



## Ryan

Wow, thanks for posting.

Those photographs really drive home the "no time to react" point.


----------



## WhoozOn1st

GG-1 said:


> Aloha
> Well finally I am reading what appears to be a honest report about the crash. the link is here
> 
> Mahalo


Not really a report at all, and the title page calls it a "Brief Overview," which is an accurate description of the photo account of the wreck and reenactment.


----------



## Dutchrailnut

WhoozOn1st said:


> GG-1 said:
> 
> 
> 
> Aloha
> Well finally I am reading what appears to be a honest report about the crash. the link is here
> 
> Mahalo
> 
> 
> 
> Not really a report at all, and the title page calls it a "Brief Overview," which is an accurate description of the photo account of the wreck and reenactment.
Click to expand...

Te PUC report has more holes in it than a swis cheese, how did they get to 80 mph combined collision speed when Download and NTSB report show 25 for UP and 42 for the Metrolink train,.

My simple math sees that as 67 mph combined collision speed.

The PUC put out a report just to be first, not to be accurate


----------



## Guest

Dutchrailnut said:


> Te PUC report has more holes in it than a swis cheese, how did they get to 80 mph combined collision speed when Download and NTSB report show 25 for UP and 42 for the Metrolink train,.My simple math sees that as 67 mph combined collision speed.
> 
> The PUC put out a report just to be first, not to be accurate


The last line you wrote says it best. California PUC is attempting to justify its funding by trying to appear to be a big player in a situation where it really has very little standing to do anything.

Politics, pure and simple.

Particularly telling is the slide number 22, "Director Clark Briefing NTSB Board Member Kitty Higgins at the Scene on the Role of the PUC." Trying to make it look like the PUC is leading the charge and is providing guidance to the NTSB.

The reality is that the NTSB is BY LAW doing the investigation and the the PUC standing in the matter is somewhere between being gofers and being underfoot.


----------



## Joel N. Weber II

Guest said:


> The reality is that the NTSB is BY LAW doing the investigation and the the PUC standing in the matter is somewhere between being gofers and being underfoot.


I was kinda surprised to see PUC involved at all.


----------



## VentureForth

This is hardly a report. Just a series of obvious facts and an interesting slide show. There are no root causes, findings, or suggestions.

There will always be interagency cooperation and, realistically, competition. I think that PUC's only role is to get things cleaned up and back to operation. Even that is just regulatory oversight - the rebuilding and certifing of the ROW belongs to UP.


----------



## Guest_George Harris_*

VentureForth said:


> the rebuilding and certifing of the ROW belongs to UP.


Track ownership is Metrolink at this location.


----------



## VentureForth

Doh.

Thanks George.


----------



## WhoozOn1st

L.A. Times:

Metrolink to consider safety gear

Thursday, 9-25-08: New train safety improvements urged

On Thursday, 9-25-08, I was returning from a *secret mission* in preparation for our Amtrak Unlimited Second Annual Gathering at Los Angeles next month.

Riding Metrolink 113 in pull mode on the Ventura County Line, I had the opportunity to get photos of the curve where the wreck occurred. Because the train was moving over this stretch of track much more slowly than usual it's a pretty good sequence, taken running outbound from Chatsworth and into the Santa Susana pass. IIRC, about 1,100' of track had to be replaced. The only remaining traces of the carnage are heavy equipment tracks on both sides of the right of way, some parked equipment, piled ties, and other stuff.

The Metrolink Moorpark station is an overnight point for some Metrolink trainsets, and there's a small yard there. Parked, and fully cloaked by heavy plastic tarp, was a 6-axle locomotive that I suspect may have been the lead UP engine in the collision; never seen any freight locomotives there before.

So for what it's worth...

Metrolink Wreck Curve


----------



## gswager

According to an article about adding second engineer to its locomotive. Should they call them, "fireman(person)"?


----------



## WhoozOn1st

gswager said:


> According to an article about adding second engineer to its locomotive. Should they call them, "fireman(person)"?


Maybe in locomotives, but good luck squeezing a second person into the cab of a Metrolink cab car.


----------



## Rumpled

Just a quick curiosity of mine.

In none of the reorts have I seen the fate of the freight train crew. I didn't see them listed as among the dead, but saw nothing else.

Any reports of if they took cover, got seriously injured or not?


----------



## George Harris

Rumpled said:


> Just a quick curiosity of mine.In none of the reorts have I seen the fate of the freight train crew. I didn't see them listed as among the dead, but saw nothing else.


Injured but both survived. Do not recall the extent of the injuries. Broken bones, at least. Despite the PUC "closing speed of 80 mph" according to other sources, NTSB? the freight train speed was 25 mph. Since it appears that the passenger locomotive was driven backward by the impact, the decelleration rate experienced by the freight crew would have been much less than that of the passenger loco.

Despite the hokum about "closing speed" the real issue is rate of change of speed, that is acceleration rate. The freight engine went from 25 mph to stopped in a distance of a few feet. The passenger engine went from 42 mph in one direction to some unkown but under 25 mph and probably well under it speed in the other direction in a very short distance, giving it and its unfortunate occupant a much higher acceleration rate.


----------



## Dutchrailnut

UP train had a 3 man crew, conductor just scrapes and bruises, Brakeman and Engineer in Hospital with broken bones.


----------



## access bob

Dutchrailnut said:


> UP train had a 3 man crew, conductor just scrapes and bruises, Brakeman and Engineer in Hospital with broken bones.


never heard, did they ride it in or bail out????

Bob


----------



## Dutchrailnut

access bob said:


> Dutchrailnut said:
> 
> 
> 
> UP train had a 3 man crew, conductor just scrapes and bruises, Brakeman and Engineer in Hospital with broken bones.
> 
> 
> 
> never heard, did they ride it in or bail out????
> 
> Bob
Click to expand...

They rode it, after all they only had about 2 seconds.


----------



## amtrakwolverine

Dutchrailnut said:


> access bob said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Dutchrailnut said:
> 
> 
> 
> UP train had a 3 man crew, conductor just scrapes and bruises, Brakeman and Engineer in Hospital with broken bones.
> 
> 
> 
> never heard, did they ride it in or bail out????
> 
> Bob
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> They rode it, after all they only had about 2 seconds.
Click to expand...

not even enough time get out of the seat.


----------



## WhoozOn1st

L.A. Times:

Metrolink is pairing up engineers

"It's just an interim measure until we can find something permanent."

--David Solow, Metrolink Chief Executive.


----------



## amtrakwolverine

the women who quit said the driver ran a red signal. thats the truth and how is that pre-mature. what we don't know is why did he run the signal. was he too busy texting and not looking out the window. Did he go into diabetic shock or coma. did he fall asleep from working a split shift. Was it suicide. we don't know and thats what the NTSB is trying to find out.


----------



## had8ley

KISS_ALIVE said:


> the women who quit said the driver ran a red signal. thats the truth and how is that pre-mature. what we don't know is why did he run the signal. was he too busy texting and not looking out the window. Did he go into diabetic shock or coma. did he fall asleep from working a split shift. Was it suicide. we don't know and thats what the NTSB is trying to find out.


Yes, but the dog did it goes so far. I remember one incident that we investigated where a switch engine ran into the back of an Amtrak train. The brother engineer was vehement that his brakes did not apply. I asked him if he had put his engine into emergency to which we got a resounding, "YES." I then asked him to plug the engine. Every sander worked and there was no sand on the rail leading up the hind end of the pax train. He changed his story on the spot.


----------



## WhoozOn1st

L.A. Times:

Firm that employed Metrolink engineer had other troubles

Veolia is a huge outfit.


----------



## WhoozOn1st

I've generally avoided posting links to emotional stories about the wreck, but because this one involves the engineer I'm making an exception.

A burden of grief on their shoulders


----------



## amtrakwolverine

i know this is a different wreck but the one were the 2 metrolinks crashed into a car parked by a man claiming suicide. they say the driver of that train could have stopped in time if he had been paying proper attention and he goes on trail next year. seams metrolink has trouble with the drivers they use.


----------



## Dutchrailnut

KISS_ALIVE said:


> i know this is a different wreck but the one were the 2 metrolinks crashed into a car parked by a man claiming suicide. they say the driver of that train could have stopped in time if he had been paying proper attention and he goes on trail next year. seams metrolink has trouble with the drivers they use.


drivers ?? what are we British ?? their called Locomotive Engineers


----------



## George Harris

KISS_ALIVE said:


> i know this is a different wreck but the one were the 2 metrolinks crashed into a car parked by a man claiming suicide. they say the driver of that train could have stopped in time if he had been paying proper attention and he goes on trail next year. seams metrolink has trouble with the drivers they use.


1. Complete nonsense. Probably could not have gooten stopped in tine no matter how hard he tried.

2. Why should be expected to have stopped.


----------



## Ryan

Dutchrailnut said:


> KISS_ALIVE said:
> 
> 
> 
> i know this is a different wreck but the one were the 2 metrolinks crashed into a car parked by a man claiming suicide. they say the driver of that train could have stopped in time if he had been paying proper attention and he goes on trail next year. seams metrolink has trouble with the drivers they use.
> 
> 
> 
> drivers ?? what are we British ?? their called Locomotive Engineers
Click to expand...

Actually, while we're being overly pedantic, _they're_ called Engineers (unless you happen to know someone that possess an engineer, and then I stand corrected).


----------



## amtrakwolverine

Dutchrailnut said:


> KISS_ALIVE said:
> 
> 
> 
> i know this is a different wreck but the one were the 2 metrolinks crashed into a car parked by a man claiming suicide. they say the driver of that train could have stopped in time if he had been paying proper attention and he goes on trail next year. seams metrolink has trouble with the drivers they use.
> 
> 
> 
> drivers ?? what are we British ?? their called Locomotive Engineers
Click to expand...

there the same thing engineer driver same thing. i'll call them what i will maybe murderer would be better HMMMMMM :angry:


----------



## amtrakwolverine

George Harris said:


> KISS_ALIVE said:
> 
> 
> 
> i know this is a different wreck but the one were the 2 metrolinks crashed into a car parked by a man claiming suicide. they say the driver of that train could have stopped in time if he had been paying proper attention and he goes on trail next year. seams metrolink has trouble with the drivers they use.
> 
> 
> 
> 1. Complete nonsense. Probably could not have gooten stopped in tine no matter how hard he tried.
> 
> 2. Why should be expected to have stopped.
Click to expand...


2005 Glendale train crash

though Mr. Alvarez has been convicted, the Metrolink engineer allegedly should have been able to stop the train before ever striking the jeep had he only been paying proper attention. That case is scheduled to go to trial on June 8, 2009, with Los Angeles attorney Jerome Ringler as lead counsel.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metrolink_(Ca...2C_January_2005

like said it seams metrolink needs to find another sub-contractor for its ENGINEERS


----------



## had8ley

KISS_ALIVE said:


> Dutchrailnut said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> KISS_ALIVE said:
> 
> 
> 
> i know this is a different wreck but the one were the 2 metrolinks crashed into a car parked by a man claiming suicide. they say the driver of that train could have stopped in time if he had been paying proper attention and he goes on trail next year. seams metrolink has trouble with the drivers they use.
> 
> 
> 
> drivers ?? what are we British ?? their called Locomotive Engineers
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> there the same thing engineer driver same thing. i'll call them what i will maybe murderer would be better HMMMMMM :angry:
Click to expand...

I watched 17 people commit suicide in front of my engines in my career; EVERY crossing that they tried to beat me at had either cross bucks, lights and/or gates. It's a state law in Louisiana that the train has the right of way and automobile traffic must stop and yield to the train. I didn't sleep well after many of these incidents (they were NOT accidents) but I certainly don't feel like a murderer~ I hope St. Peter agrees. "They say" doesn't hold much water with me.


----------



## George Harris

had8ley said:


> KISS_ALIVE said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Dutchrailnut said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> KISS_ALIVE said:
> 
> 
> 
> i know this is a different wreck but the one were the 2 metrolinks crashed into a car parked by a man claiming suicide. they say the driver of that train could have stopped in time if he had been paying proper attention and he goes on trail next year. seams metrolink has trouble with the drivers they use.
> 
> 
> 
> drivers ?? what are we British ?? their called Locomotive Engineers
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> there the same thing engineer driver same thing. i'll call them what i will maybe murderer would be better HMMMMMM :angry:
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> I watched 17 people commit suicide in front of my engines in my career; EVERY crossing that they tried to beat me at had either cross bucks, lights and/or gates. It's a state law in Louisiana that the train has the right of way and automobile traffic must stop and yield to the train. I didn't sleep well after many of these incidents (they were NOT accidents) but I certainly don't feel like a murderer~ I hope St. Peter agrees. "They say" doesn't hold much water with me.
Click to expand...

Had8ley:

I appreciate the massive level of restraint in your response. So far as I am concerned, KISS ALIVE has gone way beyond any level of reason or decency in his statements, and stooped to gross insult. I really do not trust myself to say more.

George


----------



## Ryan

George Harris said:


> had8ley said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> KISS_ALIVE said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Dutchrailnut said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> KISS_ALIVE said:
> 
> 
> 
> i know this is a different wreck but the one were the 2 metrolinks crashed into a car parked by a man claiming suicide. they say the driver of that train could have stopped in time if he had been paying proper attention and he goes on trail next year. seams metrolink has trouble with the drivers they use.
> 
> 
> 
> drivers ?? what are we British ?? their called Locomotive Engineers
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> there the same thing engineer driver same thing. i'll call them what i will maybe murderer would be better HMMMMMM :angry:
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> I watched 17 people commit suicide in front of my engines in my career; EVERY crossing that they tried to beat me at had either cross bucks, lights and/or gates. It's a state law in Louisiana that the train has the right of way and automobile traffic must stop and yield to the train. I didn't sleep well after many of these incidents (they were NOT accidents) but I certainly don't feel like a murderer~ I hope St. Peter agrees. "They say" doesn't hold much water with me.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> Had8ley:
> 
> I appreciate the massive level of restraint in your response. So far as I am concerned, KISS ALIVE has gone way beyond any level of reason or decency in his statements, and stooped to gross insult. I really do not trust myself to say more.
> 
> George
Click to expand...

Really? I don't want to put words in KISS ALIVE's mouth, but the way I read it, I don't think that he called Had8ley a murderer at all. Obviously, there is something different about this case that the engineer COULD HAVE prevented this (or at least there's a reason enough for a prosecutor and grand jury to send it along to trial - in any event, the proof is a heck of a lot stronger than just "they say"). Seems as though you both aren't able to separate his criticism of a particular engineer with criticizing engineers as a whole.

Just my $0.02 (now worth $0.015)


----------



## Dutchrailnut

Latest NTSB report, note accident happend at 16:23 or 4:23PM.

************************************************************

NTSB ADVISORY

************************************************************

National Transportation Safety Board

Washington , DC 20594

October 1, 2008

************************************************************

UPDATE: NTSB'S INVESTIGATION OF THE METROLINK, UNION PACIFIC

ACCIDENT IN CALIFORNIA

************************************************************

The following is an update of the NTSB's investigation of

the September 12, 2008 accident in Chatsworth, California

involving a Metrolink commuter train and a Union Pacific

freight train. As a result of the head-on collision, there

were 25 fatalities and numerous injuries.

Information regarding the Metrolink engineer's cell phone

activity on the day of the accident was obtained from his

service provider under subpoena from the NTSB. As part of

the ongoing investigation, this information is being used to

determine the timing of cell phone activity, which includes

text messaging to and from the engineer's cell number, in

relation to the engineer's duty hours and train operations.

Although the precise timing and correlation of these events

is still underway at the Safety Board's Recorder Laboratory,

preliminary information is being released regarding the

approximate cell phone activity during the engineer's duty

hours on the day of the accident.

On the day of the accident, the Metrolink engineer was on

duty for two periods of time. The engineer was responsible

for the operation of a train from 6:44 am until 8:53 am.

During this period of time, the engineer's cell phone

received 21 text messages and sent 24 text messages.

He was then off duty until 2:00 pm. The engineer was

responsible for the operation of Metrolink train 111 from

3:03 pm until the time of the accident. During this time

period, the engineer's cell phone received 7 text messages

and sent 5 text messages. According to the time on the cell

phone provider's records, the last text message received by

the engineer's phone before the accident was at 4:21:03 pm,

and the last text message sent from the engineer's cell

phone was 4:22:01 pm.


----------



## gswager

And what time was the train ran over the switch and at the point of accident?


----------



## Joel N. Weber II

If you start looking at the seconds, you'd better make sure everyone is handling leap seconds in a consistent fashion.


----------



## PetalumaLoco

Joel N. Weber II said:


> If you start looking at the seconds, you'd better make sure everyone is handling leap seconds in a consistent fashion.


Don't they happen only every 4 minutes?


----------



## PetalumaLoco

The senate is voting right now on Amtrak and Railroad Safety programs.

On C-Span2.


----------



## PetalumaLoco

nevermind


----------



## Dutchrailnut

from signal to point of impact is 25 seconds


----------



## Joel N. Weber II

PetalumaLoco said:


> Don't they happen only every 4 minutes?


No, leap seconds happen sometime between one second every few years and one second every six months.

The problem is that if some of the systems you're dealing with happen to ignore leap second corrections completely and others don't, over the years they will gradually drift out of sync by several seconds.

One of my coworkers was recently pointing out to me that one of the problems with leap seconds is that you cannot pinpoint a time 50 years in the future precisely, because we do not know how many leap seconds will be inserted over the course of the next 50 years.

However, given that the timestamps on any cell phone text messages only indicate when the cell phone user hit the send button (if they even reflect that time precisely) and not when he was busy looking at the cell phone's display to compose a message, the potential leap second issue may not have much relevance. A hypothetical engineer could spend 30 seconds composing the first 2/3rds of the first text message he starts composing that day during the time he or she runs a signal and is killed in a collision, and then there'd be no record of a text message being sent that day at all.


----------



## PetalumaLoco

Joel N. Weber II said:


> PetalumaLoco said:
> 
> 
> 
> Don't they happen only every 4 minutes?
> 
> 
> 
> No, leap seconds happen sometime between one second every few years and one second every six months.
> 
> The problem is that if some of the systems you're dealing with happen to ignore leap second corrections completely and others don't, over the years they will gradually drift out of sync by several seconds.
> 
> One of my coworkers was recently pointing out to me that one of the problems with leap seconds is that you cannot pinpoint a time 50 years in the future precisely, because we do not know how many leap seconds will be inserted over the course of the next 50 years.
> 
> However, given that the timestamps on any cell phone text messages only indicate when the cell phone user hit the send button (if they even reflect that time precisely) and not when he was busy looking at the cell phone's display to compose a message, the potential leap second issue may not have much relevance. A hypothetical engineer could spend 30 seconds composing the first 2/3rds of the first text message he starts composing that day during the time he or she runs a signal and is killed in a collision, and then there'd be no record of a text message being sent that day at all.
Click to expand...

Joel

I appreciate the explanation. I was pulling your leg. B)


----------



## VentureForth

Interesting that the cell phone usage was so well documented. Now they need to get a time stamp on the train and correlate it to the phone records. Then they need to back up and see if the engineer could have been in the station at the time the text was sent.

Good point, Joel, about the fact that it can take several minutes to compose a text, but the time stamp is only relavent when you hit send. Also, if he was in the middle of texting while driving, and had the collision before hitting send, it would never be recorded.

I'm interested in learning from the pathology reports....


----------



## frj1983

Can someone, please, please, explain to me what is this big DEAL about texting and why it is so important to be doing it anywhere and everywhere?????????????????????????????

I just don't get it! :blink:


----------



## haolerider

VentureForth said:


> Interesting that the cell phone usage was so well documented. Now they need to get a time stamp on the train and correlate it to the phone records. Then they need to back up and see if the engineer could have been in the station at the time the text was sent.
> Good point, Joel, about the fact that it can take several minutes to compose a text, but the time stamp is only relavent when you hit send. Also, if he was in the middle of texting while driving, and had the collision before hitting send, it would never be recorded.
> 
> I'm interested in learning from the pathology reports....


The latest report shows he sent a test message 22 seconds before the crash. Whether sending or receiving, it appears as though he was more focused on the texting than on his train duties. Very difficult.


----------



## amtrakwolverine

George Harris said:


> had8ley said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> KISS_ALIVE said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Dutchrailnut said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> KISS_ALIVE said:
> 
> 
> 
> i know this is a different wreck but the one were the 2 metrolinks crashed into a car parked by a man claiming suicide. they say the driver of that train could have stopped in time if he had been paying proper attention and he goes on trail next year. seams metrolink has trouble with the drivers they use.
> 
> 
> 
> drivers ?? what are we British ?? their called Locomotive Engineers
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> there the same thing engineer driver same thing. i'll call them what i will maybe murderer would be better HMMMMMM :angry:
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> I watched 17 people commit suicide in front of my engines in my career; EVERY crossing that they tried to beat me at had either cross bucks, lights and/or gates. It's a state law in Louisiana that the train has the right of way and automobile traffic must stop and yield to the train. I didn't sleep well after many of these incidents (they were NOT accidents) but I certainly don't feel like a murderer~ I hope St. Peter agrees. "They say" doesn't hold much water with me.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> Had8ley:
> 
> I appreciate the massive level of restraint in your response. So far as I am concerned, KISS ALIVE has gone way beyond any level of reason or decency in his statements, and stooped to gross insult. I really do not trust myself to say more.
> 
> George
Click to expand...

now look i was not calling Had8ley a murderer your the one who needs to stop reading posts wrong. i was referring to the engineer sense Had8ley was mad cause i said driver instead of engineer. there the same thing he drives the train. and i said i'll call them what i will.


----------



## VentureForth

frj1983 said:


> Can someone, please, please, explain to me what is this big DEAL about texting and why it is so important to be doing it anywhere and everywhere?????????????????????????????
> I just don't get it! :blink:


Here is one BBK Report that shows how texting can be more dangerous than driving drunk. It's a no brainer: Anything - whether it's the radio, a Happy meal, or booze - that distracts your mind from driving is hazardous. In aviation, it's called Situational Awareness. Know everything that is going on around you.

If it were only a matter of your own life that was at risk, that'd be one thing. When you're charged with the safety of even one other person or more, then it's your responsibility to have their interest above all.


----------



## quadrock

Any chance that they can or did recover the Engineer's cell phone from the wreckage?


----------



## OlympianHiawatha

I too have never been able to understand the reason for a text message when we already have voice mail technology. Hopefully some good will come out of this tragedy and get states to pass laws banning these cell phones, at least while driving. I know in Oklahoma there is already talk of making text messaging while driving a crime as serious as DUI, hopefully carrying the similar fines and prison.


----------



## VentureForth

OlympianHiawatha said:


> I too have never been able to understand the reason for a text message when we already have voice mail technology. Hopefully some good will come out of this tragedy and get states to pass laws banning these cell phones, at least while driving. I know in Oklahoma there is already talk of making text messaging while driving a crime as serious as DUI, hopefully carrying the similar fines and prison.


Now I don't think that's necessary. It's already illegal to drive while distracted. You can be ticketed for weaving while eating a cheeseburger. Point is, we don't need new laws - particularly laws that are nearly impossible to enforce. Enforce the laws that exist and bust people for reckless driving.


----------



## Green Maned Lion

Being distracted is so variable, though. I can drive my car with one hand while holding a cup of coffee in the other. (I have no cupholders). I've been doing this for years, including with stick-shifts. And I occassionally take a sip from the cup, too. I've met people who are completely incapable of properly driving a car while drinking coffee. It confounds me as to how, but they exist. Hell, I even did it with my Morgan.

So because some people can and others can't, you can't define what "distracted" can be, unless you purely put it in the hands of a police officer. Whereas if driving while talking on the phone illegal, well, its clear that you were doing it. You did it, you broke the law. Period.


----------



## Joel N. Weber II

Green Maned Lion said:


> Being distracted is so variable, though. I can drive my car with one hand while holding a cup of coffee in the other. (I have no cupholders). I've been doing this for years, including with stick-shifts. And I occassionally take a sip from the cup, too. I've met people who are completely incapable of properly driving a car while drinking coffee. It confounds me as to how, but they exist. Hell, I even did it with my Morgan.
> So because some people can and others can't, you can't define what "distracted" can be, unless you purely put it in the hands of a police officer. Whereas if driving while talking on the phone illegal, well, its clear that you were doing it. You did it, you broke the law. Period.


There's a chapter in Richard Feynman's book ``What Do You Care What Other People Think?'' about the subject of how different people use different parts of their brain to count, and how this means that different people have different sets of tasks that they can't do while also counting.

I have seen people argue, also, that the legal limit for alcohol in the bloodstream while driving which states are required to adopt to get federal highway funding is somewhat lower than where the cutoff really is for where people start to be likely to be involved in serious accidents.


----------



## WhoozOn1st

L.A. Times:

Train engineer sent text message just before crash


----------



## Joel N. Weber II

OlympianHiawatha said:


> I too have never been able to understand the reason for a text message when we already have voice mail technology.


The amount of time it takes from when I pick up my cell phone to when I have finished entering my password, hit the button to inform the voicemail system that I actually want to hear the voicemail message (apparently this is not actually obvious to the voicemail system), and listen to the message tends to be a lot longer than the amount of time it takes me to pick up my cell phone and read a text message.

If there are details like phone numbers in a voicemail message that I need to extract, I then need to listen to the message another one or two times to copy the details and make sure I got them right. If I have text, I can scroll through the message much more efficiently to find the details I need.

It also turns out to be somewhat easier to set up a computer to send a text message to my cell phone than it is to set up a computer to leave speech synthesized voicemail.

I do hate entering text messages from a 10 digit keypad on a cell phone, though I occasionally do so for short messages.


----------



## VentureForth

Joel N. Weber II said:


> OlympianHiawatha said:
> 
> 
> 
> I too have never been able to understand the reason for a text message when we already have voice mail technology.
> 
> 
> 
> I do hate entering text messages from a 10 digit keypad on a cell phone, though I occasionally do so for short messages.
Click to expand...

I just got a blackberry and love it! Texts that come in that have a phone number can be dialed from the message. That's a great feature.


----------



## Green Maned Lion

Blackberries are the Airplanes of communication. There is no place for them on earth. We should eliminate them with great prejudice.


----------



## WhoozOn1st

I appreciate that interest in this topic has waned with distance, but it remains a pretty big deal around here, and will be for years. This story is about lawyers who might be called "ambulance chasers."

After deadly Metrolink crash, aggressive lawyers swoop in


----------



## George Harris

And now we have this:

www.latimes.com/news/printedition/california/la-me-traincrash4-2008oct04,0,6537656.story

Where three people who apparently know what they are talking about said that the signal was green.


----------



## WhoozOn1st

Eyewitnesses are notoriously unreliable. Everybody thinks they know what they're talking about.

Best, in my view, to wait for the results of the NTSB investigation.


----------



## VentureForth

George Harris said:


> And now we have this:
> www.latimes.com/news/printedition/california/la-me-traincrash4-2008oct04,0,6537656.story
> 
> Where three people who apparently know what they are talking about said that the signal was green.





> "They asked me all kinds of questions," including whether Sanchez had been using a cellphone, Atkinson said. He said he saw Sanchez using a train radio, but not a cellphone.


Can you really see the difference between a cell phone, a radio, whether or not he was texting in his lap, etc from the platform into the cab of a locomotive? If he were in a cab car, that'd be semi-understandable, but in a loco?


----------



## HP_Lovecraft

I'm sure the engineer was using a radio while at the station, since they usually have to coordinate with the conductor to know when they are all loaded, and ready to move.

The issue with the lights is curious though.

There is always the odd possibilty that there was a reflection from a green light elsewhere, or traffic lights, or some optical illusion?

Plus, as the article hints at, they could be lying to protect a friend, or to protect the train industry in general?

Or, perhaps the light was green, moving the fault from a "bad engineer", to the state itself, which greatly increases exposure to liability?


----------



## AlanB

HP_Lovecraft said:


> Or, perhaps the light was green, moving the fault from a "bad engineer", to the state itself, which greatly increases exposure to liability?


Whatever the NTSB decides caused the accident, might move the liability around among the various players. But nothing can increase the liability, which is capped at $200 Million for all claims against this accident. That is Federal cap for any and all cliams arising out of the accident.


----------



## VentureForth

HP_Lovecraft said:


> I'm sure the engineer was using a radio while at the station, since they usually have to coordinate with the conductor to know when they are all loaded, and ready to move.


Are we that far behind? How simple is it to have a light in the cab that shows that the doors are all completely closed, followed by a buzzer by the conductor to visually verify all aboard?


----------



## George Harris

We are really off into useless speculation, a lot of it with ignorance of the basic nuts and bolts of how Metrolink operates.


----------



## GG-1

George Harris said:


> We are really off into useless speculation, a lot of it with ignorance of the basic nuts and bolts of how Metrolink operates.


Mahalo George

Access at my daughters house is difficult Just read the newest posts, It is time to wait to know the whole truth.

Aloha


----------



## WhoozOn1st

Not really dredging up history here. The 12-3-08 L.A. Times has this article about some possible new factors involved in last September's Metrolink/UP cornfield meet outside Chatsworth:

Train Crash Light at Issue

"The red signal near the Chatsworth Metrolink station was less clear than yellow and green ones, probe finds."

The online story includes a video that features trains operating in the wreck area, views of the signals at issue, and a brief interview with an NTSB person.


----------



## GG-1

WhoozOn1st said:


> Not really dredging up history here. The 12-3-08 L.A. Times has this article about some possible new factors involved in last September's Metrolink/UP cornfield meet outside Chatsworth:


Mahalo for that piece.

Seems that one thing was funny. Said first flashing yellow, then a solid yellow, and the the red where he was supposed to stop. But then the reporter did mention the stop in the station with the red being a mile up and visible.

Seems to convey a major mystery, Why did he depart the station that day?

Again Mahalo and Aloha


----------



## AlanB

GG-1 said:


> WhoozOn1st said:
> 
> 
> 
> Not really dredging up history here. The 12-3-08 L.A. Times has this article about some possible new factors involved in last September's Metrolink/UP cornfield meet outside Chatsworth:
> 
> 
> 
> Mahalo for that piece.
> 
> Seems that one thing was funny. Said first flashing yellow, then a solid yellow, and the the red where he was supposed to stop. But then the reporter did mention the stop in the station with the red being a mile up and visible.
> 
> Seems to convey a major mystery, Why did he depart the station that day?
> 
> Again Mahalo and Aloha
Click to expand...

Because you stop near the signal, not a mile away from the red signal. Especially since in some cases, being that far away from the red signal might find the rear of the train still in the last block (ie. past the yellow signal). That would leave the signal behind you red, preventing another train from moving further up the tline and perhaps fouling a needed switch.


----------



## spacecadet

GG-1 said:


> WhoozOn1st said:
> 
> 
> 
> Not really dredging up history here. The 12-3-08 L.A. Times has this article about some possible new factors involved in last September's Metrolink/UP cornfield meet outside Chatsworth:
> 
> 
> 
> Mahalo for that piece.
> 
> Seems that one thing was funny. Said first flashing yellow, then a solid yellow, and the the red where he was supposed to stop. But then the reporter did mention the stop in the station with the red being a mile up and visible.
Click to expand...

Not to mention that there's a shot of the signal with a telephoto lens from a good distance away, and the red light is clearly visible even in a little low quality video player window.

This story seems to basically mirror what I read on what amounts to a conspiracy theory web site a while back - I'm not sure if it was linked earlier here (14 pages!), but this signal theory has been going around for a while now. It seems to me that at best it might be a contributing factor, but that was bright sunlight that they just showed that signal under and I could see it fine.


----------



## amtrakwolverine

AlanB said:


> GG-1 said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> WhoozOn1st said:
> 
> 
> 
> Not really dredging up history here. The 12-3-08 L.A. Times has this article about some possible new factors involved in last September's Metrolink/UP cornfield meet outside Chatsworth:
> 
> 
> 
> Mahalo for that piece.
> 
> Seems that one thing was funny. Said first flashing yellow, then a solid yellow, and the the red where he was supposed to stop. But then the reporter did mention the stop in the station with the red being a mile up and visible.
> 
> Seems to convey a major mystery, Why did he depart the station that day?
> 
> Again Mahalo and Aloha
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> Because you stop near the signal, not a mile away from the red signal. Especially since in some cases, being that far away from the red signal might find the rear of the train still in the last block (ie. past the yellow signal). That would leave the signal behind you red, preventing another train from moving further up the tline and perhaps fouling a needed switch.
Click to expand...

reports say that the train normally will wait at the station for the daily UP to pass so why didn't he wait at the station.


----------



## GG-1

KISS_ALIVE said:


> AlanB said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> GG-1 said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> WhoozOn1st said:
> 
> 
> 
> Not really dredging up history here. The 12-3-08 L.A. Times has this article about some possible new factors involved in last September's Metrolink/UP cornfield meet outside Chatsworth:
> 
> 
> 
> Mahalo for that piece.
> 
> Seems that one thing was funny. Said first flashing yellow, then a solid yellow, and the the red where he was supposed to stop. But then the reporter did mention the stop in the station with the red being a mile up and visible.
> 
> Seems to convey a major mystery, Why did he depart the station that day?
> 
> Again Mahalo and Aloha
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> Because you stop near the signal, not a mile away from the red signal. Especially since in some cases, being that far away from the red signal might find the rear of the train still in the last block (ie. past the yellow signal). That would leave the signal behind you red, preventing another train from moving further up the tline and perhaps fouling a needed switch.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> reports say that the train normally will wait at the station for the daily UP to pass so why didn't he wait at the station.
Click to expand...

Aloha

Alan's comment make sense but I read in several reports, Like Kiss Alive, that, that meet in the station was a daily occurrence. I remember an Amtrak train pulling up to the signal and the end of a passing siding at San Jaun Capistrano to wait for a metrolink train, I am sure that the Amtrak train was fouling cross streets there.

So we still need to let the experts finish their investigation, may god or whatever guide them safely to the correct answer.


----------



## WhoozOn1st

Don't know if we're in for a spate of reports about the wreck, but this one was in the 12-4-08 L.A. Times:

No drugs, alcohol found in body of engineer

Regarding comments above about the UP freight meets, IIRC Chatsworth was a common point, but not the only one, depending on the daily freight's progress.


----------



## VentureForth

I find the inability to see the red light irrelevant. In the absence of a clear signal, you stop, contact a dispatcher, then proceed as guided. Those are the rules.

I'm thankful to see that the autopsy came in to be drug and medication-free. However, an autopsy cannot determine one's mental condition.

If anything, now there are more questions that need to be answered...


----------



## AlanB

And now just to add to the confusion and questions:



> The conductor aboard the commuter train that collided with a freight train in September told investigators the warning light along the track was green before the crash that killed 25 people, his attorney said Thursday (Dec. 4).


The full story from the UTU's website can be found here.


----------



## WhoozOn1st

WhoozOn1st said:


> Don't know if we're in for a spate of reports about the wreck


Does three days in a row constitute a "spate?"

12-5-08 L.A. Times story, a more comprehensive version of the AP story (lifted from the Times) on the UTU site:

Signal was green, says crewman

It includes a reprise of the earlier video.


----------



## VentureForth

How can the conductor see the light from inside the train, especially when it's moving loco-forward? I see in the article that it was observed from the station, but wasn't there an additional signal before the one at the switch, ie: at the end of the platform? It almost seems convenient that the conductor (for the first time, and through his attorney) is collaborating what Railfans were stating about the light earlier.

Another Sanchez question: Regardless of the light, the switch was fouled. The rails were bent "badly". A) Why couldn't Sanchez visually verify the alignment of the switch? B) If the rails were bent so bad, why didn't Sanchez feel them? Why didn't he even hiccup on the throttle?

The final point of the article was an interesting observation I've made a bunch of times - what good is calling out the signals if you don't call green? If you miss calling one, then it will be assumed green. Call out all signals, and the conductor would know if you missed one (if he's trained well on the route).


----------



## AlanB

VentureForth said:


> How can the conductor see the light from inside the train, especially when it's moving loco-forward? I see in the article that it was observed from the station, but wasn't there an additional signal before the one at the switch, ie: at the end of the platform? It almost seems convenient that the conductor (for the first time, and through his attorney) is collaborating what Railfans were stating about the light earlier.


No, the yellow warning signal was before the station stop, so the in theory "red" signal was the next signal that the train would encounter. So the conductor would have been able to see it as he was closing the doors on the train, a procedure that would have him hanging out the door as he closed the rest of the doors on the train and the train started up. He's supposed to visually verify that he's not dragging anyone in a closed door.



VentureForth said:


> Another Sanchez question: Regardless of the light, the switch was fouled. The rails were bent "badly". A) Why couldn't Sanchez visually verify the alignment of the switch? B ) If the rails were bent so bad, why didn't Sanchez feel them? Why didn't he even hiccup on the throttle?


Well if his full attention was indeed out the window, then he would have been able to see that the switch was set against him. He probably wouldn't have seen it in time to stop before crossing the switch and damaging it, but still he would have stopped and probably with enough time to get the UP train stopped before a collision. Even if there wasn't enough time to stop UP, at least the closure rate would have only been 40 MPH or less instead of 80+.

And while AFAIK a train that I've been on has never run a switch set against us, I'd imagine that to someone sitting in 250,000 pound locomotive that it wouldn't seem like much more than any ordinary bump in the road. I have been on a subway train that crossed a spring switch and beyond the clang as the switch slaps closed after each set of wheels, you wouldn't know that you'd crossed a spring switch.



VentureForth said:


> The final point of the article was an interesting observation I've made a bunch of times - what good is calling out the signals if you don't call green? If you miss calling one, then it will be assumed green. Call out all signals, and the conductor would know if you missed one (if he's trained well on the route).


First, both the conductor and the engineer have to be well trained on the route, that's required by FRA regs. As for calling out all signals, there seems to be two schools of thought on this one and both have some merit. As mentioned above, CSX and NS both require all signals to be called. RR's west of the Miss don't require clears to be called.

A few years back the Texas Eagle derailed on bad track because the crew missed a warning call from another train about the bad track. They missed that call because a defect detector that was closer to them was busy transmitting and it stepped on the other radio call. After that incident many RR's proceeded to shorten the messages broadcast by DD's to help prevent such a scenario in the future. In the same vein it's thought by some that calling every signal creates too much chatter that could also lead to the same issue. In addition, it's just one more thing to distract the engineer from doing something else, like perhaps noticing someone laying on the tracks.

Bottom line is that it goes both ways. There are good reasons to call all signals, and there are good reasons not to do so. Frankly the best solution would be to ensure that every train has cab signals, and that those signals are also relayed visually on the conductor’s radio or some other device that he/she can always see.


----------



## amtrakwolverine

VentureForth said:


> How can the conductor see the light from inside the train, especially when it's moving loco-forward? I see in the article that it was observed from the station, but wasn't there an additional signal before the one at the switch, ie: at the end of the platform? It almost seems convenient that the conductor (for the first time, and through his attorney) is collaborating what Railfans were stating about the light earlier.
> Another Sanchez question: Regardless of the light, the switch was fouled. The rails were bent "badly". A) Why couldn't Sanchez visually verify the alignment of the switch? B) If the rails were bent so bad, why didn't Sanchez feel them? Why didn't he even hiccup on the throttle?
> 
> The final point of the article was an interesting observation I've made a bunch of times - what good is calling out the signals if you don't call green? If you miss calling one, then it will be assumed green. Call out all signals, and the conductor would know if you missed one (if he's trained well on the route).


he suffered from type 2 diabetes's and was sent home twice for failing to control it. maybe he went to a diabetic shock and passed out


----------



## WhoozOn1st

WhoozOn1st said:


> WhoozOn1st said:
> 
> 
> 
> Don't know if we're in for a spate of reports about the wreck
> 
> 
> 
> Does three days in a row constitute a "spate?"
> 
> 12-5-08 L.A. Times story, a more comprehensive version of the AP story (lifted from the Times) on the UTU site:
> 
> Signal was green, says crewman
> 
> It includes a reprise of the earlier video.
Click to expand...

A synopsis of the story linked above appeared on the TrainsMag News Wire on 12-8-08, so I'll take this golden opportunity to gratuitously point out that YOU SAW IT HERE FIRST, courtesy of WhoozOn1st.

Majored in Theatre, minored in self-promotion. :lol:


----------



## WhoozOn1st

During last Sunday evening's weekly On Track On Line live chat session - an enjoyable alternative while waiting for Amtrak Unlimited weekly chat to be restored - a question arose regarding whether Metrolink had ever had a year without a collision. None of us knew, so I decided to look into it.

No annually-indexed Metrolink accident info found yet, so I'll keep looking for that. If anybody has suggestions for where to look I'm all eyes. Maybe I'm going about it wrong.

What I DID find was that no matter how I worded search parameters the results included scads of links to lawyers - ambulance chasers - and I gave up counting after about 20.

Understand that I have no kneejerk problem with attorneys. I count one among my pals, and I've had a couple do some good work on my behalf.

Still and all, as I searched for Metrolink accident stats I couldn't help feeling at least somewhat that the Chatsworth victims, survivors, and their families are as chum in the water to provoke a feeding frenzy.

Sad on all fronts.


----------



## WhoozOn1st

"David R. Solow has been widely criticized since the Chatsworth wreck that killed 25."

Crash thrusts Metrolink's chief into the limelight

He was hired from New Jersey Transit in 1990.


----------



## rogers55

On Nov 17 a wildfire burned through that area.

Any tests of the signals after that time would be suspect at best.


----------



## WhoozOn1st

With five (count 'em) major articles in just over a week we are now officially in spate territory, and the one linked below is the most extensive to date.

Train Crash's Roots Run Deep

"Metrolink was considered such a pipsqueak by one freight rail [sic] that its senior executives would not even return telephone calls from the transit line's leaders..."


----------



## Joel N. Weber II

WhoozOn1st said:


> Train Crash's Roots Run Deep


They seem to be arguing that the lack of automatic train stop explains why Metrolink is far more dangerous than the MBTA Commuter Rail system. One of the problems with this is that I don't think the MBTA Commuter Rail system has any automatic train stop outside the NEC tracks.


----------



## WhoozOn1st

Cripes, the L.A. Times is really cranking out the Metrolink wreck stories. This is the 6th in 11 days, and of the current flurry the first one on a weekend.

Safety of Rail System Assailed

"A two-month review of the five-county commuter train operation found that a far great focus on safety was needed..."


----------



## amtrakwolverine

caltran doesn't have automatic stop nether does tri-rail or sounder or METRA. none of those have automatic stop why isn't the press picking on them.


----------



## Neil_M

KISS_ALIVE said:


> caltran doesn't have automatic stop nether does tri-rail or sounder or METRA. none of those have automatic stop why isn't the press picking on them.


Possibly because they haven't had any big pile ups?

"Train company has no crashes and kills no passengers" isn't much of a news story really.....


----------



## amtrakwolverine

Neil_M said:


> KISS_ALIVE said:
> 
> 
> 
> caltran doesn't have automatic stop nether does tri-rail or sounder or METRA. none of those have automatic stop why isn't the press picking on them.
> 
> 
> 
> Possibly because they haven't had any big pile ups?
Click to expand...

so if there saying metrolink didnt have any ATS system and that caused the wreck. why aren't they saying that those other commuter trains are going to suffer the same fate. its not metrolinks fault. they just supply the trains. its the company they hired that suppled the engineers thats the problem. there engineers must be colored blind sense they run red lights. the last train had 2 engineers in the cab and it still ran a red light and side swiped a freight train.


----------



## Neil_M

KISS_ALIVE said:


> Neil_M said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> KISS_ALIVE said:
> 
> 
> 
> caltran doesn't have automatic stop nether does tri-rail or sounder or METRA. none of those have automatic stop why isn't the press picking on them.
> 
> 
> 
> Possibly because they haven't had any big pile ups?
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> so if there saying metrolink didnt have any ATS system and that caused the wreck. why aren't they saying that those other commuter trains are going to suffer the same fate. its not metrolinks fault. they just supply the trains. its the company they hired that suppled the engineers thats the problem. there engineers must be colored blind sense they run red lights. the last train had 2 engineers in the cab and it still ran a red light and side swiped a freight train.
Click to expand...

Its the press. They don't understand railways (or much else of what they write or broadcast),the details of how the railway company man their operations are just that, detail. They see 'Metrolink' on the side of the train and see a big pile of debris and human misery. That's what sells the story.


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## WhoozOn1st

KISS_ALIVE said:


> caltran doesn't have automatic stop nether does tri-rail or sounder or METRA. none of those have automatic stop why isn't the press picking on them.


Maybe because those outfits haven't had 25 dead and 135 injured in a corn field meet lately.

