# Amtrak Crew rule violation on #80(16)



## jis (Nov 17, 2013)

According to reports in TO there was a major rule violation by the Amtrak Engine crew on #80(16) leading to a shutdown of the railroad between Rocky Mount and Petersburg for almost 5 hours. That would explain 80 and everything following it through that segment running many hours late on the 16th.

Apparently this is what happened. Signals were out of service in the block (scheduled maintenance) between Rocky Mount NC and Delmar NC. The section was operating using EC-1 (CSX version of track warrant, what on NEC is known as Form D). When 80 stopped at RMT it read in its EC-1 authorizing it to pass the block in question, and it proceeded to enter the block. #92 following #80 stopped at RMT and started copying its EC-1 for the block. The plan was for that EC-1 to be authorized when #80 cleared the signal at Delmar. According to CSX rules the signal is supposed to be called. To the astonishment of the dispatcher, the head end of #80 reported the release of the block before it had cleared the block signal at Delmar. The model board in front of the dispatcher was still active and he could see that #80 was still in block when it declared the block cleared!

That brought the railroad to a screeching halt. The crew was immediately disbarred from further operation, and everything was on hold until a replacement crew could be found.

What the #80 crew did was truly dangerous, and doubly so because immediately after that and before they had cleared the block, they had to stop for a passenger emergency, apparently while still in the block that they had declared cleared. So in the worst case scenario 92 could have got its EC-1 authority and proceeded down the block expecting it to be clear to the Delmar block signal, at 59mph, only to find #80 sitting in block ahead of them, possibly with too little distance left for them to stop short of #80.

Anyway, what actually happened will of course be uncovered in the inquiry that is taking place. But the damage was done and all trains were delayed many many hours while #80 could be restaffed and get on its way.


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## PRR 60 (Nov 17, 2013)

Not a good week for Amtrak crew operations.


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## daveyb99 (Nov 17, 2013)

Colorful adjectives aside ... how far from the "Delmar signal" was #80 when they reported clear. And also ... just how does a non-moving train (#92) catch a moving train (#80).

Further .. if the dispatcher saw where the trains were, did he not verify the report, rather than shut down everything for hours?

I get the rule violation, I just don't get the "truly dangerous" part of this story.


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## ALC Rail Writer (Nov 17, 2013)

daveyb99 said:


> Colorful adjectives aside ... how far from the "Delmar signal" was #80 when they reported clear. And also ... just how does a non-moving train (#92) catch a moving train (#80).
> 
> Further .. if the dispatcher saw where the trains were, did he not verify the report, rather than shut down everything for hours?
> 
> I get the rule violation, I just don't get the "truly dangerous" part of this story.


Jis said that 80 had ceased motion due to a "passenger emergency" before physically clearing the block, if I read his post correctly.

And even if 80 was moving it is still dangerous because 92 is under the assumption they are a certain distance ahead, clear of the block. Any time false information is given to an engineer it increases the risk of an accident. ...if nobody had noticed that 80 was still in the block 92 could have gotten permission to proceed then hello Amtrak on Amtrak pile-up. Have you ever seen "Seconds From Disaster"? Dominoes, man. If you stack enough of them together they all fall down one-by-one.


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## Nathanael (Nov 17, 2013)

Geez, I don't even know how that could happen. Perhaps the dispatcher misunderstood the radio communications of the crew on #80... perhaps the crew on #80 didn't know their territory and mistook a different signal for the Delmar signal... those are the first two things I can think of. Either would be pretty bad, but if it's anything other than that, it would be even more bizarre.


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## jis (Nov 17, 2013)

daveyb99 said:


> Colorful adjectives aside ... how far from the "Delmar signal" was #80 when they reported clear. And also ... just how does a non-moving train (#92) catch a moving train (#80).
> 
> Further .. if the dispatcher saw where the trains were, did he not verify the report, rather than shut down everything for hours?
> 
> I get the rule violation, I just don't get the "truly dangerous" part of this story.