Not long after the wreck at Chatsworth a former NTSB guy noted that "In this country we regulate by counting tombstones."

In the wake of the carnage our Senators from California, Barbara Boxer and Dianne Feinstein, jammed through the rail safety bill that had been languishing. IIRC, attached to it were the reauthorization of Amtrak, a bump in funding for it (yet to be actually appropriated), and railroad work rules changes.

The overall bottom line following the Metrolink wreck is that positive train control is now mandated by 2015 (and sooner in Metrolink's operating area), with freight railroad support. As I see it, after dragging their feet for many years they couldn't get out of it this time. Continued opposition to, and/or sloth on implementation of, PTC after the Chatsworth catastrophe might jeopardize public funding for stuff they want.


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## Joel N. Weber II

WhoozOn1st said:


> Maybe because those outfits haven't had 25 dead and 135 injured in a corn field meet lately.
> Not long after the wreck at Chatsworth a former NTSB guy noted that "In this country we regulate by counting tombstones."
> 
> In the wake of the carnage our Senators from California, Barbara Boxer and Dianne Feinstein, jammed through the rail safety bill that had been languishing. IIRC, attached to it were the reauthorization of Amtrak, a bump in funding for it (yet to be actually appropriated), and railroad work rules changes.
> 
> The overall bottom line following the Metrolink wreck is that positive train control is now mandated by 2015 (and sooner in Metrolink's operating area), with freight railroad support. As I see it, after dragging their feet for many years they couldn't get out of it this time. Continued opposition to, and/or sloth on implementation of, PTC after the Chatsworth catastrophe might jeopardize public funding for stuff they want.


The MBTA Commuter Rail system has had, in the last few years:

A death of a child at a grade crossing with two tracks; the child decided it was safe to cross as soon as one train cleared the grade crossing (while the gates were still down). There was another train that came on that track and killed that child. PTC would not have saved that child's life; deciding to grade separate any crossing with enough rail traffic to justify a second track would have.

Someone (a high school student, I think) crossed a track to get from one platform to another, and got hit by a train. PTC wouldn't have helped; where space is available, I think that it ought to be possible to lay out stations in ways that make it impossible to get somewhere useful by crossing tracks that aren't supposed to be crossed.

A large number of injuries when a stray freight car hit a train. Again, PTC wouldn't have helped; maybe having the derail powered and controlled by the dispatcher (if in fact it wasn't) would have prevented this accident.

I have to wonder if PTC would really prevent the majority of commuter rail related deaths that have occured in the last five years. I suspect PTC is getting all the attention because single accidents with moderately large death tolls always seem to get more news media attention than large numbers of accidents with relatively small per-accident death tolls that end up killing more total people over time. The number of people who have died in the collapse of skyscrappers in the US in the last ten years is probably plenty close to the number of people who have died in automobile accidents in the US each and every month for the last ten years. Somehow skyscrappers collapsing gets more attention than automobile and road safety.


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## AlanB

Joel N. Weber II said:


> A large number of injuries when a stray freight car hit a train. Again, PTC wouldn't have helped; maybe having the derail powered and controlled by the dispatcher (if in fact it wasn't) would have prevented this accident.


Actually in this accident, ACSES (Amtrak's version of PTC on the NEC) did help. It's thanks to the system and cab signals that the engineer realized that something was coming towards him that shouldn't have been. Without ASCES, he might not have had enough time to actually stop the train before the freight car hit. As it was, that warning gave him enough time to get on the radio to ask for permission to back up. Sadly that didn't arrive in time and even then it's hard to say just how much difference it would have made had he gotten permission.

But again, I think that the injuries would have been far more numerous and serious, but for the fact that the engineer had enough warning to bring his train to a stop.

On the other side of the coin, if the commuters didn't line up at the doors when their station is near, there would have been many less injuries too. The fact that people were standing awaiting the next station stop contributed to many of the injuries that did occur.


----------



## amtrakwolverine

WhoozOn1st said:


> KISS_ALIVE said:
> 
> 
> 
> caltran doesn't have automatic stop nether does tri-rail or sounder or METRA. none of those have automatic stop why isn't the press picking on them.
> 
> 
> 
> Maybe because those outfits haven't had 25 dead and 135 injured in a corn field meet lately.
> 
> Not long after the wreck at Chatsworth a former NTSB guy noted that "In this country we regulate by counting tombstones."
> 
> In the wake of the carnage our Senators from California, Barbara Boxer and Dianne Feinstein, jammed through the rail safety bill that had been languishing. IIRC, attached to it were the reauthorization of Amtrak, a bump in funding for it (yet to be actually appropriated), and railroad work rules changes.
> 
> The overall bottom line following the Metrolink wreck is that positive train control is now mandated by 2015 (and sooner in Metrolink's operating area), with freight railroad support. As I see it, after dragging their feet for many years they couldn't get out of it this time. Continued opposition to, and/or sloth on implementation of, PTC after the Chatsworth catastrophe might jeopardize public funding for stuff they want.
Click to expand...

your not getting my point. there going after metrolink cause it didn't have PTC. why wait until one of the other company's suffer the same accident. there not demanding they figure a way to stop this there just going after metrolink it self. forcing metrolink to get PTC is not going to solve anything if it happens on other commuter line cause it didn't have PTC. why not look at the bigger picture and find a way to make it affordable for all trains and railroads to have PTC or ATS in the US to prevent this from happening again.


----------



## Joel N. Weber II

KISS_ALIVE said:


> your not getting my point. there going after metrolink cause it didn't have PTC. why wait until one of the other company's suffer the same accident. there not demanding they figure a way to stop this there just going after metrolink it self. forcing metrolink to get PTC is not going to solve anything if it happens on other commuter line cause it didn't have PTC. why not look at the bigger picture and find a way to make it affordable for all trains and railroads to have PTC or ATS in the US to prevent this from happening again.


I think most of the cost of a selling a PTC system may be not the cost of building the electronic gadgets, but the cost of the liability insurance if some accident occurs in which 100 people die, where there is a lack of clear evidence to convince a jury that the maker of the PTC system shouldn't pay out the $200 million or whatever it is. If you want to build electronics that you can sell at affordable prices, there are plenty of less safety critical opportunities that are likely to carry vastly lower product liability costs.

I'd also like to know why the PTC proponents aren't proposing that we ban automobiles until a PTC system for automobiles can be developed.

There are plenty of articles out there about things like carbeurators and vacuum pumps for small airplanes, where product liability difficulties sometimes lead to difficulties for owners in buying replacement parts. I don't see why PTC would be any different.


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## AlanB

KISS_ALIVE said:


> WhoozOn1st said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> KISS_ALIVE said:
> 
> 
> 
> caltran doesn't have automatic stop nether does tri-rail or sounder or METRA. none of those have automatic stop why isn't the press picking on them.
> 
> 
> 
> Maybe because those outfits haven't had 25 dead and 135 injured in a corn field meet lately.
> 
> Not long after the wreck at Chatsworth a former NTSB guy noted that "In this country we regulate by counting tombstones."
> 
> In the wake of the carnage our Senators from California, Barbara Boxer and Dianne Feinstein, jammed through the rail safety bill that had been languishing. IIRC, attached to it were the reauthorization of Amtrak, a bump in funding for it (yet to be actually appropriated), and railroad work rules changes.
> 
> The overall bottom line following the Metrolink wreck is that positive train control is now mandated by 2015 (and sooner in Metrolink's operating area), with freight railroad support. As I see it, after dragging their feet for many years they couldn't get out of it this time. Continued opposition to, and/or sloth on implementation of, PTC after the Chatsworth catastrophe might jeopardize public funding for stuff they want.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> your not getting my point. there going after metrolink cause it didn't have PTC. why wait until one of the other company's suffer the same accident. there not demanding they figure a way to stop this there just going after metrolink it self. forcing metrolink to get PTC is not going to solve anything if it happens on other commuter line cause it didn't have PTC. why not look at the bigger picture and find a way to make it affordable for all trains and railroads to have PTC or ATS in the US to prevent this from happening again.
Click to expand...

No, with respect I think that he did get your point as did all of us. You are quite correct, the media should be going after everyone that doesn't have it. I don't think that any of us would argue that point with you. We all support and want PTC.

The simple truth though is that the media and newspaper's don't care about what makes sense or what's good for people, or what might save lives. They care about selling newspapers. They care about selling ads, be they TV, radio, or newspaper ads.

Right now the Metrolink crash is in many peoples minds, especially in the LA area. So anything that sells another newspaper is going to get printed. They are going to milk this story for as long as they can, because people will watch the TV and see an ad, people will by the papers and see an ad. That is their primary focus.

But head to Chicago where what happened in LA isn't major news anymore and hasn't been since the day of the accident, and the media there doesn't care. They won't car until and unless there is an accident in Chicago that might have been prevented with PTC technology in place. The Chicago media isn't going to get lots of readers because they run a story about how maybe people might die one day because there is no PTC on the trains. The people just won't care. They want the big sexy, flashy, attention getter headlines. A story about PTC in Chicago isn't flashy right now.

Perhaps if the RR's here in NYC didn't have PTC, maybe that might help a bit with our market here to get it more in the national headlines. But we do have PTC here, so for us here it isn't a story at all.


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## WhoozOn1st

KISS_ALIVE said:


> your not getting my point. there going after metrolink cause it didn't have PTC. why wait until one of the other company's suffer the same accident. there not demanding they figure a way to stop this there just going after metrolink it self. forcing metrolink to get PTC is not going to solve anything if it happens on other commuter line cause it didn't have PTC. why not look at the bigger picture and find a way to make it affordable for all trains and railroads to have PTC or ATS in the US to prevent this from happening again.


KISS ALIVE, your point is not getting got mainly because there doesn't seem to be one. PTC is now mandated across the board by 2015. Nobody, including the press, is "going after" Metrolink. Okay, maybe that idiot USC professor who hates trains, but he hardly counts.

Metrolink is under the gun for a number of reasons, the first of which is the deadly Chatsworth cornfield meet. All else flows directly from that. I do think, however, that UP should be taking equal heat, and we haven't seen that. UP is after all one of the PTC foot dragging freight railroads. "It's not a proven technology" is code for "We don't wanna pay for it."

Metrolink also suffers the consequences of operating in the spotlight of the nation's second largest media market. I'd wager that if a comparably deadly wreck had occurred on, say, Rail Runner, all these major changes would not be occurring so quickly, if at all. Sad to say, but there's a major difference between a deadly wreck in L.A. and a deadly wreck in a relative media backwater.

Finally, to look at the big picture, as you urge, PTC is not a matter of affordability, but of will. In my view the deaths of those poor Metrolink 111 passengers were not in vain. Given the changes underway as a result of the Chatsworth wreck, I consider them true martyrs in the cause of railroad safety. Their sacrifices created the will for change that had been so sadly lacking.


----------



## jis

WhoozOn1st said:


> Finally, to look at the big picture, as you urge, PTC is not a matter of affordability, but of will. In my view the deaths of those poor Metrolink 111 passengers were not in vain. Given the changes underway as a result of the Chatsworth wreck, I consider them true martyrs in the cause of railroad safety. Their sacrifices created the will for change that had been so sadly lacking.


It is said that each safety rule is etched in someone's blood. The PTC rule is now etched in the blood of the 25 deceased at Chatsworth. While it is true that PTC will not eliminate all fatalities in all forms of railroad accidents, it will address a rather large segment of the space of possible events leading to fatalities, and that is good.


----------



## jis

Joel N. Weber II said:


> I'd also like to know why the PTC proponents aren't proposing that we ban automobiles until a PTC system for automobiles can be developed.


I think it is quite safe to say that PTC which stands for "Positive Train Control", is not being pushed for automobiles mostly because they are not "Trains", perhaps? 

As for an equivalent other system, all safety systems are about cost vs. benefit. The average number of fatalities in a single auto event is rather low when compared to those in trains and even more so in planes, that is why different criteria are used, and rightly so, for these different modes of transportation.


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## WICT106

Would Automatic Train Stop ( for example, the Santa Fe's Intermittent Inductive Train Stop ) protect against head-on collisions ? Would it have protected against the sort of collision discussed here ? Would cab signals, either alone or in concert with ATC or ATS have prevented this sort of event ?


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## AlanB

WICT106 said:


> Would Automatic Train Stop ( for example, the Santa Fe's Intermittent Inductive Train Stop ) protect against head-on collisions ? Would it have protected against the sort of collision discussed here ? Would cab signals, either alone or in concert with ATC or ATS have prevented this sort of event ?


Let me first preference my reply with the disclaimer that until all the facts are revealed in this accident by the NTSB, some if not all of what I say, could be invalidated.

ATS cannot prevent head-on collisions.

And in this specific case I see nothing that suggests that it would have changed the above statement and would not have prevented the collision. It might however have reduced the closing speed between the two trains, and therefore have lessened the severity of the collision and quite possible have saved some if not all lives.

As for whether cab signals would have helped, that we will probably and sadly never know. Since we don't really know what happened inside that engine, its mere speculation to talk about this. But if indeed the signal wasn't as bright as it was supposed to be, or if indeed as several claim the signal was showing clear, then assuming that in between his text messages Mr. Sanchez had glanced at his console, he might have realized that something was majorly wrong and stopped his train before crossing the switch.

If the cab signals were working in concert with ATS, then he'd have a rather loud horn blaring in his ears to distract him from his text messaging once he passed the red signal. Again, that would have given him time to slow and perhaps even stop his train prior to being hit by the freight, but I would think that a collision still would have occurred. It's highly unlikely that he could have radioed the UP train fast enough for them to start stopping prior to hitting him. But again, it certainly would have decreased the closing speeds, maybe 40 to 50 MPH, and probably saved lives.

Had he failed to acknowledge that horn and deal with things, ATS would have eventually kicked in and started stopping the train. But those extra seconds that the ATS system would have given him to take action would have been critical. By the time ATS started braking, I’d guess that they would have been mere seconds away from the collision. Again, every MPH slower is a help, but I’d guess that closure still would have been in the 60 MPH to 70 MPH range.

With PTC in place however, the computer would have started demanding that Mr. Sanchez take action to slow the train as he approached the signal prior to the switch. If he didn’t, it would have begun slowing the train itself long before it got to the signal. It’s unclear if the train would have stopped prior to crossing the switch, as there are too many variables in that equation since there is no system in place and we don’t know what parameters might get set for the system.

Additionally had the commuter train still crossed the switch, the freight crew would have received an immediate warning that something was in its way and they too could have applied their brakes rapidly. Again, I suspect that with the distances involved here that an accident might still have occurred, but it would have been a low speed event with maybe a 15 to 20 MPH closure rate, instead of the near 80 MPH rate experienced.


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## WhoozOn1st

Apologies if this sounds crass regarding such a serious subject, but it looks like this topic is on a fast track to 10,000 views and headed north beyond that. That caused me to wonder about the record for topic views in these forums.


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## AlanB

Looks like the URPA newsletter might well be the leader at over 50,000 views. But I didn't really have time to study things, that was just a quick glance.


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## Joel N. Weber II

jis said:


> It is said that each safety rule is etched in someone's blood. The PTC rule is now etched in the blood of the 25 deceased at Chatsworth. While it is true that PTC will not eliminate all fatalities in all forms of railroad accidents, it will address a rather large segment of the space of possible events leading to fatalities, and that is good.


But is it addressing the largest segment?


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## WhoozOn1st

AlanB said:


> Looks like the URPA newsletter might well be the leader at over 50,000 views. But I didn't really have time to study things, that was just a quick glance.


I really meant non-pinned topics.

BTW everybody, not too long ago I asked if there had been a spike in AU membership and overall posts lately. Seemed to me that there was, but didn't know for sure. Alan and Anthony do keep tabs on such things, and Alan provided info and graphs which showed that indeed there has been posting and membership growth in the past year. Good deal!

And CHOWDAH!!


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## WhoozOn1st

Nine thousand nine hundred and and ninety-nine views of the thread on the wall, nine thousand nine hundred and ninety-nine views of the thread.

Take one down, pass it around...

Oh wait, we're counting up, not down.


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## jis

Joel N. Weber II said:


> jis said:
> 
> 
> 
> It is said that each safety rule is etched in someone's blood. The PTC rule is now etched in the blood of the 25 deceased at Chatsworth. While it is true that PTC will not eliminate all fatalities in all forms of railroad accidents, it will address a rather large segment of the space of possible events leading to fatalities, and that is good.
> 
> 
> 
> But is it addressing the largest segment?
Click to expand...

I haven't studied the area sufficiently to develop a definitive answer to the question. However, it appears that ICC and then NTSB have consistently thought that this is a very very important area of improvement, and in general I tend not to second guess the NTSB on these matters. That is of course not to say that there aren't other areas where improvements are desirable, namely areas like road/rail interfaces, and it is not like they are not being addressed in parallel too. I don't see anything wrong with the PTC issue being addressed unless of course one's position is we shall do nothing until we have figured out what to do to eliminate all fatalities from all possible sources.


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## George Harris

As to the initial issue of Sanchez seeing two signals reading such that he should have expected to see the next one at stop:

Yesterday, riding a Caltrain back into San Francisco from Mountain View, I saw this scenario unfold exactly in approach to the four track section just south of Redwood City. (I was standing so I could look out the front.) The train speed felt to be reducing in anticipation of the next being red. When the home signal first came into sight, it was reading as expected, R/R/R. It then change almost immediately to G/R/R, in other words, CLEAR. A few seconds aftet that, we bagan to accelerate. Never did see anything to explain the R/R/R.

I am saying this to say that this sort of stuff happens, so just because the normal script says expect the next signal to read stop, it could be that whatever was in that block is now no longer there, so the signal clears.

At this stage, we do not really know what happened, and it is entirely possible that we may never truly know the full story. Even if the switch had been set for the siding, the rules do not, and connot reasonably, require that the engineer be certain of the position of the switch if he has a clear signal. He can not see it soon enough for such a requirement to be practical. Whether Sanchez could have noticed in time or did would be entirely speculation.


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## AlanB

George Harris said:


> As to the initial issue of Sanchez seeing two signals reading such that he should have expected to see the next one at stop:
> Yesterday, riding a Caltrain back into San Francisco from Mountain View, I saw this scenario unfold exactly in approach to the four track section just south of Redwood City. (I was standing so I could look out the front.) The train speed felt to be reducing in anticipation of the next being red. When the home signal first came into sight, it was reading as expected, R/R/R. It then change almost immediately to G/R/R, in other words, CLEAR. A few seconds aftet that, we bagan to accelerate. Never did see anything to explain the R/R/R.
> 
> I am saying this to say that this sort of stuff happens, so just because the normal script says expect the next signal to read stop, it could be that whatever was in that block is now no longer there, so the signal clears.
> 
> At this stage, we do not really know what happened, and it is entirely possible that we may never truly know the full story. Even if the switch had been set for the siding, the rules do not, and connot reasonably, require that the engineer be certain of the position of the switch if he has a clear signal. He can not see it soon enough for such a requirement to be practical. Whether Sanchez could have noticed in time or did would be entirely speculation.


I'll add two thoughts to your comments George.

First, while you are correct that signals do get upgraded all the time, the engineer is required to radio that upgrade to the conductor. That does not appear to have happened here.

Second, while I agree that it would be highly unlikely that he would or could notice that the switch was set wrong in time to stop before fouling it, I would think that had he noticed it once he was on top of it that he would have initiated braking at that point or at least gotten on the radio to the dispatcher to find out what was up. Again, neither action appears to have been taken.

And I can't imagine that a good engineer who realized that he had just run a switch would at least take some kind of action, as failing to report it could lead to a major derailment when another train tries to use the switch. Therefore I think that it may well be possible to conclude that Mr. Sanchez was at least distracted enough by the text messaging and/or something else, so as to not notice the switch postion at all.


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## WhoozOn1st

jis said:


> However, it appears that ICC and then NTSB have consistently thought that this is a very very important area of improvement


PTC has been on the NTSB's wish list since its "Most Wanted" list was first developed, in 1990:

NTSB's original "Most Wanted"


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## WhoozOn1st

Though out of town for Christmas, following the heavy-duty holiday family festivities (everybody else conked out) I was able to read the L.A. Times online and found this:

Metrolink plans live video cameras to monitor train engineers

"The onboard surveillance is intended to enforce safety rules. But the proposal draws criticism from employees and skepticism from California Sen. Dianne Feinstein."

A factual error: Metrolink 111 was not "Ventura-bound." Metrolink's train 111 runs only as far as Moorpark.


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## WhoozOn1st

Metrolink conductor raised concerns about engineer's cellphone use

"The only surviving Metrolink crewman in Chatsworth crash tells NTSB of concerns about train's engineer."

Included is a related video from L.A. station KTLA Channel 5, which, like the Times, is owned by the bankrupt (Chapter 11) Tribune Co.

As if I needed another reason to despise cellphones...


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## Dan O

WhoozOn1st said:


> As if I needed another reason to despise cellphones...


Right. Altho in this case I think if he had been talking on the phone instead of texting that he may have done a better job. I don't text but it seems like that might require you to look down more than simple cell phone yapping. Neither one good while driving or running a train, but I'd think text messaging might be the worst.

Dan


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## WhoozOn1st

Metrolink engineer let teens ride in cab

Curiouser and curiouser!


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## gdj

WhoozOn1st said:


> Metrolink engineer let teens ride in cab
> Curiouser and curiouser!


It gets even more curiouser.

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=206...Ko&refer=us


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## amtrakwolverine

big deal alot of engineers have been known to do that. thats not a big shocker.


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## WhoozOn1st

KISS_ALIVE said:


> big deal alot of engineers have been known to do that. thats not a big shocker.


Maybe so. But this particular engineer was involved in a major deadly wreck. Stands to reason that every aspect is being scrutinized.


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## WhoozOn1st

NTSB TO OPEN DOCKET ON 2008 CHATSWORTH, CALIFORNIA RAIL ACCIDENT DURING PUBLIC HEARING

Hearing starts Tuesday, 3-3-09, and it appears that's when the docket will be made available online.


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## WhoozOn1st

Metrolink practices scrutinized

"As a hearing into the fatal Chatsworth crash is set to begin, more red-light violations have raised concerns."

The article also notes a field testing program being done by UP, with whom Metrolink shares substantial trackage.


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## WhoozOn1st

Today's NTSB hearing into the wreck is supposedly available via live webcast, but so far I've been unable to get it. Maybe they've broken for lunch already? Or perhaps it's been postponed due to weather conditions? Does anybody know??

For those who might wanna give it a shot:

NTSB Public Hearings


----------



## PetalumaLoco

WhoozOn1st said:


> Today's NTSB hearing into the wreck is supposedly available via live webcast, but so far I've been unable to get it. Maybe they've broken for lunch already? Or perhaps it's been postponed due to weather conditions? Does anybody know??
> For those who might wanna give it a shot:
> 
> NTSB Public Hearings


Yeah, I picked it up no problem.


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## WhoozOn1st

Metrolink engineer let teen take throttle

As this is being posted, the NTSB Board of Inquiry has broken for lunch. When the hearing resumes - in about an hour - there will be testimony from the Federal Railroad Administration and a discussion of Positive Train Control.


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## WhoozOn1st

Rail hearing points up lax oversight

"Current field tests fail to prevent violations of safety rules, but officials disagree on how to fix the system."

I listened to most of both days of the hearing (going to video only to see PowerPoint presentations). Though it wouldn't be quite right to call the proceedings contentious at times - that implies a two-way street - Board of Inquiry Chairwoman Kathryn O'Leary Higgins did a pretty good job of reading the Riot Act to railroad witnesses on several occasions. She was largely registering a sense of disgusted disbelief at the answers being heard in response to questions about safety violations and supervision, often regarding the on-duty use of cellphones (including texting) by train crew, which has become such a major focus of the investigation.

The NTSB's Docket of the wreck investigation is now available online: NTSB: Docket Management System

The Docket is essentially an index of the 198 documents, attachments, exhibits, and photos - each individually linked - which comprise the agency's investigation of the wreck. It is not to be confused with a final report. In closing remarks, Chairwoman Higgins expressed confidence that the investigation would be concluded and a final report issued "in a year." Given the general context of her remarks I believe she meant a year from the accident date, not from now. It was also noted in closing that the investigation team remains open to examining any additional information and evidence which may yet come to light. A number of exhibits were introduced and catalogued during the hearing, and I expect these will be added to the Docket in the near future.


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## Walt

In following the info today, it was mentioned that the Metrolink engineer failed to call out the last three signals on his radio. I assume that someone is suppose to be listening to these, right? So, after missing the first two, why didn't someone take some action (like pull the emergency red brake cord?).

Beyond what actually happened, I would think that a silent engineer is a good indication that something is going wrong up in the cab.


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## Walt

WhoozOn1st said:


> ... often regarding the on-duty use of cellphones (including texting) by train crew, which has become such a major focus of the investigation.


Apparently, not only did the Metrolink engineer send a text right before the crash, so did the freight train's conductor.


----------



## jackal

Walt said:


> In following the info today, it was mentioned that the Metrolink engineer failed to call out the last three signals on his radio. I assume that someone is suppose to be listening to these, right? So, after missing the first two, why didn't someone take some action (like pull the emergency red brake cord?).
> Beyond what actually happened, I would think that a silent engineer is a good indication that something is going wrong up in the cab.


The conductor is supposed to listen to and acknowledge all signals called out (some railroads, IIRC, don't require the conductor to acknowledge "clear" signals, though the engineer must still call them out). They're supposed to know their territory well enough to know were the signals are, and a call-out is missed, figure out why and, as you said, take any necessary corrective action.


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## Dan O

> Apparently, not only did the Metrolink engineer send a text right before the crash, so did the freight train's conductor.



Too bad they weren't texting each other. "Hey we are barreling towards each other right now!"

I right metrolink a few times a year and when I do, I try to get in the car that I think would be safest in event of a crash.

Dan


----------



## AlanB

jackal said:


> Walt said:
> 
> 
> 
> In following the info today, it was mentioned that the Metrolink engineer failed to call out the last three signals on his radio. I assume that someone is suppose to be listening to these, right? So, after missing the first two, why didn't someone take some action (like pull the emergency red brake cord?).
> Beyond what actually happened, I would think that a silent engineer is a good indication that something is going wrong up in the cab.
> 
> 
> 
> The conductor is supposed to listen to and acknowledge all signals called out (some railroads, IIRC, don't require the conductor to acknowledge "clear" signals, though the engineer must still call them out). They're supposed to know their territory well enough to know were the signals are, and a call-out is missed, figure out why and, as you said, take any necessary corrective action.
Click to expand...

Actually most RR's west of the Miss, namely UP & BNSF, don't call clear signals at all. They only call more restrictive signals. It's NS and CSX operating under NORAC the call all signals, including clears.

Now I've seen some reports that say that Metrolink requires all signals to be called, but I've also seen reports that say that Metroliink only requires lessor signals than clear to be called. And last that I had heard, the engineer did call the first lessor signal prior to the station. I seem to recall hearing that the conductor didn't acknowledge that transmission, but I won't swear to that. They claim that the engineer did not call the second lessor signal right before the station stop. But it has been mentioned that there are areas where the transmissions between the crew is not picked up by the repeaters, and therefore not recorded.

Which brings us to the last signal, after the station stop, and right before the switch. If that signal was showing clear, as several reliable witnesses have reported, then again depending on the rules of Metrolink, that signal may or may not have been called by the engineer. And of course the question still remains, is that an area where the repeaters do pick up transmissions?


----------



## Spokker

Walt said:


> Apparently, not only did the Metrolink engineer send a text right before the crash, so did the freight train's conductor.


I'm really sick of all this. I hope everyone is fired. I hope the CEO of BNSF is fired. I hope Metrolink is dissolved and a new agency takes its place. Enough is enough, you know? Two supervisors were fired. No, the entire board should be fired. The CEO of Metrolink should be fired. 
Amtrak's Pacific Surfliner somehow avoids colliding into freight trains while operating on the same exact tracks. Are they doing something Metrolink isn't?


----------



## PetalumaLoco

Spokker said:


> Amtrak's Pacific Surfliner somehow avoids colliding into freight trains while operating on the same exact tracks. Are they doing something Metrolink isn't?


----------



## WhoozOn1st

Spokker said:


> I hope the CEO of BNSF is fired.


I wholeheartedly agree. Firing the CEO of a railroad that had nothing to do with a deadly accident is _always_ a step in the right direction.


----------



## AlanB

Spokker said:


> I hope everyone is fired. I hope the CEO of BNSF is fired.


Why would you fire the CEO of BNSF for a Metrolink train that crashed into a Union Pacific freight train? :unsure: :unsure:


----------



## jackal

AlanB said:


> Spokker said:
> 
> 
> 
> I hope everyone is fired. I hope the CEO of BNSF is fired.
> 
> 
> 
> Why would you fire the CEO of BNSF for a Metrolink train that crashed into a Union Pacific freight train? :unsure: :unsure:
Click to expand...

Indeed. Everything I've heard about BNSF CEO Matt Rose has been nothing but positive.


----------



## Spokker

WhoozOn1st said:


> Spokker said:
> 
> 
> 
> I hope the CEO of BNSF is fired.
> 
> 
> 
> I wholeheartedly agree. Firing the CEO of a railroad that had nothing to do with a deadly accident is _always_ a step in the right direction.
Click to expand...

Fire every executive connected to the railroads in any way.


----------



## jackal

Spokker said:


> WhoozOn1st said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Spokker said:
> 
> 
> 
> I hope the CEO of BNSF is fired.
> 
> 
> 
> I wholeheartedly agree. Firing the CEO of a railroad that had nothing to do with a deadly accident is _always_ a step in the right direction.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> Fire every executive connected to the railroads in any way.
Click to expand...

Either you're being facetious or you're misunderstanding the situation.

The incident happened between a Metrolink train and a UP train on Metrolink (SCRRA) trackage (former UP [former-former SP] trackage which is connected up the line to UP trackage). BNSF was not involved in _any_ way, not even by the remotest stretch of anyone's imagination.

BNSF's safety record is, as I understand it, one of the better ones in the industry. I see no reason to 86 Rose or anyone else connected to BNSF.


----------



## WhoozOn1st

Spokker said:


> Fire every executive connected to the railroads in any way.


Hear hear! Replace all those hideous incompetents with people who know how to run a business right: bank presidents, Wall Street honchos, and auto executives. Declare cellphones to be weapons of mass destruction and charge him with waging a "War on Error."

Makes sense to me...

EDIT: This post has been edited by a moderator or administrator in such a way as to render it almost as senseless as the quote to which it was responding. Good Going!!


----------



## Tony

Spokker said:


> Fire every executive connected to the railroads in any way.


I wonder if I could apply for one of those, then empty, jobs?


----------



## frj1983

I wonder if Metrolink might be reconsidering it's contract with Connex????? :huh:


----------



## WhoozOn1st

Heads are rolling, and I'd be surprised if this is the end of it.

Metrolink jettisons 2 managers

"Connex employees were supervisors of the engineer involved in the deadly Chatsworth crash."

Both fired managers were Amtrak holdovers when Metrolink changed operating contractors in 2005.

In response to frj1983 above, there was an article a while back (linked somewhere in this thread, if memory serves) which reported that Metrolink's legal department has been directed to look for ways to get out of the Connex (Veolia Transportation subsidiary) contract.


----------



## WhoozOn1st

Here's a letter to the editor from the 3-6-09 L.A. Times. To spare readers the hassle of slogging through the day's other 11 letters I've resorted to the rare expedient of copy/paste:

Re “Metrolink practices scrutinized,” March 2

The Times' article on Metrolink's frequent "red light running" left me stunned in disbelief.

I'm no railroad engineer, but I still remember KTLA's "Engineer Bill," circa the 1950s -- he played "Red Light, Green Light" with his milk, and his timeless axiom was that "no engineer would ever run on a red light." It makes me wonder what the current crop of engineers is drinking.

_________________________

Off topic (and totally outing myself as an old guy  ), I well remember Engineer Bill, whooz local L.A. show, "Cartoon Express," lasted into the late 1960s. Here's a YouTube video of the program. Ten minutes, with the Red Light/Green Light milk drinking game at the end. Engineer Bill (Bill Stulla, who passed away last August at 97) has his pint-sized guests rattle off the rules of the game, with each repeating the mantra "No engineer would ever run a red light."



Enjoy. It's a real hoot!

EDIT: The letter author mistakenly credits KTLA (Channel 5) with having "Cartoon Express." Engineer Bill was on KHJ-TV Channel 9, and says so in the video.


----------



## p&sr

Spokker said:


> Fire every executive connected to the railroads in any way.


To be effective, you'd also have to fire everybody who runs the trains, everybody who fixes them, and everybody who cleans them. May as well fire everybody who rides them too.


----------



## WhoozOn1st

Greetings from San Diego. Whooz & Saxman's SAN Turn trip report soon.

Reports of negligence fuel pain after Metrolink crash

"Disclosures may help increase compensation awards, experts say. Metrolink and Connex, the company that employed the engineer, are suing each other over who bears liability."


----------



## WhoozOn1st

Metrolink might hire its own crews in wake of deadly crash

"The commuter rail agency has contracted out most of its operations since being created. But the Chatsworth collision that killed 25 last September has prompted some rethinking."

"'Contracting out served the agency well when it was much smaller, when it had fewer customers,' said [Metrolink board member Richard] Katz. 'Where the system is today, and the role the system plays, is much different. It essentially is growing up, and it calls for a different kind of management.'"

Included is a link to a slideshow with voiceover comments by a passenger who was injured in the 9-12-08 wreck. She still rides Metrolink, but among other things only sits facing backward nowadays.

At the end of the article a Metrolink spokeswoman is cited as noting that new passenger rolling stock will begin arriving in June.


----------



## WhoozOn1st

Further developments on the issue of where train crews will come from, and a return to Amtrak as operator is not ruled out:

Metrolink may hire train crews itself

"The rail agency looks to end the practice of subcontracting."

"But directors of the five-county Metrolink agency, while unanimously following a staff recommendation to end train crew subcontracting, also left the door open to partnering with Amtrak. Metrolink directors gave officials of the national passenger rail service two weeks to come up with proposals for contracting out train crews and possibly other workers."


----------



## GG-1

Aloha

AS promised when something official is available here is a NTSB animation of the oficial sequence


----------



## WhoozOn1st

Wreck repercussions continue. Metrolink's board has voted unanimously to negotiate a return to Amtrak as contract operator instead of the agency attempting to hire train crews itself.

Metrolink seeks deal for crews

"Board members said they want negotiations with Amtrak to move quickly. They agreed to keep open the option of bringing the train crews in-house if contract talks break down."


----------



## Bob Dylan

WhoozOn1st said:


> Wreck repercussions continue. Metrolink's board has voted unanimously to negotiate a return to Amtrak as contract operator instead of the agency attempting to hire train crews itself.
> Metrolink seeks deal for crews
> 
> "Board members said they want negotiations with Amtrak to move quickly. They agreed to keep open the option of bringing the train crews in-house if contract talks break down."


Very interesting,perhaps the clowns that are running CapMetro here in Austin should contract with Amtrak since they are claiming that its taking 2 years to train OBS and Supervisory folks and the trains still arent running and the $$$ flows out!!Sounds like a good idea to me,experience always counts in highly skilled work and Amtrak employees are way above average IMHO!!!


----------



## Ispolkom

WhoozOn1st said:


> Wreck repercussions continue. Metrolink's board has voted unanimously to negotiate a return to Amtrak as contract operator instead of the agency attempting to hire train crews itself.


Would this mean AGR points for Metrolink trains?


----------



## WhoozOn1st

A more detailed version of the Metrolink/Amtrak operating contract story was found in the local rag, of all places:

Metrolink board votes to replace operator Connex


----------



## RTOlson

Ispolkom said:


> Would this mean AGR points for Metrolink trains?


Probably not. Amtrak provides services to Caltrain, but they are not Amtrak's trains (and you don't get any AGR points)

I think having Amtrak operate Metrolink trains could work, but I would definitely hope that Metrolink and Amtrak work hard to ensure a quality service. IIRC, Amtrak has operated trains for Metrolink in the past before the regional agency went with the company owned Veolia.


----------



## Ispolkom

RTOlson said:


> Ispolkom said:
> 
> 
> 
> Would this mean AGR points for Metrolink trains?
> 
> 
> 
> Probably not. Amtrak provides services to Caltrain, but they are not Amtrak's trains (and you don't get any AGR points)
> 
> I think having Amtrak operate Metrolink trains could work, but I would definitely hope that Metrolink and Amtrak work hard to ensure a quality service. IIRC, Amtrak has operated trains for Metrolink in the past before the regional agency went with the company owned Veolia.
Click to expand...

You're right, I see in the article that Amtrak is already running four Metrolink lines, and no points on them.


----------



## WhoozOn1st

Ispolkom said:


> I see in the article that Amtrak is already running four Metrolink lines, and no points on them.


Careful! The statement in the article threw me for a moment, and is perhaps kinda confusing:

"Amtrak...already runs passenger trains on four of the seven Metrolink lines, including the Ventura County line."

What this actually means is that Amtrak's OWN trains (Pacific Surfliners, Coast Starlight, Sunset Limited, Southwest Chief - for which you DO get AGR points) run on the same tracks as 4 of the 7 Metrolink Lines, NOT that Amtrak is already operating the Metrolink trains on those lines.

EDIT: In any case, no AGR on Metrolink, even if Amtrak starts operating its trains again. None when Amtrak operated Metrolink before, either.


----------



## Ispolkom

WhoozOn1st said:


> Ispolkom said:
> 
> 
> 
> I see in the article that Amtrak is already running four Metrolink lines, and no points on them.
> 
> 
> 
> Careful! The statement in the article threw me for a moment, and is perhaps kinda confusing:
> 
> "Amtrak...already runs passenger trains on four of the seven Metrolink lines, including the Ventura County line."
> 
> What this actually means is that Amtrak's OWN trains (Pacific Surfliners, Coast Starlight, Sunset Limited, Southwest Chief - for which you DO get AGR points) run on the same tracks as 4 of the 7 Metrolink Lines, NOT that Amtrak is already operating the Metrolink trains on those lines.
> 
> EDIT: In any case, no AGR on Metrolink, even if Amtrak starts operating its trains again. None when Amtrak operated Metrolink before, either.
Click to expand...

I thought that it was funny that Metrolink had two operators for its lines, though I'm sure what the reporter wrote was clear to locals. Thanks for clearing up my confusion, even though it dashes my plans for point runs on Metrolink the next time I'm in LA.


----------



## MattW

I'm assuming this is good for Amtrak as it means more jobs for them and Metrolink will be paying them for the crews?


----------



## WhoozOn1st

MattW said:


> I'm assuming this is good for Amtrak as it means more jobs for them and Metrolink will be paying them for the crews?


Certainly Metrolink would be paying for Amtrak crews to operate its trains, but how many NEW Amtrak jobs might result from an operating contract is unclear. Over the years I've talked with several Metrolink engineers, three of whom were Amtrak employees when I first met them (a fourth is also ex-Amtrak, but Connex when first met recently), made the switch to Connex and kept their same runs when Metrolink changed operators, and I suppose might be able to rejoin Amtrak if negotiations pan out and Metrolink returns to Amtrak.


----------



## AlanB

Ispolkom said:


> RTOlson said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Ispolkom said:
> 
> 
> 
> Would this mean AGR points for Metrolink trains?
> 
> 
> 
> Probably not. Amtrak provides services to Caltrain, but they are not Amtrak's trains (and you don't get any AGR points)
> 
> I think having Amtrak operate Metrolink trains could work, but I would definitely hope that Metrolink and Amtrak work hard to ensure a quality service. IIRC, Amtrak has operated trains for Metrolink in the past before the regional agency went with the company owned Veolia.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> You're right, I see in the article that Amtrak is already running four Metrolink lines, and no points on them.
Click to expand...

Definately no points. Amtrak runs the MARC services on the NEC and one can even buy a MARC ticket that's issued on Amtrak ticket stock. Still no points.


----------



## Green Maned Lion

One thing it might mean is Amtrak controlling dispatch on Metrolink track. Which may mean greater priority for Amtrak trains running on them.


----------



## WhoozOn1st

Two anniversaries this week. 9/11 everybody knows. 9/12 will mark a year since the Metrolink/UP cornfield meet at Chatsworth. Whether there will be a new spate of articles covering in detail various aspects of the collision we shall see. This one is on the front page of today's L.A. Times.

Metrolink struggles with reform a year after crash

"Upgrades promised after 25 were killed are growing costlier and more complicated."

"A burst of energy to remake the region's Metrolink train operation was unleashed by the deadliest rail collision in modern California history, a watershed event that killed 25, injured 130 and prompted landmark federal mandates to modernize the nation's rail safety systems.

"Today, the rush to reform Metrolink -- a thinly staffed hybrid transportation agency once derided as the political stepchild of the five counties that created it -- is becoming increasingly costly, time-consuming and complicated."


----------



## WhoozOn1st

With 3 my designated spate threshold, this article as the 1-year anniversary of the fatal Metrolink/UP wreck nears is the second. A memorial to Metrolink victims was unveiled in the rotunda/atrium at the bus end of Los Angeles Union Station on Tuesday, 9-8-09. Besides the bus terminal outside this end of LAUS there are also MTA ticket windows and a Red Line subway entrance. You could hardly put the memorial plaque further away from where Metrolink trains operate - on the station's tracks at the other end facing Alameda street - and still have it inside LAUS. The photo accompanying this article shows the bronze plaque, which depicts the curve where the wreck occurred from what was the UP freight train's viewpoint approaching the collision.

Metrolink memorial

The news story notes a previous Metrolink wreck that also resulted in numerous fatalities:

"In January 2005, 11 passengers died and more than 180 were injured when a Metrolink train derailed near Glendale after slamming into a sport utility vehicle that had been left on the tracks.

"The driver of the SUV, Juan Manuel Alvarez, who was trying to commit suicide but changed his mind at the last minute, was convicted of murder and sentenced last year to 11 consecutive life terms."

______________________

I don't know if any form of Positive Train Control might have prevented that one.


----------



## AlanB

WhoozOn1st said:


> I don't know if any form of Positive Train Control might have prevented that one.


It wouldn't have. Perhaps if he had left the vehicle in the crossing PTC might have at least slowed the train down some prior to the crash. But once he drove the vehicle onto the tracks themselves and out of the crossing area, PTC would have had no clue that there was a problem.


----------



## WhoozOn1st

This article about one of the UP locomotives involved in the cornfield meet doesn't technically count toward the anticipated spate of stories surrounding the 1-year anniversary of the wreck cuz it comes from the local rag, not the L.A. Times. The Ventura County Star story is about UP engine No. 8485, which since shortly after the collision has sat in the tiny yard at Moorpark, Metrolink 111's intended destination. The other UP locomotive involved in the calamity sits in the small yard at Oxnard, only visible if one knows where to look, and sometimes not at all if hidden by freight cars in the yard.

Crews put tarp on damaged locomotive

"Union Pacific was asked by the National Transportation Safety Board to preserve the locomotive in its current post-accident condition, so the railroad asked Metrolink if it could temporarily store it at its nearby Moorpark facility."

_____________________

Coincidentally, AlanB and other members of On Track On Line (OTOL) rode Metrolink 111 - same run as the train involved in the wreck - during their SoCal RailFest 2009 in July. The ride had been part of the planned Fest itinerary since before the disaster.


----------



## WhoozOn1st

With the arrival of the 1-year anniversary of the deadly UP/Metrolink wreck at Chatsworth the story count is now officially a spate. I expect there'll be another round of articles when the NTSB's final report on the calamity is released.

Metrolink still behind on some safety measures

"The public agency has not undertaken a thorough assessment of its management organization or completed a strategic plan, and its board of directors has not gone though a self-assessment of its performance, said Linda Bollinger, facilitator for the peer review panel set up in the wake of the Chatsworth crash that killed 25 and injured 135 one year ago."

A family tries to heal its wounds

"Twenty-four passengers, from 18 to 75 years old, were killed when Metrolink 111 rammed a Union Pacific freight train head-on, one of the state's worst rail catastrophes. The victims will be remembered today in programs at the Chatsworth station and in Simi Valley, where many of the victims were headed."

_____________________

On Friday there was local TV news coverage of a memorial attended by L.A. Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa, who was shown planting a tree next to the rail line behind a private school adjacent to the Metrolink Death Curve at Chatsworth. After the collision the school was used as a triage area and communications center for rescue efforts.

Absent from local reporting - perhaps understandably - is any mention of the huge impact this disaster has had on the entire U.S. rail system. The wreck was clearly the catalyst for swift congressional action mandating Positive Train Control - a back burner issue the freight railroads had been resisting since about forever (and continue to fight in one way or another) - as part of a larger rail safety bill that also included a reauthorization of Amtrak.


----------



## VentureForth

Has there been any indication that they will consider medical checks for their engineers and conductors like commercial aviation requires every 6 months for airline pilots?

A second crew member in the cab of any train on single track where passengers are should also be a requirement.


----------



## Green Maned Lion

Your requirements are silly. The PTC should prevent this type of accident forever more. Also, it wasn't a medical issue. Sanchez was texting with his little kiddie pals, or so phone company records suggest. I've seen morons texting while riding bikes.

Even if he wasn't texting at that precise moment, his mind was probably not on his job.

I wonder, once PTC is installed, what the next defect in the rail system will show itself. PTC won't end collisions. Just this kind of collision.


----------



## AlanB

Actually I wouldn't bet that PTC would have prevented this accident. There is a chance that the train still would have collided with PTC.

However, I will guarantee that the collision would not have been as severe with PTC, assuming that PTC couldn't have prevented it. PTC would have certainly slowed the commuter train considerably before the collision, and possibly even made a dent in the freight train's speed too. Instead of an 80 MPH closure rate, it probably would have been in the range of 20MPH to 30 MPH closure rate, a rate that most likely would have been survivable for all but perhaps Mr. Sanchez.

And for that matter, even without PTC, if Mr. Sanchez hadn't been texting he would have seen that the switch was set against him and would have immediately started braking.

I for one am not at present fully accepting the current NTSB line that the signal was red. I have doubts at this point since there are too many reliable witness' who say it was green. I for one don't understand why they seem to be totally disregarding both the conductor's statements that it was green, as well as statements from two railfans and one security officer who is charged with riding the trains to enforce the fare rules and has some idea how things work.


----------



## jis

AlanB said:


> Actually I wouldn't bet that PTC would have prevented this accident. There is a chance that the train still would have collided with PTC.


A PTC system with positive train stop would have prevented it. By definition, a positive train stop system stops the train before it passes a signal at danger. I believe the PTC system that is mandated has this property, which is what makes it complex and makes its characteristics different fro safely operating freight trains at freight train speeds vs.passenger trains at significantly higher speeds, since pesky things like distance to next signal and braking curves have to be taken into consideration.

For example ACSES level 2 and above will prevent such a collision. But then again a runaway freight car cannot be protected against without using derailing switches, which Amtrak spent a lot of energy getting rid of at places like Gunpow not long before the Chase accident, one that would not have occurred had Amtrak not gone through the trouble of removing the drailing switches at that interlocking.


----------



## AlanB

jis said:


> AlanB said:
> 
> 
> 
> Actually I wouldn't bet that PTC would have prevented this accident. There is a chance that the train still would have collided with PTC.
> 
> 
> 
> A PTC system with positive train stop would have prevented it. By definition, a positive train stop system stops the train before it passes a signal at danger. I believe the PTC system that is mandated has this property, which is what makes it complex and makes its characteristics different fro safely operating freight trains at freight train speeds vs.passenger trains at significantly higher speeds, since pesky things like distance to next signal and braking curves have to be taken into consideration.
Click to expand...

In normal operating circumstances I would agree with you Jishnu, but remember that this accident wasn't quite normal. First, let's talk about normal. In the case of the Metrolink train, had the engineer sailed past the approach signal (the signal right before the red one), at a rate of speed higher than allowed by that signal, then yes PTC would have kicked in and stopped the train prior to the stop signal.

However, in this case that approach signal was just prior to a station stop. Therefore the train was already slowing down to make that stop, therefore no penalty application by PTC. Now the engineer starts back up after making the station stop. By the time he reaches a speed that would be above the maximum allowed by the restricting approach signal, he's probably already covered half the one mile distance to the signal at danger.

Once he gets above the maximum allowed speed, the PTC gives him a warning that he needs to stop/slow the train down. The engineer is given at least 15 to 20 seconds, maybe even a bit more time, to actually start slowing the train. If no action is taken, a loud blaring alarm goes off that would basically wake the dead, warning the engineer that he needs to take immediate action. And again, the engineer is given several seconds, probably 15 to 20 again. By this point, the train has now probably covered another 1/4th of a mile, if not more.

PTC finally has enough of the inaction and it applies the brakes, but with less than 1/4th of a mile left between the switch and the engine, there is no way that this train is stopping before running the switch. UP coming at 40 MPH will slow once its PTC warns the engineer that there is a problem ahead, but again, he's not stopping before colliding with the Metrolink train. Yes, it won't be an 80 MPH collision, but there will almost certainly be a collision.

All that said, if PTC had been there that day, it is most likely that Mr. Sanchez would have dropped his cell phone and stopped the train in time. But, if Mr. Sanchez had been somehow incapacitated, it is unlikely that PTC would have prevented an accident. It would have mitigated the consequences of a collision, but I suspect that one still would have happened.


----------



## George Harris

If Mr. Sanchez had been incapacitated, he would not have left Chatsworth, as he would not have opened the throttle.

Since he was supposed to stop short of the signal, PTC would not have applied the brakes on the freight train until he overan the home signal, at which point the freight was only seconds from the point of collision.

Not certain, but since Metrolink was already in a stop-at-next-signal mode when at the station, could he have accelerated to the speed that he did at all? In fact, would the system have let him do anything other than creep forward at restricted speed until the end of circuit just before the home signal?


----------



## AlanB

George Harris said:


> If Mr. Sanchez had been incapacitated, he would not have left Chatsworth, as he would not have opened the throttle.


Obviously I meant that he had become incapacitated after departing the station. But yes, you are correct in this case.



George Harris said:


> Since he was supposed to stop short of the signal, PTC would not have applied the brakes on the freight train until he overan the home signal, at which point the freight was only seconds from the point of collision.


Agreed.



George Harris said:


> Not certain, but since Metrolink was already in a stop-at-next-signal mode when at the station, could he have accelerated to the speed that he did at all? In fact, would the system have let him do anything other than creep forward at restricted speed until the end of circuit just before the home signal?


No, it's highly unlikely that any PTC system would have allowed him to reach 40MPH with a restricted cab speed. But unless the system was designed with a graduated speed control that went lower and lower as he approached the red signal, it would have allowed at least a 20 MPH speed, before it started setting off alarm bells. And given the amount of time that's built in to allow the engineer to do the right thing before the computer takes over, he probably would have reached 25 MPH to 30 MPH, before PTC shut him down. Especially if Mr. Sanchez had the throttle shoved all the way forward.


----------



## WhoozOn1st

Metrolink staffing criticized by Boxer

"The senator is shocked that 87% of trains still have just one crew member in the cab a year after the Chatsworth crash."

"'This is not good,' Boxer said in an interview. She said she was led to believe after the Chatsworth crash that the agency would be adding crew members to all trains until a high-tech collision avoidance system could be deployed."


----------



## GG-1

AlanB said:


> George Harris said:
> 
> 
> 
> If Mr. Sanchez had been incapacitated, he would not have left Chatsworth, as he would not have opened the throttle.
> 
> 
> 
> Obviously I meant that he had become incapacitated after departing the station. But yes, you are correct in this case.
> 
> 
> 
> George Harris said:
> 
> 
> 
> Since he was supposed to stop short of the signal, PTC would not have applied the brakes on the freight train until he overan the home signal, at which point the freight was only seconds from the point of collision.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> Agreed.
> 
> 
> 
> George Harris said:
> 
> 
> 
> Not certain, but since Metrolink was already in a stop-at-next-signal mode when at the station, could he have accelerated to the speed that he did at all? In fact, would the system have let him do anything other than creep forward at restricted speed until the end of circuit just before the home signal?
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> No, it's highly unlikely that any PTC system would have allowed him to reach 40MPH with a restricted cab speed. But unless the system was designed with a graduated speed control that went lower and lower as he approached the red signal, it would have allowed at least a 20 MPH speed, before it started setting off alarm bells. And given the amount of time that's built in to allow the engineer to do the right thing before the computer takes over, he probably would have reached 25 MPH to 30 MPH, before PTC shut him down. Especially if Mr. Sanchez had the throttle shoved all the way forward.
Click to expand...

Aloha

What the two of you covered makes a lot of sense, but leaves out ont thing from the reports I remember, and how would this affect what you wrote. Th train accelerated to 52mph before the yellow signal, and then reduced speed to 43mph with no other speed change before the Accident. In the distance involved it seems that it would have been impossible to reach 50+mph.

Alan, elsewhere raised a credible question about some reports of the signal being green. Sunlight could have mixed with the yellow light and looked green if the viewer was at the right angle. Mr. Sanchez looking at the signal "on axis" would not have this color effect", clearly Mr. Sanchez was not paying attention to duty.


----------



## zoltan

WhoozOn1st said:


> Metrolink staffing criticized by Boxer"The senator is shocked that 87% of trains still have just one crew member in the cab a year after the Chatsworth crash."
> 
> "'This is not good,' Boxer said in an interview. She said she was led to believe after the Chatsworth crash that the agency would be adding crew members to all trains until a high-tech collision avoidance system could be deployed."


How many people are responsible for driving the average car, bus or truck as they travel unguided, largely unsignalled except at a proportion or intersections, over space shared by other cars, buses, trucks, pedestrians, and occasionally trains?

Once you decide that for safety reasons you need to increase the cost of providing train services, investment in more trains becomes less effective, fewer people are persuaded out of their cars, and therefore continue to use a mode of travel that is far less safe than trains are. And more people are killed and injured. But when did politicians ever look past the most immediate and direct consequences of their actions?


----------



## George Harris

WhoozOn1st said:


> Metrolink staffing criticized by Boxer"The senator is shocked that 87% of trains still have just one crew member in the cab a year after the Chatsworth crash."
> 
> "'This is not good,' Boxer said in an interview. She said she was led to believe after the Chatsworth crash that the agency would be adding crew members to all trains until a high-tech collision avoidance system could be deployed."


Yeah, and the other senator from California was shocked to find that passenger trains and freight trains both run in both directions on one track. She is (both of them actually) a POLITICIAN ! ! ! That means that almost any reality that is normal to the rest of the world is shocking to them.


----------



## WhoozOn1st

This story doesn't appear in my Saturday L.A. Times, but is apparently online as part of the Sunday edition (hits stands today).

Using the Chatsworth wreck as a sort of reference/starting point, the article takes a broader look at Metrolink safety issues, with a focus on grade crossings and comparisons with the MTA's approach. Interesting video about a particular grade crossing and its peculiarities.

Metrolink system's toll: 244

"The regional rail agency is criticized for paying too little attention to safety -- including dangerous crossings -- on tracks it owns and uses."

And now if you'll excuse me, I have a train to catch!


----------



## alanh

Wow, interesting article.

Metrolink's position and Pasadena's position is that the should do nothing because (a) the intersection will be rebuilt as an overpass as part of an I-5 project Real Soon Now, and (b) the drivers broke the law and they can't do anything about that.

The I-5 project was mentioned in the NTSB report (PDF). However, the date was 2006 then; the earliest date for starting is now 2010. It's seems dumb to wait when some simple things could be done.

As for the drivers breaking the law.... It's true they did run the RR signals. However, it's not true that nothing can be done. If there's a disproportionate violation of a signal at a particular intersection, it usually means there's a design problem. For example, the problem of people going around a gate can be addressed with a median barrier, which is exactly what the NTSB suggested here. Increased enforcement is also possible, such as cameras at crossings to record violators.

I've never been a fan of the all-red-flashing preemption, and apparently the NTSB isn't either. The justification for it is that it allows a vehicle that's stopped on the tracks to move forward, whereas a car or truck facing a solid red would just stay stopped. If one direction has flashing red signal, then the others cannot have a regular green signal so they have to flash red or yellow also. However, if there's a green clearance period (the light turns green for a few seconds after the gate goes down so traffic between the gate and signal can go) that should be less of a problem. Movements with that conflict with the railroad can then get a solid red which motorists are more likely to obey.

I wonder if anyone has ever considered ditching the the RR flashers and replacing them with a standard traffic light.


----------



## George Harris

alanh said:


> As for the drivers breaking the law.... It's true they did run the RR signals. However, it's not true that nothing can be done. If there's a disproportionate violation of a signal at a particular intersection, it usually means there's a design problem. For example, the problem of people going around a gate can be addressed with a median barrier, which is exactly what the NTSB suggested here. Increased enforcement is also possible, such as cameras at crossings to record violators.


maybe yes, maybe no. As to the median barrier, this is a requiremetn for a whistle free crossing. As to the cameras, they are useful as a defense to the inevitable lawsuit, not much else unless the violators get a ticket that they have to pay.



> I wonder if anyone has ever considered ditching the the RR flashers and replacing them with a standard traffic light.


This has been disussed many times over the years by those that analyze traffic control devices.


----------



## WhoozOn1st

Metrolink adds video cameras to locomotives

"They will also be standard equipment in 57 new 'lead cars' [aka cab cars] -- passengers cars that lead commuter trains when the locomotive is pushing from behind."


----------



## jis

AlanB said:


> In normal operating circumstances I would agree with you Jishnu, but remember that this accident wasn't quite normal. First, let's talk about normal. In the case of the Metrolink train, had the engineer sailed past the approach signal (the signal right before the red one), at a rate of speed higher than allowed by that signal, then yes PTC would have kicked in and stopped the train prior to the stop signal.
> However, in this case that approach signal was just prior to a station stop. Therefore the train was already slowing down to make that stop, therefore no penalty application by PTC. Now the engineer starts back up after making the station stop. By the time he reaches a speed that would be above the maximum allowed by the restricting approach signal, he's probably already covered half the one mile distance to the signal at danger.
> 
> Once he gets above the maximum allowed speed, the PTC gives him a warning that he needs to stop/slow the train down. The engineer is given at least 15 to 20 seconds, maybe even a bit more time, to actually start slowing the train. If no action is taken, a loud blaring alarm goes off that would basically wake the dead, warning the engineer that he needs to take immediate action. And again, the engineer is given several seconds, probably 15 to 20 again. By this point, the train has now probably covered another 1/4th of a mile, if not more.
> 
> PTC finally has enough of the inaction and it applies the brakes, but with less than 1/4th of a mile left between the switch and the engine, there is no way that this train is stopping before running the switch. UP coming at 40 MPH will slow once its PTC warns the engineer that there is a problem ahead, but again, he's not stopping before colliding with the Metrolink train. Yes, it won't be an 80 MPH collision, but there will almost certainly be a collision.
> 
> All that said, if PTC had been there that day, it is most likely that Mr. Sanchez would have dropped his cell phone and stopped the train in time. But, if Mr. Sanchez had been somehow incapacitated, it is unlikely that PTC would have prevented an accident. It would have mitigated the consequences of a collision, but I suspect that one still would have happened.


Alan, A properly designed PTC system enforces the invariant that the engine does not pass a signal at danger. If necessary it overrides all these niceties of blowing horns and giving 15 seconds to the engineer to react. So I still contend that any PTC system with continuous monitoring worth its salt must have been able to prevent this accident. Otherwise it ain't a real PTC system.

The job of a properly designed PTC system is to enforce the braking curve so that the train comes to a standstill before it reaches a signal at danger, with or without the cooperation of the operator. Once the braking curve is violated the operators is essentially out of the loop. Have seen such happen on a TGV. It is different from a penalty brake application. It is enforcement of the computed braking curve to stop at a particular point (or bring the speed down to some specified value by a particular point) It is impressive how smoothly it works. Now of course if one is using something on the cheap that does not deal with brake curve enforcement then all bets are off, and then it is not a system that can guarantee positive train separation.


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## WhoozOn1st

Here's a different, and somewhat more detailed, take on Metrolink's installation of cab cameras. From RailwayAge:

L.A. Metrolink pioneers inward-facing locomotive cameras

"All cameras and audio devices in each of the system's 52 locomotives will be activated between October 7 and 12. LDVRs [Locomotive Digital Video Recorders] will also be included in the 57 new Crash Energy Management-equipped lead passenger cars that Metrolink will place into service in the coming year."

I may have been aboard one of the new cab cars for a run from Lancaster to LAX on the Antelope Valley Line last Saturday (train 266); definitely a different design than seen/ridden previously (my first time on AV Line). An extra compartment in front (push mode) beyond main seating, and seatbacks had greater recline angle. Just not sure what "in the coming year" means, and whether some might already be in service.

Return run on train 269 included usual cab car in consist.

EDIT: Redesign of the cab cars came as a result of Metrolink's 2005 Glendale wreck, which killed 11.


----------



## WhoozOn1st

L.A. Times reader responses to the above story about Metrolink cab cameras (copy/paste to spare AU readers the slog through 11 letters on other topics):

Re “Metrolink adds video cameras to locomotives,” Oct. 6

The horrible and entirely preventable Chatsworth Metrolink collision should remind us all that rail safety is a top priority.

The threat by the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen to sue to remove cameras shows that rail crews are not on board yet with the seriousness of the rail safety problem. Neither is Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger, who wants us all to believe in a huge construction project for high-speed trains by 2025 using expensive bonds. He needs to start thinking about improvements in trains and public safety that can happen next year.

__________________

During the last several years, my wife and I have traveled throughout Europe using a variety of public ground transportation -- trains, buses, streetcars.

We never observed a driver texting or using a cellphone. The drivers take their job seriously.

Here, the union's response was predictable. Cameras an invasion of privacy? This is public transportation. You have no rights to privacy.


----------



## DET63

Metrolink adds video cameras inside locomotive cabs



> The Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen, the union representing the Metrolink engineers, has called the cameras ineffective, and an invasion of privacy.
> 
> The union plans to take legal action to remove them.
> 
> 
> 
> "If guys fall asleep or go through a red signal, whether the camera is there or not doesn't really make a difference. The camera doesn't have a magic button to stop the train," said Timothy Smith, chairman of the union's California legislative board.
> 
> 
> 
> Instead, Metrolink should staff each locomotive with two engineers and install positive train-control systems, he said. Those high-tech braking systems use digital communications with Global Positioning System technology to monitor train locations and speeds, and if engineers fail to comply with signals, the train automatically applies the brakes.
> 
> 
> 
> Metrolink board member Richard Katz said the agency plans to install the on-board automatic braking systems on all its trains by 2012.


----------



## MattW

I can't see what's wrong with the cameras. It's not a bedroom, I assume the bathrooms won't have cameras in them (if they exist) so what's the big deal? I get the feeling complacency with the rules is partially what led to this crash. "I've never crashed before while texting so it won't hurt this time." Complacency kills, and perhaps when people performing critical jobs start getting slapped with disciplinary action for rule violations, this will stop. No, there will probably never be a definite "he wasn't texting and because of that he saved the the train" incident, but prevention can sometimes be the best cure (though don't get me started on the WHO and H1N1).


----------



## WhoozOn1st

Same railroad, different wreck...

Metrolink's tab for 2005 wreck is at $30 million

"Claims arising from the Chatsworth crash are in early stages. Plaintiffs' attorneys in that case said they were planning on having their experts review the crash site early next month. Attorneys have said those lawsuits will probably overwhelm a $200-million cap that Congress imposed 11 years ago on a railroad's liability in any one accident."


----------



## WhoozOn1st

Another red-light probe for Metrolink

"Metrolink is investigating a new safety breach on the regional commuter line involving an engineer who allegedly failed to stop at a red signal last week as another train approached.

"The incident, which also is being reviewed by federal regulators, is the fourth alleged red-light violation since the Sept. 12, 2008, crash in Chatsworth that killed 25. Investigators have attributed that crash to an engineer running a red light."

Also...

"The current probe will be one of the first to incorporate footage from just-installed video cameras that are trained on engineers."


----------



## Rob_C

How about a relatively simple IR system that works like your remote control? The red light sends a signal in the direction of an oncoming train, the train gets the signals and plays a loud "RED" sound or voice that the engineer hears. I don't know what could be much better than that other than complete computer control which probably has it's own pitfalls.


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## transit54

Rob_C said:


> How about a relatively simple IR system that works like your remote control? The red light sends a signal in the direction of an oncoming train, the train gets the signals and plays a loud "RED" sound or voice that the engineer hears. I don't know what could be much better than that other than complete computer control which probably has it's own pitfalls.


There's two problems with this approach:

1) If there isn't line of sight between the two trains. IR needs line of sight to work effectively and reliably. If there was line of sight, the crews would probably already be putting their trains into emergency.

2) Other trains - consider a double-tracked line. If a train is heading in one direction, it's going to be broadcasting IR signals to trains heading up the the other track. Sure, it could be programed to identify what track it is on, but trains routinely switch tracks. So it wouldn't be failsafe, as it would need to be updated by the crew (if you invested in the technology to make it automatic you're going to be very close to a PTC system anyway).


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## Ryan

He's not talking about the trains sending out the IR, but the red signals. That's actually a pretty good idea.


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## transit54

HokieNav said:


> He's not talking about the trains sending out the IR, but the red signals. That's actually a pretty good idea.


Ah, now I understand. That is a good idea. Except, would it present a problem with double tracks and two trains moving in the same direction, one which has a red and one which has a green? There would need to be a way to limit the range of the IR signal, or target it to a particular train. Not that it couldn't be accomplished...


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## amtrakwolverine

what they could due is have a thing to trip the trains breaks like they due for subways. when a signal is red a lever is up and hits a valve switch on the underside of the car dumping the air.


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## MattW

Use a low power IR diode laser mounted track-centerline, or off the end of a curve pointed track centerline.


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## AlanB

The problem with anything IR based is that by the time a train going 70 MPH is within range of the IR, nothing is going to stop that train from running that red signal, short of a brick wall. And it would need to be a very thick brick wall, which would have other repercussions.

Yes, the if engineer obeyed the approach signal before the red signal, then the IR reminder might be helpful. But if the engineer isn't paying attention at all, and is still rolling along at higher speeds, then any warning triggered by an IR device will come too late.

The same problem would come into play with any trackside trip arm, by the time the train hits that arm and has its air dumped, it will be well beyond the signal and most likely in the path of another approaching train.


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## VentureForth

Another problem would be that the second a bug splattered on the IR receiver, it would render the system useless.


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## WhoozOn1st

Metrolink's CEO could be moved aside

"David R. Solow has been under pressure since Chatsworth crash"

"...[Metrolink] board members said Solow appeared overloaded at times by the demands of the job, which intensified substantially after last year's head-on collision, which left 25 dead and 135 injured."

Service cuts are also on the agenda:

"To avoid or minimize the 6% fare boost initially proposed by Solow's team, the board today will consider cutting dozens of lower ridership trains used by thousands of riders each month."


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## WhoozOn1st

Metrolink's CEO accepts demotion

"David R. Solow, the five-county Metrolink agency's chief executive for more than a decade, agreed to step down and take a new advisory position guiding deployment of a complex safety system [positive train control] intended to prevent a repeat of last year's crash, which left 25 dead and 135 injured."

Service and fare hike questions were kicked down the road:

"Also on Friday, the board, in a sharply divided vote, put off decisions on the latest 3% proposed fare increase and possible cutbacks of dozens of trains until early next year.

"The action could exacerbate a multimillion-dollar shortfall in the current year's operating budget, officials acknowledged. But a slim majority of members said they wanted to continue exploring other cost-cutting measures and potential sources of new revenue."

FWIW, the last Metrolink fare increase reduced the Amtrak/Metrolink price difference to the point where I now prefer to pay a little extra for a Surfliner to L.A. and get the AGR points; more convenient schedule, too.


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## WhoozOn1st

Metrolink got a waiver to not post simple safety signs (clumsy headline!)

"Known in railroad parlance as 'delay in block' warnings, they are designed to remind locomotive engineers of speed restrictions required after they stop at passenger depots located within a series, or 'block,' of signals.

"Generally, those restrictions require trains leaving the station to stay under 40 mph and be prepared to stop until engineers see a signal indicating it is clear to go faster.

"The federal requirements were prompted by deadly, back-to-back 1996 passenger rail accidents in New Jersey and Maryland that were similar to the Chatsworth crash. In both cases, engineers failed to stop at junction signals."

___________

Does anybody recall the particulars of the N.J. and Maryland wrecks?


----------



## Long Train Runnin'

From this list 

The NJ crash:



> February 9, 1996 – Secaucus, New Jersey, United States: New Jersey Transit Train 1254 traveling to Hoboken Terminal via the Bergen County Line runs a red signal a few hundred yards east of where the Secaucus Junction Station is currently located and slams into NJT Train 1107 traveling to Suffern, New York via the NJT Main Line. Both engineers and a passenger on Train 1254 are killed.



The MD crash:



> February 16, 1996 – Silver Spring, Maryland, United States: The engineer of a MARC commuter train bound for Washington Union Station, either misses or ignores a stop signal and collides with outbound Amtrak train no. 29, the westbound Capitol Limited. The crash left 3 crew and 8 passengers dead aboard the MARC train.[65] Three die of injuries suffered in the impact; but the rest are killed by smoke and flames, the fire which may have been ignited by oil pot switch heaters. This accident lead to the FRA instituting the Delay in Block Rule, and also was a major impetus for the Passenger Equipment Safety Standards regulation (49 CFR Part 238).


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## WhoozOn1st

This article is posted over at the Commuter rail forum because its main focus is Metrolink's new crash-resistant cars, set to arrive from S. Korea. They were designed and built as a direct result of the fatal (11 dead) wreck at Glendale years before the Chatsworth calamity. It's posted here as well because it also touches on the subject of the Chatsworth-related story posted above yesterday.

Metrolink to get updated rail cars

"Responding to a Times report on Thursday, officials said they would review a 13-year-old federal waiver that allowed Metrolink to forgo installing simple safety signs intended to avoid crashes like last year's head-on collision in Chatsworth that left 25 dead and 135 injured. The signs were intended to remind engineers to proceed slowly, watching for signal status after they stop at stations that are between trackside control lights."

____________

The photo that accompanies the L.A. Times story shows a locomotive sporting Metrolink's new paint scheme and logo. In the wake of the cornfield meet at Chatsworth I've often thought the old (current) logo is pretty unfortunate:







To Long Train Runnin': Thanks for the info on the NJ and MD wrecks, but I asked does anybody RECALL them. Despite your advanced years I seriously doubt you have any direct memory of those 1996 accidents.


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## Green Maned Lion

I remember one of them. Our house keeper was on a train behind one of them and was late to work as a result.


----------



## George Harris

WhoozOn1st said:


> To Long Train Runnin': Thanks for the info on the NJ and MD wrecks, but I asked does anybody RECALL them. Despite your advanced years I seriously doubt you have any direct memory of those 1996 accidents.


Recall, as in remember when they happened? 1996 is not that long ago, so of course is the answer.

If you want the details, go to the NTSB web site and look up the accident report. These things are exhaustive in their details.


----------



## George Harris

Following are the report numbers from the NTSB web site



> Title: Collision and Derailment of Maryland Rail Commuter MARC Train 286 and National Railroad Passenger Corportation AMTRAK Train 29 Near Silver Spring, MD February 16, 1996 NTSB Report Number: RAR-97-02, adopted on 6/17/1997
> 
> NTIS Report Number: PB97-916302
> 
> Title: Railroad Accident Report Near Head-on Collision and Derailment of Two New Jersey Transit Commuter Trains Near Seacaucus, New Jersey February 9, 1996
> 
> NTSB Report Number: RAR-97-01, adopted on 3/25/1997
> 
> NTIS Report Number: PB97-916301
> 
> Title: Railroad Accident Report Collision of Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Train T-111 with Standing Train at Shady Grove Passenger Station, Gaithersburg, Maryland January 6, 1996
> 
> NTSB Report Number: RAR-96-04, adopted on 10/29/1996
> 
> NTIS Report Number: PB96-916304


I have thrown in the WMATA accident for flavor.

These things have both a summary posted and a pdf of the report.


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## WhoozOn1st

George Harris said:


> WhoozOn1st said:
> 
> 
> 
> To Long Train Runnin': Thanks for the info on the NJ and MD wrecks, but I asked does anybody RECALL them. Despite your advanced years I seriously doubt you have any direct memory of those 1996 accidents.
> 
> 
> 
> Recall, as in remember when they happened? 1996 is not that long ago, so of course is the answer.
> 
> If you want the details, go to the NTSB web site and look up the accident report. These things are exhaustive in their details.
Click to expand...

Thanks, I will take a look at the NTSB stuff. It was really just a joke about Long Train's age. He was about 4 in 1996.


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## WhoozOn1st

On 1-21-10 the NTSB is expected to release its final report on the Metrolink/UP wreck at Chatsworth:

Final report on deadly Metrolink crash comes down to signal color

"Federal investigators presented evidence about the crash at a public hearing in March. At Thursday’s meeting the board will determine a probable cause and contributing factors, as well as safety recommendations for Metrolink and other rail agencies. Board members have already been briefed on the proposed findings. But those can be debated and amended during Thursday's meeting before the final written report is completed...."

______________________

Note caption on the photo which accompanies the story: "A signal turns red behind a Metrolink train pulling out of the Chatsworth station." In fact, the signals are in FRONT of the train (note headlights), which is shown exiting the Metrolink Death Curve, inbound for ARRIVAL at Chatsworth. EDIT: The error has since been acknowledged online and the caption revised.

The NTSB meeting will be available via live webcast (scroll down).


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## amtrakwolverine

once again inept news reporters.


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## VentureForth

Any pictures anywhere of the new coaches?


----------



## DET63

WhoozOn1st said:


> On 1-21-10 the NTSB is expected to release its final report on the Metrolink/UP wreck at Chatsworth:
> Final report on deadly Metrolink crash comes down to signal color
> 
> "Federal investigators presented evidence about the crash at a public hearing in March. At Thursday’s meeting the board will determine a probable cause and contributing factors, as well as safety recommendations for Metrolink and other rail agencies. Board members have already been briefed on the proposed findings. But those can be debated and amended during Thursday's meeting before the final written report is completed...."
> 
> ______________________
> 
> Note caption on the photo which accompanies the story: "A signal turns red behind a Metrolink train pulling out of the Chatsworth station." In fact, the signals are in FRONT of the train (note headlights), which is shown exiting the Metrolink Death Curve, inbound for ARRIVAL at Chatsworth. EDIT: The error has since been acknowledged online and the caption revised.
> 
> The NTSB meeting will be available via live webcast (scroll down).


Here's the pic in question, with the current caption:







A Metrolink train nears the signal north of the Chatsworth station. (Al Seib / Los Angeles Times / 

November 19, 2008)


----------



## guest metrolink rider

Here's the Metrolink report from government via Los Angeles Times The engineer was judged to have screwed up, surprise,surprise...

Investigators: Light was red in 2008 Chatsworth train crash, despite what witnesses said

January 21, 2010 | 10:01 am

Ntsb200

Federal investigators today expanded on the reasoning behind their conclusion that a Metrolink engineer who, records show, had been text messaging ran a red light before the deadly 2008 collision in Chatsworth. Eyewitnesses maintained that the signal was green.

While acknowledging that during post-crash sight tests some investigators could make out a green signal from the station, the National Transportation Safety Board staff said other investigators could not see the light color, which is near the distance limits of human perception.

All of the agency's test evidence, analysis of radio communications and dispatch-center records indicated the signal was red, investigators said. Officials noted that the agency had found that witness perceptions could be at odds with scientific evidence, particularly when they had expectations of what would occur.

And the Metrolink train typically had a green light leaving the Chatsworth station.

Board member Robert L. Sumwalt summed up the findings, saying, "It was likely that those witnesses saw a light but couldn't discern a color and assumed that it was green because it was normally green." In addition, staff experts noted that green lights can be seen from greater distances, and the red light was not visible from the station.

Board members also noted that though the draft report does not cite fatigue as a factor in the crash, they were concerned about grueling split-shift schedules for engineers at Metrolink and other passenger rail services.

Conductors and engineers work a 10-hour shift over a period of 15 hours, board Chairwoman Deborah Hersman said. "To me, 15-hour days seem too long," she said.

Sumwalt said Sanchez would only get about 4 1/2 hours of uninterrupted sleep each work night. "I do worry about the chronic fatigue here," Sumwalt said.

Hersman touched on the text messaging, which will be discussed in the afternoon session, suggesting that the engineer was likely distracted because he had stopped calling out the color of two track side warning signals prior to the crash.

"This engineer really didn't have his head in the game at the time of collision," she said. "He wasn't on top of it."

-- Robert J. Lopez and Rich Connell


----------



## guest

January 22, 2010

Expert Says Engineer Sent Text Messages Before Deadly Train Crash

By MATTHEW L. WALD/THE NEW YORK TIMES

WASHINGTON — The Los Angeles commuter train engineer who ran a red signal and hit an oncoming freight train while he was sending cellphone text messages in his cab, killing himself and 24 others, had passed two previous signals warning that he would have to stop ahead, a staff expert told the National Transportation Safety Board in a hearing here on Thursday.

The commuter engineer, Robert Sanchez, who was among those killed, was supposed to notify a dispatcher by radio that he had seen signal indications. According to a tape of the radio transmissions, he had done so for several green signals and one yellow one, which warned that a stop was coming. But the recording did not capture him radioing that he had seen the last yellow signal or the final red signal, investigators said.

“This engineer really did not have his head in the game,” said Deborah A.P. Hersman, the board chairwoman.

The commuter and freight trains hit at a combined speed of 84 miles an hour, investigators said. The trains were visible to each other for only about five seconds before the impact; the engineer of the freight train applied the emergency brakes in the last two seconds, but the commuter engineer never did. The collision, on Sept. 12, 2008, occurred just north of the station in Chatsworth, Calif.

The board is meeting to review a draft report on the incident from its staff, and to vote on the report and its recommendations.

Mr. Sanchez worked a schedule of 6 a.m. to 9:30 a.m., and then 2 p.m. to 7 p.m., with a 70-mile commute from his home at the beginning and end of the day. But Rick Narvell, an expert for the board, said at the hearing that fatigue did not contribute to the crash.

“Yes, I’m concerned about it,” he told the board members, “but the circumstances of this accident indicate we had a fellow here who was alert and texting.”

The engineer sent or received 43 text messages on the day of the crash, including one 22 seconds before the crash, the board has previously said. Less than a month after the crash, Congress passed a law to require “positive train control” — a computer system that senses a train approaching a red signal at high speed and slows it down or stops it if an engineer disobeys the signal — by 2015. But the board, Ms. Hersman noted at the hearing, has been calling for this kind of system for years.

“We would have liked to see positive train control implement sooner,” she said. “Sadly, it took this accident and 25 more lives and an act of Congress to move this technology from testing to reality.”


----------



## WhoozOn1st

I caught the morning session of the NTSB meeting via live webcast, but missed the afternoon stuff covering the texting issue while Team Whooz redeployed (during a serious dust storm on I-10) to Tucson.

NTSB blames engineer for 2008 Metrolink crash, urges railroads to install cameras to monitor train crews

"The board's sharp language and findings blaming the engineer could shift tens of millions of dollars in liability away from Metrolink, a taxpayer-subsidized five-county agency, and onto the private contractor that hired and supervised the engineer, Connex Railroad, some officials said. Connex and Metrolink have sued each other over financial responsibility, and Metrolink has noted that the contractor is responsible for the 'willful misconduct' of its employees."


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## WhoozOn1st

Wreck repercussions redux. Amtrak will take over as Metrolink's contract operator on July 1.

Metrolink workers object to personality testing

"Union leaders say the tests are not valid or relevant measures of a trained and experienced employee's ability to safely operate trains. They say they don't object to testing of potential hires who aren't union members. But forcing existing train crews to pass the tests could arbitrarily cost good workers their jobs, they say."


----------



## jis

WhoozOn1st said:


> Wreck repercussions redux. Amtrak will take over as Metrolink's contract operator on July 1.
> Metrolink workers object to personality testing
> 
> "Union leaders say the tests are not valid or relevant measures of a trained and experienced employee's ability to safely operate trains. They say they don't object to testing of potential hires who aren't union members. But forcing existing train crews to pass the tests could arbitrarily cost good workers their jobs, they say."


If it is part of the standard vetting procedure for working for Amtrak, I don't see why it should not apply to people who are becoming Amtrak employees to continue working on Metrolink. I don't see what it has to do with being a member of Union or not, unless the Union has a specific agreement with Amtrak overriding such requirements. Afterall when I moved to my current employer through a straight acquisition of the previous employer, I did have to go through the usual vetting procedure including drug tests and what nots even though my employment was supposed to flow in with the acquisition.


----------



## leemell

jis said:


> WhoozOn1st said:
> 
> 
> 
> Wreck repercussions redux. Amtrak will take over as Metrolink's contract operator on July 1.
> Metrolink workers object to personality testing
> 
> "Union leaders say the tests are not valid or relevant measures of a trained and experienced employee's ability to safely operate trains. They say they don't object to testing of potential hires who aren't union members. But forcing existing train crews to pass the tests could arbitrarily cost good workers their jobs, they say."
> 
> 
> 
> If it is part of the standard vetting procedure for working for Amtrak, I don't see why it should not apply to people who are becoming Amtrak employees to continue working on Metrolink. I don't see what it has to do with being a member of Union or not, unless the Union has a specific agreement with Amtrak overriding such requirements. Afterall when I moved to my current employer through a straight acquisition of the previous employer, I did have to go through the usual vetting procedure inclduing drug tests and what nots even though my employment was supposed to flow in with the acquisition.
Click to expand...

I agree with you. In addition these employees are in a position of affecting public safety. When I was vetted for a sworn public safety position not only did I have to take those tests, had to have a psych exam by a psychologist.


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## WhoozOn1st

Here's an L.A. Times editorial on the issue of personality tests for current Metrolink engineers and conductors set to become Amtrak employees when Amtrak returns as Metrolink's contract operator (replacing Connex, a Veolia subsidiary). The editorial gives the date of the changeover as June 26, while the news story posted here last week said it's July 1. Talking with the Metrolink engineer before my run to L.A. last week (day before the news story appeared), he was unclear on the changeover date himself. Apparently there's some sort of contract overlap that has to be negotiated away. Perhaps that has occurred since the news story appeared, and June 26 is the actual change. Guess we'll see!

Safety first at Metrolink

"Metrolink workers say they don't see a connection between the tests and the safe operation of trains, so they fear it's a ruse to get rid of some veteran employees. But in fact it's entirely reasonable for the company to want to screen out potentially risky personnel before entrusting them with the lives of Metrolink passengers. What's less clear, however, is whether testing people who've been on the job for numerous trouble-free years would be an effective way to bring hidden liabilities to the surface."


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## Rumpled

I think the Metrolink employees have something of a point that veteran Amtrak employees haven't had to take the tests; just new hires.

Many of these employees are apparently former Amtrak employees as well.

If they disqualify too many; they won't have enough people to run the trains.


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## VentureForth

They should just submit personal cell phone logs for the last three months...


----------



## leemell

Rumpled said:


> I think the Metrolink employees have something of a point that veteran Amtrak employees haven't had to take the tests; just new hires.Many of these employees are apparently former Amtrak employees as well.
> 
> If they disqualify too many; they won't have enough people to run the trains.


The union needs to be careful here, by refusing, they look like they are favoring employee retention over safety. Sometimes it is better accept a loss than win and lose in the court of public opinion. It already sounds like that is happening based on letters in the Times.


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## WhoozOn1st

Signs of compromise...

Clash over Metrolink personality tests may be avoided

"Under the changes announced Thursday, existing employees of the departing contractor, Connex Railroad, who plan to stay on with the new operator [Amtrak] would not be automatically disqualified if they fail the tests, said Southern California Regional Rail Authority board chairman Keith Millhouse. Instead, they will be given additional training and testing, he said."


----------



## Dan O

http://www.pe.com/localnews/stories/PE_New...04.4c54f84.html

Metrolink officials say new railcars will save lives

New impact-minimizing passenger cars should be carrying commuters in Southern California later this year and will one day save lives, Metrolink officials said Monday.


----------



## WhoozOn1st

One Metrolink engineer has been barred from operating any train on Metrolink-controlled tracks, and a second is under investigation, for allegedly trying to block the views of new, in-cab cameras. This story includes a video of silent test footage from three of these cameras: One facing out and forward, one on the engineer, and one wider view of the locomotive's cab (showing 4 people in there).

2 Metrolink engineers investigated

"After Metrolink installed its cameras, the National Transportation Safety Board called for all of the nation's passenger trains to carry similar equipment. The Federal Railroad Administration, which implements safety requirements, is reviewing the recommendation. But at this point cameras are not considered a safety appliance subject to either federal regulation or federal enforcement actions involving tampering, said FRA spokesman Warren Flatau."


----------



## WhoozOn1st

"Metrolink and its former train operating contractor on Wednesday offered to pay $200 million to victims of the 2008 Chatsworth rail disaster that killed 25 people, setting the stage for one of the costliest rail accident settlements in the nation's history."

Metrolink proposes crash payout

"The Chatsworth crash is the first accident to bump up against the $200-million liability limit, which Congress adopted in 1997 to keep passenger rail financially viable."

A lead co-counsel with the group of victims' attorneys says a legal challenge or legislative effort to alter the federal liability cap would likely be focused on Connex/Veolia, not Metrolink. Deeper pockets, naturally.


----------



## WhoozOn1st

Relatives tell engineer's employer of effects of Chatsworth Metrolink crash

"A federal court last week approved a $200-million settlement that relieves Metrolink and private contractor Connex Railroad, a subsidiary of Veolia, of any additional liability. But attorneys for the victims say costs will far exceed that amount and are seeking, with Rep. Elton Gallegly's help, to raise the liability limit to $275 million.

"On Monday, survivors and relatives of those who died told Veolia officials that the cap — adopted by Congress in 1997 — would mean that those most severely injured might not get needed continuing medical help..."


----------



## WhoozOn1st

"The nation's leading coalition of local transit agencies wants Congress to delay a key rail safety reform prompted by the deadly Metrolink commuter disaster three years ago [this September] in Chatsworth."

Delay sought in rail safety reform plan

"The request, expected to be presented Thursday at a Washington hearing, has drawn fire from California's senior U.S. senator and Southern California's Metrolink rail system, which is racing to complete the nation's first so-called positive train control system, or PTC, by the end of next year."

Metrolink is opposed to any delay...

"Metrolink officials fear that slippage on the national PTC deadline could lead to delays and increased costs for their $200-million system, which is funded largely with local and state money. Federal officials could feel less urgency to resolve radio signal issues, they said. And private companies may have less incentive to swiftly develop new train control technologies needed to link the sophisticated system together. 'When anyone starts talking about pushing back the deadline, that's a threat,' said John Fenton, Metrolink's chief executive officer."


----------



## Spokker

If PTC allows higher speeds then I'm all for it. If nothing about operations changes, it's a lot of money for only a marginal increase in safety. Train travel is pretty safe as it is.


----------



## WhoozOn1st

Anniversary of another deadly September day...

Solemn gathering marks anniversary of Metrolink crash

"Kloster's son Michael was 'nearly cut in half' in the wreck, losing a kidney and suffering massive internal injuries. He may be facing dialysis and, at 51, his life span has been significantly shortened, she said.

"Even with his settlement of $7 million — the second highest among those injured — he'll end up $500,000 in the red after his medical and legal fees, his mother said.

"A 1997 federal law — the Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act — caps liability damages for a single railroad accident at $200 million."

EDIT: The photo that accompanies the story's headline on the L.A. Times homepage shows an Amtrak Pacific Surfliner passing the Metrolink wreck memorial at Simi Valley. Apparently it was not deemed worth even the minimal time and effort that woulda been required to get a shot of the correct type of train; that or plain ignorance.


----------



## RailCon BuffDaddy

I recently found a 2008 article, "Metrolink Chatsworth Crash - Was the Light Green?" at http://laist.com/2008/10/04/investigating_the_metrolink_crash_w.php, after perusing the recently-released NTSB Report on the accident. The report barely addresses the real issues, imho.