Shutdown happened because once the Engineer broke a rule, and the rules require that s/he be immediately disbarred from any further operation of trains. Add that to the fact that this is a single track section and the fiasco is complete.

The danger was that #80 was still in the block that it had declared that it had cleared. Of course as it turns out in this case because of the alert dispatcher the danger was only potential. But if the dispatcher did not notice the discrepancy and had gone ahead and issued the EC-1 to 92 allowing it to proceed in a block at 59mph while another train was sitting in the block, that could have led to a rear and collision. The situation would have been equivalent to a block signal showing clear when the block it protects is still occupied.

Yes, it was pretty bizarre. Very likely some sort of loss of situational awareness on part of the #80 head end. But in some sense this was less bizarre than the Bala Cynwyd incident earlier in the week.

And today 80(17) had an altercation with a pedestrian in North Carolina delaying it 3 hours. See http://www.wral.com/amtrak-train-hits-kills-person-in-mebane/13122186/


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## OlympianHiawatha (Nov 17, 2013)

Good call by the CSX! When it comes to railroad safety there is no pulling over, climbing or descending to avoid a collision. When rules are violated the involved Crew(s) need to be pulled and either dismissed or retrained. No questions about it.


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## jis (Nov 18, 2013)

CSX just followed the rules as they are. Once they knew that a rule had been broken it was not really their call to make, unless of course they wanted to break some rules too and let the crew continue.


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## daveyb99 (Nov 18, 2013)

Lots of "could of's" ... so my question is: if the dispatcher had an electronic display that contradicted the engineers report, why did he not ask for confirmation.

And further, a violation requires a complete shutdown? It does not happen that way in ATC .. pilots are not required to land short if they break a rule or bust a clearance.

I get the seriousness, but seems like a bad system to work in.


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## cirdan (Nov 18, 2013)

What does it mean, to replace an entire crew. Surely a dining car attendant cannot in any way be held responsible for a signal violation?


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## rrdude (Nov 18, 2013)

cirdan said:


> What does it mean, to replace an entire crew. Surely a dining car attendant cannot in any way be held responsible for a signal violation?


TRAIN crew, not OBS crew... Engineer, conductor, asst. conductor, fireman, (if they still had them....)


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## jis (Nov 18, 2013)

cirdan said:


> What does it mean, to replace an entire crew. Surely a dining car attendant cannot in any way be held responsible for a signal violation?


Neither CSX nor FRA cares about what the OBS crew does as far as operations go. They only care about the operating crew as far as the rules violations being discussed here are concerned. So replacement would be for Engineer and Conductor typically.


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## jis (Nov 18, 2013)

daveyb99 said:


> Lots of "could of's" ... so my question is: if the dispatcher had an electronic display that contradicted the engineers report, why did he not ask for confirmation.
> 
> And further, a violation requires a complete shutdown? It does not happen that way in ATC .. pilots are not required to land short if they break a rule or bust a clearance.
> 
> I get the seriousness, but seems like a bad system to work in.


The rules require that when a rules violation is detected the operating crew must be removed from duty and not be allowed to operate the train any further. When a rules violation happens on a single track railroad this means now you have a train without an operating crew sitting stationary occupying the single track section until a new qualified crew can get to the train to move it. Until that happens the railroad is effectively shut down. It does not matter whether it is ATC or what. On a single track ATC section with ATC out and operations under track warrant exactly the same thing would happen under the same circumstances.


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## Ryan (Nov 18, 2013)

I think he's talking about planes, and the ATC he's talking about is Air Traffic Control. If a pilot busts a rule, they're not required to land at the nearest airport until a relief pilot can be made available.

It's a silly comparison since you can part a train as soon as the violation is known, you can't park an airplane at 40,000' and wait for a new pilot to show up.