(from the Ventura Star) "The NTSB found the PROBABLE (emphasis mine, weasel wording theirs) cause of the Sept.12, 2008 collision that killed 25 and injured nearly 100 was the engineer's failure to stop at a red light. Engineer Robert Sanchez, who was killed in the crash, was texting 22 seconds before the crash." An earlier report by Robert Lopez on the LA Times web site contained the following quote:

"Smith, of the engineers union, said he suspects freight and commuter railroad systems have "kind of been looking the other way" on cellphone use in locomotives. He said wireless phones provide an additional means of communication between train operators and dispatchers, who can be "bombarded" with radio traffic." (this quote seems to have evaporated from the web for some reason)

The powers-that-be continue their relentless attack upon the Metrolink engineer, and the Media continue to peddle the fiction that red signals on shared train tracks are just like red lights on streets, but apparently no longer ask hard questions, like:

DID HE STOP TO PICK UP PASSENGERS AT THE CHATSWORTH STATION? (yes, says NTSB)

WHO WAS HE TEXTING? (Person A, says NTSB)

WAS TEXTING A ROUTINE WAY FOR ENGINEERS TO GET AROUND AN OBSOLETE, OVERLOADED RADIO SYSTEM? (the conductor of the freight train also texted 35 times while the train was moving, says NTSB)

WAS HE TRYING TO LET THE ONCOMING FREIGHT TRAIN ENGINEER KNOW HE WAS DEPARTING BECAUSE HIS SIGNAL WAS GREEN (as witnesses have stated) WHICH MEANT THE TRACK WAS CLEAR? (perhaps "Person A" could answer that one)

HOW COULD HE AND THE CONDUCTOR (who survived, btw) HAVE IGNORED THE FACT THAT NO SCHEDULED FREIGHT TRAIN HAD PASSED BY WHEN HE LEFT THE CHATSWORTH STATION? (which is what they would have been waiting for if the signal was red)

IF THE SIGNAL WAS RED (meaning the switch was set "open" to allow the scheduled freight train to pass), HOW COULD HE HAVE BENT THE RAIL ENDS OF THE SWITCH WITHOUT HE, THE CONDUCTOR OR THE PASSENGERS EVEN NOTICING, LET ALONE GETTING DERAILED BY SUCH AN EVENT? (photo of switch in NTSB report does NOT show obvious damage, imho)

WHO THROWS THE SWITCHES? IS THIS NOT DONE REMOTELY, BY THE DISPATCHER? IF THE SIGNAL WAS GREEN, AS WITNESSES HAVE STATED, DOES THIS NOT IMPLICATE THE DISPATCHER? (the request to throw the switch, giving Metrolink a "green" signal, was "stacked" in the Digicon system, says NTSB on p.24 - (And the testimony of the multiple witnesses that Metrolink had a green signal was ignored WHY, exactly???)

WHY WAS THE SPEED LIMIT 40 MPH FOR TRAINS EXITING A TUNNEL WITH A METROLINK STATION LOCATED JUST AROUND A BLIND CORNER? (Over 40 years ago, from the top of Stony Point, I watched in horror as two juvenile delinquents dragged a cross-tie over the tracks just in front of a freight train exiting the same tunnel - it made a huge noise, but fortunately did not derail the train, which was moving slowly enough to stop within the track curve.)

AND FINALLY, see footnote 40 on page 28 of the NTSB Report - "Investigators were not able to locate the engineer’s wireless device after the accident." (dead men tell no tales - and neither do their missing cell phones...)

I doubt the whole truth of this awful event will ever come out - and certainly not if the NTSB has anything to say about it. I realize that other posts may have dealt with at least some of these questions, and I welcome all sincere responses.

Just sign me,

RailCon BuffDaddy


----------



## George Harris

I am just going to talk about a few things, mainly the most obvious since it is late and I do not have a copy of the accident report or other information in front of me.



RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> I recently found a 2008 article, "Metrolink Chatsworth Crash - Was the Light Green?" at http://laist.com/2008/10/04/investigating_the_metrolink_crash_w.php, after perusing the recently-released NTSB Report on the accident. The report barely addresses the real issues, imho.
> 
> (from the Ventura Star) "The NTSB found the PROBABLE (emphasis mine, weasel wording theirs) cause of the Sept.12, 2008 collision that killed 25 and injured nearly 100 was the engineer's failure to stop at a red light. Engineer Robert Sanchez, who was killed in the crash, was texting 22 seconds before the crash." An earlier report by Robert Lopez on the LA Times web site contained the following quote:
> 
> "Smith, of the engineers union, said he suspects freight and commuter railroad systems have "kind of been looking the other way" on cellphone use in locomotives. He said wireless phones provide an additional means of communication between train operators and dispatchers, who can be "bombarded" with radio traffic." (this quote seems to have evaporated from the web for some reason)
> 
> The powers-that-be continue their relentless attack upon the Metrolink engineer, and the Media continue to peddle the fiction that red signals on shared train tracks are just like red lights on streets, but apparently no longer ask hard questions, like:


for the following:



> DID HE STOP TO PICK UP PASSENGERS AT THE CHATSWORTH STATION? (yes, says NTSB)


Yes



> WHO WAS HE TEXTING? (Person A, says NTSB)
> WAS TEXTING A ROUTINE WAY FOR ENGINEERS TO GET AROUND AN OBSOLETE, OVERLOADED RADIO SYSTEM? (the conductor of the freight train also texted 35 times while the train was moving, says NTSB)
> 
> WAS HE TRYING TO LET THE ONCOMING FREIGHT TRAIN ENGINEER KNOW HE WAS DEPARTING BECAUSE HIS SIGNAL WAS GREEN (as witnesses have stated) WHICH MEANT THE TRACK WAS CLEAR? (perhaps "Person A" could answer that one)


To do so would be pointless.



> HOW COULD HE AND THE CONDUCTOR (who survived, btw) HAVE IGNORED THE FACT THAT NO SCHEDULED FREIGHT TRAIN HAD PASSED BY WHEN HE LEFT THE CHATSWORTH STATION? (which is what they would have been waiting for if the signal was red)


Not quite sure of your point. Freight trains usually have no published schedule.



> IF THE SIGNAL WAS RED (meaning the switch was set "open" to allow the scheduled freight train to pass), HOW COULD HE HAVE BENT THE RAIL ENDS OF THE SWITCH WITHOUT HE, THE CONDUCTOR OR THE PASSENGERS EVEN NOTICING, LET ALONE GETTING DERAILED BY SUCH AN EVENT? (photo of switch in NTSB report does NOT show obvious damage, imho)


The passenger train was going through the turnout in the trailing direction. The engineer could probably have seen the way the switch was set before going over it, but no one else would be able to see it, certainly not at all from inside the train, which would be the location of the conductor. There would probably have been no noticable bump going over the switch.



> WHO THROWS THE SWITCHES? IS THIS NOT DONE REMOTELY, BY THE DISPATCHER? IF THE SIGNAL WAS GREEN, AS WITNESSES HAVE STATED, DOES THIS NOT IMPLICATE THE DISPATCHER? (the request to throw the switch, giving Metrolink a "green" signal, was "stacked" in the Digicon system, says NTSB on p.24 - (And the testimony of the multiple witnesses that Metrolink had a green signal was ignored WHY, exactly???)


A piece of an answer: The switch is thrown by the dispatcher. The switch cannot be thrown with a train on the approach circuit. Therefore, if the system was set to throw the switch to permit Metrolink to go through, it would not happen until the freight cleared the circuit.



> WHY WAS THE SPEED LIMIT 40 MPH FOR TRAINS EXITING A TUNNEL WITH A METROLINK STATION LOCATED JUST AROUND A BLIND CORNER? (Over 40 years ago, from the top of Stony Point, I watched in horror as two juvenile delinquents dragged a cross-tie over the tracks just in front of a freight train exiting the same tunnel - it made a huge noise, but fortunately did not derail the train, which was moving slowly enough to stop within the track curve.)


Why not? Trains do not operate by line of sight on this piece of railroad, but by signal idication.



> AND FINALLY, see footnote 40 on page 28 of the NTSB Report - "Investigators were not able to locate the engineer’s wireless device after the accident." (dead men tell no tales - and neither do their missing cell phones...)
> I doubt the whole truth of this awful event will ever come out - and certainly not if the NTSB has anything to say about it. I realize that other posts may have dealt with at least some of these questions, and I welcome all sincere responses.
> 
> Just sign me,
> 
> RailCon BuffDaddy


Do not understand your suspicion of the NTSB.


----------



## RailCon BuffDaddy

> I do not have a copy of the accident report or other information in front of me


Perhaps you should get one



> yes


Thereby rendering the status of previous signals irrelevant - otherwise they would still be waiting in Chatsworth



> To do so would be pointless.


Ya think? Well, maybe so - if the signal was green, Metrolink was going to collide with the freight train, even if it never left Chatsworth. Thanks for helping make this point, even if you did not mean to. You don't happen to know "Person A", do you? And how about addressing the second question - is texting on the job ROUTINE FOR ENGINEERS (and conductors)?



> Freight trains usually have no published schedule.


Waiting for that particular freight train in Chatsworth was an almost daily occurrence for the Metrolink, as numerous published accounts reveal.



> There would probably have been no noticable bump going over the switch.


When I posed this question to a real live conductor standing near his train, he said it might derail or tip over, but there was no way it would go unnoticed.



> The switch cannot be thrown with a train on the approach circuit.


]
Gee, then PTC is already built into the system?



> Why not? Trains do not operate by line of sight on this piece of railroad, but by signal idication.


I assume you meant "indication". Then we don't need engineers and their pesky unions at all, do we? Just award a nationwide PTC contract to Lionel...



> Do not understand your suspicion of the NTSB.


The NTSB who failed to recover the Metrolink engineer's cell phone? That one?


----------



## WhoozOn1st

If this sort of stuff is gonna continue ad nauseum, perhaps the best place for it would be a Metrolink Wreck Conspiracy Theories thread. That way the congenitally suspicious would have a place to play without the facts getting in the way.


----------



## RailCon BuffDaddy

Umm, this WAS a discussion of facts - unless you're one of those who always accept the word of authority as "fact" without question. Perhaps that is also congenital...

RailCon BuffDaddy


----------



## leemell

RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> I recently found a 2008 article, "Metrolink Chatsworth Crash - Was the Light Green?" at http://laist.com/200...ink_crash_w.php, after perusing the recently-released NTSB Report on the accident. The report barely addresses the real issues, imho.
> 
> (from the Ventura Star) "The NTSB found the PROBABLE (emphasis mine, weasel wording theirs) cause of the Sept.12, 2008 collision that killed 25 and injured nearly 100 was the engineer's failure to stop at a red light. Engineer Robert Sanchez, who was killed in the crash, was texting 22 seconds before the crash."
> 
> [snip]
> 
> Just sign me,
> 
> RailCon BuffDaddy


"Probable cause" is the wording used in all NTSB accident reports --- be it train, plane or automobile. No engineering report can be made with absolute 100% certainty and this reflects that real world fact.


----------



## RailCon BuffDaddy

leemell -

I must admit this particular revelation is an eye-opener. Even more eye-opening is this from http://www.helicoptercrashes.com/ntsb-crash-investigation:

"NTSB probable cause determinations are not admissible in evidence [49 USC 1441(e)]. Private litigants must prove the cause of the crash to a jury without the benefit of the conclusions of the NTSB accident investigations."

Now, would you care to comment on my earlier post and responses above? We are talking about lives lost and others changed forever.

RailCon BuffDaddy


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## George Harris

A few things:

When I said that I did not have the NTSB report in front of me, I meant exactly that, I did not have it where I could look at it at the time of my previous answer. I do have one and have read it through shortly after it was available.

As to feeling when you trail through a switch set against your movement, the conductor you talked to has a more sensitive butt than I do. It is in effect the same as going through a spring switch, which is still done in a lot of places on the US railroad system. Normally it feel no different tha trailing through the curved side of a switch set for your move.

Don't see how whether the line operated by CTC or ABS, manual block, or timetable and train orders has anything to do with the need or lack of need for an engineer in the cab. Having CTC does not equal having ATS. I am not going to go into the ins and out of how signal systems operate beyond that, but there are some other things you said that indicate a lack of understanding in this area.

Again, othere than under yard speeed rules, trains do not operate by line of sight alone, as it is very normal for a train to be able to stop within half the length of track they can see.

The above is as far as I am going to go.

See WhoozOn1st post.


----------



## leemell

RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> leemell -
> 
> I must admit this particular revelation is an eye-opener. Even more eye-opening is this from http://www.helicopte...-investigation:
> 
> "NTSB probable cause determinations are not admissible in evidence [49 USC 1441(e)]. Private litigants must prove the cause of the crash to a jury without the benefit of the conclusions of the NTSB accident investigations."
> 
> Now, would you care to comment on my earlier post and responses above? We are talking about lives lost and others changed forever.
> 
> RailCon BuffDaddy


Sir,

The NTSB is charged with determining probably cause to find and fix safety related issues, NOT find fault. Have you ever searched a major vehicle wreck? I have. That the NTSB did not find the cell phone means nothing. Something that small could be anywhere, it it exists at all any more. More than likely it is in a myriad of tiny pieces. Other than that, I don't understand your question. It seems to be a very straight forward NTSB report, just like all the others I have read and I have read many.

I will not comment any further on your posts.


----------



## RailCon BuffDaddy

To all who were kind enough to respond,

After you finish defending the NTSB, perhaps one of you could contact them and mention that in their report RAR1001, the September 12, 2008 Chatsworth Metrolink collision, they include a photo of the "run-through" switch (Fig. 7, p. 23). They state the track view is looking East - however, the tracks run North-South at that point. Also the purported "damaged switch", ("bent back like a banana" per wikipedia's entry) is not evident and is inconsistent with other published photos of the "damaged switch". Oh well, it can't be used as evidence in court - perhaps with good reason.

RailCon BuffDaddy


----------



## George Harris

RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> After you finish defending the NTSB, perhaps one of you could contact them and mention that in their report RAR1001, the September 12, 2008 Chatsworth Metrolink collision, they include a photo of the "run-through" switch (Fig. 7, p. 23). They state the track view is looking East - however, the tracks run North-South at that point. Also the purported "damaged switch", ("bent back like a banana" per wikipedia's entry) is not evident and is inconsistent with other published photos of the "damaged switch". Oh well, it can't be used as evidence in court - perhaps with good reason.
> RailCon BuffDaddy


If you go back to page 5, you will see a schematic of the area, and see the statement "east [geographically south]" on that page *twice*! That is, the timetable direction of the railroad is west from Los Angeles, regardless of the precise compass direction. Thus, when the description of the direction of the picture is given as looking east, it is talking about *timetable direction* east, not necessarily compass direction east.

Wikipedia may say "bent back like a banana" but the NTSB report does not. I have now looked at the picture in the report. For what it is worth, according to the time stamp on the picture, it was taken 21 hours after the accident. The gaps I see between point and stock rail do suggest it could have been run-through. The shine you see right at the point of the right hand switch rail would indicate wheel flange contact, which does not normally happen on a detail 5100 switch when properly positioned. (AREMA Detail 5100 is the formal descirption of switch point shape commonly referred to as a "Sampson switch point". There is damage to the switch but the nature and extent cannot be ascertained by looking at one picture. It would take some walking around, close looks, measurements, multiple pictures, analysis and some discussion.

I am not defending the NTSB per se, but see nothing in the points you have raised that justifies attacking their analysis and conclusions. Sometimes they do tend to provide somewhat simplistic explanations for things, but I think that has a lot to do with their normal audience.

An aside: It is normal to give a section of railroad a designated timetable direction that has only an approximate relationship to the points of the compass. I understand that Southern Pacific considered San Francisco the west pole of the planet for their purposes and all their lines were designated as running east from there. Thus, sitting in Oakland you would be going east toward Sacramento and standing on the same track you would be going east if you were going in the opposite direction toward Los Angeles.


----------



## RailCon BuffDaddy

George -

Thanks for response. Let's say I accept your answer about the direction stated in Fig. 7 p. 23. Look at Fig 8 on p. 26, which shows ONE signal on the right side of main track at CP Topanga facing West, geographically North. Here are two photos which show TWO signals, one on the right side of main track and the other on the left side of siding. Photo in NTSB report actually appears to be a cropped shot of photo #1 below, with the signal on the left just out of view. Other explanation could be that BOTH photos below are fakes - which explanation do you choose? Did NTSB crop this shot to deceive?

Photo #1 http://www.justiceandrailroadsafety.com/files/Photo2RedSignalsatCPTopanga.jpg

Photo #2 http://www.latimes.com/media/photo/2010-01/51738161.jpg

RailCon BuffDaddy


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## AlanB

The NTSB doesn't make policy, they don't make rules, and they don't testify in court hearings. Their sole purpose is to try and figure out what went wrong and to make recommendations to the governing body, be it the FRA or the FAA or whomever, about how to avoid a repeat of that type of accident. They have no reason to deceive anyone. It serves them no purpose. They don't get a bonus for making things come out a certain way, or an extra weeks vacation in the Caribbean, or whatever.

If they cropped the photo, then they did so because only the signal in the photo was the relevant or governing signal for that train. No need to show a signal for the other track that the engineer would not be looking at or paying attention to.


----------



## RailCon BuffDaddy

> If they cropped the photo, then they did so because only the signal in the photo was the relevant or governing signal for that train. No need to show a signal for the other track that the engineer would not be looking at or paying attention to.


Umm, this certainly puts a new spin on everything. There were witnesses who said the signal was green, the NTSB guy who said the red signal may have been poorly visible, the conclusion that the Metrolink engineer went through the red signal because he was was busy texting, but NOWHERE that I have ever found was the issue of TWO SIGNALS *even mentioned!!* If NTSB's intent is to find the truth, they have failed, imho. If their intent is to plant seeds of deception in the public's mind via the mass media, they seem to have succeeded.

RailCon BuffDaddy


----------



## jis

RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> Umm, this WAS a discussion of facts - unless you're one of those who always accept the word of authority as "fact" without question. Perhaps that is also congenital...
> 
> RailCon BuffDaddy


Umm. not quite. It was a laundry list of observations by a person who has an axe to grind and apparently less than stellar knowledge of rail operations and signaling systems and protocols in use on the line, who is trying to disprove a theory that more or less is consistent with the known facts, without providing an alternative theory which can be sustained based on known facts. Hence Whooz's characterization of it as a "Conspiracy Theory". And BTW this has nothing to do with defending the NTSB. What is your alternative theory and what facts support it? If you start off with "the signal was green", or that an adversely set switch cannot be run through in a trailing direction without noticing a bump in a well sprung passenger car or locomotive ... well....


----------



## RailCon BuffDaddy

jis -

Will you kindly post my response to AlanB before I respond to you? Also, it would be nice to know if I pass the code challenge.

RailCon BuffDaddy


----------



## AlanB

RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> If they cropped the photo, then they did so because only the signal in the photo was the relevant or governing signal for that train. No need to show a signal for the other track that the engineer would not be looking at or paying attention to.
> 
> 
> 
> Umm, this certainly puts a new spin on everything. There were witnesses who said the signal was green, the NTSB guy who said the red signal may have been poorly visible, the conclusion that the Metrolink engineer went through the red signal because he was was busy texting, but NOWHERE that I have ever found was the issue of TWO SIGNALS *even mentioned!!* If NTSB's intent is to find the truth, they have failed, imho. If their intent is to plant seeds of deception in the public's mind via the mass media, they seem to have succeeded.
> 
> RailCon BuffDaddy
Click to expand...

NO! It changes nothing.

If the signals were set correctly for the freight train, as reported, then the other signal would have been red no matter what. Can't have the track about to be used by the freight train cleared in the opposite direction. Even if that signal were still somehow green, something that is highly, highly unlikely, the engineer would still be at fault if he looked at that signal. The engineer would only look at the signal for his track; not the other track.

Second, one thing that you need to understand is that the signals follow what the switch does. That's why the NTSB is insisting that the signal had to have been red. After their testing, at no time did that signal not turn to danger (or red) when the switch was set against the oncoming Metrolink train. On the other side, for the freight train, when that switch was thrown to permit the freight to come by, every time it turned that signal to clear for the freight train. This is how automated signals work.

Nothing other than a failure in the relay boxes could ever set the signal to clear for the approaching Metrolink train if the switch was set against that train. The signal has to be red, baring some mechanical failure in the signal's control circuits. That is the nature of the signals and the interlockings that they govern.


----------



## AlanB

RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> jis -
> 
> Will you kindly post my response to AlanB before I respond to you? Also, it would be nice to know if I pass the code challenge.
> 
> RailCon BuffDaddy


Jishnu can't do as you request; only a member of the staff here can see the hidden guest posts. While I regret that we had to resort to doing this, we didn't use to, unfortunately it's the only way that we can protect our members from the spammers that like to post their slim on our board. Because of them, unfortunately people such as yourself using our guest posting feature have to suffer and wait until someone from the staff sees and approves of your post. It's a bummer; but such is the world we live in unfortunately. 

The only way around it would be for you to register an account with us, at which point your posts would show immediately. It also provides a few other advantages too. No pressure, just explaining why things are the way they are and how you can make your life easier.


----------



## RailCon BuffDaddy

> trying to disprove a theory that more or less is consistent with the known facts


Sounds like something less than a wholehearted endorsement of the NTSB's conclusions, does it not?



> without providing an alternative theory which can be sustained based on known facts. Hence Whooz's characterization of it as a "Conspiracy Theory".


You want it both ways, don't you? If I don't provide an alternative theory, it's a "conspiracy theory".



> If you start off with "the signal was green"


Umm, WHICH signal?



> or that an adversely set switch cannot be run through in a trailing direction without noticing a bump in a well sprung passenger car or locomotive


I defer to the real live conductor I spoke to.

Now, assuming you are a railroading professional, please answer this honestly - *Is texting a routine way for engineers and conductors to work around an obsolete, overloaded radio system, as I noted in my original post?*

RailCon BuffDaddy


----------



## AlanB

RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> or that an adversely set switch cannot be run through in a trailing direction without noticing a bump in a well sprung passenger car or locomotive
> 
> 
> 
> I defer to the real live conductor I spoke to.
> 
> Now, assuming you are a railroading professional, please answer this honestly - *Is texting a routine way for engineers and conductors to work around an obsolete, overloaded radio system, as I noted in my original post?*
> 
> RailCon BuffDaddy
Click to expand...

I doubt very much that the conductor has ever gone through a switch set against him, and if he did, it is highly unlikely that he would notice. All that happens in this case is that the wheels force the switch over to the correct position. There is no derailment, there is no extra bumps beyond the normal one would encounter going over a switch. Any extra slight bump would only be felt in the engine as it forced the switch to bend into the other position.

I've been through a spring switch move than once, other than hearing the springs slap the switch back the other way, you would not know that the wheels had just pushed that switch over to the other position.

And NO, texting is not a way around radio procedures. One engineer from Metrolink would be highly unlikely to even know the cell phone number of an engineer over at Union Pacific.

Besides, the radios are not overloaded. I always travel with a scanner, and while I don't ride the line in question all that often, there in never constant chatter on the radio. Even in the east where traffic is a bit higher, and rules are different, 90% of the time the radio is silent.


----------



## RailCon BuffDaddy

> If the signals were set correctly for the freight train, as reported, then the other signal would have been red no matter what. Can't have the track about to be used by the freight train cleared in the opposite direction.


My point is that I have NEVER EVEN SEEN ANY REFERENCE TO MULTIPLE SIGNALS. Now, lets assume both signals were red:



> Second, one thing that you need to understand is that the signals follow what the switch does.


So, which path would the freight train barreling East (geographically South) at 40 mph have taken??



> That's why the NTSB is insisting that the signal had to have been red. After their testing, at no time did that signal not turn to danger (or red) when the switch was set against the oncoming Metrolink train.


 Umm, someone DID have to fix that run-through switch BEFORE the NTSB tested it, didn't they?



> On the other side, for the freight train, when that switch was thrown to permit the freight to come by, every time it turned that signal to clear for the freight train. This is how automated signals work.


I ask this in all seriousness - WHAT COLOR IS "CLEAR"?



> Nothing other than a failure in the relay boxes could ever set the signal to clear for the approaching Metrolink train if the switch was set against that train. The signal has to be red, baring some mechanical failure in the signal's control circuits. That is the nature of the signals and the interlockings that they govern.


This seems to leave wiggle room for mechanical error, imho. Also, it's worth noting that the siding in question has a spur track leading off of it just East (geographically South) of the Chatsworth Metrolink Station.

I don't know if the issue of passengers and freight sharing the same track ever comes up here, but if you truly want to get to the root cause of this tragedy, that would be the place to look, imho.

RailCon BuffDaddy


----------



## jis

RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> trying to disprove a theory that more or less is consistent with the known facts
> 
> 
> 
> Sounds like something less than a wholehearted endorsement of the NTSB's conclusions, does it not?
Click to expand...

It is not for me to endorse anything or not in the first place. But I have not seen any evidence presented so far to questions NTSB's conclusions. And your arguments appear to me to be mostly spurious so far.



> without providing an alternative theory which can be sustained based on known facts. Hence Whooz's characterization of it as a "Conspiracy Theory".
> 
> 
> 
> You want it both ways, don't you? If I don't provide an alternative theory, it's a "conspiracy theory".
Click to expand...

No actually it is a random fishing expedition wasting everyone's time 



> If you start off with "the signal was green"
> 
> 
> 
> Umm, WHICH signal?
Click to expand...

The one that the Metrolink was facing, since that is the one that an unreliable witness thought was green?



> or that an adversely set switch cannot be run through in a trailing direction without noticing a bump in a well sprung passenger car or locomotive
> 
> 
> 
> I defer to the real live conductor I spoke to.
Click to expand...

And the real live conductor told you that he can tell when he passes over a switch set the other way in trailing direction? Amazing!



> Now, assuming you are a railroading professional, please answer this honestly - *Is texting a routine way for engineers and conductors to work around an obsolete, overloaded radio system, as I noted in my original post?*


Actually that is a red herring. Because even if that were the case that does not excuse anyone missing a red signal. And in this case the texting was not related to any control or operations issues but was chatting with a railfan.


----------



## MikefromCrete

"Clear" is railroad jargon for "green."


----------



## RailCon BuffDaddy

MikefromCrete said:


> "Clear" is railroad jargon for "green."


Thank you, Mike. Would you care to answer this - in the photo below, which path will an oncoming freight train take?







RailCon BuffDaddy


----------



## WhoozOn1st

Please do not feed the trolls.


----------



## AlanB

RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> MikefromCrete said:
> 
> 
> 
> "Clear" is railroad jargon for "green."
> 
> 
> 
> Thank you, Mike. Would you care to answer this - in the photo below, which path will an oncoming freight train take?
> 
> RailCon BuffDaddy
Click to expand...

One cannot tell based upon the evidence in that photo.

One would need to see either a closeup photo of the switch or the signal on the single track section that would have been facing the freight train.

It's not possible to reach any conclusions by looking at the signals for trains going in the other direction.


----------



## AlanB

RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> If the signals were set correctly for the freight train, as reported, then the other signal would have been red no matter what. Can't have the track about to be used by the freight train cleared in the opposite direction.
> 
> 
> 
> My point is that I have NEVER EVEN SEEN ANY REFERENCE TO MULTIPLE SIGNALS. Now, lets assume both signals were red:
Click to expand...

So what? It doesn't matter! The engineer doesn't look at both signals, he only looks at the one for his track. So it doesn't matter that there are two signals.



RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> Second, one thing that you need to understand is that the signals follow what the switch does.
> 
> 
> 
> So, which path would the freight train barreling East (geographically South) at 40 mph have taken??
Click to expand...

I'm currently traveling across country by train, so I'm using a cell phone connection and have no intention of downloading the entire NTSB report to find out. Winging things from memory, I seem to think that the freight was to go straight through the switch, but again I'm really not sure.



RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> That's why the NTSB is insisting that the signal had to have been red. After their testing, at no time did that signal not turn to danger (or red) when the switch was set against the oncoming Metrolink train.
> 
> 
> 
> Umm, someone DID have to fix that run-through switch BEFORE the NTSB tested it, didn't they?
Click to expand...

NO. I suspect that they tested it both broken and after fixing.

However, fixing the bent points on a switch would in no way affect what happens to the signals as the switch is thrown.



RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> On the other side, for the freight train, when that switch was thrown to permit the freight to come by, every time it turned that signal to clear for the freight train. This is how automated signals work.
> 
> 
> 
> I ask this in all seriousness - WHAT COLOR IS "CLEAR"?
Click to expand...

Green.



RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> Nothing other than a failure in the relay boxes could ever set the signal to clear for the approaching Metrolink train if the switch was set against that train. The signal has to be red, baring some mechanical failure in the signal's control circuits. That is the nature of the signals and the interlockings that they govern.
> 
> 
> 
> This seems to leave wiggle room for mechanical error, imho. Also, it's worth noting that the siding in question has a spur track leading off of it just East (geographically South) of the Chatsworth Metrolink Station.
Click to expand...

Well nothing is ever 100%, but the NTSB tested it multiple times. They place monitoring equipment on the circuits to see what's going on, etc. And if the equipment had failed that one time, then the odds are that it would have failed again in subsequent years.



RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> I don't know if the issue of passengers and freight sharing the same track ever comes up here, but if you truly want to get to the root cause of this tragedy, that would be the place to look, imho.
> RailCon BuffDaddy


There is no issue with sharing tracks. This country has been doing so successfully for over 100 years.

Besides, if we're going to start doing that for trains, then I guess we should make trucks take a different highway than the cars.


----------



## RailCon BuffDaddy

> One cannot tell based upon the evidence in that photo.
> One would need to see either a closeup photo of the switch or the signal on the single track section that would have been facing the freight train.
> 
> It's not possible to reach any conclusions by looking at the signals for trains going in the other direction.



But AlanB wrote:



> Second, one thing that you need to understand is that the signals follow what the switch does. That's why the NTSB is insisting that the signal had to have been red. After their testing, at no time did that signal not turn to danger (or red) when the switch was set against the oncoming Metrolink train. On the other side, for the freight train, when that switch was thrown to permit the freight to come by, every time it turned that signal to clear for the freight train. This is how automated signals work.


So the engineer in the oncoming train has no idea which path he is about to take, and there is no relation between one side of a signal and the other? And next time, I should "just take the train"???

RailCon BuffDaddy


----------



## AlanB

RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> One cannot tell based upon the evidence in that photo.
> One would need to see either a closeup photo of the switch or the signal on the single track section that would have been facing the freight train.
> 
> It's not possible to reach any conclusions by looking at the signals for trains going in the other direction.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> But AlanB wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Second, one thing that you need to understand is that the signals follow what the switch does. That's why the NTSB is insisting that the signal had to have been red. After their testing, at no time did that signal not turn to danger (or red) when the switch was set against the oncoming Metrolink train. On the other side, for the freight train, when that switch was thrown to permit the freight to come by, every time it turned that signal to clear for the freight train. This is how automated signals work.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> So the engineer in the oncoming train has no idea which path he is about to take, and there is no relation between one side of a signal and the other? And next time, I should "just take the train"???
> 
> RailCon BuffDaddy
Click to expand...

Of course the engineer of the oncoming train knows which track he's going to take.

That junction where the accident happened has 3 signals, your photo shows two of the three. The signal located along the single track section would indicate to the engineer which way the switch was set and therefore which track he would be moving on to.


----------



## George Harris

RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> George -
> 
> Thanks for response. Let's say I accept your answer about the direction stated in Fig. 7 p. 23. Look at Fig 8 on p. 26, which shows ONE signal on the right side of main track at CP Topanga facing West, geographically North. Here are two photos which show TWO signals, one on the right side of main track and the other on the left side of siding. Photo in NTSB report actually appears to be a cropped shot of photo #1 below, with the signal on the left just out of view. Other explanation could be that BOTH photos below are fakes - which explanation do you choose? Did NTSB crop this shot to deceive?


Again, your point escapes me entirely. Yes, on close inspection these are the same picture. A close examination shows the same people in the same positions, shadows identical, etc. Yes the NTSB picture was cropped, and it is stretched sideways somewhat. The cropping is just to the right of the left side signal mast. If you look at the position where the head of the left side signal is in the view in the NTSB report, that is approximately level with the head of the right hand signal, you can see part of the head of that signal. The presence or absence of the left hand signal and its indication are immaterial to the issue of whether or not the Metrolink ran its signal, as the right signal was the one governing his movement.

By the way, red in all directions is the default position of "home" signals on a CTC signal system. Therefore, seeing both of these signals red means only that westbound trains are to stop short of these signals. It does not indicate whether or not a train is approaching from the west, only that a westbound train is not allowed to pass this point. However, the norm is that when these signals hold a train it means that this has been the selected meeting point and there will be a train coming.

As to the one cannot tell which path is cleared for an approaching train by looking at the signals shown in the picture, that is because these signals DO NOT govern his movements. If the picture was clear enough to see the position of the switch points, then you could tell, but the resolution of the picture is not that good. As Alan says, the train approaching would know.

For this particular location, his allowable speed would be the same as the speed limit on the curve for freight trains is 40 mph and the speed limit through the turnout is 40 mph.

As to the "shocked that passenger trains and freight trains run on the same track or in both directions on the same track" That statement was made by one of the US congresspeople or senators from California. It was and is downright silly. This sort of thing has been done in all countries for as long as there have been railroads.

I do not know what you are looking for or why, but this appears in all manners to be a very straightforward run a red signal collision and nothing more. All these conspiracy theories and what-if and maybes are a waste of time and energy for all involved. By this point, I am primarily responding for the benefit of those that are unfamiliar to the basics of how railroads run and not for someone who appears to have some axe to grind.


----------



## RailCon BuffDaddy

> That junction where the accident happened has 3 signals, your photo shows two of the three. The signal located along the single track section would indicate to the engineer which way the switch was set and therefore which track he would be moving on to.


Well, I hate to mention this, but Fig.2, p. 5 of the NTSB report only seems to show ONE signal at CP Topanga, on the East side which is the Metrolink engineer's right side. Also, this drawing does not show the spur track off of the siding. And I'm having trouble believing the poor souls sitting on a siding have NO INDICATION if they are about to be rammed by an oncoming freight train.

RailCon BuffDaddy


----------



## AlanB

RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> That junction where the accident happened has 3 signals, your photo shows two of the three. The signal located along the single track section would indicate to the engineer which way the switch was set and therefore which track he would be moving on to.
> 
> 
> 
> Well, I hate to mention this, but Fig.2, p. 5 of the NTSB report only seems to show ONE signal at CP Topanga, on the East side which is the Metrolink engineer's right side. Also, this drawing does not show the spur track off of the siding. And I'm having trouble believing the poor souls sitting on a siding have NO INDICATION if they are about to be rammed by an oncoming freight train.
> 
> RailCon BuffDaddy
Click to expand...

The figure in the NTSB report only shows the one signal that controlled the movements of the Metrolink train. It is the only signal that has any relevance to the accident. The signal on the other track in that photo is irrelevant, the Metrolink engineer wasn't obeying that signal. And the signal for the approaching UP train, not shown in any diagrams or photos so far mentioned in this topic would have told the UP freight engineer which track he was going to move onto.

Once the UP freight train had passed the switch, then and only then would the signal for the Metrolink train have changed its aspect and told the Metrolink engineer what to do.

And the problem is that the Metrolink engineer did not pay attention to that signal that controlled his train.

Finally, "the poor souls" were sitting on a siding. Their engineer failed to obey the signal and blew through the danger aspect (red light), through a switch set against him, went through a tunnel and rounded a curve before he plowed head on into the freight train. Had he not been distracted and obeyed that signal, the freight would have safely passed the passenger train on the other track.


----------



## jis

RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> I don't know if the issue of passengers and freight sharing the same track ever comes up here, but if you truly want to get to the root cause of this tragedy, that would be the place to look, imho.


Nah, they should completely solve the problem once and for all! They should insist on a separate track for each train, so they could never collide even if the engineer fell asleep smoking dope. That will put the railroads out of business so there will be no trains and hence no chance of any train collisions :lol:


----------



## George Harris

AlanB said:


> Finally, "the poor souls" were sitting on a siding. Their engineer failed to obey the signal and blew through the danger aspect (red light), through a switch set against him, went through a tunnel and rounded a curve before he plowed head on into the freight train. Had he not been distracted and obeyed that signal, the freight would have safely passed the passenger train on the other track.


Alan:

Minor correction that has nothing to do with the basic facts of the case: The Metrolink train did not get as far as the tunnel. The collision was about half was through the curve that extends most of the way between the turnout and the tunnel mouth.


----------



## AlanB

George Harris said:


> AlanB said:
> 
> 
> 
> Finally, "the poor souls" were sitting on a siding. Their engineer failed to obey the signal and blew through the danger aspect (red light), through a switch set against him, went through a tunnel and rounded a curve before he plowed head on into the freight train. Had he not been distracted and obeyed that signal, the freight would have safely passed the passenger train on the other track.
> 
> 
> 
> Alan:
> 
> Minor correction that has nothing to do with the basic facts of the case: The Metrolink train did not get as far as the tunnel. The collision was about half was through the curve that extends most of the way between the turnout and the tunnel mouth.
Click to expand...

George,

Yes, thanks!  My bad. Like I said, I'm winging some of this from memory, as I'm currently on the California Zephyr out of Chicago running on the UP detour route. My tenuous cell phone connection simply isn't strong enough to download huge reports.

Now that I think about it again, it was the freight train that had just come out of the tunnel and was halfway through the curve when to the crews surprise there was a Metrolink train where it shouldn't have been, right in front of them.


----------



## RailCon BuffDaddy

> Now that I think about it again, it was the freight train that had just come out of the tunnel and was halfway through the curve when to the crews surprise there was a Metrolink train where it shouldn't have been, right in front of them.


Maybe you'd like to answer this question, from my original post -

WHY WAS THE SPEED LIMIT 40 MPH FOR TRAINS EXITING A TUNNEL WITH A METROLINK STATION LOCATED JUST AROUND A BLIND CORNER? (Over 40 years ago, from the top of Stony Point, I watched in horror as two juvenile delinquents dragged a cross-tie over the tracks just in front of a freight train exiting the same tunnel - it made a huge noise, but fortunately did not derail the train, which was moving slowly enough to stop within the track curve.)

RailCon BuffDaddy


----------



## AlanB

RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> Now that I think about it again, it was the freight train that had just come out of the tunnel and was halfway through the curve when to the crews surprise there was a Metrolink train where it shouldn't have been, right in front of them.
> 
> 
> 
> Maybe you'd like to answer this question, from my original post -
> 
> WHY WAS THE SPEED LIMIT 40 MPH FOR TRAINS EXITING A TUNNEL WITH A METROLINK STATION LOCATED JUST AROUND A BLIND CORNER? (Over 40 years ago, from the top of Stony Point, I watched in horror as two juvenile delinquents dragged a cross-tie over the tracks just in front of a freight train exiting the same tunnel - it made a huge noise, but fortunately did not derail the train, which was moving slowly enough to stop within the track curve.)
> 
> RailCon BuffDaddy
Click to expand...

For the same reasons that we let drivers go 70 MPH around blind curves or over hilltops where they can't see that traffic hasn't suddenly stopped ahead of them. Or why do we often put stop signs or traffic lights around a blind curve? We trust in a system that in theory is supposed to work and that everyone will obey the rules of the road. When someone doesn't, bad things happen.

But we don't usually lower the speed limits on our highways because of it. And while I abhor the idea that so many were injured and killed in that Metrolink wreck, we kill more and maim more people every year on our highways than did this Metrolink accident. Yet we don't change the rules there at all.

So why should they change the speed limit here. The system has worked properly for many, many years without incident. All evidence points to the inattention of one person unfortunately. So they're not going to rewrite all the rules because of that.

Additionally, one big change that did come out of this crash is the mandate for Positive Train Control. Had that been in place at that time, it would have stopped the train when the engineer failed to do so. Now that work is underway to install PTC through out the country where passenger trains run, this type of accident will be even far more unlikely to happen because of one person's mistake or inattention.


----------



## George Harris

Alan:

Enjoy your trip. Don't sweat not having the erpert. I have it both my work computer and my home computer, and soemwhere in my precise filing system, OK, OK for those that know me, multitudinous piles of papers, reports, plans, etc., a paper copy. For anything needed from there, ask adn ye sahll receive.

RailCon:



> WHY WAS THE SPEED LIMIT 40 MPH FOR TRAINS EXITING A TUNNEL WITH A METROLINK STATION LOCATED JUST AROUND A BLIND CORNER?


You have already asked this one and it has been answered.  :angry:

It is called operation in accordance with signal indication. The signal preceeding the one at this location, officially CP Topanga at milepost 444.4, tells him what to expect at this location. The authority could just as well have been ABS or Manual block and there would still have been no need for him to run by line of sight.

I may not have stated this clearly enough, but only in yards and on low speed industry tracks do trains operate by line of sight. Under this situation the allowed maximum speed is defined, in concept but not necessarily word for word as being able to stop within half the range, looking out for obstructions, other trains, broken rails, switches not properly lined and not exceeding 15 mph. Sometimes the spped may be 10 mph, sometimes 20 mph.

In all other situations trains operate by the authority of signal indication, automatic block and train orders, manual block, timetable adn train orders, or some such. There are still lines in this country that host passenger trains with no signal system of any kind. The route of the Vermonter north of White River Junction is one. The line used by the Sunset when it ran east of New Orleans was unsignaled between Flomaton AL and Tallahassee FL.


----------



## MattW

To add a bit to what George said, I believe the maximum speed allowed on these unsignaled portions is 59mph for passenger trains and 49mph for freight (track conditions permitting)...faster than the 40mph in the signaled, CTC section where this crash took place.


----------



## George Harris

MattW said:


> To add a bit to what George said, I believe the maximum speed allowed on these unsignaled portions is 59mph for passenger trains and 49mph for freight (track conditions permitting)...faster than the 40mph in the signaled, CTC section where this crash took place.


Correct. The specific reference is 49 CFR 236. Specifically, paragraph 236.0 c, which says:



> Where a passenger train is operated at a speed of 60 or more miles per hour, or a freight train is operated at a speed of 50 or more miles per hour, a block signal system complying with the provisions of this part shall be installed or a manual block system shall be placed permanently in effect which shall conform to the following conditions: . . .


Thus, on good track without signals, you are not permitted to have a speed limit of 60 mph or mose, but you can set it at 59 mph.

Likewise, the source of the commony used 79 mph limit is in 49 CFR 236, paragraph 236.0 d, which says:



> (d) Where any train is operated at a speed of 80 or more miles per hour, an automatic cab signal, automatic train stop or automatic train control system complying with the provisions of this part shall be installed.


Edit: The full title of the part is: *PART 236—RULES, STANDARDS, AND INSTRUCTIONS GOVERNING THE INSTALLATION, INSPECTION, MAINTENANCE, AND REPAIR OF SIGNAL AND TRAIN CONTROL SYSTEMS, DEVICES, AND APPLIANCES*


----------



## RailCon BuffDaddy

May the Good Lord protect rail passengers - no one else seems interested...

RailCon BuffDaddy


----------



## AlanB

RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> May the Good Lord protect rail passengers - no one else seems interested...
> 
> RailCon BuffDaddy


May the Good Lord protect all automobile drivers - no one else seems interested in protecting them. In 2009 according to the US Bureau of Transportation Statistics 33,808 people died on our highways. That's just the highways! That count doesn't include local streets & roads. And you're worrying about rail passengers because a fraction of that number died in the Metrolink crash.

On the other hand, rail passenger actually have far more protection that drivers, and far more regulations, rules & laws to help ensure their safety than do drivers. I can say with complete confidence that I'm safer on an train than I am in my car. And at risk of being a little full of myself, I do believe that I'm a pretty good driver.


----------



## PRR 60

AlanB said:


> RailCon BuffDaddy said:
> 
> 
> 
> May the Good Lord protect rail passengers - no one else seems interested...
> 
> RailCon BuffDaddy
> 
> 
> 
> May the Good Lord protect all automobile drivers - no one else seems interested in protecting them. In 2009 according to the US Bureau of Transportation Statistics 33,808 people died on our highways. That's just the highways! That count doesn't include local streets & roads. And you're worrying about rail passengers because a fraction of that number died in the Metrolink crash.
> 
> On the other hand, rail passenger actually have far more protection that drivers, and far more regulations, rules & laws to help ensure their safety than do drivers. I can say with complete confidence that I'm safer on an train than I am in my car. And at risk of being a little full of myself, I do believe that I'm a pretty good driver.
Click to expand...

The 2009 statistic of 33,808 fatalities is for all traffic fatalities on all types of roadways - interstate, arterial, collector and local. It is not just highways. While that is a substantial number, it is considerably less than the over 50,000 who died in 1980. That is the result of a lot of things like safer cars and better highway design.

However, there is no arguing that transportation modes of all types are safer than driving. It is often and accurately stated that the most hazardous part of any air or rail trip is the drive to the airport or station.


----------



## Trogdor

RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> May the Good Lord protect rail passengers - no one else seems interested...
> 
> RailCon BuffDaddy


I guess this "no one else seems interested" is why Positive Train Control is being mandated over the next few years, right?

RailCon, seriously, what point are you trying to make, other than to demonstrate that you have absolutely *zero* clue whatsoever about how railroads operate? You don't need to keep proving to us that you don't know anything about railroading, because you made that quite clear in your first post, and have reaffirmed it in every subsequent post.


----------



## jis

MattW said:


> To add a bit to what George said, I believe the maximum speed allowed on these unsignaled portions is 59mph for passenger trains and 49mph for freight (track conditions permitting)...faster than the 40mph in the signaled, CTC section where this crash took place.


Interestingly, the Canadians (i.e. Transport Canada) have allowed upto 100mph on certain specific unsignaled territories using track warrants, for VIA Rail, in the Montreal - Ottawa - Toronto Corridor.

Then again, the Brits run many times the distance we do at 125mph using just TPWS, which is one step below what we call cab signals. Fortunately on the real HSR they are using the same TVM430 that the French use on their TGV lines. Most other higher speed lines are now getting equipped with ERTMS 2 (equivalent to or in some ways better than Cab+ACSES on our NEC) after all these years! For example the collision just outside of Paddington a few years back was completely avoidable with a even a rudimentary ATS system as used say on the SantaFe in the US.

As for no one being interested in protecting passengers, the US is actually one of the most conservative countries when it comes to signal and control protection for rail passengers. It would really help if folks would spend the time to learn about the systems in place before arriving at outrageous conclusions.


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## RailCon BuffDaddy

I suspect most of the responders to my original post have more expertise in "railroading" than railroads. The deceased Metrolink engineer also continues to be subjected to "railroading". Smith of the Engineers Union, and the Conductor I spoke to, qualify as experts on RAILROADS, imho.

RailCon BuffDaddy


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## jis

RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> I suspect most of the responders to my original post have more expertise in "railroading" than railroads. The deceased Metrolink engineer also continues to be subjected to "railroading". Smith of the Engineers Union, and the Conductor I spoke to, qualify as experts on RAILROADS, imho.


All that I can say is a persuasive case has not been made yet to substantiate the claim that anyone is being railroaded. Just repeating a statement over and over does not make it so, no matter who the maker of the statement is and how many credentials they carry. Again all IMHO of course.


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## Trogdor

A few of us _are_ railroaders. We don't need to speak to someone with the "Engineers Union" (what's that?), or some random conductor, because we deal with this stuff on a regular basis as part of our jobs.

Even those in this thread who don't work for railroads (none of whom, unlike you, are claiming or implying they have more expertise in railroading than the railroads) are giving you very good, accurate explanations of how things are supposed to work.

Railroading wasn't invented yesterday. Railroads in this country have been around for over 150 years. The various rulebooks in use today represent lessons learned over those 150 years. The investigators who wrote the accident report weren't born yesterday either.

Your questions, on the other hand, indicate that you really don't have the slightest understanding of how railroads operate. Given that, it doesn't matter if you spoke to an engineer or a conductor, or what they said. It doesn't mean that you suddenly understand what's going on, because, again, you clearly don't.

In various posts, you've demonstrated that you don't understand how signals work or what information those signals convey to the engineer, you don't understand how railroad crews communicate with each other, you don't understand how switches work, you don't understand how speed limits on the railroad are established, yet despite all that, you insist on furthering some ridiculous conspiracy theory about how the NTSB is involved in a coverup despite the fact that the most obvious, logical occurrence here was that the engineer was distracted and flat-out ran a stop signal. Most collisions on the main line are due to this cause (running a stop signal).

It was human error on the part of the Metrolink engineer. If you can't accept that, then there's nothing more anyone, anywhere, can explain to you on this topic.


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## George Harris

I think we might as well bring this discussion to a close. It is obvious that no matter what anyone says Mr. RailCon has no interest in moving beyond his fixed opinions and has now resorted to attacking those who do not agree with nor support his viewpoints. It might be interesting to know who this person really is and the reason behind his attempts to support the unsupportable and substantiate various fallacies.

My last thought: There is this interesting thing about facts and reality: They are completely unaffected by opinions and belief regardless of who holds them or why they hold them.


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## RailCon BuffDaddy

The questions I raised in my original post remain unanswered. Anyone who can accept "texting" as the cause of the Chatsworth accident is delusional or naive. All the time-tested safety protocols built into our railway system seem to have failed at one particular instant, supposedly allowing the Metrolink engineer to run through a switch set against him - *AND NO ONE NOTICED???* Now, let the ad hominem attack continue...

RailCon BuffDaddy


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## jis

George Harris said:


> It is called operation in accordance with signal indication. The signal preceeding the one at this location, officially CP Topanga at milepost 444.4, tells him what to expect at this location. The authority could just as well have been ABS or Manual block and there would still have been no need for him to run by line of sight.


George,

I am not as familiar with the signal aspects out west as I am with the ones out east here, basically NORAC area. Would Topanga have showed either red over green or flashing green, depending on whether the freight was supposed to stop on the passing track or not, the red indicating it was set for diverging track at the interlocking? Or would the indication be something else? Thanks.

For the OP, in contrast, in case he is interested, the signal at Topanga that the freight faced would have showed plain green if it was signaled to run straight through the interlocking without stopping at either end of the station. That is how the freight engineer knew he was going onto the diverging track, and was expected to modulate his speed based on his knowledge of the territory. I believe most of the west is route signaling, though Metrolink may be speed signaling. I am not quite sure. maybe George or Troqdor know for sure.


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## Trogdor

In looking through the report, the only reference I see to the signals the freight train would have seen indicates that they passed a yellow/yellow (approach diverging) signal at the intermediate signal west of CP Topanga. At Topanga, the freight would have seen either a red/green (diverging clear), if the route was clear at the other end of the siding, or a red/yellow (diverging approach) or red/flashing yellow (diverging advance approach) if he was to stop at the other end of the siding. The report (at least, what I've seen, unless it's hidden somewhere) doesn't specify whether the freight train's route had been set past CP Bernson.


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## Shawn Ryu

Time to add another track on that line. Maybe that would help?


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## leemell

RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> trying to disprove a theory that more or less is consistent with the known facts
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> or that an adversely set switch cannot be run through in a trailing direction without noticing a bump in a well sprung passenger car or locomotive
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> I defer to the real live conductor I spoke to.
> 
> Now, assuming you are a railroading professional, please answer this honestly - *Is texting a routine way for engineers and conductors to work around an obsolete, overloaded radio system, as I noted in my original post?*
> 
> RailCon BuffDaddy
Click to expand...

So your going by the word of ONE conductor as absolute authority on what may or may not be felt on a trailing switch? Maybe you should poll a significant percentage of crew to find out if it really is detectable.

I've listened to hundreds of hours of the radio conversations in this entire area and can say that these frequencies are not used more that 1-5%, and are far from overloaded or obsolete.


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## leemell

RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> I don't know if the issue of passengers and freight sharing the same track ever comes up here, but if you truly want to get to the root cause of this tragedy, that would be the place to look, imho.
> 
> RailCon BuffDaddy


Really! Do you know anything about railroads and their operation? I say that probably 95% of passenger rail traffic is on lines shared with freight and usually owned by the freight line. That has been true for nearly the entire life of railroading.


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## jis

Trogdor thanks. That's the info I was looking for


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## AlanB

RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> The questions I raised in my original post remain unanswered. Anyone who can accept "texting" as the cause of the Chatsworth accident is delusional or naive. All the time-tested safety protocols built into our railway system seem to have failed at one particular instant, supposedly allowing the Metrolink engineer to run through a switch set against him - *AND NO ONE NOTICED???* Now, let the ad hominem attack continue...
> 
> RailCon BuffDaddy


The only safety protocol was the danger signal. That danger signal, or red light, told that engineer that he needed to stop his train and wait; period!

Now if drivers in cars can blaze through red lights every day in this country because they are distracted by texting, why is it that you cannot believe that an engineer can't be distracted. These men & women aren't super heros. They are just ordinary people who have been given specific training to do their jobs. They either use the skills they learned and obey the rules of the road, or bad things happen.

Now in the future, PTC will prevent this type of accident. But unfortunately that technology wasn't in use at that time on that line.

By the way, up in Boston they had a trolley accident about a year ago or so, where one trolley rear ended another trolley. The cause? Texting!

As for the conductor and the trailing switch, I highly doubt that most working conductors today have ever passed through a switch set against them. They wouldn't know what it felt like. And one reason that I know most conductors have never passed through a switch set against them is the fact that any crew doing so would be suspended and quite probably fired on the spot. That is a very serious rules violation, not to mention an expense that no company wants. So it simply doesn't happen with any regularity.

Perhaps in a yard it might happen a bit more, but even there it would be rare. On a mainline, it is not a common thing at all.


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## RailCon BuffDaddy

Shawn Ryu said:


> Time to add another track on that line. Maybe that would help?


What a wonderful, sensible, rational suggestion! Unfortunately, this is in California, and the titanic business interests here have been dickering with high-speed passenger rail for decades - LA to SF! No, LA to Las Vegas! Well, let's start in Fresno and work it out later! Meanwhile, this particular section of single track includes three tunnels built in 1904, with the west tunnel exiting into a 90 degree curve (the NTSB Report says 6 degrees, but that's per each 100 feet, I believe), and what lies beyond the curve is hidden behind a giant rock formation known as Stony Point. I have previously mentioned the train near-disaster I witnessed from atop Stony Point many years ago. Fortunately, that freight was traveling slowly enough to stop within the track curve. Having a 40 mph speed limit on this section of track was a disaster waiting to happen - and it did.

RailCon BuffDaddy


----------



## RailCon BuffDaddy

> The only safety protocol was the danger signal. That danger signal, or red light, told that engineer that he needed to stop his train and wait; period!


And what does the conductor do - punch tickets and lead the passengers in old railroading songs? What if the engineer is incapacitated? What is the emergency cord for - or have budget cuts eliminated them?



> As for the conductor and the trailing switch, I highly doubt that most working conductors today have ever passed through a switch set against them. They wouldn't know what it felt like. And one reason that I know most conductors have never passed through a switch set against them is the fact that any crew doing so would be suspended and quite probably fired on the spot. That is a very serious rules violation, not to mention an expense that no company wants. So it simply doesn't happen with any regularity.
> Perhaps in a yard it might happen a bit more, but even there it would be rare. On a mainline, it is not a common thing at all.


Gee, how would anyone know? Unless they hit an oncoming train, that is. And I'm sorry but I cannot not tell what kind of switch was used at CP Topanga, but I will bet it's not the economical spring switch seen in the East and also popular with model railroaders.

RailCon BuffDaddy


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## RailCon BuffDaddy

> with the west tunnel exiting into a 90 degree curve


I meant the EAST tunnel

RailCon BuffDaddy


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## AlanB

RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> Shawn Ryu said:
> 
> 
> 
> Time to add another track on that line. Maybe that would help?
> 
> 
> 
> What a wonderful, sensible, rational suggestion! Unfortunately, this is in California, and the titanic business interests here have been dickering with high-speed passenger rail for decades - LA to SF! No, LA to Las Vegas! Well, let's start in Fresno and work it out later! Meanwhile, this particular section of single track includes three tunnels built in 1904, with the west tunnel exiting into a 90 degree curve (the NTSB Report says 6 degrees, but that's per each 100 feet, I believe), and what lies beyond the curve is hidden behind a giant rock formation known as Stony Point. I have previously mentioned the train near-disaster I witnessed from atop Stony Point many years ago. Fortunately, that freight was traveling slowly enough to stop within the track curve. Having a 40 mph speed limit on this section of track was a disaster waiting to happen - and it did.
> 
> RailCon BuffDaddy
Click to expand...

And once again, if we follow your logic, most Interstate Highways would have speed limits of 50 MPH maximum, since in far too many places you would not be able to stop in time if something went wrong. Instead we often have mega accidents with multiple cars involved and sometimes even trucks & buses. And we've just several horrible bus accidents on the East Coast where I live, several of which were caused by drivers not following the rules of the road. Which is what the NTSB has concluded happened with the Metrolink accident, the driver didn't pay attention properly.

So based upon one bad train accident you want the trains to go 10 MPH around that curve, yet you don't seem at all upset with the thousands killed each year on our roads & highways. Please explain that to me. Where is your outrage for the carnage on the highways? Where are all your posts asking for lower speed limits on our highways?

I don't understand.


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## AlanB

RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> The only safety protocol was the danger signal. That danger signal, or red light, told that engineer that he needed to stop his train and wait; period!
> 
> 
> 
> And what does the conductor do - punch tickets and lead the passengers in old railroading songs? What if the engineer is incapacitated? What is the emergency cord for - or have budget cuts eliminated them?
Click to expand...

Now you're just being silly. I'm sorry! I think that I've been very patient with you in trying to explain things to you; but stuff about RR songs is just foolish on your part. If you wish to continue the discussion, please refrain from such nonsense or I will put an end to things.

As for the conductor, they have multiple duties, including things like taking tickets, opening/closing doors, reminding the engineer of slow orders, documenting delays and why they happened, etc. But one thing the conductor cannot do is see the signals from inside the coaches. So unless the conductor saw the next signal from the platform or the engineer radioed him to say that the signal was at danger, the conductor would not know that the engineer had run a red light and he would not pull the emergency cord.



RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> As for the conductor and the trailing switch, I highly doubt that most working conductors today have ever passed through a switch set against them. They wouldn't know what it felt like. And one reason that I know most conductors have never passed through a switch set against them is the fact that any crew doing so would be suspended and quite probably fired on the spot. That is a very serious rules violation, not to mention an expense that no company wants. So it simply doesn't happen with any regularity.
> Perhaps in a yard it might happen a bit more, but even there it would be rare. On a mainline, it is not a common thing at all.
> 
> 
> 
> Gee, how would anyone know? Unless they hit an oncoming train, that is. And I'm sorry but I cannot not tell what kind of switch was used at CP Topanga, but I will bet it's not the economical spring switch seen in the East and also popular with model railroaders.
> 
> RailCon BuffDaddy
Click to expand...

IIRC, George already noted what type of switch was at CP Topanga. But I do know that it was not a spring switch. That changes nothing!

All the engine did was shove/bend the very thin ends of the switch that normally move back & forth to control which track a train moves on to. While neither you nor I could physically bend those points on the switch, it would be mere child's play for the engine to bend/shove those points. No one, save the engineer, would ever notice that those points had been bent from inside the train. To them it would feel just like every other switch that they would normally go over. Only someone standing next to the switch after the train had fully passed over it would ever know that the switch had been damaged by the engine. And that assumes that they know what to look for.


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## Shawn Ryu

Cant be that expensive, it only takes few miles of tracks to prevent it from happening.

Although its curious why Surfliners and Starlight has never been involved in these kinds of accidents or was there ever one?


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## Trogdor

Shawn Ryu said:


> Cant be that expensive, it only takes few miles of tracks to prevent it from happening.


Railroad track construction costs millions of dollars per mile, and that's on straight, flat land. When you're winding through mountains, those costs can go up tenfold (or higher). Yeah, "cant be that expensive."



> Although its curious why Surfliners and Starlight has never been involved in these kinds of accidents or was there ever one?


Why is it curious? The Surfliners, Starlight, freight trains, and the many other Metrolink trains that operate over that very same segment of track weren't involved in those kinds of accidents because the engineers were *paying attention to their job*.


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## jis

Shawn Ryu said:


> Cant be that expensive, it only takes few miles of tracks to prevent it from happening.
> 
> Although its curious why Surfliners and Starlight has never been involved in these kinds of accidents or was there ever one?


The statement that "it takes just a few miles of track to prevent it", is about as absurd as it gets. OK, so it will prevent it from happening at that point, but that still leaves many many miles of single track elsewhere. You don't build second tracks to facilitate engineers not paying attention to their signals. That is what they get paid for. You build second tracks if the capacity is needed.

Engineers who do not pay attention to their signals are derelict in their duty and should stop being engineers, and not force everyone else to pay with lives and money to put in additional tracks so that they can run red signals safely.

Engineers generally do their jobs well, that is why Surfliners and Starlight and Metrolinks don't get into such accidents.


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## leemell

Moderators --- I think it is time to shut this thread down.


----------



## Shawn Ryu

Trogdor said:


> Shawn Ryu said:
> 
> 
> 
> Cant be that expensive, it only takes few miles of tracks to prevent it from happening.
> 
> 
> 
> Railroad track construction costs millions of dollars per mile, and that's on straight, flat land. When you're winding through mountains, those costs can go up tenfold (or higher). Yeah, "cant be that expensive."
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Although its curious why Surfliners and Starlight has never been involved in these kinds of accidents or was there ever one?
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> Why is it curious? The Surfliners, Starlight, freight trains, and the many other Metrolink trains that operate over that very same segment of track weren't involved in those kinds of accidents because the engineers were *paying attention to their job*.
Click to expand...

I guess at the end of the day being careless is the issue huh.

Millions isnt a lot when you put it in perspective really. Many projects costs the government billions rather easily.


----------



## George Harris

RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> Shawn Ryu said:
> 
> 
> 
> Time to add another track on that line. Maybe that would help?
> 
> 
> 
> What a wonderful, sensible, rational suggestion! Unfortunately, this is in California, and the titanic business interests here have been dickering with high-speed passenger rail for decades - LA to SF! No, LA to Las Vegas! Well, let's start in Fresno and work it out later! Meanwhile, this particular section of single track includes three tunnels built in 1904, with the west tunnel exiting into a 90 degree curve (the NTSB Report says 6 degrees, but that's per each 100 feet, I believe), and what lies beyond the curve is hidden behind a giant rock formation known as Stony Point. I have previously mentioned the train near-disaster I witnessed from atop Stony Point many years ago. Fortunately, that freight was traveling slowly enough to stop within the track curve. Having a 40 mph speed limit on this section of track was a disaster waiting to happen - and it did.
> 
> RailCon BuffDaddy
Click to expand...

OK, you do have it right on this one. The 90 degrees was the approximate total change of direction. The 6 degrees was the change of dirction in 100 feet. This method of defining the radius of railroad curves has been in use for a very long time.

Ah, "titanic business interests . . . decades, . . ." blah, blah. Another conspiricy theory. There are many reasons that the high speed railroad has not gotten started. Politics, various pressure groups, NIMBYS, it costs too much, its in the wrong place, no one is going to ride it, it will destroy the environment, it goes through the only known habitat of __, the requirement to perform studies to suit every govenment agency and pressure group affected or that think the are or might be, and on and on.

Most of all it is completely irrelvant to the issue being discussed here. Whether or not the HSR is built has no relation to the tunnel and track alignment here or any plan to do anything with it. (So far as I know there is not plan to do anything here.) Whether the tunnels were built in 1904, 2004, or 1804 is also of no significance. There clearances, grades, lining condition, and such like are significant *to the tunnels, the track, and passage of trains through them* but in no shape or fashion to the accident.

When you look at the distance between the switch run through and the point of collision, is is absolutely obvious that even if the track had been straight for miles there would have been no way for the freight train to stop before hitting the Metrolink train. And: If the metrolink engineer failed to observed the signal indication that was in his face and the switch position that he could easily see if he simply looked at it, what would make anyone think he would pay attention to a freight train a thousand or so feet away if it had been positioned where he could see it?

As JIS said:



> The statement that "it takes just a few miles of track to prevent it", is about as absurd as it gets. OK, so it will prevent it from happening at that point, but that still leaves many many miles of single track elsewhere. You don't build second tracks to facilitate engineers not paying attention to their signals. That is what they get paid for. You build second tracks if the capacity is needed.
> Engineers who do not pay attention to their signals are derelict in their duty and should stop being engineers, and not force everyone else to pay with lives and money to put in additional tracks so that they can run red signals safely.
> 
> Engineers generally do their jobs well, that is why Surfliners and Starlight and Metrolinks don't get into such accidents.



The turnout was and is a number 20 turnout which is safe and comfortable for and had a speed limit of 40 mph. The switch was power operated. As to the run through not being noticed, this has already been explained well by Alan.



> All the engine did was shove/bend the very thin ends of the switch that normally move back & forth to control which track a train moves on to. While neither you nor I could physically bend those points on the switch, it would be mere child's play for the engine to bend/shove those points. No one, save the engineer, would ever notice that those points had been bent from inside the train. To them it would feel just like every other switch that they would normally go over. Only someone standing next to the switch after the train had fully passed over it would ever know that the switch had been damaged by the engine. And that assumes that they know what to look for.


As someone who has been involved in this sort of stuff, I can say that if it were decided TODAY to add a few miles of double track west of Chatsworth including rebuilding the tunnels, it would probably be about 10 years before they would be in service, and that would be if no one fights the project. The cost I would not want to even guess, but it is reasonably certain that $100 million would not get you there. And, as has been said, this would be for capacity, not for safety reasons. The safety issues were and are being dealt with by other means. Reality says that you cannot prevent everything all the time. If you think it is possible, they you are delusional. There is not enough money in the USA to eliminate all possibilities of collisions of all kinds in all places. As Alan has said, the highest death and injury rates per mile traveled are on the roads, not the rails.


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## RailCon BuffDaddy

I really think your readers are entitled to read this - please post it!

You all DO realize that the freight train had an engineer, a conductor AND a brakeman in the cab while the Metrolink had ONE engineer with 125 passengers depending entirely upon his vigilance for their safety (so you say), don't you? And is anyone curious as to WHY the Metrolink engineer AND the ticket-punching conductor thought it was SAFE to leave the Chatsworth station in the first place, when they HAD TO HAVE BEEN MADE AWARE BY THE DISPATCHER THAT THE LEESDALE LOCAL FREIGHT WAS ONCOMING? Oh, wait - the conductor survived, let's ask him on his company-issued cell phone...

Oh, and if you read through the NTSB report very carefully, you notice that all mention of MULTIPLE SIGNALS AT CP TOPANGA have been redacted - except ONE ON PAGE 50, which they seem to have overlooked...

RailCon BuffDaddy


----------



## AlanB

RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> I really think your readers are entitled to read this - please post it!
> 
> You all DO realize that the freight train had an engineer, a conductor AND a brakeman in the cab while the Metrolink had ONE engineer with 125 passengers depending entirely upon his vigilance for their safety (so you say), don't you? And is anyone curious as to WHY the Metrolink engineer AND the ticket-punching conductor thought it was SAFE to leave the Chatsworth station in the first place, when they HAD TO HAVE BEEN MADE AWARE BY THE DISPATCHER THAT THE LEESDALE LOCAL FREIGHT WAS ONCOMING? Oh, wait - the conductor survived, let's ask him on his company-issued cell phone...


It is highly unlikely that the dispatcher would have radioed the Metrolink train to tell them about the freight train. The crew doesn't need to know why they have a red signal, they only need to know that the signal is red and that they must stop their train.

As for why they would leave the station, do you stop your car 3 blocks away from a red light? No! You pull up to the light and stop. Train engineers would do the same, they pull up and stop just short of the red light. So no matter whether the light was green or red, the conductor would indicate to the engineer that all doors are closed and that he can safely move the train.

Finally, while I do seem to recall that the freight train had 3 people in the cab, the position of brakeman no longer exists in railroading. That third person was most likely a supervisor or something. I will concede however that had a conductor been up in the cab, it is likely that this accident never would have happened. Or at the very least, the impact would have been minimized as the conductor could have hit the mushroom and stopped the train after it rode through the switch.



RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> Oh, and if you read through the NTSB report very carefully, you notice that all mention of MULTIPLE SIGNALS AT CP TOPANGA have been redacted - except ONE ON PAGE 50, which they seem to have overlooked...
> RailCon BuffDaddy


So, if you were a policeman investigating a traffic accident, would you fill out your report in such a way as to let everyone know that the traffic light 2 blocks away from the accident was green at the time of the accident? Who cares that there were other signals? It is irrelevant to the accident. There is only 1 signal that matters, the signal controlling the Metrolink train. All the other signals have nothing to do with the accident! They are not part of the equation. Talking about those other signals is about as useful as talking about that traffic light 2 blocks away. The other signals didn't cause the accident, they didn't trigger the accident, and they have nothing to do with the accident report.

Please stop looking for a conspiracy where there isn't one!


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## AlanB

Railcon,

One other request/FYI, please understand that there are only a 6 staff members who can approve guest posts, and 2 of them are currently in transit on trains to Seattle. A third leaves tomorrow. That means that all the burden falls on the remaining 3, unless I have a good signal from my train, to approve those posts. And all of us are volunteers, we don't get paid to sit here waiting for the next post.

So please be patient if it takes a couple of hours before your post shows up. It's not necessary to post the same thing multiple times.

Thanks for understanding this!


----------



## jis

RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> I really think your readers are entitled to read this - please post it!
> 
> You all DO realize that the freight train had an engineer, a conductor AND a brakeman in the cab while the Metrolink had ONE engineer with 125 passengers depending entirely upon his vigilance for their safety (so you say), don't you? And is anyone curious as to WHY the Metrolink engineer AND the ticket-punching conductor thought it was SAFE to leave the Chatsworth station in the first place, when they HAD TO HAVE BEEN MADE AWARE BY THE DISPATCHER THAT THE LEESDALE LOCAL FREIGHT WAS ONCOMING? Oh, wait - the conductor survived, let's ask him on his company-issued cell phone...


If the normal procedure was followed the Metrolink Conductor would have said something like "OK to proceed on signal indication". Then it is the job of the Engineer to make sure that he is following signal indication, which in this case he clearly didn't. OTOH, the Freight crew did follow their signal indication. And yes, Engineers get paid to be vigilant and be responsible for the safety of their train. If they can't cut it they should not be engineers.

It is unlikely that the dispatcher under normal circumstances would call to just let them know why the signal was red. And in any case even if the dispatcher said the line was clear, an Engineer is really not authorized to disobey a red signal based on just a random conversation. To override a home signal it takes a track warrant which must be copied down on a specified form before an adverse home signal can be passed. In general signal indication always takes precedence over random conversations. Only specific procedure duly followed can authorize overriding of a signal indication, and it takes three people to agree on the authorization before it can be put in motion.

So all procedures were followed, except the Engineer failed to carry out his part. Plain and simple.



> Oh, and if you read through the NTSB report very carefully, you notice that all mention of MULTIPLE SIGNALS AT CP TOPANGA have been redacted - except ONE ON PAGE 50, which they seem to have overlooked...


As Alan says, there is no reason to mention other signals that have no bearing on the facts of the accident.


----------



## RailCon BuffDaddy

jis said:


> RailCon BuffDaddy said:
> 
> 
> 
> I really think your readers are entitled to read this - please post it!
> 
> You all DO realize that the freight train had an engineer, a conductor AND a brakeman in the cab while the Metrolink had ONE engineer with 125 passengers depending entirely upon his vigilance for their safety (so you say), don't you? And is anyone curious as to WHY the Metrolink engineer AND the ticket-punching conductor thought it was SAFE to leave the Chatsworth station in the first place, when they HAD TO HAVE BEEN MADE AWARE BY THE DISPATCHER THAT THE LEESDALE LOCAL FREIGHT WAS ONCOMING? Oh, wait - the conductor survived, let's ask him on his company-issued cell phone...
> 
> 
> 
> If the normal procedure was followed the Metrolink Conductor would have said something like "OK to proceed on signal indication". Then it is the job of the Engineer to make sure that he is following signal indication, which in this case he clearly didn't. OTOH, the Freight crew did follow their signal indication. And yes, Engineers get paid to be vigilant and be responsible for the safety of their train. If they can't cut it they should not be engineers.
> 
> It is unlikely that the dispatcher under normal circumstances would call to just let them know why the signal was red. And in any case even if the dispatcher said the line was clear, an Engineer is really not authorized to disobey a red signal based on just a random conversation. To override a home signal it takes a track warrant which must be copied down on a specified form before an adverse home signal can be passed. In general signal indication always takes precedence over random conversations. Only specific procedure duly followed can authorize overriding of a signal indication, and it takes three people to agree on the authorization before it can be put in motion.
> 
> So all procedures were followed, except the Engineer failed to carry out his part. Plain and simple.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Oh, and if you read through the NTSB report very carefully, you notice that all mention of MULTIPLE SIGNALS AT CP TOPANGA have been redacted - except ONE ON PAGE 50, which they seem to have overlooked...
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> As Alan says, there is no reason to mention other signals that have no bearing on the facts of the accident.
> 
> Sorry you still don;t have a case that can stand on its own two feet.
Click to expand...

If a dispatcher doesn't use the radio to tell opposing train traffic what train(s) to wait for, WHY do they need a radio at all? Perhaps you would like to give us a concise, jargon-free explanation of CTC?

Next, let me remind everyone what the uncropped picture of CP Topanga is:

[image]http://www.justiceandrailroadsafety.com/files/Photo2RedSignalsatCPTopanga.jpg[/image]

This is what the Metrolink conductor and witnesses were all seeing FROM A MILE AWAY - TWO SIGNALS 40 FEET APART. I SUPPOSE THEY ALL KNEW TO IGNORE THE ONE ON THE LEFT (sarcasm). And if one is going to quote chapter and verse on regulations and procedures, it would be natural to assume there is good reason. Did the nature of that section of track have anything to do with THREE PEOPLE being in the freight cab? Yet Metrolink had only ONE with 125 passengers lives in the balance?

RailCon BuffDaddy


----------



## George Harris

I think it is time we all gave up on trying to reason with this guy and simply ignore anything he says further. It should be obvious by now that he has his mind completely closed to anything that does not agree with his pet theory. It would be interesting to know what the conductor he talked to really said. It may not bear any resemblence to what RailCon is saying he said.


----------



## AlanB

RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> If a dispatcher doesn't use the radio to tell opposing train traffic what train(s) to wait for, WHY do they need a radio at all? Perhaps you would like to give us a concise, jargon-free explanation of CTC?


They use the radio to copy track warrants in places where there are no signals, to get permission to proceed if a signal fails, so that the conductor can tell the train to move, and various other reasons. But they rarely use it to tell the crew that a freight train is coming in the other direction. I've traveled from NY to California over the past few days via train listening in to the radio chatter, what there is of it, and not once in over 2,000 miles has a dispatcher informed our train's crew that a freight is coming the other way. Heck, we sat for 20 minutes yesterday at a red signal waiting for our eastbound sister train with the crew guessing that's why we had a red signal. Not once did the dispatcher call the crew to confirm that's why we had a red light.



RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> Next, let me remind everyone what the uncropped picture of CP Topanga is:[image]http://www.justiceandrailroadsafety.com/files/Photo2RedSignalsatCPTopanga.jpg[/image]


Please stop reminding us! It is a useless picture. It proves nothing!



RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> This is what the Metrolink conductor and witnesses were all seeing FROM A MILE AWAY - TWO SIGNALS 40 FEET APART. I SUPPOSE THEY ALL KNEW TO IGNORE THE ONE ON THE LEFT (sarcasm). And if one is going to quote chapter and verse on regulations and procedures, it would be natural to assume there is good reason. Did the nature of that section of track have anything to do with THREE PEOPLE being in the freight cab? Yet Metrolink had only ONE with 125 passengers lives in the balance?
> RailCon BuffDaddy


No, the Metrolink conductor would be lucky if he could even see any signals from where he was located. Yes, I agree that the engineer could see both. And you can save your sarcasm. The engineer would never look at the other signal. You don't pass the test to get your license to drive trains if you don't know which signal controls the movements of the track you are on.

Besides, there is no way that both signals could have been green. The only possible combinations are that is 1 is green and 1 is red or both are red. If both signals were green, then it's an accident waiting to happen. But again, the system would not permit such a condition.


----------



## RailCon BuffDaddy

> I've traveled from NY to California over the past few days via train listening in to the radio chatter, what there is of it, and not once in over 2,000 miles has a dispatcher informed our train's crew that a freight is coming the other way. Heck, we sat for 20 minutes yesterday at a red signal waiting for our eastbound sister train with the crew guessing that's why we had a red signal. Not once did the dispatcher call the crew to confirm that's why we had a red light.


If I had to travel across the US by train, I would want to be in the cab with every other engineer on my cell phone speed dial - is that where you were? You might want to read the "railway signaling" entry in wikipedia, btw. It seems they had better safety protocols 150 years ago - and I'm NOT being sarcastic.



> Please stop reminding us! It is a useless picture. It proves nothing!


I wonder if a juror might feel differently...



> Besides, there is no way that both signals could have been green. The only possible combinations are that is 1 is green and 1 is red or both are red. If both signals were green, then it's an accident waiting to happen. But again, the system would not permit such a condition.


If the red was poorly visible, then the conductor and witnesses might not have been able to tell WHICH signal was green from a mile away. Also, NONE of you want to acknowledge that the burden you place upon the single Metrolink engineer is MADNESS - WHAT HAPPENS IF HE HAS A HEART ATTACK?


----------



## Ryan

You really need to learn more about railroading.

If he has a heart attack, the train stops. Here's up it works: If a set period of time goes by without the engineer making any inputs (change the throttle, apply/release the brakes, sound the horn, etc) then a little buzzer goes off and then engineer hits a button to acknowledge the fact.

If the engineer doesn't hit the button (if for example because he's had a heart attack), the train automatically stops.


----------



## the_traveler

RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> Also, NONE of you want to acknowledge that the burden you place upon the single Metrolink engineer is MADNESS - WHAT HAPPENS IF HE HAS A HEART ATTACK?


I'll tell you what would happen of he had a heart attack! The train would automatically stop!




Every locomotive has a "dead man's switch" which is a button that must be pushed every ___ seconds (to show if he/she is awake). If this button is not pushed, the train stops automatically!

[Moderator hat on]

I feel some of this discussion is getting out of line. The above is one such statement. If you do not know how railroads operate, *PLEASE* do not post as if you do!



Otherwise, this thread may need to be closed!

[Moderator hat off]


----------



## RailCon BuffDaddy

Ryan said:


> You really need to learn more about railroading.
> 
> If he has a heart attack, the train stops. Here's up it works: If a set period of time goes by without the engineer making any inputs (change the throttle, apply/release the brakes, sound the horn, etc) then a little buzzer goes off and then engineer hits a button to acknowledge the fact.
> 
> If the engineer doesn't hit the button (if for example because he's had a heart attack), the train automatically stops.


But he can blow through through a switch set against him without ANYONE noticing - it seems the folks running the railroad need to learn a little more about railroading as well...

RailCon BuffDaddy


----------



## AlanB

RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> I've traveled from NY to California over the past few days via train listening in to the radio chatter, what there is of it, and not once in over 2,000 miles has a dispatcher informed our train's crew that a freight is coming the other way. Heck, we sat for 20 minutes yesterday at a red signal waiting for our eastbound sister train with the crew guessing that's why we had a red signal. Not once did the dispatcher call the crew to confirm that's why we had a red light.
> 
> 
> 
> If I had to travel across the US by train, I would want to be in the cab with every other engineer on my cell phone speed dial - is that where you were? You might want to read the "railway signaling" entry in wikipedia, btw. It seems they had better safety protocols 150 years ago - and I'm NOT being sarcastic.
Click to expand...

While I'd love a chance to sit up front for a bit of the journey, I surely would not relish the idea of 4 day and 3 nights sitting in a seat in the engine.



RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> Please stop reminding us! It is a useless picture. It proves nothing!
> 
> 
> 
> I wonder if a juror might feel differently...
Click to expand...

Only if you or a lawyer manages to confuse the heck out of them with some of the nonsense that you've been posting.

I can see you now driving your car and broadsiding someone because you ran a red light: "Well officer, the traffic light at the next corner was green so I figured that this one had to be green too."



RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> Besides, there is no way that both signals could have been green. The only possible combinations are that is 1 is green and 1 is red or both are red. If both signals were green, then it's an accident waiting to happen. But again, the system would not permit such a condition.
> 
> 
> 
> If the red was poorly visible, then the conductor and witnesses might not have been able to tell WHICH signal was green from a mile away. Also, NONE of you want to acknowledge that the burden you place upon the single Metrolink engineer is MADNESS - WHAT HAPPENS IF HE HAS A HEART ATTACK?
Click to expand...

I could see witnesses being confused, especially ones like you who don't understand how RR's work. But the conductor, if he could even see that signal, would not be confused. He would know better. And others have already addressed your "madness".


----------



## AlanB

RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> Ryan said:
> 
> 
> 
> You really need to learn more about railroading.
> 
> If he has a heart attack, the train stops. Here's up it works: If a set period of time goes by without the engineer making any inputs (change the throttle, apply/release the brakes, sound the horn, etc) then a little buzzer goes off and then engineer hits a button to acknowledge the fact.
> 
> If the engineer doesn't hit the button (if for example because he's had a heart attack), the train automatically stops.
> 
> 
> 
> But he can blow through through a switch set against him without ANYONE noticing - it seems the folks running the railroad need to learn a little more about railroading as well...
> 
> RailCon BuffDaddy
Click to expand...

People blow through red lights every day in this country. When do you plan to start fixing that?


----------



## Ryan

RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> Ryan said:
> 
> 
> 
> You really need to learn more about railroading.
> 
> If he has a heart attack, the train stops. Here's up it works: If a set period of time goes by without the engineer making any inputs (change the throttle, apply/release the brakes, sound the horn, etc) then a little buzzer goes off and then engineer hits a button to acknowledge the fact.
> 
> If the engineer doesn't hit the button (if for example because he's had a heart attack), the train automatically stops.
> 
> 
> 
> But he can blow through through a switch set against him without ANYONE noticing - it seems the folks running the railroad need to learn a little more about railroading as well...
> 
> RailCon BuffDaddy
Click to expand...

That's completely illogical.
And in a few years, it'll be impossible as PTC will automatically apply the brakes if you blow through a red signal.

Seriously, what exactly is your point with all of this? What is your theory? I'm hearing a lot of disagreement with what the NTSB said, a major lack of knowledge in how all of this works, but no coherent point.


----------



## MattW

RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> If I had to travel across the US by train, I would want to be in the cab with every other engineer on my cell phone speed dial - is that where you were?


And do what? Call every other engineer on the entire railroad every five seconds to make sure they aren't anywhere near yours?


----------



## RailCon BuffDaddy

MattW said:


> RailCon BuffDaddy said:
> 
> 
> 
> If I had to travel across the US by train, I would want to be in the cab with every other engineer on my cell phone speed dial - is that where you were?
> 
> 
> 
> And do what? Call every other engineer on the entire railroad every five seconds to make sure they aren't anywhere near yours?
Click to expand...

Well, no - just the engineer on the next opposing train I encounter, since one cannot count on the dispatcher for this, apparently. Which reminds me, does anyone know who the Leesdale Local freight conductor was texting at 4:20 PM, right before the crash? Was his cell phone company-issued, as was the Metrolink counductor's?

RailCon BuffDaddy


----------



## Trogdor

MattW said:


> RailCon BuffDaddy said:
> 
> 
> 
> If I had to travel across the US by train, I would want to be in the cab with every other engineer on my cell phone speed dial - is that where you were?
> 
> 
> 
> And do what? Call every other engineer on the entire railroad every five seconds to make sure they aren't anywhere near yours?
Click to expand...


That's actually a good idea. The next time I'm in an automobile (which isn't often, fortunately), I'm going to have the cell phone number for every other driver in the city programmed into my phone, and call them to make sure they're planning to stop at the next red light, and to let them know that I'll be going through the intersection.

I actually hope this thread keeps going, because it's pretty entertaining!


----------



## Ryan

RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> Well, no - just the engineer on the next opposing train I encounter, since one cannot count on the dispatcher for this, apparently.


Why would you have to rely on the dispatcher to tell you what's coming? Do you only stop at a red light if there is traffic in the area? How would you know what the next opposing train that you encounter is going to be?
Also:



Ryan said:


> Seriously, what exactly is your point with all of this? What is your theory? I'm hearing a lot of disagreement with what the NTSB said, a major lack of knowledge in how all of this works, but no coherent point.


----------



## RailCon BuffDaddy

> And in a few years, it'll be impossible as PTC will automatically apply the brakes if you blow through a red signal.


And what a happy day that will be - meanwhile you should look up "defect detector" on wikipedia. And then read this from the NTSB report:

"According to recorded data for the power-operated switch at CP Topanga (about 377 feet west of the westbound Topanga signal), train 111 ran through the switch at 4:22:02 p.m.17 At this time, the train’s brakes were off and the throttle remained in position 4. A few seconds later, the defect detector just west of the CP Topanga switch broadcast a “no defects” message indicating that train 111 had passed the detector."

Maybe someone should see if CP Topanga has a defective defect detector - and no, I'm not being silly. Who could possibly make this stuff up?


----------



## Trogdor

RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> And in a few years, it'll be impossible as PTC will automatically apply the brakes if you blow through a red signal.
> 
> 
> 
> And what a happy day that will be - meanwhile you should look up "defect detector" on wikipedia. And then read this from the NTSB report:
> 
> "According to recorded data for the power-operated switch at CP Topanga (about 377 feet west of the westbound Topanga signal), train 111 ran through the switch at 4:22:02 p.m.17 At this time, the train’s brakes were off and the throttle remained in position 4. A few seconds later, the defect detector just west of the CP Topanga switch broadcast a “no defects” message indicating that train 111 had passed the detector."
> 
> Maybe someone should see if CP Topanga has a defective defect detector - and no, I'm not being silly. Who could possibly make this stuff up?
Click to expand...

You are the one that is making stuff up.

A defect detector checks the train for defects. Metrolink 111's train had no defects (meaning the wheels were in good condition, the brakes weren't stuck, the axles weren't overheating, etc.). Defect detectors don't check the track, they check the train.

Any other clueless statements you wish to make?


----------



## George Harris

RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> Next, let me remind everyone what the uncropped picture of CP Topanga is:
> 
> [image]http://www.justiceandrailroadsafety.com/files/Photo2RedSignalsatCPTopanga.jpg[/image]
> 
> This is what the Metrolink conductor and witnesses were all seeing FROM A MILE AWAY - TWO SIGNALS 40 FEET APART. I SUPPOSE THEY ALL KNEW TO IGNORE THE ONE ON THE LEFT (sarcasm).


Absolutely!. Otherwise they would not be qualified to be part of an operating crew.


> And if one is going to quote chapter and verse on regulations and procedures, it would be natural to assume there is good reason.


The good reason is that only the signal that was to the right of the track they were on applied to them. The signal on the left applied only to the track on the left. It was red because that track had been cleared for the oncoming train.


> Did the nature of that section of track have anything to do with THREE PEOPLE being in the freight cab? Yet Metrolink had only ONE with 125 passengers lives in the balance?


To quote Perry Mason: "Incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial." 
This whole whoop de doop about the picture and the presumption that there was a conspiracy inside the NTSB to high the left hand signal head has already been answered quite thoroughly. As least I think it was.

You post that brought it up was on 3 October 2011 at 9:40am, claiming among other things that the NTSB deliberately cut the left signal out of the picture.

The answer was posted on 3 October 2011 at 12:31 pm (noon plus 31 minutes, that is)



> Again, your point escapes me entirely. Yes, on close inspection these are the same picture. A close examination shows the same people in the same positions, shadows identical, etc. Yes the NTSB picture was cropped, and it is stretched sideways somewhat. The cropping is just to the right of the left side signal mast. If you look at the position where the head of the left side signal is in the view in the NTSB report, that is approximately level with the head of the right hand signal, you can see part of the head of that signal. The presence or absence of the left hand signal and its indication are immaterial to the issue of whether or not the Metrolink ran its signal, as the right signal was the one governing his movement.
> By the way, red in all directions is the default position of "home" signals on a CTC signal system. Therefore, seeing both of these signals red means only that westbound trains are to stop short of these signals. It does not indicate whether or not a train is approaching from the west, only that a westbound train is not allowed to pass this point. However, the norm is that when these signals hold a train it means that this has been the selected meeting point and there will be a train coming.
> 
> As to the "one cannot tell which path is cleared for an approaching train by looking at the signals shown in the picture", that is because these signals DO NOT govern his movements. If the picture was clear enough to see the position of the switch points, then you could tell, but the resolution of the picture is not that good. As Alan says, the train approaching would know.
> 
> For this particular location, his allowable speed would be the same as the speed limit on the curve for freight trains is 40 mph and the speed limit through the turnout is 40 mph.
> 
> As to the "shocked that passenger trains and freight trains run on the same track or in both directions on the same track" That statement was made by one of the US congresspeople or senators from California. It was and is downright silly. This sort of thing has been done in all countries for as long as there have been railroads.


----------



## George Harris

Trogdor said:


> RailCon BuffDaddy said:
> 
> 
> 
> And what a happy day that will be - meanwhile you should look up "defect detector" on wikipedia. And then read this from the NTSB report:
> 
> "According to recorded data for the power-operated switch at CP Topanga (about 377 feet west of the westbound Topanga signal), train 111 ran through the switch at 4:22:02 p.m.17 At this time, the trains brakes were off and the throttle remained in position 4. A few seconds later, the defect detector just west of the CP Topanga switch broadcast a no defects message indicating that train 111 had passed the detector."
> 
> Maybe someone should see if CP Topanga has a defective defect detector - and no, I'm not being silly. Who could possibly make this stuff up?
> 
> 
> 
> You are the one that is making stuff up.
> 
> A defect detector checks the train for defects. Metrolink 111's train had no defects (meaning the wheels were in good condition, the brakes weren't stuck, the axles weren't overheating, etc.). Defect detectors don't check the track, they check the train.
> 
> Any other clueless statements you wish to make?
Click to expand...