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## Phil S (Nov 18, 2013)

Nobody said anything about "parking a plane". The comment was to land at the nearest airport, which I don't think is such a bad comparison. The reason it isn't done is because of the enormous inconvenience to passengers (or shippers) and cost of getting a crew to an airport at which the company might likely have no presence at all. Yes, the US railroad rules and procedures seem needlessly cumbersome and complicated, maybe left over from a previous technology? A better comparison might be the rules for say Japan Shinkasen. Do they immediately stop the train and bring half the system to a grinding halt just because of one stupid/dangerous mistake that ended up (admittedly through pure luck) having absolutely zero consequences? Maybe I can find something about that on the Internet - if so I'll post it.


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## Ryan (Nov 18, 2013)

WellTrained said:


> Nobody said anything about "parking a plane". The comment was to land at the nearest airport, which I don't think is such a bad comparison.


It is a bad comparison, since landing at the nearest airport still involves operating the plane through a complex evolution (more complicated in fact, since you're landing at an airport that you're likely not familiar with and had no plans to do so). It's in no way similar to stopping the train and walking away.


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## jis (Nov 18, 2013)

Yes, the problem is that when the term ATC is used in a railroad forum, a reasonable interpretation of the acronym is "Automatic Train Control". At least that is how I interpreted it.

The reason that US landed up with these strict rules is that whenever leeway was given to make the rules reasonable, apparently the railroad companies tended to get extremely creative with their interpretation. In order to put a stop to that the rules became extremely prescriptive with no possibility of extensions except in extremely extenuating circumstances.

It is a very different situation when automatic protection is in place. Merely missing a speed restriction warning does not cause any nuclear option to fire off. There is penalty application, Things are reset and things carry on after a few minutes delay and possibly a terse yell from the dispatcher. OTOH, when there is no protection in place between you and a potential collision after you run a red signal, that is when all hell breaks lose.

Incidentally at such points I think (but I may be wrong) the rules also require a drug test of some sort these days.

BTW, in your research about Shinkansen, find out what happens when a Shinkansen is running under exceptional circumstances with signal and protection system inoperative and the driver disobeys an explicit instruction in a dangerous way. Just finding out what happens when a minor infraction happens under an automatic regime is not particularly interesting since such things do not lead to disbarment in the US either.

And yes, comparing railroad control with air traffic control is more or less a waste of time.


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## Shortline (Nov 18, 2013)

As info, a violation involving a train or engine occupying a main track without authority (as in the case being discussed here) is potentially decertifying, for the conductor and engineer. Typically the train will be instructed to stop, an the crew removed from service pending a 242 (conductor Certification) and/or 240 (engineer certification) hearing. Assitant Conductors, Firemen, Brakemen, etc typically recieve a similar discipline hearing, but not decertification (even if they are also "certified" as a Conductor or Engineer, because they are not acting in the capacity of Engineer or Conductor, and therefore not subject to decertification.

Many Railroads also require "reasonable cause" drug testing under part 219, this is an optional test under Federal Law, but it's pretty much industry standard to do so on Class I Railroads, as well as on many Class II and Class III Railroads and is usually covered under union agreements or company policy to remain consistent. In some cases, a RFE or DSLE will board a train with the crew, and move the train to a suitable place to clear the main for a re-crew, but that's not always possible. If the 240/242 investigation reveals a violation did occur, or the crew members involve waive their rights to a hearing and accept the violation, the Engineer and Conductor are decertified for a period of 30 days. (there is a provision that allows returning to service at half that time, if certain conditions are met, and the RR chooses to do so). Decertification is covered under Federal Law under parts 240 and 242, and not up to the Railroad to decide how to discipline, decertification is generally cut and dried, if the facts indicate a decertification event occured, a crew will be decertified.

And, for what it's worth, the FRA, under DOT, is very similar to the FAA, and many provisions are very close, so comparing the two really isn't that much of a stretch.


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## jis (Nov 18, 2013)

Shortline, thanks for the definitive info. Much appreciated.