Wikipedia is not the Encyclopedia Britannica. It is not exhaustive and frequently not accurate, either. If you want solid information on a subject you have got to go way beyond what is found in Wikipedia.

All the defect detector is telling us is that the train passed it before the point of collision. It is a machine that has no idea what authority the train has as it goes over it. In fact, defect detectors have no idea what train is going over it. In this case, it is known that the train that went over it was train 111 by its position relative to the point of collision. It was not because the detector recorded or gave the train number.


----------



## Trogdor

RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> Well, no - just the engineer on the next opposing train I encounter, since one cannot count on the dispatcher for this, apparently. Which reminds me, does anyone know who the Leesdale Local freight conductor was texting at 4:20 PM, right before the crash? Was his cell phone company-issued, as was the Metrolink counductor's?
> 
> RailCon BuffDaddy



Now, this is just absurd. In the same sentence you both expect the engineer of one train to know exactly what the next train they will encounter will be, and who the crew is on that train (so you can send them a message saying...what, exactly?), but still think it's the dispatcher's responsibility to tell you what the next train you will encounter is?

So, if the dispatcher doesn't tell you what the next train is, how are you supposed to know who to send your text message to?

Of course, this is just a hypothetical, because in reality, it is not the engineer's job to know who is on the crew of the next train they encounter. It is, however, the engineer's job to (among other things) follow the signals, which the engineer of Metrolink 111 didn't do.

I'll let you in on another secret that you don't seem to comprehend: the track/signal layout at CP Topanga is as straightforward as they come (I know, as I've ridden in the cab of locomotives through there). There are two tracks, and two signals. If an engineer is qualified on the territory, he/she should know the location of every signal on the territory in question, and which one applies to which track. The other eyewitnesses (railfans on the platform) don't need to know which signal applies to which track, because they're not operating a train.

There are hundreds of places around the country where signals are around curves, or where, due to track curvature or whatever, you can be looking directly at a signal that appears to be right in front of you, but in fact it applies to another track. Despite all this, hundreds of thousands of people in the US travel safely on railroads (millions if you count transit, which is a different category) every day. The engineer, who, again, is qualified on the territory (or he won't be operating the train), knows this, and knows which signal applies to which track. The signal will never sneak up on an engineer, because the engineer already knows where the next signal is (even if it's "hidden" around a curve). An engineer not paying attention (because he was texting, for example) is violating the rules of the job. If he had followed the rules, the accident wouldn't have happened. But he didn't, and it did. It's not the dispatcher's fault. It's not the radio system's fault. It's not the "confusing" (to you, but nobody else) signal layout's fault. It's not the NTSB's fault. It's not the other freight train crew's fault.

The fact that you don't understand how someone is supposed to interpret a location where two signals are right next to each other just solidifies my earlier point that you know absolutely nothing, whatsoever, about railroading. The fact that you think you should be texting or calling other engineers on the railroad telling them where you are further demonstrates your ignorance of railroading. You still won't say what your point is, either. You just keep asking really dumb questions.


----------



## RailCon BuffDaddy

> A defect detector checks the train for defects. Metrolink 111's train had no defects (meaning the wheels were in good condition, the brakes weren't stuck, the axles weren't overheating, etc.). Defect detectors don't check the track, they check the train.
> Any other clueless statements you wish to make?


Perhaps some sneaky lawyer could put this more eloquently, but do you expect the jury to believe that a defect detector somehow manages to check that the wheels were in good condition, the brakes weren't stuck, the axles weren't overheating, etc., BUT DIDN"T HAVE A CLUE THAT THE SWITCH HAD BEEN RUN THROUGH!!?? Or just maybe the Metrolink engineer really had a green signal after all...

RailCon BuffDaddy


----------



## George Harris

This guy is getting most of his "information" from a web site www.justiceandrailroadsafety.com The group calls itself Justice and Railroad Safety and their header says,

The Chatsworth Metrolink Disaster:

Justice for Victims

Improve Railroad Safety for All

At the bottom of the page is this statement:



> This web site is paid for by Justice and Railroad Safety. The information contained on these pages and on any pages linked from these pages is intended to provide general information only. You should consult with an attorney licensed to practice in your jurisdiction before relying upon any of the information presented here. | Law Firm Marketing by Law Promo


Therefore, this site seems to be little more than a lawyer advertizing and promotional site. They could hardly be considered an unbiased source of information.

Go down on the right side of their main page and click on the box labeled "DOCUMENTS" and you will find most (all?) the documents that RailCon has used or referenced.


----------



## Ryan

That's... depressing.

RailCon, what did you think that a defect detector is and what do you think that it should have done?

Are you ever going to get around to answering this?

Seriously, what exactly is your point with all of this? What is your theory? I'm hearing a lot of disagreement with what the NTSB said, a major lack of knowledge in how all of this works, but no coherent point.


----------



## leemell

George Harris said:


> This guy is getting most of his "information" from a web site www.justiceandrailroadsafety.com The group calls itself Justice and Railroad Safety and their header says,
> 
> The Chatsworth Metrolink Disaster:
> 
> Justice for Victims
> 
> Improve Railroad Safety for All
> 
> At the bottom of the page is this statement:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> This web site is paid for by Justice and Railroad Safety. The information contained on these pages and on any pages linked from these pages is intended to provide general information only. You should consult with an attorney licensed to practice in your jurisdiction before relying upon any of the information presented here. | Law Firm Marketing by Law Promo
> 
> 
> 
> Therefore, this site seems to be little more than a lawyer advertizing and promotional site. They could hardly be considered an unbiased source of information.
> 
> Go down on the right side of their main page and click on the box labeled "DOCUMENTS" and you will find most (all?) the documents that RailCon has used or referenced.
Click to expand...

Ok, now it all makes sense and sounds familiar. Been there and done that. This uninformed/half baked information that is lawyer ad/newspaper writer talk. It is being parroted by an equally ignorant and uneducated individual that suits his beliefs.


----------



## AlanB

RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> A defect detector checks the train for defects. Metrolink 111's train had no defects (meaning the wheels were in good condition, the brakes weren't stuck, the axles weren't overheating, etc.). Defect detectors don't check the track, they check the train.
> Any other clueless statements you wish to make?
> 
> 
> 
> Perhaps some sneaky lawyer could put this more eloquently, but do you expect the jury to believe that a defect detector somehow manages to check that the wheels were in good condition, the brakes weren't stuck, the axles weren't overheating, etc., BUT DIDN"T HAVE A CLUE THAT THE SWITCH HAD BEEN RUN THROUGH!!?? Or just maybe the Metrolink engineer really had a green signal after all...
> 
> RailCon BuffDaddy
Click to expand...

Yes, I expect a jury to believe that, since that is the defect detector's job. It checks for dragging equipment, stuck brakes, and overheated wheels.

It does not check for the tiny scratch marks that would be on a wheel after running through a switch.

The job of a defect detector isn't to know what the train did or didn't do before it passed through the detector. It's just a simple mechanical & computerized device that looks for the aforementioned defects.

What you're proposing would be like asking a mechanic to know and call the the police because I ran a red light on the way to the car wash. The mechanics job is to figure out what is wrong with my car and fix it. Yes, the mechanic does something that the detector doesn't do, he fixes my car after determining what is broken. The defect detector just informs the crew that something mechanical is wrong. And there was nothing mechanically wrong with that train, other than perhaps a few scratches on the wheels.


----------



## jis

leemell said:


> George Harris said:
> 
> 
> 
> This guy is getting most of his "information" from a web site www.justiceandrailroadsafety.com The group calls itself Justice and Railroad Safety and their header says,
> 
> The Chatsworth Metrolink Disaster:
> 
> Justice for Victims
> 
> Improve Railroad Safety for All
> 
> At the bottom of the page is this statement:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> This web site is paid for by Justice and Railroad Safety. The information contained on these pages and on any pages linked from these pages is intended to provide general information only. You should consult with an attorney licensed to practice in your jurisdiction before relying upon any of the information presented here. | Law Firm Marketing by Law Promo
> 
> 
> 
> Therefore, this site seems to be little more than a lawyer advertizing and promotional site. They could hardly be considered an unbiased source of information.
> 
> Go down on the right side of their main page and click on the box labeled "DOCUMENTS" and you will find most (all?) the documents that RailCon has used or referenced.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> Ok, now it all makes sense and sounds familiar. Been there and done that. This uninformed/half baked information that is lawyer ad/newspaper writer talk. It is being parroted by an equally ignorant and uneducated individual that suits his beliefs.
Click to expand...

The level of ignorance exhibited by the OP certainly suggested a possibility like this. Thanks for digging this up. Now at least I can stop participating in this silliness. :angry2:


----------



## RailCon BuffDaddy

> Yes, I expect a jury to believe that, since that is the defect detector's job. It checks for dragging equipment, stuck brakes, and overheated wheels.
> It does not check for the tiny scratch marks that would be on a wheel after running through a switch.
> 
> The job of a defect detector isn't to know what the train did or didn't do before it passed through the detector. It's just a simple mechanical & computerized device that looks for the aforementioned defects.
> 
> What you're proposing would be like asking a mechanic to know and call the the police because I ran a red light on the way to the car wash. The mechanics job is to figure out what is wrong with my car and fix it. Yes, the mechanic does something that the detector doesn't do, he fixes my car after determining what is broken. The defect detector just informs the crew that something mechanical is wrong. And there was nothing mechanically wrong with that train, other than perhaps a few scratches on the wheels.


Now the sneaky lawyer might ask HOW the defect detector manages to check all those things ON THE TRAIN, but cannot know about an abnormal action severe enough to, and I quote, leave the rail ends "bent in the shape of a banana". And please note that the Metrolink would have first made contact with the rail end tapers at the THICK END, NOT THE POINTED END. And that's also why I believe the conductor I spoke to, btw.

RailCon BuffDaddy


----------



## AlanB

RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> Yes, I expect a jury to believe that, since that is the defect detector's job. It checks for dragging equipment, stuck brakes, and overheated wheels.
> It does not check for the tiny scratch marks that would be on a wheel after running through a switch.
> 
> The job of a defect detector isn't to know what the train did or didn't do before it passed through the detector. It's just a simple mechanical & computerized device that looks for the aforementioned defects.
> 
> What you're proposing would be like asking a mechanic to know and call the the police because I ran a red light on the way to the car wash. The mechanics job is to figure out what is wrong with my car and fix it. Yes, the mechanic does something that the detector doesn't do, he fixes my car after determining what is broken. The defect detector just informs the crew that something mechanical is wrong. And there was nothing mechanically wrong with that train, other than perhaps a few scratches on the wheels.
> 
> 
> 
> Now the sneaky lawyer might ask HOW the defect detector manages to check all those things ON THE TRAIN, but cannot know about an abnormal action severe enough to, and I quote, leave the rail ends "bent in the shape of a banana". And please note that the Metrolink would have first made contact with the rail end tapers at the THICK END, NOT THE POINTED END. And that's also why I believe the conductor I spoke to, btw.
> 
> RailCon BuffDaddy
Click to expand...

If the train had made contact with the pointed ends first, then it would have followed what ever direction the switch was pointed to. And once again, the damage to the switch would be far more severe than the damage to the engines wheels. While I'm not an expert on steel, personally I'd equate things like this; the engines wheels suffered about as much damage as the tires on your car would suffer running over a soda can. The soda can on the other hand would be destroyed.

As for how the detector can do one thing and not the other, the detector does what it was built to do. You would no more expect your dishwasher to tell you that your plate has a crack in it than one would expect a defect detector to tell you that the train damaged a switch a half mile away or whatever the distance actually is.


----------



## Trogdor

RailCon, this was already addressed. Defect detectors check the train, not the track. Running through a switch would damage the switch, but not the train. The detector would find nothing wrong with the train, because the train wasn't damaged.

How is that possible? Because the train is big and heavy, and the switch is relatively light.

It's the same way that you can bend a nail with a hammer, yet not damage the hammer at all.


----------



## leemell

You folks ought to just stop responding to this guy. He has his teeth in the bit of a conspiracy theory that is backstopped by a lawyer's propaganda that is aimed at scaring up clients. He puts in just enough truth and facts to make his theories plausible to the gullible and the gullible has bit it hard here.

Stop responding and he will go away.


----------



## Dan O

I have learned a few things from this last exchange.

1--I don't know anything at all about trains and railroads. No surprise there as it is not a big interest but there is much that has been said that I had no idea even existed.

2--There are some people here who do know a lot about the above. Good to know when I have a question.

3--What initially looks like a reasonable question (or in this case set of questions) about a subject I know nothing about can be quickly shown to be less than reasonable.

4--This forum can be more entertaining (and educational) than I thought.

Dan


----------



## RailCon BuffDaddy

Dan O said:


> I have learned a few things from this last exchange.
> 
> 1--I don't know anything at all about trains and railroads. No surprise there as it is not a big interest but there is much that has been said that I had no idea even existed.
> 
> 2--There are some people here who do know a lot about the above. Good to know when I have a question.
> 
> 3--What initially looks like a reasonable question (or in this case set of questions) about a subject I know nothing about can be quickly shown to be less than reasonable.
> 
> 4--This forum can be more entertaining (and educational) than I thought.
> 
> Dan


Glad you found the exchange entertaining and educational. You might really enjoy

, for a good bellylaugh on the foibles of a single engineer in a locomotive cab.
RailCon BuffDaddy


----------



## RailCon BuffDaddy

Dan O said:


> I have learned a few things from this last exchange.
> 
> 1--I don't know anything at all about trains and railroads. No surprise there as it is not a big interest but there is much that has been said that I had no idea even existed.
> 
> 2--There are some people here who do know a lot about the above. Good to know when I have a question.
> 
> 3--What initially looks like a reasonable question (or in this case set of questions) about a subject I know nothing about can be quickly shown to be less than reasonable.
> 
> 4--This forum can be more entertaining (and educational) than I thought.
> 
> Dan


Dan, I'm curious about one thing - HOW CAN AN OBS CHIEF CLAIM NOT TO KNOW ANYTHING AT ALL ABOUT TRAINS AND RAILROADS??? Are you "taking one for the team"?

"Chief of OBS (On-Board Service), a supervisory job ``over almost every aspect of the train, except conductor...

...Most long-haul trains in the system have a chief of OBS to ensure quality service to the passengers. We do everything from crew assignments, proper stocking of the train`s food and equipment, such as cooking utensils, to linens on sleeping cars. We also do visual mechanical inspection of the equipment in the yards before departure, and prior to each trip we take notice of any special services required by a passenger-whether that request be for kosher meals, storage of medications, handicapped assistance, oxygen, etc..."

RailCon BuffDaddy


----------



## Trogdor

Dan O said:


> 3--What initially looks like a reasonable question (or in this case set of questions) about a subject I know nothing about can be quickly shown to be less than reasonable.


To be clear, someone who is truly curious and seeking understanding of certain things can ask questions, even similar to the ones the guest/RailCon was asking, and if their intent is honestly to learn more about the subject, they will generally get good answers.

However, in this case, the poster was not interested in gaining understanding of anything, refused to acknowledge the validity of any of the responses he received, clearly had an agenda (as evidenced by questions such as "Do you really expect a jury to believe..." and such).

He wasn't asking reasonable questions, because he was not interested in reasonable answers.


----------



## AlanB

RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> You might really enjoy



First, no train typically ever has two engineers in the cab. About the only time that would ever happen is if a supervisor was doing an inspection.

Second, freight trains would always have two people in the cab when out on the mainline.

Third, in a yard a freight train would only have an engineer in the cab, as the conductor normally in the cab when out on the mainline, would be on the ground to direct the switching.

And the train in that video was in a yard, when things went wrong. It's one incident in many years. Thousands of yard moves are made in this country every day without incident and only one person in the cab. And in fact, in some yards, there is no one in the cab anymore.


----------



## AlanB

RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> Dan, I'm curious about one thing - HOW CAN AN OBS CHIEF CLAIM NOT TO KNOW ANYTHING AT ALL ABOUT TRAINS AND RAILROADS??? Are you "taking one for the team"?
> 
> "Chief of OBS (On-Board Service), a supervisory job ``over almost every aspect of the train, except conductor...
> 
> ...Most long-haul trains in the system have a chief of OBS to ensure quality service to the passengers. We do everything from crew assignments, proper stocking of the train`s food and equipment, such as cooking utensils, to linens on sleeping cars. We also do visual mechanical inspection of the equipment in the yards before departure, and prior to each trip we take notice of any special services required by a passenger-whether that request be for kosher meals, storage of medications, handicapped assistance, oxygen, etc..."
> 
> RailCon BuffDaddy


It's an honorary title. Dan is not really an OBS.

Since this is a forum about Amtrak trains, as one makes posts to this forum, one receives honorary titles based upon the number of posts made. That title has nothing to do with what they actually do for a living. I'm a network/computer consultant. But for the fact that I'm an administrator on this forum which takes precedent, the number of post that I've made would show my title as an engineer. But again, I'm not. I work in computers.


----------



## Dan O

AlanB said:


> It's an honorary title. Dan is not really an OBS.


Alan. it's only honorary? I guess I'd be over 5.000 Amtrak miles (see signature) if I was an OBS chief for real.


----------



## AlanB

Dan O said:


> AlanB said:
> 
> 
> 
> It's an honorary title. Dan is not really an OBS.
> 
> 
> 
> Alan. it's only honorary? I guess I'd be over 5.000 Amtrak miles (see signature) if I was an OBS chief for real.
Click to expand...

Dan,

You know, I never really look at signatures.  So I never noticed that.


----------



## AlanB

AlanB said:


> RailCon BuffDaddy said:
> 
> 
> 
> Dan, I'm curious about one thing - HOW CAN AN OBS CHIEF CLAIM NOT TO KNOW ANYTHING AT ALL ABOUT TRAINS AND RAILROADS??? Are you "taking one for the team"?
> 
> "Chief of OBS (On-Board Service), a supervisory job ``over almost every aspect of the train, except conductor...
> 
> ...Most long-haul trains in the system have a chief of OBS to ensure quality service to the passengers. We do everything from crew assignments, proper stocking of the train`s food and equipment, such as cooking utensils, to linens on sleeping cars. We also do visual mechanical inspection of the equipment in the yards before departure, and prior to each trip we take notice of any special services required by a passenger-whether that request be for kosher meals, storage of medications, handicapped assistance, oxygen, etc..."
> 
> RailCon BuffDaddy
> 
> 
> 
> It's an honorary title. Dan is not really an OBS.
> 
> Since this is a forum about Amtrak trains, as one makes posts to this forum, one receives honorary titles based upon the number of posts made. That title has nothing to do with what they actually do for a living. I'm a network/computer consultant. But for the fact that I'm an administrator on this forum which takes precedent, the number of post that I've made would show my title as an engineer. But again, I'm not. I work in computers.
Click to expand...

PS. I forgot to add that the position of OBS no longer exists at Amtrak; it hasn't for several years now.


----------



## Dan O

AlanB said:


> Dan O said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> AlanB said:
> 
> 
> 
> It's an honorary title. Dan is not really an OBS.
> 
> 
> 
> Alan. it's only honorary? I guess I'd be over 5.000 Amtrak miles (see signature) if I was an OBS chief for real.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> Dan,
> 
> You know, I never really look at signatures.  So I never noticed that.
Click to expand...

Actually that was more for RailCon BuffDaddy. He was the one that thought I was the OBS chief.

Dan


----------



## George Harris

Dan:

There are several of us on here that have jobs in the industry. Generally we are fairly low key about for who and doing what, as that which is written is around forever and what you say can and will be used against you if someone has an axe to grind.


----------



## RailCon BuffDaddy

AlanB said:


> You might really enjoy


It appears that you are playing games with job titles in order to obscure that fact that not all trains have functional vigilance switches - otherwise this train could NOT have run away. Furthermore, perhaps you would like to comment on the "fatal flaw" in signal callout protocol - SINCE GREEN SIGNALS ARE NOT CALLED OUT BY THE ENGINEER AND REPEATED BY THE CONDUCTOR, THE CONDUCTOR CANNOT RECOGNIZE INCAPACITATION OF THE ENGINEER IF IT OCCURS PASSING A GREEN SIGNAL.


----------



## guest

George Harris said:


> Dan:
> 
> There are several of us on here that have jobs in the industry. Generally we are fairly low key about for who and doing what, as that which is written is around forever and what you say can and will be used against you if someone has an axe to grind.


All I can say is that those of you responding to RailCon Whatever have had the patience of Job. As a longtime Metrolink rider, I would not have gotten back on the trains if I, and the multitude of my fellow passengers, did not believe the NTSB report and new safety/equipment measures were based on fact. Thanks to you and the others who have posted here for adding reassurance for those of us who regularly ride the system.


----------



## AlanB

RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> You might really enjoy



First, the only one playing games here is you I'm sorry to say! I'm not sure what your game is, but you're clearly not seeking general info and are shopping for something to somehow help in a case against Metrolink or perhaps trying to clear the engineers name. I'm not sure which; but I warn you that my patience is wearing thin with some of these accusations that you've been making.

Second, back in the days of the steam engines, inside the cab on a mainline run you would find only a fireman and the engineer. In the caboose you'd find the conductor and some brakemen. As automation increased, brakemen went away. When diesels came online, to a large extent in this country firemen went away, and on freight trains the conductor moved into the cab. On Amtrak trains when there are two people in the cab, then the second person is still called the fireman, even though he/she doesn't shovel coal anymore.

Next, what the heck is a "functional vigilance switch"?

As for your final sentence, oddly enough RR's on the east coast operate under NORAC rules which require the engineer to call all signals out on the radio to the conductor. The rules in place on the host RR's west of the Mississippi do not require that green or clear's be called. If you don't like that policy, complain to Union Pacific and BNSF, as they set those rules.

Regarding the engineer being incapacitated, the dead man's feature takes care of that problem. The engineer, be it on an Amtrak, Metrolink, or freight engine, must make some input be it changing speed, blowing the horn, ringing the bell, applying the brakes, etc. ever 1 to 2 minutes. It's a random amount of time. If the engineer doesn't make any input within the time limit, the alerter starts beeping. The engineer has about 15 to 20 seconds to hit a button confirming that he's still alive and kicking. If he fails to hit that button within the allotted time, an extremely loud horn that would wake the dead starts going off. No one could sleep through that racket, I've heard that horn go off and it is VERY loud.

Once that horn goes off, he's got another 15 to 20 seconds to respond and hit that button. If he fails to do so, the onboard computers assume that he is indeed incapacitated for some reason and the computer will apply the brakes and bring the train to a halt. And it will sit there until that engineer either recovers to do something about the stop, or rescue workers carry him off the train and a new engineer gets on board to move the train.

Now in the case of that runaway train, when yard work is being done, the alerter system is disabled because there can be periods where nothing is happening and the engineer has left the cab and because everything is done at low speeds. And under normal circumstances in the yard, people would quickly notice if the engineer were incapacitated. I don't recall the specifics right now on the CSX runaway incident and I'm not going looking for them as I'm about to start my journey home by train. But I do recall that there were a series of mistakes made that led to that incident, mistakes unlikely to ever be repeated again, especially after what happened with CSX.


----------



## RailCon BuffDaddy

> First, the only one playing games here is you I'm sorry to say! I'm not sure what your game is


THE TRUTH



> Second, back in the days of the steam engines, inside the cab on a mainline run you would find only a fireman and the engineer. In the caboose you'd find the conductor and some brakemen. As automation increased, brakemen went away. When diesels came online, to a large extent in this country firemen went away, and on freight trains the conductor moved into the cab. On Amtrak trains when there are two people in the cab, then the second person is still called the fireman, even though he/she doesn't shovel coal anymore.


The presence of any one of these, along with the engineer, would have prevented the CSX runaway - or will you argue that point, as well?



> Next, what the heck is a "functional vigilance switch"?


Please see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dead-man%27s_vigilance_device - functional means working; operational; not defeated in some manner.



> As for your final sentence, oddly enough RR's on the east coast operate under NORAC rules which require the engineer to call all signals out on the radio to the conductor. The rules in place on the host RR's west of the Mississippi do not require that green or clear's be called. If you don't like that policy, complain to Union Pacific and BNSF, as they set those rules.


I think "catastrophically" is more appropriate than "oddly". And three warm bodies in the freight cab, but only one in the Metrolink. But look at all the money and radio bandwidth they save...



> Now in the case of that runaway train, when yard work is being done, the alerter system is disabled because there can be periods where nothing is happening and the engineer has left the cab


By most accounts that's what happened - except the train was moving when he jumped off to throw a switch so he would not run through it, and the train then speeded up, preventing him from getting back on board.

One final point - local residents interviewed after the Chatsworth accident stated that it was normal for the Leesdale Local freight to speed through the Chatsworth Station on the main (East) track - the SAME track the Metrolink departed on the day of the accident. The presence of TWO signals at CP Topanga, with one cropped out of the NTSB report, becomes ever more curious...

Thank you for your response.

RailCon BuffDaddy


----------



## George Harris

AlanB said:


> I don't recall the specifics right now on the CSX runaway incident and I'm not going looking for them as I'm about to start my journey home by train. But I do recall that there were a series of mistakes made that led to that incident, mistakes unlikely to ever be repeated again, especially after what happened with CSX.


The series of event is by safety professionals called the "Cascade of Events". the exact words may be wrong, but normally when there is a serious accident there is no sigle cause. For every serious accident, there are normally a certain number of minor accidents, I think the normal ratio is about 30, and for each minor accident, there are normally a certain number of near misses and rules violations.

The normal mindset of safety professionals borders on paranoia, and if that is mentioned, there usual answer is to the effect, "Yes, but am I being paranoid enough?" Thye usually go beyond the "rare as chicken teeth" concerns to wanting to have a dentist on call in case one those chicken teeth develops a cavity.

When we look at the number of train meets that we have on single track railroads the percentage of accidesnt approaches the vanishing point. It is far below the rate of road accidents. In fact, every form of public transportation is safer than driving.

Maybe RailCon is unaware that there are people out there whose profession is to ensure safety and analyze accidents aaand rule violations far more than just the NTSB. If the NTSP report had any errors of significance, any number of these people would be screaming foul and pointing out the errors. I am NOT talking about those that have an interst in twisting the outcome for their own advantage, but those whe have nothing to gain by disputing the findings of the NTSB.

Yes thing still happen, but that is because we a imperfect humans, not God. With the best of efforts and intentions things will go wrong and be done wrong from tiem to time.

We also need to recognize that reality to avoid "By striving fro perfection we drive out the good."

An outstanding example of doing this would be to so burden railroad passenger service with major costs for minor safety benefits that the economics become unacceptable even for governments, thereby driving travel more to roads with their much less controlled environment and their much higher accident rates.


----------



## AlanB

RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> First, the only one playing games here is you I'm sorry to say! I'm not sure what your game is
> 
> 
> 
> THE TRUTH
Click to expand...

Sorry, but NO! You're not interested in the truth; if you were, then you wouldn't be here making the statements you're making and ignoring those who've responded to you. If Metrolink had reached the conclusion that you did, then fine I could understand your suspicion. The NTSB is an independent, impartial third party. They aren't prone to lying, and as George pointed out, there are any number of other experts who would by crying foul at this point in there were problems in the NTSB report.



RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> Second, back in the days of the steam engines, inside the cab on a mainline run you would find only a fireman and the engineer. In the caboose you'd find the conductor and some brakemen. As automation increased, brakemen went away. When diesels came online, to a large extent in this country firemen went away, and on freight trains the conductor moved into the cab. On Amtrak trains when there are two people in the cab, then the second person is still called the fireman, even though he/she doesn't shovel coal anymore.
> 
> 
> 
> The presence of any one of these, along with the engineer, would have prevented the CSX runaway - or will you argue that point, as well?
Click to expand...

Yes, they would have prevented it. However, ever since the end of steam there would never more than one person have been in the CSX cab while in the yard. And had the engineer followed the rules that are there for a reason, there would have been no runaway. Instead he left the cab to prevent his getting caught for one violation and created an even bigger problem and violation that probably got him fired.



RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> Next, what the heck is a "functional vigilance switch"?
> 
> 
> 
> Please see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dead-man%27s_vigilance_device - functional means working; operational; not defeated in some manner.
Click to expand...

I don't think that I've ever heard anyone working in the industry refer to it as such.



RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> As for your final sentence, oddly enough RR's on the east coast operate under NORAC rules which require the engineer to call all signals out on the radio to the conductor. The rules in place on the host RR's west of the Mississippi do not require that green or clear's be called. If you don't like that policy, complain to Union Pacific and BNSF, as they set those rules.
> 
> 
> 
> I think "catastrophically" is more appropriate than "oddly". And three warm bodies in the freight cab, but only one in the Metrolink. But look at all the money and radio bandwidth they save...
Click to expand...

Again, SOP for the freight would have been two. It was just an oddity that three happened to be in the cab that day.

As for the rules, if the engineer of Metrolink thought that he had a clear signal, he would have radioed that info to the conductor and the result would still be the same. So whether or not they call the clear signals west of the Miss is irrelevant to this discussion.



RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> One final point - local residents interviewed after the Chatsworth accident stated that it was normal for the Leesdale Local freight to speed through the Chatsworth Station on the main (East) track - the SAME track the Metrolink departed on the day of the accident. The presence of TWO signals at CP Topanga, with one cropped out of the NTSB report, becomes ever more curious...


No, the cropping of the pictures still makes no difference.

First, nothing is ever normal on a RR. Rule #1 is expect a train at any time in any direction. Trains don't always run on the same schedule. And what happened yesterday is no indication of what will happen today. That's why the signals are there. And the only signal that matters is the one that the Metrolink engineer ran. There are places where there are 6 even 8 signals because of the number of tracks. Every engineer knows which track they are on and which signal they must look at and obey.


----------



## Trogdor

RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> One final point - local residents interviewed after the Chatsworth accident stated that it was normal for the Leesdale Local freight to speed through the Chatsworth Station on the main (East) track - the SAME track the Metrolink departed on the day of the accident.


Local residents wouldn't know what the "Leesdale Local" is, wouldn't know a main track from a siding, and know about as much about railroading as you do (that is to say, absolutely nothing).



> The presence of TWO signals at CP Topanga, with one cropped out of the NTSB report, becomes ever more curious...


Curious, in what sense? Curious in the sense that you don't know a damn thing about what signals are for, or how to read them?

The fact that there are two signals (actually three, if you count the one for eastbound traffic) at CP Topanga is a non-issue. It was never an issue, and never will be an issue.

I don't know what the CSX runaway train has to do with this case, unless you're just scraping the bottom of the barrel looking for anything at all that will defend your position (which, honestly, I still don't know what your position is).


----------



## George Harris

RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> One final point - local residents interviewed after the Chatsworth accident stated that it was normal for the Leesdale Local freight to speed through the Chatsworth Station on the main (East) track - the SAME track the Metrolink departed on the day of the accident.


The chance of this statement ibeing accurate is little to mone. Whether it did or not is a non-issue. The issue is solely what was supposed to happen at the particular time of the accident, which has been well established beyond doubt and question.

And the significance of this statement is??? *NONE WHATSOEVER.*



> The presence of TWO signals at CP Topanga, with one cropped out of the NTSB report, becomes ever more curious...


Ever heard the expression "beating a dead horse?" Continuing to ramble on about the presence of two signals but only one showing in the picture is exactly that. The issue and consequences (none at all) have been exhaustively explained any yet you persist in bringing it up. There had to be two signals because there were two tracks. The one to the right of the track and *only that signal* had any significance to the operation of the Metrolink train.

What is your purpose with all these questions and claims?


----------



## RailCon BuffDaddy

George Harris said:


> RailCon BuffDaddy said:
> 
> 
> 
> One final point - local residents interviewed after the Chatsworth accident stated that it was normal for the Leesdale Local freight to speed through the Chatsworth Station on the main (East) track - the SAME track the Metrolink departed on the day of the accident.
> 
> 
> 
> The chance of this statement ibeing accurate is little to mone. Whether it did or not is a non-issue. The issue is solely what was supposed to happen at the particular time of the accident, which has been well established beyond doubt and question.
> 
> And the significance of this statement is??? *NONE WHATSOEVER.*
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The presence of TWO signals at CP Topanga, with one cropped out of the NTSB report, becomes ever more curious...
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> Ever heard the expression "beating a dead horse?" Continuing to ramble on about the presence of two signals but only one showing in the picture is exactly that. The issue and consequences (none at all) have been exhaustively explained any yet you persist in bringing it up. There had to be two signals because there were two tracks. The one to the right of the track and *only that signal* had any significance to the operation of the Metrolink train.
> 
> What is your purpose with all these questions and claims?
Click to expand...

As has been mentioned, there are THREE signals at CP Topanga, including the one that would have been seen, albeit too late to matter, by the Leesdale Local crew. The NTSB report states that the prior intermediate signal the Leesdale Local crew saw was "yellow over yellow". How very helpful - one one track there is an opposing commuter train, and the other is clear - the next signal will tell you (TOO LATE). And if you think all railroad professionals know what "yellow over yellow" means, read THIS. If you want to get an engineer's view, watch THIS.

RailCon BuffDaddy


----------



## Ryan

You're so completely wrong on this it's mind boggling.

An internet discussion amongst people not qualified on the territory in question proves nothing. Knowing what the signal aspects mean is a core competency for holding an engineer/conductor position.

The signal just before the siding isn't "TOO LATE", it isn't like the engineer steers the train onto one track or another based on the signal. The direction the train is going to take is set by the dispatcher.

I'll defer to a real engineer, but my understanding is that the y/y aspect means "diverging approach" in that territory, so the engineer does in fact know that he'll be taking the siding at the next signal.

This pretty much makes every single one of your statements factually incorrect.

And I ask again - what is your point? What is your alternative theory? Rather than tell us that you think the NTSB is wrong, try telling us what you think actually happened, and why it's important?

Edit: And just so we're abundantly clear, RailCon - even though it says "engineer" under my name over there (and I am an engineer), I'm not really a locomotive engineer. I'm just a guy that likes riding trains. The fact that I'm not certain about what a signal aspect 3,000 miles away means doesn't mean that real locomotive engineers trained on that territory don't know what it means.

Edit2: Watched the video and it proves my point. The first signal passed is y/y meaning that the train is going to go into the siding at the next switch. As he approaches that siding, you can see that the switch is lined to go into the siding, and the signal is showing red over green - a "diverging clear", meaning that he's going to go into the siding and that the way ahead is clear after that. At the last second, you see the signal change to red over red, because the oncoming train has gotten too close to the switch and there is a chance of collision (which is exactly what happens).


----------



## AlanB

Ryan said:


> At the last second, you see the signal change to red over red, because the oncoming train has gotten too close to the switch and there is a chance of collision (which is exactly what happens).


The signal changes to red over red because the other train is now in the same block as the train about to take the siding; not because it's too close to the signal. The other train crossed the point where it went from the block that it was supposed to stop within and into the block that it was not supposed to be in.

I can't watch that video from the train, need more band width, but I suspect that I've seen the video in question. And the signals worked properly and the train crew from the train from which the video was shot did everything correctly. It was the opposing crew that screwed up and violated their stop signal causing the accident. There was only one cause of this accident, and that was the inattention of the crew in the oncoming train. I've never gone looking for the accident report for this accident, but it is quite clear even to this non-expert what happened and who screwed up.


----------



## RailCon BuffDaddy

> The signal changes to red over red because the other train is now in the same block as the train about to take the siding; not because it's too close to the signal. The other train crossed the point where it went from the block that it was supposed to stop within and into the block that it was not supposed to be in.


What do we have here, differing opinions of signal interpretation? And WHAT magic sensor decides when the oncoming train is in the wrong block? And WHY is there NO margin of error or warning time for the approaching train? Could it be that the more warning margin provided, the LESS room to squeeze another carlength into a siding? And the PTC boosters want to peddle HIGHER TRAIN SPEEDS as a reason to invest untold billions, while ignoring the more mundane safety solutions such as uniform, unequivocal and timely signaling.



> I can't watch that video from the train, need more band width, but I suspect that I've seen the video in question. And the signals worked properly and the train crew from the train from which the video was shot did everything correctly. It was the opposing crew that screwed up and violated their stop signal causing the accident. There was only one cause of this accident, and that was the inattention of the crew in the oncoming train. I've never gone looking for the accident report for this accident, but it is quite clear even to this non-expert what happened and who screwed up.


Why don't you? At ONE CRITICAL INSTANT, the conductor thought he saw a signal turn red, but the engineer thought it was still "clear" (which means green, is that clear?). At sunrise, no less. What a wonderful margin for error - now let's ship all our nuclear waste by train...

RailCon BuffDaddy


----------



## Ryan

Yes, that's the video. I used "too close to the switch" because I didn't want to get into blocks with the guy - from a layman's perspective they're the same thing, if you get too close to the switch you go into the next block.


----------



## RailCon BuffDaddy

Come on, it's all of you against me - surely you are not too scared to post my last message, are you? Or do you need to wait until you can gather enough responses to bury it first?

RailCon BuffDaddy


----------



## AlanB

RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> The signal changes to red over red because the other train is now in the same block as the train about to take the siding; not because it's too close to the signal. The other train crossed the point where it went from the block that it was supposed to stop within and into the block that it was not supposed to be in.
> 
> 
> 
> What do we have here, differing opinions of signal interpretation? And WHAT magic sensor decides when the oncoming train is in the wrong block? And WHY is there NO margin of error or warning time for the approaching train? Could it be that the more warning margin provided, the LESS room to squeeze another carlength into a siding? And the PTC boosters want to peddle HIGHER TRAIN SPEEDS as a reason to invest untold billions, while ignoring the more mundane safety solutions such as uniform, unequivocal and timely signaling.
Click to expand...

What we have here is two rail fans using different wording to describe things. Remember, we don't work for any railroad. I'm a computer consultant who just happens to like trains and know something about them.

And yes, there is a wire loop attached to the tracks with a very low current that runs through it. When the train passes that spot in the track, the wheels & axles close that loop, indicating to the signal circuits that a train has passed into the block.



RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> I can't watch that video from the train, need more band width, but I suspect that I've seen the video in question. And the signals worked properly and the train crew from the train from which the video was shot did everything correctly. It was the opposing crew that screwed up and violated their stop signal causing the accident. There was only one cause of this accident, and that was the inattention of the crew in the oncoming train. I've never gone looking for the accident report for this accident, but it is quite clear even to this non-expert what happened and who screwed up.
> 
> 
> 
> Why don't you? At ONE CRITICAL INSTANT, the conductor thought he saw a signal turn red, but the engineer thought it was still "clear" (which means green, is that clear?). At sunrise, no less. What a wonderful margin for error - now let's ship all our nuclear waste by train...
> 
> RailCon BuffDaddy
Click to expand...

Which part of "I'm currently on a train" did you not understand? I'm using a cell phone connection to get online as I roll along the Mississippi River on my to Chicago and my next train home. Watching videos takes more data and band width than I wish to use at this time for this discussion.

And shipping nuclear waste by train is far safer than shipping it by truck. Trucks have many more accidents than do trains.

I asked you this once before and you still haven't answered it; why aren't you as concerned about automobile safety as you are with trains? We kill many, many more people with cars & trucks than we ever kill with trains. Where is your outrage and concern about this?


----------



## Ryan

RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> What do we have here, differing opinions of signal interpretation?


Nope, just differing ways of descriping the same thing to someone that's demonstrated a profound refusal to listen to those explanations.


> And WHAT magic sensor decides when the oncoming train is in the wrong block?


Alan described it above, and it operated exactly as designed. 


> And WHY is there NO margin of error or warning time for the approaching train?


Because the "magic" sensor can't see into the future to see that the oncoming train is going to creep farther forward than it's supposed to. As soon as it does, the signal facing the video camera turns red.


> Could it be that the more warning margin provided, the LESS room to squeeze another carlength into a siding?


 Nope. Given the timing involved, there's no signal system in the world that would have stopped that collision, it's simple physics. You can't stop a train on a dime.


> And the PTC boosters want to peddle HIGHER TRAIN SPEEDS as a reason to invest untold billions, while ignoring the more mundane safety solutions such as uniform, unequivocal and timely signaling.


Actually, the PTC boosters cite increased safety. PTC may have stopped the Chatsworth crash, but it wouldn't have done a thing in the crash depicted in the video.


> Why don't you? At ONE CRITICAL INSTANT, the conductor thought he saw a signal turn red, but the engineer thought it was still "clear" (which means green, is that clear?). At sunrise, no less.


Even if the brakes had magically applied at the second the signal had gone red (which is what PTC would roughly do), the train still wouldn't have been able to stop in time. 


> What a wonderful margin for error - now let's ship all our nuclear waste by train...


As has been mentioned, train travel is FAR safer than vehicle travel.


----------



## AlanB

RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> Come on, it's all of you against me - surely you are not too scared to post my last message, are you? Or do you need to wait until you can gather enough responses to bury it first?
> 
> RailCon BuffDaddy


I've explained this once before to you, but I'm going to do it once again. Guest posts thanks to idiots who like to spam our forum must be approved by a staff member now. Once upon a day, guest posts showed up immediately, but alas not any more. It's the only way that we can protect against spammers posting dirty pictures on our forum, a forum that has members under the age of 18.

And since some of the staff is currently traveling home by train, like me, it takes time before we see your post and can approve it.

And I'm going to warn you one last time, keep making posts like this one where you try to goad us into something and it will be your last. My patience is wearing thin with you, and I think that I've been very patient with you. Some of the staff currently won't even approve your posts anymore because they're tired of your nonsense so they leave things for me. If you wish to keep posting here, I'll ask you to please be a bit more respectful. The staff and I don't get paid for this, Amtrak doesn't own this forum, it is privately owned. And the staff is all volunteer. We do this because we like trains and because we want this forum to remain both a pleasant place for our members and a place where people can come and ask questions about Amtrak or train in general.

This will be your last warning, after this is you continue in this vein, I can assure you that it will be your last post that gets approved.


----------



## RailCon BuffDaddy

> Because the "magic" sensor can't see into the future to see that the oncoming train is going to creep farther forward than it's supposed to. As soon as it does, the signal facing the video camera turns red.


Obviously, the "magic" sensor could have and SHOULD have been farther back. Another viewer of the video noted that the camera train DID run a red signal at almost 40 mph. Now this wasn't really fair, because camera train has no time to react, or so the video makes one believe - but if you watch carefully, you notice that TWO SEGMENTS of the clip were DELETED, for some reason. Who knows what those missing segments might have revealed.



> Given the timing involved, there's no signal system in the world that would have stopped that collision, it's simple physics. You can't stop a train on a dime.


Apparently the standard headlight protocol for unsignaled territory would have worked just fine - the oncoming train is on the main track and moving, or he would have dimmed his headlight when he stopped. And, who knows what the oncoming train's camera might have revealed.



> PTC may have stopped the Chatsworth crash, but it wouldn't have done a thing in the crash depicted in the video.


How so? If the Metrolink was stopped with PTC, it would be on the single track, and the Leesdale Local would have stilled careened into it at 40 mph.



> As has been mentioned, train travel is FAR safer than vehicle travel.


Given the potential for disaster, I remain, alas, unconsoled...


----------



## Ryan

Also, there's a simple solution.

Spend 30 seconds, sign up for an account and your posts will appear as soon as you press the button. As long as you don't break the rules, you can post to your heart's content!


----------



## Trogdor

RailCon is getting more looney toons by the day.

Next he'll express amazement at the magic of electricity that allows a light to illuminate through a shaded lens, filtering the color of said light and giving the observer the impression that a given light is "green" or "red" (such magical devices we have these days).


----------



## AlanB

RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> Because the "magic" sensor can't see into the future to see that the oncoming train is going to creep farther forward than it's supposed to. As soon as it does, the signal facing the video camera turns red.
> 
> 
> 
> Obviously, the "magic" sensor could have and SHOULD have been farther back. Another viewer of the video noted that the camera train DID run a red signal at almost 40 mph. Now this wasn't really fair, because camera train has no time to react, or so the video makes one believe - but if you watch carefully, you notice that TWO SEGMENTS of the clip were DELETED, for some reason. Who knows what those missing segments might have revealed.
Click to expand...

No, the sensor is exactly where its supposed to be.



RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> Given the timing involved, there's no signal system in the world that would have stopped that collision, it's simple physics. You can't stop a train on a dime.
> 
> 
> 
> Apparently the standard headlight protocol for unsignaled territory would have worked just fine - the oncoming train is on the main track and moving, or he would have dimmed his headlight when he stopped. And, who knows what the oncoming train's camera might have revealed.
Click to expand...

That's a nicety, not a requirement. Not all engineers dim the headlight when stopped and another train approaches. The other trains' camera, if there was one, would have revealed that its engineer ran a red signal.



RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> PTC may have stopped the Chatsworth crash, but it wouldn't have done a thing in the crash depicted in the video.
> 
> 
> 
> How so? If the Metrolink was stopped with PTC, it would be on the single track, and the Leesdale Local would have stilled careened into it at 40 mph.
Click to expand...

First, even if PTC only stopped the Metrolink train (and we'll come back to this idea in a minute), that would have made the closure rate between the two trains only 40 MPH, instead of the 80 MPH combined speed with which they collided. That would have saved many, if not all lives lost. There is a huge difference between a 40 MPH collision and a 80 MPH collision.

Second, PTC must be installed on all engines leading trains operating within PTC territory. This is why Metrolink doesn't already have it installed, because UP must also do so. However, had PTC been in operation, it would have applied the brakes to both trains the second that Metrolink ran the red signal. Most likely that would have prevented the collision entirely, but worst case scenario if the freight couldn't be stopped quite quick enough, we'd be talking about a collision of probably 15 MPH or less. That would have saved all lives and resulted in only minor injuries.



RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> As has been mentioned, train travel is FAR safer than vehicle travel.
> 
> 
> 
> Given the potential for disaster, I remain, alas, unconsoled...
Click to expand...

Once again, I ask, where is your outrage against cars & trucks? I expect an answer!


----------



## Ryan

Do we have the technology to make PTC such that it enforces the signal BEFORE you get to it? For example in Chatsworth, instead of PTC and kicking in after the engineer blew past the red signal, there was some logic that said "OK, there's a red signal 100 yards ahead, this train is moving at 30 MPH and would need 500 yards to stop, therefore I must apply the brakes right now!"

Apply that logic test over and over and over as a train approaches a red signal, and it makes it very hard for the train to make it past a red signal. You'd have to build a lot of info into the system (braking distance vs speed curves, etc), but it would make it pretty hard to run 2 trains into one another.

Then of course the real question is "Is the expense of such a system worth it?".


----------



## Trogdor

Ryan said:


> Do we have the technology to make PTC such that it enforces the signal BEFORE you get to it? For example in Chatsworth, instead of PTC and kicking in after the engineer blew past the red signal, there was some logic that said "OK, there's a red signal 100 yards ahead, this train is moving at 30 MPH and would need 500 yards to stop, therefore I must apply the brakes right now!"


That's exactly what PTC is suppsoed to do.

These systems are quite advanced and have logic built in with very conservative braking curves and such, and will actually apply a penalty brake long before the "drop dead" decision point for slowing down for a speed restriction or signal.

I don't recall all the specific details, since it's not my area, but having been to a presentation on PTC at a conference last year, my vague memory says that for the given equipment operating, the PTC system will require that the engineer be below the speed/braking curve for a given restriction, with that curve set at some very conservative distance (i.e. in normal operation, you could be beyond that curve and still slow down/stop in time), PLUS an error factor to account for the possibility that the system is slightly off in where it thinks you are. So, as an example, if a train under normal conditions requires 2,500 feet to stop from its given speed, the system would start enforcing a penalty brake at 3,000 or 3,500 feet from the "target."

The downside to this is that it's actually going to take you longer to get where you're going (assuming no speed increases on the railroad), because while a good engineer will know his train well enough to know when to apply the brakes for a given stop or speed restriction, the system will force them all to slow down far in advance of that.


----------



## AlanB

Ryan said:


> Do we have the technology to make PTC such that it enforces the signal BEFORE you get to it? For example in Chatsworth, instead of PTC and kicking in after the engineer blew past the red signal, there was some logic that said "OK, there's a red signal 100 yards ahead, this train is moving at 30 MPH and would need 500 yards to stop, therefore I must apply the brakes right now!"


Yes, that technology exists and that's how it would actually work anyhow. Many light rail trains also already have speed enforcement, where the operator gets a few seconds to deal with going over the speed limit, before the brakes are applied.

Since the Metrolink train was operating in a block that would have required it to be able to slow to a stop before the red signal, once the engineer got above a certain speed as he accelerated away from the platform the PTC would have started blaring a horn to let him know that he was above the safe speed for that block. Had the engineer failed to reduce the speed within a few seconds, the computes would have stopped the train automatically.

It is still potentially possible that the train would have made it through the switch and onto to the main, but it wouldn't have been very far past that switch before it reached a full stop. And of course, as I already noted, if the train had made it past the red signal then the PTC would have shutdown the freight engine too. But it is equally likely that it would have stopped before the signal and crossing the switch set against it.


----------



## Ryan

OK cool, I thought that might be the case but wasn't sure. I'm thinking that might be RailCon's point, but he's doing a terrible job communicating it.


----------



## Trogdor

Ryan said:


> OK cool, I thought that might be the case but wasn't sure. I'm thinking that might be RailCon's point, but he's doing a terrible job communicating it.


In 6 or 7 (lost count) pages of rants, he has demonstrated that he clearly does not have a point.


----------



## jis

PTC would not have allowed the Metrolink to get upto a speed from which it could not be brought to a standstill short of the stop signal that it faced, and indeed it would have enforced the stop short of the signal irrespective of what the engineer did or did not do. Same is true of ACSES on the NEC, which is certified to conform to the requirements of a PTC system.


----------



## RailCon BuffDaddy

Ryan said:


> Do we have the technology to make PTC such that it enforces the signal BEFORE you get to it?


How about what I said in post #552? - "Obviously, the "magic" sensor could have and SHOULD have been farther back." This might be more economical, and is already the case in some places. I'll bet all you "railroad enthusiasts" even know where. The Amtrak/PTC lobbyists/union busters among you might have to look it up...

RailCon BuffDaddy


----------



## Ryan

It's not as simple as just putting the sensor farther back. The distance should (and does, it seems) vary with the speed and stopping distance of the train.


----------



## MattW

RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> Ryan said:
> 
> 
> 
> Do we have the technology to make PTC such that it enforces the signal BEFORE you get to it?
> 
> 
> 
> How about what I said in post #552? - "Obviously, the "magic" sensor could have and SHOULD have been farther back." This might be more economical, and is already the case in some places. I'll bet all you "railroad enthusiasts" even know where. The Amtrak/PTC lobbyists/union busters among you might have to look it up...
> 
> RailCon BuffDaddy
Click to expand...

How much farther back? Don't forget that a light locomotive move has considerably less stopping distance than a loaded coal train. The only way to have an effective stopping distance is to have a computer dynamically calculate stopping distance based on weight, speed, grade etc. so to stop trains that run red signals for all trains in all conditions is to have the sensor for that very far back. Far enough perhaps that the engineer can no longer see the signal and wouldn't know when to proceed which means you should place the signal back at the sensor which kind of renders the whole point moot. The traditional signaling system has served us well for a hundred years with very few accidents in general, and even fewer that weren't caused by human error (as in the incident at hand, Chatsworth).

Also, you seem to be changing your tune. Earlier, you were deriding the railroad industry for not caring enough about passengers, yet when people mention PTC which will have huge safety benefits, you deride the PTC supporters.


----------



## leemell

RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> Come on, it's all of you against me - surely you are not too scared to post my last message, are you? Or do you need to wait until you can gather enough responses to bury it first?
> 
> RailCon BuffDaddy


What are you? Thirteen years old? You childish responsses and lack of real knowledge would seem to point to that.


----------



## RailCon BuffDaddy

MattW said:


> RailCon BuffDaddy said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Ryan said:
> 
> 
> 
> Do we have the technology to make PTC such that it enforces the signal BEFORE you get to it?
> 
> 
> 
> How about what I said in post #552? - "Obviously, the "magic" sensor could have and SHOULD have been farther back." This might be more economical, and is already the case in some places. I'll bet all you "railroad enthusiasts" even know where. The Amtrak/PTC lobbyists/union busters among you might have to look it up...
> 
> RailCon BuffDaddy
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> How much farther back? Don't forget that a light locomotive move has considerably less stopping distance than a loaded coal train. The only way to have an effective stopping distance is to have a computer dynamically calculate stopping distance based on weight, speed, grade etc. so to stop trains that run red signals for all trains in all conditions is to have the sensor for that very far back. Far enough perhaps that the engineer can no longer see the signal and wouldn't know when to proceed which means you should place the signal back at the sensor which kind of renders the whole point moot. The traditional signaling system has served us well for a hundred years with very few accidents in general, and even fewer that weren't caused by human error (as in the incident at hand, Chatsworth).
> 
> Also, you seem to be changing your tune. Earlier, you were deriding the railroad industry for not caring enough about passengers, yet when people mention PTC which will have huge safety benefits, you deride the PTC supporters.
Click to expand...

Sensor appears to be right at the signal in THIS video - which unfortunately is also right at the switch, with NO margin for error. Some places have the sensor & signal set back 220 yards, I believe, which makes sense. Headlight signaling makes sense, also - and has been around a long time. I am ALL for greater rail safety, but not necessarily expensive, lengthy pie-in-the-sky schemes which will surely be thwarted by an industry intent on cutting corners at every turn - and won't even admit that cell phones are the primary way that rail crews try to insure their safety in this environment.

RailCon BuffDaddy

Moderator Comment:

I do no understand the point being made here. This may be because I am on a V E R R Y S L O W conection. But the video does show the crash.The video does not show the Chatsworth Situation. It took me almost hour to receive the video.


----------



## Trogdor

MattW said:


> RailCon BuffDaddy said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Ryan said:
> 
> 
> 
> Do we have the technology to make PTC such that it enforces the signal BEFORE you get to it?
> 
> 
> 
> How about what I said in post #552? - "Obviously, the "magic" sensor could have and SHOULD have been farther back." This might be more economical, and is already the case in some places. I'll bet all you "railroad enthusiasts" even know where. The Amtrak/PTC lobbyists/union busters among you might have to look it up...
> 
> RailCon BuffDaddy
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> How much farther back? Don't forget that a light locomotive move has considerably less stopping distance than a loaded coal train. The only way to have an effective stopping distance is to have a computer dynamically calculate stopping distance based on weight, speed, grade etc. so to stop trains that run red signals for all trains in all conditions is to have the sensor for that very far back. Far enough perhaps that the engineer can no longer see the signal and wouldn't know when to proceed which means you should place the signal back at the sensor which kind of renders the whole point moot. The traditional signaling system has served us well for a hundred years with very few accidents in general, and even fewer that weren't caused by human error (as in the incident at hand, Chatsworth).
> 
> Also, you seem to be changing your tune. Earlier, you were deriding the railroad industry for not caring enough about passengers, yet when people mention PTC which will have huge safety benefits, you deride the PTC supporters.
Click to expand...

RailCon is confusing PTC (which is coming, and currently only exists in a few locations) with standard block signals. Whether his confusion is intentional or just due to his own ignorance...not sure.

Signal blocks are not based on train stopping distance. The "magic sensor" to which he refers is a track circuit, which simply indicates whether or not a train is in a given block. There is no moving track circuits farther back. That's not the point of a track circuit.

PTC will have (and in the cases where it already exists, currently has) all the necessary braking curves figured out, and will enforce restrictions and signals prior to the train getting there. All the computations related to stopping distance will be done on the locomotive and not on the track.

Track circuits will never (and have never been designed to) tell you that a train is about to violate a signal. You simply can't move the "sensor" back, because that would be the same as moving the entire signal block, and that doesn't solve the problem of an engineer not paying attention to the signals in the first place.


----------



## AlanB

RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> Ryan said:
> 
> 
> 
> Do we have the technology to make PTC such that it enforces the signal BEFORE you get to it?
> 
> 
> 
> How about what I said in post #552? - "Obviously, the "magic" sensor could have and SHOULD have been farther back." This might be more economical, and is already the case in some places. I'll bet all you "railroad enthusiasts" even know where. The Amtrak/PTC lobbyists/union busters among you might have to look it up...
> 
> RailCon BuffDaddy
Click to expand...

First, there is nothing magic about the sensor.

Second, it's job is to indicate to the signaling system when the train leaves one block and moves into the next block. Moving it further back only changed the length of the blocks, one gets shorter and one get longer.


----------



## AlanB

RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> MattW said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> RailCon BuffDaddy said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Ryan said:
> 
> 
> 
> Do we have the technology to make PTC such that it enforces the signal BEFORE you get to it?
> 
> 
> 
> How about what I said in post #552? - "Obviously, the "magic" sensor could have and SHOULD have been farther back." This might be more economical, and is already the case in some places. I'll bet all you "railroad enthusiasts" even know where. The Amtrak/PTC lobbyists/union busters among you might have to look it up...
> 
> RailCon BuffDaddy
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> How much farther back? Don't forget that a light locomotive move has considerably less stopping distance than a loaded coal train. The only way to have an effective stopping distance is to have a computer dynamically calculate stopping distance based on weight, speed, grade etc. so to stop trains that run red signals for all trains in all conditions is to have the sensor for that very far back. Far enough perhaps that the engineer can no longer see the signal and wouldn't know when to proceed which means you should place the signal back at the sensor which kind of renders the whole point moot. The traditional signaling system has served us well for a hundred years with very few accidents in general, and even fewer that weren't caused by human error (as in the incident at hand, Chatsworth).
> 
> Also, you seem to be changing your tune. Earlier, you were deriding the railroad industry for not caring enough about passengers, yet when people mention PTC which will have huge safety benefits, you deride the PTC supporters.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> Sensor appears to be right at the signal in THIS video - which unfortunately is also right at the switch, with NO margin for error. Some places have the sensor & signal set back 220 yards, I believe, which makes sense. Headlight signaling makes sense, also - and has been around a long time. I am ALL for greater rail safety, but not necessarily expensive, lengthy pie-in-the-sky schemes which will surely be thwarted by an industry intent on cutting corners at every turn - and won't even admit that cell phones are the primary way that rail crews try to insure their safety in this environment.
> 
> RailCon BuffDaddy
Click to expand...

This could be your most ridiculous statement to date.

Engineers on most RR's are banned from using their cell phones. Therefore it could not be "the primary form of communication between trains". And again, engineers don't trade phone numbers.


----------



## AlanB

RailCon BuffDaddy,

I've politely asked you now three times to answer my question, yet you continue to ignore it and to post ridiculous and often silly information. I believe that I've been more than polite with you, taking my time to try and explain things, and providing answers to your questions. You however seem unwilling to reciprocate.

Therefore this will be my last post to you, and the above post will be the last one approved by the staff. Since you can't answer my question, a reasonable question, this conversation is now over. Sorry! But I gave you three chances.

Goodbye.


----------



## RailCon BuffDaddy

What was your question and why is it significant to this thread, which concerns the Chatsworth Metrolink accident?

RailCon BuffDaddy


----------



## Ryan

RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> and won't even admit that cell phones are the primary way that rail crews try to insure their safety in this environment.


I'm really wildly curious what evidence he has to back this statement up.

Perhaps if he were to answer this question (not that I'm holding my breath), you might let that one slip through, Alan? 

Or RailCon can actually register for an account, but I don't see that happening either.


----------



## jis

RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> Ryan said:
> 
> 
> 
> Do we have the technology to make PTC such that it enforces the signal BEFORE you get to it?
> 
> 
> 
> How about what I said in post #552? - "Obviously, the "magic" sensor could have and SHOULD have been farther back." This might be more economical, and is already the case in some places. I'll bet all you "railroad enthusiasts" even know where. The Amtrak/PTC lobbyists/union busters among you might have to look it up...
Click to expand...

Your ignorance and arrogance are both breathtaking :help:


----------



## AlanB

RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> What was your question and why is it significant to this thread, which concerns the Chatsworth Metrolink accident?
> 
> RailCon BuffDaddy


I'm going to reverse myself and allow for this post to go through. Please don't mistake my generosity, as I won't do this again!

My question is, you're all upset over rail safety and this accident in California with Metrolink. Where is your outrage for the carnage on the highways, the Metrolink crash killed less than 0.1% of the number of people killed on our highways? Why aren't you concerned about that?

As for why it is significant, first, simply because I've been very polite and tolerant with you. It's nice to answer others questions when they've been busy answering yours.

Second, it's relevant because I'm trying to understand why you are so fixated on this one accident and don't seem to care a whit about other forms of transportation that kill many more people than trains kill.


----------



## George Harris

jis said:


> RailCon BuffDaddy said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Ryan said:
> 
> 
> 
> Do we have the technology to make PTC such that it enforces the signal BEFORE you get to it?
> 
> 
> 
> How about what I said in post #552? - "Obviously, the "magic" sensor could have and SHOULD have been farther back." This might be more economical, and is already the case in some places. I'll bet all you "railroad enthusiasts" even know where. The Amtrak/PTC lobbyists/union busters among you might have to look it up...
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> Your ignorance and arrogance are both breathtaking :help:
Click to expand...

The "magic sensor" has no magic to it at all. It is simply the track circuit. I think it would be wasting my fingers to try even the most basic of explanations.

The limit of a track circuit is set by the presence of an insulated joint in the rails, which is usually located at or slightly in advance of a signal. (Yes, I know that there are now coded track circuits that make insulated joints unnecessary except to prevent dirct short circuits in turnouts and a few other place, but I am not signal engineer and really do not know how to explain it. I let the signal guys tell me where they want the IJ's and then tell them they should not be dead opposite each other.

The track circuit did not fall off the turnip truck yesterday. The original form was invented in 18 something or other, I think 1880 something. That is why for many years semaphores were used. These things were first used before light bulbs were common, if not before they were invented. An oil lamp would not be bright enough to be seen it the daytime.

There have been many improvements since, but the basics of having a small electric current in the rails with the wheels completing the circuit to announce the presence of a train has been around for well over 100 years.

I am sure that the next hit will be something to the effect of why we are still using obsolete technology or some such. Announcement: old does not equal obsolete.


----------



## PRR 60

AlanB said:


> RailCon BuffDaddy said:
> 
> 
> 
> What was your question and why is it significant to this thread, which concerns the Chatsworth Metrolink accident?
> 
> RailCon BuffDaddy
> 
> 
> 
> I'm going to reverse myself and allow for this post to go through. Please don't mistake my generosity, as I won't do this again!
> 
> My question is, you're all upset over rail safety and this accident in California with Metrolink. Where is your outrage for the carnage on the highways, the Metrolink crash killed less than 0.1% of the number of people killed on our highways? Why aren't you concerned about that?
> 
> As for why it is significant, first, simply because I've been very polite and tolerant with you. It's nice to answer others questions when they've been busy answering yours.
> 
> Second, it's relevant because I'm trying to understand why you are so fixated on this one accident and don't seem to care a whit about other forms of transportation that kill many more people than trains kill.
Click to expand...

I don't think a debate about rail safety is related in any way to safety of other modes. There is a presumption of safety with rail travel that does nor exist with auto travel. If a rail accident occurs, it is an obligation of all parties to find out why it happened and determine ways to prevent it from happening again. The methods of doing that are certainly issues that can be debated. The Metrolink accident was bad, certainly due to the appalling death toll, but also due to how it happened. For me, it was chilling. The weaknesses in rail safety exposed by the accident have to be fixed, one way or another. The fact that about 100 are killed each day in motor vehicle accidents is irrelevant to the discussion of how to prevent another Metrolink-type accident.


----------



## RailCon BuffDaddy

> I'm going to reverse myself and allow for this post to go through. Please don't mistake my generosity, as I won't do this again!


Am I correct in assuming you will post my response?



> My question is, you're all upset over rail safety and this accident in California with Metrolink. Where is your outrage for the carnage on the highways, the Metrolink crash killed less than 0.1% of the number of people killed on our highways? Why aren't you concerned about that?


Who says I'm not concerned? Is this thread the place to talk about it? Wouldn't you ban it for being irrelevant?



> As for why it is significant, first, simply because I've been very polite and tolerant with you. It's nice to answer others questions when they've been busy answering yours.


Maybe it's only due to the limited number of "volunteer" moderators you have, but my posts seem to be delayed unduly, and, typically, are promptly buried by responses, some overly verbose, some misleading, some insulting, and most curiously, nearly ALL antagonistic to some degree. In my view, the only post which even ATTEMPTED to answer the questions in my original post was #424 by George Harris, to whom I responded in #425. I have no interest in irrelevancies, rabbit holes or ad hominem attacks. I have seen some of my questions asked by others on other forums, and they are often subjected to the same tactics.



> Second, it's relevant because I'm trying to understand why you are so fixated on this one accident and don't seem to care a whit about other forms of transportation that kill many more people than trains kill.


Your conclusion is unwarranted. If a local street signal was malfunctioning or worse, let's say it showed yellow over yellow and everyone had a slightly different understanding of what it meant, I would surely try and find the right people to complain to. If our local police could not communicate with the fire department, I would surely want to know WHY they couldn't use a cell phone. I have tried to provide quotes and references for my posts to the best of my ability and bandwidth. If this forum is indeed what you present it to be, you might admonish the poster who asked me "what are you, a 13-year old?" Even if I were, so what? Is it OK if I were to ask that poster "what are you, an Amtrac/PTC lobbyist/union buster"?

RailCon BuffDaddy


----------



## AlanB

PRR 60 said:


> AlanB said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> RailCon BuffDaddy said:
> 
> 
> 
> What was your question and why is it significant to this thread, which concerns the Chatsworth Metrolink accident?
> 
> RailCon BuffDaddy
> 
> 
> 
> I'm going to reverse myself and allow for this post to go through. Please don't mistake my generosity, as I won't do this again!
> 
> My question is, you're all upset over rail safety and this accident in California with Metrolink. Where is your outrage for the carnage on the highways, the Metrolink crash killed less than 0.1% of the number of people killed on our highways? Why aren't you concerned about that?
> 
> As for why it is significant, first, simply because I've been very polite and tolerant with you. It's nice to answer others questions when they've been busy answering yours.
> 
> Second, it's relevant because I'm trying to understand why you are so fixated on this one accident and don't seem to care a whit about other forms of transportation that kill many more people than trains kill.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> I don't think a debate about rail safety is related in any way to safety of other modes. There is a presumption of safety with rail travel that does nor exist with auto travel. If a rail accident occurs, it is an obligation of all parties to find out why it happened and determine ways to prevent it from happening again. The methods of doing that are certainly issues that can be debated. The Metrolink accident was bad, certainly due to the appalling death toll, but also due to how it happened. For me, it was chilling. The weaknesses in rail safety exposed by the accident have to be fixed, one way or another. The fact that about 100 are killed each day in motor vehicle accidents is irrelevant to the discussion of how to prevent another Metrolink-type accident.
Click to expand...

The problem here is that this is no longer a debate about rail safety; this has become a debate about how rail is terrible and kills lots of people and shouldn't transport nuclear waste, etc. And therefore I'm interested to hear what his views are regarding the carnage on the highways, since he only seems concerned with killing rail because of a couple of accidents. He only seems concerned with reducing speed limits for trains because of a couple of accidents.

And even if one doesn't agree with all of that, it was still a polite and reasonable request from someone who has been more than fair in answering questions from the OP, when many members have already asked me to simply shut things down.


----------



## jis

The issue of accident prevention is one of risk mitigation. Clearly all accidents cannot be prevented. Beyond a certain point the net damage prevented turns out to be worth way less than the effort it takes to get there. A rational discussion should be about what is the right threshold. Unfortunately emotions get in the way of such a determination.

The glaring thing about the Metrolink accident was the realization (again) that people placed in positions of responsibility do not necessarily take their jobs seriously enough. But even in cases where they apparently took their jobs quite seriously and made a wrong decision, do lead to accidents. Witness the AF 447 crash in the Atlantic. So this is potentially a very serious issue to discuss. But unfortunately that is not what has been going on here.


----------



## RailCon BuffDaddy

George Harris said:


> jis said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> RailCon BuffDaddy said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Ryan said:
> 
> 
> 
> Do we have the technology to make PTC such that it enforces the signal BEFORE you get to it?
> 
> 
> 
> How about what I said in post #552? - "Obviously, the "magic" sensor could have and SHOULD have been farther back." This might be more economical, and is already the case in some places. I'll bet all you "railroad enthusiasts" even know where. The Amtrak/PTC lobbyists/union busters among you might have to look it up...
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> Your ignorance and arrogance are both breathtaking :help:
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> The "magic sensor" has no magic to it at all. It is simply the track circuit. I think it would be wasting my fingers to try even the most basic of explanations.
> 
> The limit of a track circuit is set by the presence of an insulated joint in the rails, which is usually located at or slightly in advance of a signal. (Yes, I know that there are now coded track circuits that make insulated joints unnecessary except to prevent dirct short circuits in turnouts and a few other place, but I am not signal engineer and really do not know how to explain it. I let the signal guys tell me where they want the IJ's and then tell them they should not be dead opposite each other.
> 
> The track circuit did not fall off the turnip truck yesterday. The original form was invented in 18 something or other, I think 1880 something. That is why for many years semaphores were used. These things were first used before light bulbs were common, if not before they were invented. An oil lamp would not be bright enough to be seen it the daytime.
> 
> There have been many improvements since, but the basics of having a small electric current in the rails with the wheels completing the circuit to announce the presence of a train has been around for well over 100 years.
> 
> I am sure that the next hit will be something to the effect of why we are still using obsolete technology or some such. Announcement: old does not equal obsolete.
Click to expand...

George - I like your one-line answers better. If you prefer, let's call my "magic sensor" your "track circuit". My point is that they, AND the signal can be st back from the switch - and in some places they are, by 220 yards. This allows a margin of error in that the indication of a track violation comes AHEAD of the actual violation. In the case of Chatsworth and Kismet, there was NO margin of error, with disasters of varying degree the result. My post was in response to the question jis asked about enforcing PTC enforcing the signal before you get to it, btw. Having seen the glossy PTC sales clip, with GPS and satellites and computer banks and who knows what else, I can offer my considered opinion that it will make a fortunate few very wealthy, BUT IT WON'T WORK.


----------



## AlanB

RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> I'm going to reverse myself and allow for this post to go through. Please don't mistake my generosity, as I won't do this again!
> 
> 
> 
> Am I correct in assuming you will post my response?
Click to expand...

I asked the question, and while I think that the response was weak, of course I'm going to let your post go through.



RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> My question is, you're all upset over rail safety and this accident in California with Metrolink. Where is your outrage for the carnage on the highways, the Metrolink crash killed less than 0.1% of the number of people killed on our highways? Why aren't you concerned about that?
> 
> 
> 
> Who says I'm not concerned? Is this thread the place to talk about it? Wouldn't you ban it for being irrelevant?
Click to expand...

No one says that you're not concerned, but you seem to be devoting an unusual amount of time, effort, and energy towards bad mouthing rail for reasons that still remain unclear. No ones ignores mounds of evidence from an impartial agency whose only job is to determine what went wrong without an agenda. So again, I was curious if you devote this much time and effort to getting speed limits lowered on our highways so as to save lives there as you've spent trying to put trains down.



RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> As for why it is significant, first, simply because I've been very polite and tolerant with you. It's nice to answer others questions when they've been busy answering yours.
> 
> 
> 
> Maybe it's only due to the limited number of "volunteer" moderators you have, but my posts seem to be delayed unduly, and, typically, are promptly buried by responses, some overly verbose, some misleading, some insulting, and most curiously, nearly ALL antagonistic to some degree. In my view, the only post which even ATTEMPTED to answer the questions in my original post was #424 by George Harris, to whom I responded in #425. I have no interest in irrelevancies, rabbit holes or ad hominem attacks. I have seen some of my questions asked by others on other forums, and they are often subjected to the same tactics.
Click to expand...

Well again, a few of the staff have already suggested (along with several members) that we cut you off. So much of the burden for approving your posts has fallen to me, and as I've noted more than once, I've been out riding trains from one coast to the other, as well as leading our annual get together for our members in Seattle. That said, you're posts are only sitting perhaps a bit longer than normal. Again, there are only 6 staff members here who aren't on all the time, and 3 of those staffers were at our event.

As for the content of posts, we allow considerable latitude here, especially compared to other forums. In fact, on some forums, you'd have been shut down after your second or third post. And you wouldn't even be allowed to post as a guest, we're one of the few forums that allows that. And when you come here posting wild & unsupported accusations, then pile on top of that a clear lack of understanding of how RR's work, I'm not exactly surprised that some treat you with disdain.



RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> Second, it's relevant because I'm trying to understand why you are so fixated on this one accident and don't seem to care a whit about other forms of transportation that kill many more people than trains kill.
> 
> 
> 
> Your conclusion is unwarranted. If a local street signal was malfunctioning or worse, let's say it showed yellow over yellow and everyone had a slightly different understanding of what it meant, I would surely try and find the right people to complain to. If our local police could not communicate with the fire department, I would surely want to know WHY they couldn't use a cell phone. I have tried to provide quotes and references for my posts to the best of my ability and bandwidth. If this forum is indeed what you present it to be, you might admonish the poster who asked me "what are you, a 13-year old?" Even if I were, so what? Is it OK if I were to ask that poster "what are you, an Amtrac/PTC lobbyist/union buster"?
> 
> RailCon BuffDaddy
Click to expand...

Let's see, to some people a yellow traffic light means accelerate so as to beat the light. To others it means slow down and get ready to stop at the light. Are you complaining about that? Are you trying to educate people about that?

Or if the speed limit is 65 MPH, why do some think that means that they can go 75 MPH or even 80 MPH? Are you doing anything about that?

As for the cell phone bit, train engineers have radios and everyone operating on a segment of track uses the same frequency. So if there is a need to communicate beyond the instructions provided by the signals, engineers can do so, as well as conductors. And of course in an emergency situation, they could use their cell phones to call for emergency assistance, assuming that they actually have a cell phone signal. Which is quite probably one of the biggest reasons that engineers don't use cell phones for communications, since there are still many places in this country were trains operate and do not have cell phone service.

I just rode the Empire Builder between Seattle & Chicago, which runs just south of the Canadian border for much of the run. I only had cell service for about 2/3rds of the time I was on that train. That other 1/3rd of the time I couldn't have made a phone call if my life depended on it. And this, along with other evidence cited earlier is why engineers do NOT use cell phones to communicate with either other trains or the dispatchers. They use their radios, because every RR has repeaters installed along the tracks to ensure radio communications are possible.


----------



## RailCon BuffDaddy

Please review my original list of questions at post #423, which concern rail safety and scapegoating in the Chatsworth accident. I have been trying to keep my responses brief and to the point, and ask others to do likewise.

RailCon BuffDaddy


----------



## AlanB

RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> George Harris said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> jis said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> RailCon BuffDaddy said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Ryan said:
> 
> 
> 
> Do we have the technology to make PTC such that it enforces the signal BEFORE you get to it?
> 
> 
> 
> How about what I said in post #552? - "Obviously, the "magic" sensor could have and SHOULD have been farther back." This might be more economical, and is already the case in some places. I'll bet all you "railroad enthusiasts" even know where. The Amtrak/PTC lobbyists/union busters among you might have to look it up...
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> Your ignorance and arrogance are both breathtaking :help:
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> The "magic sensor" has no magic to it at all. It is simply the track circuit. I think it would be wasting my fingers to try even the most basic of explanations.
> 
> The limit of a track circuit is set by the presence of an insulated joint in the rails, which is usually located at or slightly in advance of a signal. (Yes, I know that there are now coded track circuits that make insulated joints unnecessary except to prevent dirct short circuits in turnouts and a few other place, but I am not signal engineer and really do not know how to explain it. I let the signal guys tell me where they want the IJ's and then tell them they should not be dead opposite each other.
> 
> The track circuit did not fall off the turnip truck yesterday. The original form was invented in 18 something or other, I think 1880 something. That is why for many years semaphores were used. These things were first used before light bulbs were common, if not before they were invented. An oil lamp would not be bright enough to be seen it the daytime.
> 
> There have been many improvements since, but the basics of having a small electric current in the rails with the wheels completing the circuit to announce the presence of a train has been around for well over 100 years.
> 
> I am sure that the next hit will be something to the effect of why we are still using obsolete technology or some such. Announcement: old does not equal obsolete.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> George - I like your one-line answers better. If you prefer, let's call my "magic sensor" your "track circuit". My point is that they, AND the signal can be st back from the switch - and in some places they are, by 220 yards. This allows a margin of error in that the indication of a track violation comes AHEAD of the actual violation. In the case of Chatsworth and Kismet, there was NO margin of error, with disasters of varying degree the result. My post was in response to the question jis asked about enforcing PTC enforcing the signal before you get to it, btw. Having seen the glossy PTC sales clip, with GPS and satellites and computer banks and who knows what else, I can offer my considered opinion that it will make a fortunate few very wealthy, BUT IT WON'T WORK.
Click to expand...

Gee, that's funny seeing as how PTC already works on the Northeast corridor and in Michigan, not to mention in many other countries around the world.

Yet you're so sure it won't work.


----------



## jis

Suffice it to say that PTC does not imply GPS etc. That is one implementation. And also use of GPS does not imply not using track circuit where it already exists. These systems are meant to be overlays on existing systems. The currently working PTC on the NEC is track circuit based and is an overlay on the existing PRR cab signal system. There are PTC equivalent installations elsewhere in the world that are GPS and radio based and they work fine. Incidentally NEC does have a radio link which is used only for non-critical messages. Critical messages are all transmitted via coded track circuit or static transponders.

The assertion that "it won;t work" is just an uninformed opinion, and of course everyone is entitled to at least one


----------



## RailCon BuffDaddy

AlanB said:


> RailCon BuffDaddy said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I'm going to reverse myself and allow for this post to go through. Please don't mistake my generosity, as I won't do this again!
> 
> 
> 
> Am I correct in assuming you will post my response?
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> I asked the question, and while I think that the response was weak, of course I'm going to let your post go through.
> 
> 
> 
> RailCon BuffDaddy said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> My question is, you're all upset over rail safety and this accident in California with Metrolink. Where is your outrage for the carnage on the highways, the Metrolink crash killed less than 0.1% of the number of people killed on our highways? Why aren't you concerned about that?
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> Who says I'm not concerned? Is this thread the place to talk about it? Wouldn't you ban it for being irrelevant?
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> No one says that you're not concerned, but you seem to be devoting an unusual amount of time, effort, and energy towards bad mouthing rail for reasons that still remain unclear. No ones ignores mounds of evidence from an impartial agency whose only job is to determine what went wrong without an agenda. So again, I was curious if you devote this much time and effort to getting speed limits lowered on our highways so as to save lives there as you've spent trying to put trains down.
> 
> 
> 
> RailCon BuffDaddy said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> As for why it is significant, first, simply because I've been very polite and tolerant with you. It's nice to answer others questions when they've been busy answering yours.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> Maybe it's only due to the limited number of "volunteer" moderators you have, but my posts seem to be delayed unduly, and, typically, are promptly buried by responses, some overly verbose, some misleading, some insulting, and most curiously, nearly ALL antagonistic to some degree. In my view, the only post which even ATTEMPTED to answer the questions in my original post was #424 by George Harris, to whom I responded in #425. I have no interest in irrelevancies, rabbit holes or ad hominem attacks. I have seen some of my questions asked by others on other forums, and they are often subjected to the same tactics.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> Well again, a few of the staff have already suggested (along with several members) that we cut you off. So much of the burden for approving your posts has fallen to me, and as I've noted more than once, I've been out riding trains from one coast to the other, as well as leading our annual get together for our members in Seattle. That said, you're posts are only sitting perhaps a bit longer than normal. Again, there are only 6 staff members here who aren't on all the time, and 3 of those staffers were at our event.
> 
> As for the content of posts, we allow considerable latitude here, especially compared to other forums. In fact, on some forums, you'd have been shut down after your second or third post. And you wouldn't even be allowed to post as a guest, we're one of the few forums that allows that. And when you come here posting wild & unsupported accusations, then pile on top of that a clear lack of understanding of how RR's work, I'm not exactly surprised that some treat you with disdain.
> 
> 
> 
> RailCon BuffDaddy said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Second, it's relevant because I'm trying to understand why you are so fixated on this one accident and don't seem to care a whit about other forms of transportation that kill many more people than trains kill.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> Your conclusion is unwarranted. If a local street signal was malfunctioning or worse, let's say it showed yellow over yellow and everyone had a slightly different understanding of what it meant, I would surely try and find the right people to complain to. If our local police could not communicate with the fire department, I would surely want to know WHY they couldn't use a cell phone. I have tried to provide quotes and references for my posts to the best of my ability and bandwidth. If this forum is indeed what you present it to be, you might admonish the poster who asked me "what are you, a 13-year old?" Even if I were, so what? Is it OK if I were to ask that poster "what are you, an Amtrac/PTC lobbyist/union buster"?
> 
> RailCon BuffDaddy
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> Let's see, to some people a yellow traffic light means accelerate so as to beat the light. To others it means slow down and get ready to stop at the light. Are you complaining about that? Are you trying to educate people about that?
> 
> Or if the speed limit is 65 MPH, why do some think that means that they can go 75 MPH or even 80 MPH? Are you doing anything about that?
> 
> As for the cell phone bit, train engineers have radios and everyone operating on a segment of track uses the same frequency. So if there is a need to communicate beyond the instructions provided by the signals, engineers can do so, as well as conductors. And of course in an emergency situation, they could use their cell phones to call for emergency assistance, assuming that they actually have a cell phone signal. Which is quite probably one of the biggest reasons that engineers don't use cell phones for communications, since there are still many places in this country were trains operate and do not have cell phone service.
> 
> I just rode the Empire Builder between Seattle & Chicago, which runs just south of the Canadian border for much of the run. I only had cell service for about 2/3rds of the time I was on that train. That other 1/3rd of the time I couldn't have made a phone call if my life depended on it. And this, along with other evidence cited earlier is why engineers do NOT use cell phones to communicate with either other trains or the dispatchers. They use their radios, because every RR has repeaters installed along the tracks to ensure radio communications are possible.
Click to expand...

If you will indulge me by not demanding I answer every question in every sentence above, let's focus on the Chatsworth accident and the role of cell phones. I don't know who the Leesdale Local freight conductor was texting at 4:20 PM, but I surely believe an "impartial" NTSB investigation would DEMAND Verizon provide that info and INCLUDE it in their report. I want to know WHY the freight had THREE warm bodies in the cab while Metrolink had ONE. I want to know WHY we need PTC when Metrolink dosen't even have front-facing cameras. I want to see the UNEDITED freight camera video from the intermediate signal before CP Topanga onward. I want to know WHY the NTSB cropped the photo of CP Topanga.

I want to know what kind of pressure is exerted on train crews to keep quiet about the daily hazards they confront, and how they try to survive.

RailCon BuffDaddy


----------



## RailCon BuffDaddy

jis said:


> Suffice it to say that PTC does not imply GPS etc. That is one implementation. And also use of GPS does not imply not using track circuit where it already exists. These systems are meant to be overlays on existing systems. The currently working PTC on the NEC is track circuit based and is an overlay on the existing PRR cab signal system. There are PTC equivalent installations elsewhere in the world that are GPS and radio based and they work fine. Incidentally NEC does have a radio link which is used only for non-critical messages. Critical messages are all transmitted via coded track circuit or static transponders.
> 
> The assertion that "it won;t work" is just an uninformed opinion, and of course everyone is entitled to at least one


If "PTC" is really just a marketing gimmick to get money to improve rail safety, I hope it is money spent wisely. I hope the scapegoating of the Metrolink engineer is acknowledged in time to bring comfort to his family. I hope our future is not unmanned 90 mph freights full of nuclear waste sharing one track with unmanned 120 mph commuters, depending on a "Star Wars" conglomeration of highly complex technology given to unpredictable failure...

RailCon BuffDaddy


----------



## George Harris

RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> If you will indulge me . . . . I want to know WHY the NTSB cropped the photo of CP Topanga.


RailCon: This and everything else you have asked has been explained ad nauseum. My elementary school grandchildren have a better understanding of this stuff than you do.

Alan: Count me as having joined the "I've had it" crowd.


----------



## AlanB

RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> If you will indulge me by not demanding I answer every question in every sentence above, let's focus on the Chatsworth accident and the role of cell phones.


Well it would be nice to know that you plan on working to educate people about the real meaning of yellow in a traffic light just as hard as you seem to be going after the RR's here.



RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> I don't know who the Leesdale Local freight conductor was texting at 4:20 PM, but I surely believe an "impartial" NTSB investigation would DEMAND Verizon provide that info and INCLUDE it in their report.


Who cares? It's not relevant to the accident, even if he was texting. And I can't say as I recall that, but again I remind you that I'm still on my way home running through NY State as I write this, so I can't download the entire report.

But, for the record, the conductor isn't operating the locomotive. So his texting would have no impact on things. Second, the freight train did nothing wrong; they were operating according to the rules of the road and signal indication. Finally, there were two other sets of eyes on the road, even if indeed the conductor's eyes were elsewhere.

Conclusion, his texting had nothing to do with the accident.



RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> I want to know WHY the freight had THREE warm bodies in the cab while Metrolink had ONE.


The freight normally would have had two warm bodies in the cab; that would be SOP (Standard Operating Procedure). The third, and this is speculation on my part, could have been there because he was deadheading or because he was doing some sort of inspection/qualifying one of the other crew members on that route or re-certifying one of the crew members to operate on some segment of track that the freight train was running on that day. And there are probably a few other possibilities that I'm not thinking of at the moment. However, it changes nothing!

As for why the Metrolink train only has one, that comes down to cost and some of the public that doesn't wish to subsidize trains, even as they drive their cars on the subsidized roads.



RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> I want to know WHY we need PTC when Metrolink dosen't even have front-facing cameras.


Because PTC would stop a train in this situation and save lives; a forward facing camera would only show why people were killed. I'd rather keep people from being killed than watch their demise.



RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> I want to see the UNEDITED freight camera video from the intermediate signal before CP Topanga onward.


Is there even video from the freight engine? And what proof do you have that it was edited, if indeed it exists? And what proof do you have that something critical was edited out?



RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> I want to know WHY the NTSB cropped the photo of CP Topanga.


Perhaps because it made it fit into the report better and/or perhaps because it is irrelevant and would probably confuse some who don't understand RR's and signals. The photo is simply there to provide a frame of reference to what the signal looks like and where it is located. It's not a photo of the signal aspects at the time of the accident. The photo was taken after testing and after the Metrolink train had run through the signal. So even if the signal had been green, as reported by some, once the train went by that signal it would have turned red. So any subsequent photo would still show two red signals.

Just as an FYI in case you don't know, "aspects" is RR speak for was the signal clear, at danger, or some other condition.



RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> I want to know what kind of pressure is exerted on train crews to keep quiet about the daily hazards they confront, and how they try to survive.


While there may be some pressure, the Whistle Blower rules allow for any employee to report things anonymously. And these days the engines all carry black boxes and such that can't be tampered with. This in stark contrast to trucks where pressure commonly leads to falsified paper records.


----------



## jis

RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> jis said:
> 
> 
> 
> Suffice it to say that PTC does not imply GPS etc. That is one implementation. And also use of GPS does not imply not using track circuit where it already exists. These systems are meant to be overlays on existing systems. The currently working PTC on the NEC is track circuit based and is an overlay on the existing PRR cab signal system. There are PTC equivalent installations elsewhere in the world that are GPS and radio based and they work fine. Incidentally NEC does have a radio link which is used only for non-critical messages. Critical messages are all transmitted via coded track circuit or static transponders.
> 
> The assertion that "it won't work" is just an uninformed opinion, and of course everyone is entitled to at least one
> 
> 
> 
> If "PTC" is really just a marketing gimmick to get money to improve rail safety, I hope it is money spent wisely.
Click to expand...

PTC is not marketing gimmick. It actually works, whether you like to believe it or not.



> I hope the scapegoating of the Metrolink engineer is acknowledged in time to bring comfort to his family.


As I said everyone is entitled to an opinion. But its connection to reality is not necessarily always established. 



> I hope our future is not unmanned 90 mph freights full of nuclear waste sharing one track with unmanned 120 mph commuters, depending on a "Star Wars" conglomeration of highly complex technology given to unpredictable failure...


No one is planning 90mph freights unmanned or otherwise. As for commuters, already 125 mph ones and 110mph ones already exist and do share tracks with freight and have so far a perfect safety record on the higher speed tracks. They have less than perfect safety record only on lower speed tracks that are not equipped with PTC. And none of them are unmanned. Only those toy airport people movers are unmanned, which travel so slowly that they'd hardly get a dent if they crashed. 