Some of the rules between FAA and FRA can be similar, but the equipment that FAA controls is not restricted to operating on tracks. For example it would be pointless to talk about a TCAS system as used on planes for providing advice on evasive action to the crew in the railroad context. Airways are a 3D free flow controlled space. Railroads are essentially a one dimensional semi-static graph space where control is exercised. Thus even the rules that do appear to be similar are so mainly by chance.

Yes ground traffic control at airports is more similar to rail traffic control, but that is not the biggest control issue for air traffic control


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## Devil's Advocate (Nov 18, 2013)

Anything that helps maintain practical safety while also helping to avoiding five hour system wide delays sounds like a good thing to me. Bring on the PTC.


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## gmushial (Nov 18, 2013)

What's the limiting factor w/re implementing/using PTC at this point? Don't most of the major RRs already have GPS units installed on all the locos? Is it a case of integrating that data into the dispatching operations, or??? Or are we waiting for the smaller RR companies to catch up. The fact that we can get near-realtime updates w/re locations of Amtrak trains - we can't be that far away (wishful thinking??).


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## CHamilton (Nov 18, 2013)

Fred Frailey has a good comment on the state of PTC.

http://cs.trains.com/trn/b/fred-frailey/archive/2013/11/11/there-goes-positive-train-control.aspx


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## Shortline (Nov 18, 2013)

jis said:


> Airways are a 3D free flow controlled space. Railroads are essentially a one dimensional semi-static graph space where control is exercised. Thus even the rules that do appear to be similar are so mainly by chance.


Sure, operating conditions are different, but he regulations are written in much the same manner, 3D or 2 D, it's the same priciple, especially regarding post incident investigation and certification issues, so the conditions may be different, but the rules are not similar by chance, they're by design, in the grand scheme of things....FRA is just 40 years behind in many ways. I expect to see similar medical standards regulations, similar to the FAA flight physicals required of pilots. TCAS regulations are very similar to PTC regulations. Certification standards under part 240 and 242 are very similar to certification standards for pilots under part 91 and 141, operating standards under 135 or other part 14 regulations are very similar to FRA parts 218, 219, 225, etc. It's all the same lawyers, in the end. That's all I was saying. Obviously the conditions are different, but the rules and regulations are written very similarly to those in Aviation, and it's definetly by design. As Railroads embrace and field new technology, the similarities will become even more pronounced.


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## gmushial (Nov 18, 2013)

CHamilton said:


> Fred Frailey has a good comment on the state of PTC.
> 
> http://cs.trains.com/trn/b/fred-frailey/archive/2013/11/11/there-goes-positive-train-control.aspx


Interesting article/piece and thanks for posting the link... but two comments: the fact that we can get near realtime updates on Amtrak train locations, must mean something is working; and it sounds like BNSF generated a bad implementation - there really is no need to add a pole and transceiver every two miles - talk about pig-headed engineering. ... one has to wonder if there isn't some grandstanding involved here, ie, BNSF makes it as expensive as possible to implement, and then has rights to complain about how government is anti-business - this could/should have been implemented using the existing cell-phone networks, and couple watt transmitters on the trains so they can be heard by at least one tower. Analogy: think about emergency communications and how they work 99.999% of the time - when a trains needs to transmit its location, if it doesn't get an ack back, then simply retransmit until it does - eventually (10-15 seconds they will, or the other end of the tunnel, they will). Here out in the sticks, with lots of canyons etc, the police still are able to communicate; and with one's cell, one can go about almost anywhere, and have a signal... and since the locos would be on the transmitting side, they can simply use more than 10mw that a cell is using - go to 2w, go to 5w and be heard (like the cell towers do).


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## jis (Nov 18, 2013)

Shortline said:


> jis said:
> 
> 
> > Airways are a 3D free flow controlled space. Railroads are essentially a one dimensional semi-static graph space where control is exercised. Thus even the rules that do appear to be similar are so mainly by chance.
> ...


OK. I do agree with that. Thanks for the clarification.


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## Rule G (Nov 18, 2013)

Shortline said:


> As info, a violation involving a train or engine occupying a main track without authority (as in the case being discussed here) is potentially decertifying, for the conductor and engineer. Typically the train will be instructed to stop, an the crew removed from service pending a 242 (conductor Certification) and/or 240 (engineer certification) hearing. Assitant Conductors, Firemen, Brakemen, etc typically recieve a similar discipline hearing, but not decertification (even if they are also "certified" as a Conductor or Engineer, because they are not acting in the capacity of Engineer or Conductor, and therefore not subject to decertification.
> 
> Many Railroads also require "reasonable cause" drug testing under part 219, this is an optional test under Federal Law, but it's pretty much industry standard to do so on Class I Railroads, as well as on many Class II and Class III Railroads and is usually covered under union agreements or company policy to remain consistent. In some cases, a RFE or DSLE will board a train with the crew, and move the train to a suitable place to clear the main for a re-crew, but that's not always possible. If the 240/242 investigation reveals a violation did occur, or the crew members involve waive their rights to a hearing and accept the violation, the Engineer and Conductor are decertified for a period of 30 days. (there is a provision that allows returning to service at half that time, if certain conditions are met, and the RR chooses to do so). Decertification is covered under Federal Law under parts 240 and 242, and not up to the Railroad to decide how to discipline, decertification is generally cut and dried, if the facts indicate a decertification event occured, a crew will be decertified.


 In this case it is likely that the crew will be banned from operating on CSX, even after they serve the disciplinary period.


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## Devil's Advocate (Nov 18, 2013)

gmushial said:


> Interesting article/piece and thanks for posting the link... but two comments: the fact that we can get near realtime updates on Amtrak train locations, must mean something is working; and it sounds like BNSF generated a bad implementation - there really is no need to add a pole and transceiver every two miles - talk about pig-headed engineering.


What you see in the near real time Amtrak status maps comes from an on-board GPS system that is entirely separate from the host railroad's dispatching, detection, and signal indication systems. It's possible that a GPS system may have some potential advantages as an emergency backup system sometime in the future. However it also has many potential problems as currently implemented. If you've ever looked at a GPS display while riding Amtrak you'll see that it often gets confused as to where exactly the train is located. Even when it's set to follow raw unfiltered coordinates it can still deviate more than enough to place the train on a neighboring track where it doesn't belong and where another train may already be present or about to enter the block. The GPS systems on board Amtrak locomotives are more robust than consumer models but they're still based on technology that is nowhere near foolproof. Even on the official Amtrak status maps you'll notice that trains will routinely deviate from their expected path. Before a GPS system could hope to take over for any conventional dispatching system someone would have to map out every mainline, every subdivision, every siding, and every yard an Amtrak train might pass through. That's a major undertaking that is likely to be rather complicated, not only from a technical level but also from a bureaucratic and political perspective.


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## ALC Rail Writer (Nov 18, 2013)

Semi-unrelated... Google asked it's developer community to send them GPS data from their phones while they are on trains. They have expressed interest in mapping Amtrak and commuter rail systems and integrating that into Google Maps as well possibly being able to provide schedule and delay information off their main search.


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## gmushial (Nov 18, 2013)

ALC Rail Writer said:


> Semi-unrelated... Google asked it's developer community to send them GPS data from their phones while they are on trains. They have expressed interest in mapping Amtrak and commuter rail systems and integrating that into Google Maps as well possibly being able to provide schedule and delay information off their main search.


Good olde Google... there ahead of the pack, not because they're that superior, but simply because they don't hand out their "can't do" pills each and every morning, and expect/demand their employees take them. ;-)


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## gmushial (Nov 18, 2013)

Devil's Advocate said:


> gmushial said:
> 
> 
> > Interesting article/piece and thanks for posting the link... but two comments: the fact that we can get near realtime updates on Amtrak train locations, must mean something is working; and it sounds like BNSF generated a bad implementation - there really is no need to add a pole and transceiver every two miles - talk about pig-headed engineering.
> ...