So let's please get off the hyperbole shall we? As a matter of fact most of the new PTC being installed won't even be capable of dealing with 90 mph trains in the first place, notwithstanding all the drooling that is going on among passenger railfans. Only purpose built PTC for higher speed operations, which BTW costs much more, will be capable of such, like ACSES on the NEC.


----------



## Trogdor

Since RailCon, for whatever reason, seems fixated (among other things) on the "multiple interpretations" (where? Who on the railroad...not on this list...but on the actual railroad operating actual trains has conflicting interpretations of what Yellow over Yellow meant to the freight train as it approached CP Topanga?), perhaps this will be useful.

Directly from the special instructions of the Metrolink Timetable.

Aspect: Yellow over yellow (or yellow over yellow over red, depending on the signal)

Name: Approach Diverging

Indication: Proceed prepared to advance on diverging route at next signal not exceeding prescribed speed through turnout(s).

That is absolutely the only valid interpretation of the yellow over yellow signal on Metrolink rail (out east, yellow over yellow has a different meaning, but that would not apply here). There is no debate over this fact. No engineer can be qualified on the territory without learning every signal which may apply to his/her train on that territory. Further, no engineer can be qualified on the territory without knowing the speeds at every location, including turnout speeds.

Therefore, if the engineer of a UP freight train heading east toward CP Topanga sees Yellow over Yellow at the advance signal, he knows that he will be taking the diverging route into the siding at the next signal, and he knows what speed he will need to operate his train when he reaches CP Topanga.

This is not subject to debate or individual interpretation.


----------



## RailCon BuffDaddy

> (out east, yellow over yellow has a different meaning, but that would not apply here).


I find this fascinating, amazing and scary. From posts I've read elsewhere, the meaning might change as a result of a merger as well. And sometimes engineers relocate, I suppose. I, for one, am really, really happy with street signal uniformity among states. And I'm speculating now, but I'll bet rail crews would vote for that, too, if there were no reprisals (regardless of any qualification procedure).

Perhaps you could tell me when, if and how these signals would tell the freight crew that a Metrolink was on one of the tracks past the switch at CP Topanga. Did yellow over yellow mean that Metrolink was on the main track? What colors would the same signal show if Metrolink was on the siding?

RailCon BuffDaddy


----------



## AlanB

RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> (out east, yellow over yellow has a different meaning, but that would not apply here).
> 
> 
> 
> I find this fascinating, amazing and scary. From posts I've read elsewhere, the meaning might change as a result of a merger as well. And sometimes engineers relocate, I suppose. I, for one, am really, really happy with street signal uniformity among states. And I'm speculating now, but I'll bet rail crews would vote for that, too, if there were no reprisals (regardless of any qualification procedure).
Click to expand...

Qualifying doesn't mean taking a simple test. It means making multiple runs over the trackage you're trying to qualify on with another qualified engineer or a supervisor. When you know every signal, grade crossing, curve, speed limit change, etc. a supervisor then rides with you and you must prove yourself to that supervisor before you are considered qualified to operate a train without supervision.

So someone moving across country and transferring jobs, doesn't just pack up, move, and start work the very next day as a qualified engineer on that new trackage.



RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> Perhaps you could tell me when, if and how these signals would tell the freight crew that a Metrolink was on one of the tracks past the switch at CP Topanga. Did yellow over yellow mean that Metrolink was on the main track? What colors would the same signal show if Metrolink was on the siding?
> RailCon BuffDaddy


I'm not an expert on this, but that yellow over yellow told the freight crew that they would be changing tracks to the siding. And that was all the information that they needed to have. Yes, they probably could have guessed that a Metrolink train was on the main track waiting for them, and certainly they could have assumed that they were changing tracks because some train was in the way. But again, they don't need to know what train is there. They only need to know that they have to slow down and take the siding.

Not sure about your second question.


----------



## Trogdor

RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> (out east, yellow over yellow has a different meaning, but that would not apply here).
> 
> 
> 
> I find this fascinating, amazing and scary. From posts I've read elsewhere, the meaning might change as a result of a merger as well. And sometimes engineers relocate, I suppose. I, for one, am really, really happy with street signal uniformity among states. And I'm speculating now, but I'll bet rail crews would vote for that, too, if there were no reprisals (regardless of any qualification procedure).
Click to expand...

Regardless of your opinion, it's part of being qualified on the territory. It was also completely irrelevant to the accident in this discussion.



> Perhaps you could tell me when, if and how these signals would tell the freight crew that a Metrolink was on one of the tracks past the switch at CP Topanga. Did yellow over yellow mean that Metrolink was on the main track? What colors would the same signal show if Metrolink was on the siding?
> RailCon BuffDaddy


I've already mentioned on this thread, signals do not tell you what other trains are doing. They tell you what your train is supposed to do. Why is this so difficult to understand?

The only thing the freight train crew should be concerned with is that they pass CP Topanga at the prescribed speed for the turnout, meaning that the switch is lined for them to take the diverging route. It doesn't matter one bit what the reason for that is. There could be a train on the other track, the track could be out of service for maintenance, there could be some other issue making routing on the main track unfeasible, or the dispatcher could just route them that way for the hell of it (not likely, but still in the universe of possibilities). Whether or not a train is on the main doesn't matter, because the freight train isn't going that way.


----------



## RailCon BuffDaddy

> I'm not an expert on this, but that yellow over yellow told the freight crew that they would be changing tracks to the siding. And that was all the information that they needed to have. Yes, they probably could have guessed that a Metrolink train was on the main track waiting for them, and certainly they could have assumed that they were changing tracks because some train was in the way. But again, they don't need to know what train is there. They only need to know that they have to slow down and take the siding.
> Not sure about your second question.


Faith-based railroading? - concern and fear level rising... rising...

RailCon BuffDaddy


----------



## AlanB

RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> I'm not an expert on this, but that yellow over yellow told the freight crew that they would be changing tracks to the siding. And that was all the information that they needed to have. Yes, they probably could have guessed that a Metrolink train was on the main track waiting for them, and certainly they could have assumed that they were changing tracks because some train was in the way. But again, they don't need to know what train is there. They only need to know that they have to slow down and take the siding.
> Not sure about your second question.
> 
> 
> 
> Faith-based railroading? - concern and fear level rising... rising...
> 
> RailCon BuffDaddy
Click to expand...

Gee, just like driving. You have to have faith that the other driver is going to stop at that red light or that stop sign. You have to have faith that the other driver will signal and not cut you off.

And once again, we kill many more people driving that ever die in train wrecks, so if I have to depend on faith, I'm going to depend on the railroad. They have a far, far better record than do drivers! In fact, I'm far less concerned and far less worried sitting here on the Lake Shore Limited going home to NY than I will be tomorrow when I get in my car to go visit a client.

Your faith is misplaced! Sorry!


----------



## jis

RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> I'm not an expert on this, but that yellow over yellow told the freight crew that they would be changing tracks to the siding. And that was all the information that they needed to have. Yes, they probably could have guessed that a Metrolink train was on the main track waiting for them, and certainly they could have assumed that they were changing tracks because some train was in the way. But again, they don't need to know what train is there. They only need to know that they have to slow down and take the siding.
> Not sure about your second question.
> 
> 
> 
> Faith-based railroading? - concern and fear level rising... rising...
Click to expand...

I think you should consider locking yourself in your room and never leaving it, since if you do you will need to rely on others around you behaving rationally and according to rules.  Now one couldn't possibly depend on others to do anything right, can one?


----------



## MattW

Why is it faith-based? Faith that the other train won't run its signals just like driving as Alan said? Or faith that there isn't another train on the track you're being routed into? If the latter, then the very design of the signaling system won't give you a favorable signal if there's a train blocking your path.


----------



## jis

MattW said:


> Why is it faith-based? Faith that the other train won't run its signals just like driving as Alan said? Or faith that there isn't another train on the track you're being routed into? If the latter, then the very design of the signaling system won't give you a favorable signal if there's a train blocking your path.


The faith involved here is that an engineer will not run a red signal. That appears to be a fundamental assumption behind the design of non positive train control systems. Now if it is inconvenient to deal with that assumption because you absolutely positively want to exonerate an engineer who clearly took actions to toss that assumption out the window then you do have to invoke, faith, pixie-dust and whatever else pleases you to make a case.


----------



## GG-1

Aloha

Not being considered, that MetroLink train met that freight train in the Chatsworth Station 5 days per week. The Engineer on the MetroLink train that fatal day met the freight train 4 days a week, so why did he leave the station in the first place, without serious question. His signal should not have shown clear, the Conductor should not have given a clear to proceed.


----------



## jis

GG-1 said:


> Aloha
> 
> Not being considered, that MetroLink train met that freight train in the Chatsworth Station 5 days per week. The Engineer on the MetroLink train that fatal day met the freight train 4 days a week, so why did he leave the station in the first place, without serious question. His signal should not have shown clear, the Conductor should not have given a clear to proceed.


Conductors do not give unconditional clear to proceed. What they are supposed to say is something like "OK to proceed on signal indication". It is upto the engineer to ensure that signal indication allows him/her to proceed past the signal. The signal is not at the station but a little ways down the track, though visible from many parts of the station. This condition allowed the engineer to legitimately pull out of the station and proceed at restricted speed upto the signal since he did not have a clear. Effectively it was a DIB situation if the signal were not visible at all. Since it was visible and red, it was the engineer's choice to either sit at the station or move upto the signal and stop. So there is no fault of the conductor involved AFAICT.


----------



## GG-1

jis said:


> GG-1 said:
> 
> 
> 
> Aloha
> 
> Not being considered, that MetroLink train met that freight train in the Chatsworth Station 5 days per week. The Engineer on the MetroLink train that fatal day met the freight train 4 days a week, so why did he leave the station in the first place, without serious question. His signal should not have shown clear, the Conductor should not have given a clear to proceed.
> 
> 
> 
> Conductors do not give unconditional clear to proceed. What they are supposed to say is something like "OK to proceed on signal indication". It is upto the engineer to ensure that signal indication allows him/her to proceed past the signal. The signal is not at the station but a little ways down the track, though visible from many parts of the station. This condition allowed the engineer to legitimately pull out of the station and proceed at restricted speed upto the signal since he did not have a clear. Effectively it was a DIB situation if the signal were not visible at all. Since it was visible and red, it was the engineer's choice to either sit at the station or move upto the signal and stop. So there is no fault of the conductor involved AFAICT.
Click to expand...

Aloha

I did not intend to suggest the Conductor was at fault, but rather reinforce the fact that the meet was so standard that all involved should have expected the meet in the station and therefor question why it was not happening before proceeding.

A few years ago on the Sunset Limited on the way to LAX the engineer radioed the Conductor that he saw something strange on the track ahead (we were in a station) The Conductor, outside my room, gave permission for the engineer to walk forward to inspect the switch in question. What the engineer found was both points touching the rails. Wee waited a little over 2 hours for a crew to fix the switch.

It is normal to question anything that is contrary to expected events, So Why didn't the engineer do so. By the way, not the final report, did say the signal at the switch was green, for the MetroLink train to proceed


----------



## Trogdor

GG-1 said:


> It is normal to question anything that is contrary to expected events, So Why didn't the engineer do so.


I think it's quite evident based on all indications that the engineer was flat-out not paying attention.



> By the way, not the final report, did say the signal at the switch was green, for the MetroLink train to proceed


I can't quite figure out what this means.


----------



## GG-1

Trogdor said:


> GG-1 said:
> 
> 
> 
> It is normal to question anything that is contrary to expected events, So Why didn't the engineer do so.
> 
> 
> 
> I think it's quite evident based on all indications that the engineer was flat-out not paying attention.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> By the way, not the final report, did say the signal at the switch was green, for the MetroLink train to proceed
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> I can't quite figure out what this means.
Click to expand...

An early report I read said that the signal located at the switch was showing green to leave the Chatsworth station and proceed. If in fact the signal was green then why did the switch get damaged. This same report said several people had seen the signal as green, it was visible from the station platform.


----------



## AlanB

GG-1 said:


> jis said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> GG-1 said:
> 
> 
> 
> Aloha
> 
> Not being considered, that MetroLink train met that freight train in the Chatsworth Station 5 days per week. The Engineer on the MetroLink train that fatal day met the freight train 4 days a week, so why did he leave the station in the first place, without serious question. His signal should not have shown clear, the Conductor should not have given a clear to proceed.
> 
> 
> 
> Conductors do not give unconditional clear to proceed. What they are supposed to say is something like "OK to proceed on signal indication". It is upto the engineer to ensure that signal indication allows him/her to proceed past the signal. The signal is not at the station but a little ways down the track, though visible from many parts of the station. This condition allowed the engineer to legitimately pull out of the station and proceed at restricted speed upto the signal since he did not have a clear. Effectively it was a DIB situation if the signal were not visible at all. Since it was visible and red, it was the engineer's choice to either sit at the station or move upto the signal and stop. So there is no fault of the conductor involved AFAICT.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> Aloha
> 
> I did not intend to suggest the Conductor was at fault, but rather reinforce the fact that the meet was so standard that all involved should have expected the meet in the station and therefor question why it was not happening before proceeding.
> 
> A few years ago on the Sunset Limited on the way to LAX the engineer radioed the Conductor that he saw something strange on the track ahead (we were in a station) The Conductor, outside my room, gave permission for the engineer to walk forward to inspect the switch in question. What the engineer found was both points touching the rails. Wee waited a little over 2 hours for a crew to fix the switch.
> 
> It is normal to question anything that is contrary to expected events, So Why didn't the engineer do so. By the way, not the final report, did say the signal at the switch was green, for the MetroLink train to proceed
Click to expand...

First, it should never be assumed that anything is "normal" with trains. Trains can arrive at unexpected times, anytime.

Second, I seem to recall from what I did read way back when, that normal for these two trains was that the freight was usually already in the siding waiting for the Metrolink train to make its stop so that the freight could proceed further south. On this fateful day, things weren't normal, the freight train wasn't in the siding, it was still out on the main and heading for the siding.

Which is why the Metrolink was supposed to stop & wait and why the switch was set against the Metrolink train.


----------



## RailCon BuffDaddy

GG-1 said:


> Aloha
> 
> Not being considered, that MetroLink train met that freight train in the Chatsworth Station 5 days per week. The Engineer on the MetroLink train that fatal day met the freight train 4 days a week, so why did he leave the station in the first place, without serious question. His signal should not have shown clear, the Conductor should not have given a clear to proceed.


Aloha GG-1,

The Metrolink conductor testified that his signal was GREEN, and his words to the engineer were "Highball on the green!" One of the main problems I have is that everyone here, except you and I, wants to promote the idea that NO safety protocol was even in place, and thus totally vulnerable to a momentary lapse in attention BY A SINGLE INDIVIDUAL. Please read my post #423 if you haven't already - I would appreciate your comments.

RailCon BuffDaddy


----------



## jis

The Brits would call this a case of "Ding ding and we are off" accident, a very common source of so called SPAD (Signal Passed At Danger) accidents in the UK - driver hears the ding ding from the conductor, and immediately charges off without looking at the signal he is facing. Even if the Conductor orders the train to go past a red signal without having the appropriate paperwork in hand, that is not something that should be carried out without appropriate clearance and paperwork should the protocol require that. If the conductor calls a red signal green, that does not excuse the engineer's following that.

I am wondering if it was this accident that caused the standard language used by conductors to include the phrase "upon signal indication" rather than naming a specific signal indication.


----------



## George Harris

jis said:


> MattW said:
> 
> 
> 
> Why is it faith-based? Faith that the other train won't run its signals just like driving as Alan said? Or faith that there isn't another train on the track you're being routed into? If the latter, then the very design of the signaling system won't give you a favorable signal if there's a train blocking your path.
> 
> 
> 
> The faith involved here is that an engineer will not run a red signal. That appears to be a fundamental assumption behind the design of non positive train control systems. Now if it is inconvenient to deal with that assumption because you absolutely positively want to exonerate an engineer who clearly took actions to toss that assumption out the window then you do have to invoke, faith, pixie-dust and whatever else pleases you to make a case.
Click to expand...

For many years in this country railroads operated on the faith that a train would not go beyond the limits of his authority on non-signaled tracks. YTes, this includes passenger trains. yes, there are passenger trains that operate soelly by manual block with no signals whatsoever today in the USA. Yes, I have ridden trains on lines that I know to have train movements controled by manual block or written orders and done it with complete peace of mind. The engineer is supposed to be a professional and do what is right and correct in his operation of the train, whether he is being watched or not.

By the way, for much of the steam era and the days of 5 man train crews, there was functionally only one man it the cab responsible for the safe movement of the train, the Engineer. The fireman was exactly that, the man tending the fire. The head brakeman was watching the train behind the engine, not the track ahead. The other two men were in the caboose, which could be anywhere between a few hundred feet and a full mile away. There were no radios. Communication between the ends fo the train were very limited. In fact, during the early days of dieseldom, there was only one man in the cab. Without a fire, no fireman. That changed as diesels displaced steam more widely and the operating unions succeeded in getting firemen restored as a job protection matter.


----------



## RailCon BuffDaddy

> In fact, during the early days of dieseldom, there was only one man in the cab. Without a fire, no fireman. That changed as diesels displaced steam more widely and the operating unions succeeded in getting firemen restored as a job protection matter.


The Leesdale Local freight had THREE warm bodies in the cab but the Metrolink had ONE - are you claiming this is due to union featherbedding? Or perhaps does it more accurately reflect the relative worth that UPRR places on its cargo vs Metrolink on its passengers?

RailCon BuffDaddy


----------



## MattW

Metrolink has passenger cars for the conductor to go to (and perform certain duties). The Leesdale Local had...boxcars? Now I'm not a conductor, but if I were, I'd rather ride the cab of a locomotive than a boxcar...unless said boxcar was going 150mph down rough track :lol: :lol:


----------



## Ryan

RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> In fact, during the early days of dieseldom, there was only one man in the cab. Without a fire, no fireman. That changed as diesels displaced steam more widely and the operating unions succeeded in getting firemen restored as a job protection matter.
> 
> 
> 
> The Leesdale Local freight had THREE warm bodies in the cab but the Metrolink had ONE - are you claiming this is due to union featherbedding? Or perhaps does it more accurately reflect the relative worth that UPRR places on its cargo vs Metrolink on its passengers?
> 
> RailCon BuffDaddy
Click to expand...

You know, it's posts like these that have earned you the "hostile" reception that you've faced. The reasons for having the number of people in the cab of freight and passenger trains has been explained to you MANY times, and it has absolutely NOTHING to do with "the relative worth that UPRR places on its cargo vs Metrolink on its passengers". Yet you keep on throwing these tin foil hat theories with absolutely no evidence to back them up. Have you given up on the "cell phones are the primary method of communication between engineers one yet, or are you still going to cling to that one in the face of overwhelming evidence?

Yes, inattention by one person in the cab of a passenger train can cause accidents. PTC will make it much more difficult (but not impossible) for the inattentiveness of one person to cause an accident, yet you rail against it (no pun intended). Inattention by one person can (and does with great frequency) also kill people on the roads, in the skies, and all around us in this big scary world.


----------



## jis

Ryan said:


> Yes, inattention by one person in the cab of a passenger train can cause accidents. PTC will make it much more difficult (but not impossible) for the inattentiveness of one person to cause an accident, yet you rail against it (no pun intended). Inattention by one person can (and does with great frequency) also kill people on the roads, in the skies, and all around us in this big scary world.


There is also plenty of evidence that inattention by two or more people in the cab can cause accidents. So this whole thing about one or two or three in the cab is just a huge red herring that only distracts from discussing the real issues of ease of use of protocols and failure safety of such, which will actually reduce the chances of accidents occurring.


----------



## RailCon BuffDaddy

> You know, it's posts like these that have earned you the "hostile" reception that you've faced.


(sigh)... If only there were some way to separate the REAL engineers from the "honorary" ones here. I would really like to know what THEY think. GG-1, are you out there somewhere?

RailCon BuffDaddy


----------



## AlanB

RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> You know, it's posts like these that have earned you the "hostile" reception that you've faced.
> 
> 
> 
> (sigh)... If only there were some way to separate the REAL engineers from the "honorary" ones here. I would really like to know what THEY think. GG-1, are you out there somewhere?
> 
> RailCon BuffDaddy
Click to expand...

To my knowledge, there are only two people who are members of this forum who have every operated a train, be it freight or passenger, in real life. GG-1 is not one of them however.


----------



## AlanB

And here's a quote from a recent story that puts the "train crews communicate by cell phones" theory to bed.



> The California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) has adopted a “first-of-its-kind” regulation that bans transit-rail system operators from using personal electronic devices, such as cell phones, commission officials said in a prepared statement.


More can be found here.


----------



## Ryan

jis said:


> Ryan said:
> 
> 
> 
> Yes, inattention by one person in the cab of a passenger train can cause accidents. PTC will make it much more difficult (but not impossible) for the inattentiveness of one person to cause an accident, yet you rail against it (no pun intended). Inattention by one person can (and does with great frequency) also kill people on the roads, in the skies, and all around us in this big scary world.
> 
> 
> 
> There is also plenty of evidence that inattention by two or more people in the cab can cause accidents. So this whole thing about one or two or three in the cab is just a huge red herring that only distracts from discussing the real issues of ease of use of protocols and failure safety of such, which will actually reduce the chances of accidents occurring.
Click to expand...

Exactly - I was going to go there, but was running late for work this morning. The video of the BNSF collision that RailCon posted is a prime example of that.



RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> You know, it's posts like these that have earned you the "hostile" reception that you've faced.
> 
> 
> 
> (sigh)... If only there were some way to separate the REAL engineers from the "honorary" ones here. I would really like to know what THEY think. GG-1, are you out there somewhere?
> 
> RailCon BuffDaddy
Click to expand...

*sigh* If only you could get through your thick skull that it doesn't take an expert to comprehend the simple concepts that we're presenting. Seriously, this isn't rocket science (and I am a rocket scientist!).


----------



## RailCon BuffDaddy

> To my knowledge, there are only two people who are members of this forum who have every operated a train, be it freight or passenger, in real life. GG-1 is not one of them however.


Dare I ask, then, the basis for the condescension and derision my posts seem to create? I have cited at least two railroad professionals in support of my posts.

RailCon BuffDaddy


----------



## Trogdor

RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> To my knowledge, there are only two people who are members of this forum who have every operated a train, be it freight or passenger, in real life. GG-1 is not one of them however.
> 
> 
> 
> Dare I ask, then, the basis for the condescension and derision my posts seem to create? I have cited at least two railroad professionals in support of my posts.
> 
> RailCon BuffDaddy
Click to expand...

Because there are numerous others here who work in railroads, though not specifically operating a locomotive.


----------



## Ryan

Trogdor said:


> RailCon BuffDaddy said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> To my knowledge, there are only two people who are members of this forum who have every operated a train, be it freight or passenger, in real life. GG-1 is not one of them however.
> 
> 
> 
> Dare I ask, then, the basis for the condescension and derision my posts seem to create? I have cited at least two railroad professionals in support of my posts.
> 
> RailCon BuffDaddy
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> Because there are numerous others here who work in railroads, though not specifically operating a locomotive.
Click to expand...

And it's readily apparent that even those of us that don't work in the industry have a far more complete knowledge of how things work than you do.


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## AlanB

RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> To my knowledge, there are only two people who are members of this forum who have every operated a train, be it freight or passenger, in real life. GG-1 is not one of them however.
> 
> 
> 
> Dare I ask, then, the basis for the condescension and derision my posts seem to create? I have cited at least two railroad professionals in support of my posts.
> 
> RailCon BuffDaddy
Click to expand...

I hope that you'll take this in the way intended and not as a direct attack upon you:

But part of the problem is your fantastic claims on things and your clear lack of understanding on how things operate on a RR. Just because most people here aren't engineers, or even RR employees, does not mean that they all don't know what they're talking about. Yes, some rail fans tend to have fancy ideas that don't meet with reality, but many of the people responding to you have done their homework. They do know what they are talking about; many of them, including me, have hundreds of thousands of miles on Amtrak & other passenger trains.

As for your cites of RR professionals, first, it is your claim that you've spoken to these people. We can't verify that, and since you seem to be determined to bash rail, naturally those claims are going to be met with considerable doubt.

And in the case of talking to a conductor about crossing a switch set against him, again I can assure you that he's either talking out of his hat or felt that he was somehow easing your mind by lying to you. I've been on a train that's gone across a spring switch many times, and it feels no different than a regular switch. The only difference between a spring switch and the switch run through at CP Topenga, is that the CP Topenga switch didn't spring back into position after the run through. It was permanently bent and needed replacing.

But it would have felt no different to the conductor than any other switch around. The engine did the bending, and even there it's unlikely that the engineer would have felt it (think of a car crushing a soda can, you wouldn't notice that either), but in the coaches no one including the conductor would have noticed anything. Once the switch was bent into the new position by the engine, it acted just like any switch that was correctly positioned for normal movement through that switch. Put another way, the engine bent the switch into the correct position, and therefore to those in coach, it felt normal.


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## jis

RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> To my knowledge, there are only two people who are members of this forum who have every operated a train, be it freight or passenger, in real life. GG-1 is not one of them however.
> 
> 
> 
> Dare I ask, then, the basis for the condescension and derision my posts seem to create? I have cited at least two railroad professionals in support of my posts.
Click to expand...

Engineers of the train driving kind (as well as Conductors) are just the users of the control system signals, track circuits, magic detectors, PTC etc.). They don't necessarily know how they work, they know the procedures to follow when they receive indications from the system. In course of this thread issues were raised about whether PTC works or not and how track circuits work etc., and some absolutely unfounded wild claims were made by some. No Engineer of the train driving kind or similar professionals, could explain e.g. under what circumstances PTC would work or fail. That requires an Engineer of a different kind, ones who develop, debug, deploy and maintain control systems - CS&S guys in the railroad. And there are a few of us here who are Engineers of the latter kind too, not necessarily on railroads but quite familiar with the technology. So if you are going to dump on others in areas that you apparently, as evidenced by statements made here, know very little about, citing professionals who also are not experts in that area, you should not be surprised if you are dumped right back upon in kind.  Be considerate of others and you'll receive likewise.


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## DET63

RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> Now that I think about it again, it was the freight train that had just come out of the tunnel and was halfway through the curve when to the crews surprise there was a Metrolink train where it shouldn't have been, right in front of them.
> 
> 
> 
> Maybe you'd like to answer this question, from my original post -
> 
> WHY WAS THE SPEED LIMIT 40 MPH FOR TRAINS EXITING A TUNNEL WITH A METROLINK STATION LOCATED JUST AROUND A BLIND CORNER? (Over 40 years ago, from the top of Stony Point, I watched in horror as two juvenile delinquents dragged a cross-tie over the tracks just in front of a freight train exiting the same tunnel - it made a huge noise, but fortunately did not derail the train, which was moving slowly enough to stop within the track curve.)
> 
> RailCon BuffDaddy
Click to expand...

Others have responded to this question, but let me help out our friend RailCon BuffDaddy:

Trains cannot stop on a dime. Large freight trains may take a mile or more to stop, even when operating at moderate speeds. Usually, you cannot see that far down a track. Therefore, signals are used to inform train engineers (or operators, especially on some subway and light-rail systems) whether or not another train is occupying track that may be (and probably is) out of view. As for hooligans vandalizing a track, there is little that can be done to anticipate that. If trains went slow enough to stop in time for any potential hazard that would not be detected by a signal, they would only be going about 5-10 mph in many places. That, for obvious reasons, would simply not be practical.


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## RailCon BuffDaddy

> Trains cannot stop on a dime. Large freight trains may take a mile or more to stop, even when operating at moderate speeds. Usually, you cannot see that far down a track. Therefore, signals are used to inform train engineers (or operators, especially on some subway and light-rail systems) whether or not another train is occupying track that may be (and probably is) out of view. As for hooligans vandalizing a track, there is little that can be done to anticipate that. If trains went slow enough to stop in time for any potential hazard that would not be detected by a signal, they would only be going about 5-10 mph in many places. That, for obvious reasons, would simply not be practical.


You might want to review Trogdor's posts #590 & 593, Alanb's #592, and jis' #600. Therein, the claim is that engineers don't even NEED to know about another train occupying the track, they only need to do what the signals tell them - and a yellow over yellow signal out here apparently doesn't even tell them WHAT the "prescribed speed" is. Further, jis states that the Metrolink was cleared to leave the Chatsworth station and proceed at "restricted speed", whatever that is, to the signal at CP Topanga. However, the Metrolink was traveling at 42 mph (the posted speed limit on that track section) at impact - this means that the Metrolink engineer did not merely ignore a red signal, HE SAW A GREEN SIGNAL, AND SO DID THE CONDUCTOR (or else there was NO callout safety protocol even in effect). And let's not forget that the freight had THREE warm bodies in the cab to read signals and watch the tracks, but the Metrolink had ONE. And all the Amtrak hacks here want us to think train travel is safe, instead of compromised daily for cheaper freight service. And PTC would not have even prevented the Chatsworth disaster - but putting the track signal and sensor further away from the switch WOULD have. Umm, unless the signal was really green, that is...

RailCon BuffDaddy


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## RailCon BuffDaddy

If you clowns are going to try and use me for a punching bag, at least have the guts to post my last response.

RailCon BuffDaddy


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## AlanB

RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> Trains cannot stop on a dime. Large freight trains may take a mile or more to stop, even when operating at moderate speeds. Usually, you cannot see that far down a track. Therefore, signals are used to inform train engineers (or operators, especially on some subway and light-rail systems) whether or not another train is occupying track that may be (and probably is) out of view. As for hooligans vandalizing a track, there is little that can be done to anticipate that. If trains went slow enough to stop in time for any potential hazard that would not be detected by a signal, they would only be going about 5-10 mph in many places. That, for obvious reasons, would simply not be practical.
> 
> 
> 
> You might want to review Trogdor's posts #590 & 593, Alanb's #592, and jis' #600. Therein, the claim is that engineers don't even NEED to know about another train occupying the track, they only need to do what the signals tell them -
Click to expand...

Well an engineer can generally assume that the other track is occupied by a train, but yes they don't actually need to know that or what train it is.



RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> and a yellow over yellow signal out here apparently doesn't even tell them WHAT the "prescribed speed" is.


*False!*

I can't tell you what speed is indicated by yellow over yellow, but it is indicated in the rule book and the engineer is required to know what speed is indicated by that signal aspect.



RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> Further, jis states that the Metrolink was cleared to leave the Chatsworth station and proceed at "restricted speed", whatever that is, to the signal at CP Topanga. However, the Metrolink was traveling at 42 mph (the posted speed limit on that track section) at impact - this means that the Metrolink engineer did not merely ignore a red signal, HE SAW A GREEN SIGNAL, AND SO DID THE CONDUCTOR (or else there was NO callout safety protocol even in effect).


You've reached two *false* conclusions here. The first being that the conductor saw any signal, much less a green one. The conductor cannot see a signal from inside the train.

And there is zero evidence at hand that proves that the engineer saw a green signal. There was some evidence that it is possible that he saw a green signal, but the NTSB discounted that evidence.



RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> And let's not forget that the freight had THREE warm bodies in the cab to read signals and watch the tracks, but the Metrolink had ONE.


A useless point that you keep repeating over and over! Maybe we should start putting 3 drivers into every car in the hope that people will stop running red lights on the roads.



RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> And all the Amtrak hacks here want us to think train travel is safe, instead of compromised daily for cheaper freight service.


And you seem to want us all to believe that train travel is the deadliest form of transportation around, when I've already shown that you are far more likely to be killed driving your car. Yet you wish to keep hiding from that fact and harping on one small accident for what ever twisted reasons you have. GET OVER IT!

If you want to protect people's lives, do something useful and fight for better roads, safer cars, and better enforcement of the rules of the road.



RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> And PTC would not have even prevented the Chatsworth disaster -


*False!*

It has been proven more than adequately that PTC would indeed have prevented this accident, so you need to stop repeating this lie.



RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> but putting the track signal and sensor further away from the switch WOULD have. Umm, unless the signal was really green, that is...


No it wouldn't have prevented the tragedy! If indeed the engineer was distracted by texting, he still would have run the train right past the signal and into the path of the freight train. The location of the signal would not have changed anything. It's your complete failure to understand anything about how RR's work that permits you to believe that moving the signal would have changed things.


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## AlanB

RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> If you clowns are going to try and use me for a punching bag, at least have the guts to post my last response.
> 
> RailCon BuffDaddy


I have patiently explained to you more than once how guest posting works around here. And I've mentioned that a few of the staff members had already decided that they had had enough of your nonsense and therefore were ignoring your posts and leaving them for me. It's been just about 3 hours since you made your last post which is a reasonable delay considering that there are only 6 staff members and we don't spend every waking hour on the forum waiting for you to make a post, in fact several of us actually have jobs that take us away from the forum for hours on end.

Since you are clearly incapable of understanding these simple facts above, despite my having explained it more than once quite nicely to you, and continue to make stupid, goading statements like this current post you are now finished here! :angry: There will be no more of your posts approved by me or any other staff member since you refuse to play nice and follow the rules.

GOODBYE!


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## George Harris

AlanB said:


> Since you are clearly incapable of understanding these simple facts above, despite my having explained it more than once quite nicely to you, and continue to make stupid, goading statements like this current post you are now finished here! :angry: There will be no more of your posts approved by me or any other staff member since you refuse to play nice and follow the rules.
> GOODBYE!


Thank you, Alan.


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## jis

RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> Further, jis states that the Metrolink was cleared to leave the Chatsworth station and proceed at "restricted speed", whatever that is, to the signal at CP Topanga.


Clearly you have a comprehension problem or are confused, since I did not say anything of the sort.


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## Ryan

AlanB said:


> RailCon BuffDaddy said:
> 
> 
> 
> If you clowns are going to try and use me for a punching bag, at least have the guts to post my last response.
> 
> RailCon BuffDaddy
> 
> 
> 
> I have patiently explained to you more than once how guest posting works around here. And I've mentioned that a few of the staff members had already decided that they had had enough of your nonsense and therefore were ignoring your posts and leaving them for me. It's been just about 3 hours since you made your last post which is a reasonable delay considering that there are only 6 staff members and we don't spend every waking hour on the forum waiting for you to make a post, in fact several of us actually have jobs that take us away from the forum for hours on end.
> 
> Since you are clearly incapable of understanding these simple facts above, despite my having explained it more than once quite nicely to you, and continue to make stupid, goading statements like this current post you are now finished here! :angry: There will be no more of your posts approved by me or any other staff member since you refuse to play nice and follow the rules.
> 
> GOODBYE!
Click to expand...

The truly amazing part is that he's also been told repeatedly that if he registers for an account, he can post as often has he wants to and have them show up immediately with no staff intervention needed.

With that in mind, is it any wonder that trying to explain anything else to him was an exercise in futility? Not that I didn't have fun trying, but jeez!


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## AlanB

RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> Please note that all my posts have been "approved by a monitor".


Yes, I'm fully aware of that fact, since I'm the one who has approved most of them!



RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> Also, your response to my 9:02 AM message just happens to be at 12:06 PM, the SAME moment as my last, provocative, albeit approved message.


Correct, I was busy writing a response to your 9:02 AM message and approving it for viewing, at the same time you were once again busy taunting and goading me. Posting here is a priviledge, not a right! This is not a government owned forum, so Freedom of Speech does not apply here; even though we are very liberal about what we will allow people to post.



RailCon BuffDaddy said:


> I would appreciate the opportunity to respond to the lies, distortions and falsehoods in your 12:06 PM message, in which you characterize the Chatsworth Metrolink disaster as "one small accident".


You're welcome to respond, but unless I see something majorly different that indicates that you're actually trying to learn how rail works, it's unlikely that you post will do any better than your last one which landed in the trash can.

And once again, when comparing Metrolink to the number of people killed each year in the carnage on our highways, it is a small accident!


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## jis

Can someone who knows tell us definitively whether Metrolink uses route signaling or speed signaling? If they use route signaling than a signal aspect would not uniquely identify a speed. It would indicate a route faced by the engineer, and then the engineer uses his/her route knowledge to modulate to the correct speed for such routing.

Most Western railroads use route signaling.


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## George Harris

I think the concept would be called route signalling.

Ther are cases where the signal indicates that you will be taking a diverging move without indicating which of more than one possibile routes you will be taking.

However, every signal aspect has a defined speed limit.

Generally, the speed allowable by signal indication, the speed allowable through any given turnout, and the speed allowable on any given sectio of track can be found in the employee timetable and special instructions applicible to that particular piece of railroad.


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## leemell

AlanB said:


> RailCon BuffDaddy said:
> 
> 
> 
> If you clowns are going to try and use me for a punching bag, at least have the guts to post my last response.
> 
> RailCon BuffDaddy
> 
> 
> 
> I have patiently explained to you more than once how guest posting works around here. And I've mentioned that a few of the staff members had already decided that they had had enough of your nonsense and therefore were ignoring your posts and leaving them for me. It's been just about 3 hours since you made your last post which is a reasonable delay considering that there are only 6 staff members and we don't spend every waking hour on the forum waiting for you to make a post, in fact several of us actually have jobs that take us away from the forum for hours on end.
> 
> Since you are clearly incapable of understanding these simple facts above, despite my having explained it more than once quite nicely to you, and continue to make stupid, goading statements like this current post you are now finished here! :angry: There will be no more of your posts approved by me or any other staff member since you refuse to play nice and follow the rules.
> 
> GOODBYE!
Click to expand...

Good, and Thanks.


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## WhoozOn1st

WhoozOn1st said:


> Please do not feed the trolls.


After the well-deserved "Good riddance!" folks should examine their motivations for continuing to provide a platform for this individual. What a waste of time and effort.


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## jis

WhoozOn1st said:


> WhoozOn1st said:
> 
> 
> 
> Please do not feed the trolls.
> 
> 
> 
> After the well-deserved "Good riddance!" folks should examine their motivations for continuing to provide a platform for this individual. What a waste of time and effort.
Click to expand...

I think it would be a reasonable policy to require people to register after their 5th message post as a guest. It should make the rule clear for everyone and will save the moderators quite a bit of hassle too. However, if the moderators want to be gluttons for punishment.... Oh well....


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## Ryan

That's a pretty fantastic idea.


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## leemell

jis said:


> WhoozOn1st said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> WhoozOn1st said:
> 
> 
> 
> Please do not feed the trolls.
> 
> 
> 
> After the well-deserved "Good riddance!" folks should examine their motivations for continuing to provide a platform for this individual. What a waste of time and effort.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> I think it would be a reasonable policy to require people to register after their 5th message post as a guest. It should make the rule clear for everyone and will save the moderators quite a bit of hassle too. However, if the moderators want to be gluttons for punishment.... Oh well....
Click to expand...

On its face, that sounds reasonable, given the recent experience here.


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## MrFSS

leemell said:


> jis said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> WhoozOn1st said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> WhoozOn1st said:
> 
> 
> 
> Please do not feed the trolls.
> 
> 
> 
> After the well-deserved "Good riddance!" folks should examine their motivations for continuing to provide a platform for this individual. What a waste of time and effort.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> I think it would be a reasonable policy to require people to register after their 5th message post as a guest. It should make the rule clear for everyone and will save the moderators quite a bit of hassle too. However, if the moderators want to be gluttons for punishment.... Oh well....
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> On its face, that sounds reasonable, given the recent experience here.
Click to expand...

I think this thread and guest are 1 in a 1000.

Also, I don't think the software would allow us to set it up to do this.


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## the_traveler

"Guest" post has been deleted, as per the agreement of the staff, but I will answer his question, AFAIK (and remember) all that is needed to register as a member of AU is:


Your real name (which is not published)
Your screen name
Your email address (which is only known by the staff)

I believe all other entries are optional (I could be wrong.)


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## AlanB

jis said:


> I think it would be a reasonable policy to require people to register after their 5th message post as a guest. It should make the rule clear for everyone and will save the moderators quite a bit of hassle too. However, if the moderators want to be gluttons for punishment.... Oh well....


Unless the guest keeps using the same name over and over, there would be no easy way to enforce such a policy.

And for the rare occasions where something like this situation happens, it's not really worth the effort to come up with some manual way of tracking things.


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## AlanB

RailCon BuffDaddy,

Registration requires nothing more than a user name, which for most people isn't their real name, and an email address. We don't sell those email addresses and we don't send out emails to our members, even though we do have that capability.

That said, don't bother to sign up as after this mornings round of comments by you, I can assure you that your registration will not be approved. In more than 10 years of running this forum, the actual owner Anthony, and I have banned about 3 people from the thousands that have registered here. You're the first to be banned before ever even joining. But I'm tired of your continued insults and goading; I'd have figured by now that you'd have learned that goading me doesn't work. But apparently not!

As for your puppet master comment, had you been smart enough to think, you'd have quickly realized that couldn't be further from the truth. Remember, I told you more than once that some of the staff members wanted me to shut things down a long time ago. And I told you that some had stopped approving your posts, leaving them for me. Simple common sense would have told you that if they were puppets, then I would have ordered them to approve your posts. Instead, I let each person decide for themselves what they were comfortable & happy with doing in regard to your posts. So much for your puppet theory! Might I suggest that next time you approach a website that you actually think and try to be a bit less antagonistic?

Next, you'll note that one of the staff addressed the heavily negative comment directed at you.

Finally, this forum exists for two major purposes. The first, to fulfill the dream of the owner Anthony who when he was only 10 years old saw a lack of information on Amtrak's website back then. So he created his own little website to try to help people better understand Amtrak, see pictures of the insides of the cars, etc. That morphed into this forum, where people even as guests can still come and ask questions about Amtrak. Questions for which answers often cannot be found even now on Amtrak's website, despite major improvements to that site. Forums that allow posting without registration are few & far between; we’re a rarity on the net.

The second purpose that this site serves is to allow railfans to discuss all things Amtrak. Part of the reason for that purpose relates to the first purpose, those who ride the trains the most and the ones most likely to have the answers that new riders are seeking.

So it is only natural when you show up with wild theories and a clear lack of understanding on how things work that some push back against you. However, I believe that I remained quite tolerant and polite with you for a considerable time, despite your constant little barbs about how long things took to show up. Certainly I was urged by many people to shut things done a long time ago, yet I continued to allow you to make your posts and I approved them. But as I said earlier, my limit was reached with your posts yesterday. And this morning's round of nonsense has sealed your fate. You are done here!


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## jis

I am not suggesting that one goes out of ones way to track down use of multiple guest handles by the same person etc. It was just a random thought. At the end of the day it should be the discretion of the moderators anyway.


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## Ryan

Darn, sounds like a missed an entertaining string of posts.


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## Dan O

Ryan said:


> Darn, sounds like a missed an entertaining string of posts.


haha. Maybe entertaining but they sound also like a real pain in the rear.

Dan


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## DET63

> I can't tell you what speed is indicated by yellow over yellow, but it is indicated in the rule book and the engineer is required to know what speed is indicated by that signal aspect.


I have thought that a yellow signal meant that the train had to be operated at a speed that allowed it to stop in half the distance that the operator/engineer could see, or 20 mph, whichever is slower. But I would also have to believe that there would be specific rules for each type of train used on a track, especially one that handled both passenger and freight traffic.


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## Trogdor

DET63 said:


> I can't tell you what speed is indicated by yellow over yellow, but it is indicated in the rule book and the engineer is required to know what speed is indicated by that signal aspect.
> 
> 
> 
> I have thought that a yellow signal meant that the train had to be operated at a speed that allowed it to stop in half the distance that the operator/engineer could see, or 20 mph, whichever is slower. But I would also have to believe that there would be specific rules for each type of train used on a track, especially one that handled both passenger and freight traffic.
Click to expand...

You are thinking of restricted speed. Yellow is approach, yellow over yellow in this case is approach diverging.


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## WhoozOn1st

Surviviors say the federal liability cap is inadequate:

Four years later, survivors of Metrolink crash still hurting

"This Wednesday marks the fourth anniversary of one of the worst railroad accidents in the nation. The 25 people who died have long been eulogized and the resulting lawsuits closed. But scores of victims will still face the consequences of a federal liability cap they say has left them inadequately compensated."

"Federal investigators blamed the collision on a Connex engineer who, they concluded, failed to see a stop signal because he was texting on his cellphone. There also was evidence that Connex did not heed warnings about the engineer's cellphone use on duty.

"In the years since, attempts by the victims to recover damages were frustrated by a 1997 federal law — the Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act — that set a liability ceiling of $200 million per passenger rail accident."







Chatsworth wreck aftermath showing the impact area with the locomotive and forward two cars of the Metrolink train (left), and the two lead Union Pacific locomotives (right). Wikimedia Commons photo.
​


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