All well said... but seems to ignore what is possible if one wished to make it happen. Now that we have access to undithered GPS signals, 10cm is the standard resolution one can expect [have been working with the state and their survey crews - where we have to deal with data to the single milli-arcsecond (9-10 sig digits), where if one doesn't simply store the data as double precision one loses significance, and if one doesn't do the math in extended precision, one likewise has problems]. The fact that one has trains running over their routes already, one could simply over time (per the Google comment/request above), build up a database of where the tracks are, and then to four or five sigma place each loco accordingly... and it's not like trains randomly jump from location to location - so one doesn't have to deal with nasty data etc. ... I'm sorry, but as someone that lives in the tech world, sometimes I find it frustrating with what're presented as limitations/constraints.

climbing down off his soapbox (hear that somebody needs the wood) - greg


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## Shortline (Nov 18, 2013)

Very unlikely they will be banned. They will (if found to be non compliant) be decertified, recieve appropriate retraining as necessary, and most likely return to service. Banning is unusual in all but the most extreme cases of non-compliance, in my experience.


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## jis (Nov 18, 2013)

Shortline said:


> Very unlikely they will be banned. They will (if found to be non compliant) be decertified, recieve appropriate retraining as necessary, and most likely return to service. Banning is unusual in all but the most extreme cases of non-compliance, in my experience.


That is what I was thinking. I think one has to rise to the level of Ricky Gates in rules violation to get banned forever.


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## jis (Nov 18, 2013)

Here is BNSF's PTC deployment plan as filed with the FCC....

Warning large PDF document: BNSF PTC Implementation Plan


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## Nathanael (Nov 18, 2013)

Frankly, it's quite straightforward to implement "PTC" using track circuits. All the US Class I railroads have chased wireless PTC because they're run by people who don't understand how radio works. It turns out that wireless, GPS-based PTC is much more expensive and complicated than track circuits, but they all imagined that it would be cheaper.  And so we get delays in implementation, because the Class I railroads had executives who didn't do their research.

Worthy of note: track-circuit-based implementations don't require FCC radio licenses and don't require terribly large foundation work, unlike radio-based implementations.


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## ALC Rail Writer (Nov 18, 2013)

gmushial said:


> ALC Rail Writer said:
> 
> 
> > Semi-unrelated... Google asked it's developer community to send them GPS data from their phones while they are on trains. They have expressed interest in mapping Amtrak and commuter rail systems and integrating that into Google Maps as well possibly being able to provide schedule and delay information off their main search.
> ...


Problem is not of developers are part of the program, my friend and I sent our data out for ALC-WAS-CLT and back. The first stage is trying to make sense of the input, as mentioned above GPS goes nuts on rail routes. It took years to figure out how a GPS signal reads from a moving car, and they had a much larger pool of data and a bigger market to figure that out--however this project does fall within their stated goal to know all that is knowable and to categorize it.

With regards to PTC it would be interesting to see what solutions a company like Google could for the Class Is. Between the two the hardware is there, Google just needs access to maps and GPS data, with their infrastructure (servers to satellites) I have no doubt they could contribute to PTC projects. I'd be surprised if they aren't trying to take a bite of that pie--and if they're not they're not thinking straight.


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## gmushial (Nov 18, 2013)

Nathanael said:


> Frankly, it's quite straightforward to implement "PTC" using track circuits. All the US Class I railroads have chased wireless PTC because they're run by people who don't understand how radio works. It turns out that wireless, GPS-based PTC is much more expensive and complicated than track circuits, but they all imagined that it would be cheaper.  And so we get delays in implementation, because the Class I* railroads had executives who didn't do their research.*
> 
> Worthy of note: track-circuit-based implementations don't require FCC radio licenses and don't require terribly large foundation work, unlike radio-based implementations.


Making sure I understand correctly, ie, I think I do, but wish to be sure: you're talking about using the tracks as a conveyer of tracking and control information? If so, one uses both rails as a parallel conductor and earth as the return path? I'm assuming so (a la the old one wire telephone circuits one used to see); or does one try to use the two rails a separate conductors... but if so, how does one get around switches where a tie-bar ties the two rails (electrically) together? The only obvious problem is when you have a washout and lose conductivity. Which again raised the question: why not use the cell phone infrastructure - the many tens of billions have already been spent?

... or their underlings didn't provide the necessary and appropriate information (or they had a yes culture where such wasn't allowed - but that would be their fail).


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## jis (Nov 18, 2013)

PTC systems like ETMS from Wabtec, which is used by both BNSF and UP is an overlay on existing signaling and train control systems. So if it is installed on a track segment that has track circuit based cab signaling it would be bolted on as an overlay on it. If there is no track circuit installed previously then the train position and integrity information has to be gathered by other means, where GPS and heavier duty use of Radio comes in. Even in track circuit territory, there are additional track circuit derived info that needs to be transmitted to the train including signal aspects etc. (if the underlying system is not pulse coded track circuit) requiring radio communication.

Unfortunately US does not have a sufficiently reliable wireless telephony network deployed across the country that can be used as is, unlike the aggressively installed GSM-R network in Europe, and hence this business about railroads having to install their own wireless network. Add to that somewhat hamhanded mismanagement of the spectrum by the FCC and you have a mess on hand.

ACSES as used by Amtrak and almost all of the Northeastern Commuter railroads is also an overlay on the pre-existing Coded Track Circuit based Cab Signal and Train Control system.

All of these systems, including ACSES have a Radio segment which fills in certain additional communication needs depending on what is not available from the underlying system. Some systems like ACSES use track mounted transponders in lieu of GPS based position systems, and are generally found to be more accurate and better performant.

ACSES and ETMS can inter-operate using the wireless communication segment, typically in 220MHz band. ACSES natively uses either 900MHz or 220MHz band for its communication segment.

Google actually has relatively little experience at providing mission safety critical systems of this sort. I would be pretty worried if they started delivering PTC equipment. I have a very few very good friends who work at Google in relatively senior positions. They have no illusions about what they can provide and what is not their bailiwick. Besides, as one of them said jokingly, they would not stand for the miniscule margins in the safety-critical business either.


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## gmushial (Nov 18, 2013)

ALC Rail Writer said:


> gmushial said:
> 
> 
> > ALC Rail Writer said:
> ...


Care to say more w/re "going nuts on rail routes"?


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## jis (Nov 18, 2013)

gmushial you might find the following educational:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cab_signalling

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pulse_code_cab_signaling

It might also be a revelation to you that along most of the western trunk rail routes there is no available cell service except in spots around inhabited areas. As a matter of fact even along the Northeast Corridor reliable cell service is not available along the whole length. So using existing cell service is a non-starter since there isn't enough of it.


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## gmushial (Nov 18, 2013)

jis said:


> PTC systems like ETMS from Wabtec, which is used by both BNSF and UP is an overlay on existing signaling and train control systems. So if it is installed on a track segment that has track circuit based cab signaling it would be bolted on as an overlay on it. If there is no track circuit installed previously then the train position and integrity information has to be gathered by other means, where GPS and heavier duty use of Radio comes in. Even in track circuit territory, there are additional track circuit derived info that needs to be transmitted to the train including signal aspects etc. (if the underlying system is not pulse coded track circuit) requiring radio communication.
> 
> Unfortunately US does not have a sufficiently reliable wireless telephony network deployed across the country that can be used as is, unlike the aggressively installed GSM-R network in Europe, and hence this business about railroads having to install their own wireless network. Add to that somewhat hamhanded mismanagement of the spectrum by the FCC and you have a mess on hand.
> 
> ...


As always: excellent, informative post - many thanks.


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## gmushial (Nov 18, 2013)

jis said:


> gmushial you might find the following educational:
> 
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cab_signalling
> 
> ...


Will read, and thanks.

W/re lack of coverage: yes, and no. If one is trying to get a signal out using cell-phone power levels (10-100mw), absolutely true, but as an old ham radio type that's managed to bounce a 2m signal off the Moon and back, just like the cell phone towers, one simply uses power: rural towers routine use 100w - if one isn't transmitting continuously, then do likewise. That's always been the answer for emergency responders. 200mhz-800mhz signals yes are generally line of sight... but they do scatter nicely, and if one is willing to process nanowatt signals, they're there, and if they're digital, so much easier (with analog signals, generally there's not much one can do to improve the s/n ratios).... just seems that there is a huge investment that has been made, is still being made, ie, is only going to get better with time, and for which there is a huge knowledge base regarding, ie, why reinvent the wheel, when they all end out basically round anyway?


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## jis (Nov 18, 2013)

Incidentally, being a member of IEEE-SA I was browsing through the currently active workgroups the other day. Turns out now there is a subgroup 802 which is now working specifically on standards for PTC protocols. For those unfamiliar with IEEE, IEEE is the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers the largest professional body of you know who  . SA is a branch of IEEE that is a US Government accredited standards development organization. 802 is the section that is responsible for local area network based communication protocol standards. For example 802.3 is the old Ethernet Standard, 802.11 handles WLAN standards like our favorite WiFi. This outfit now has a workgroup (802.15) that is working on standardizing the protocols for PTC. Naturally the initial deployment will not be using this standard that is under development. But eventually things will evolve to use the standard that comes out of it. Everybody that is anybody in the industry is involved in this effort.

I would really urge people to actually spend the time to dig in and learn a bit more about the technology involved. It is actually quite fascinating, and the people involved are not nearly as technically incompetent as some of you seem to think. Way back when I had been involved briefly with the 802.3 folks in the early days of coax and thin wire LANs I was very impressed with the group that I worked with. If the crowd today is anything like they were then, they are really the most top notch people in their field.


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## gmushial (Nov 18, 2013)

jis said:


> gmushial you might find the following educational:
> 
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cab_signalling
> 
> ...


Read them - yet again: many thanks.

... would be interesting to see just how often one on a train really can't hear at least one cell tower (though at nominal sub-normal levels).... and one wonders if the cost of adding towers in those (few) places that one really can't hear a tower, wouldn't be significantly cheaper than using an entire parallel system.


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## ALC Rail Writer (Nov 18, 2013)

gmushial said:


> ALC Rail Writer said:
> 
> 
> > gmushial said:
> ...


Well for one thing Google wants it so that while you're on a train and you use one of their maps on your phone they want it to give you an accurate display of where you are. While they're limited by signal strength and coverage they can adjust their program to recognize that you are on a train, if not a specific train, and isolate the limited coordinates of that line. That way your GPS on your Google device or on Google Maps should be able to figure out, given your GPS data, that you are on say Amtrak 29 and therefore pinpoint your location on the track since they can have a precise GPS map of the CL's route.

Already Google has integrated public transit into Google Maps so that if you ask for directions between (say) West Nyack and Manhattan you're given the options for buses and trains. Eventually if you want directions from say Canton, OH to Washington DC then Google will be able to show road directions, as well as flights, buses and Amtrak options, and of course--walking. Eventually you should be able to pull up transit directions on Google Maps and Amtrak service will be shown as an option, showing the next departure and it's on-time status. If enough developers got behind it at the ground level (read: so corporate doesn't have to shell out much money for the project) then it is feasible to have that within a few years.

With regards to PTC I still maintain they could do it, Jis, and while I am surprised they're not trying to take a bite out of it I imagine they would if somebody paid them enough. After all, they bent over the NSA for how many million dollars?


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## jis (Nov 18, 2013)

gmushial said:


> W/re lack of coverage: yes, and no. If one is trying to get a signal out using cell-phone power levels (10-100mw), absolutely true, but as an old ham radio type that's managed to bounce a 2m signal off the Moon and back, just like the cell phone towers, one simply uses power: rural towers routine use 100w - if one isn't transmitting continuously, then do likewise. That's always been the answer for emergency responders. 200mhz-800mhz signals yes are generally line of sight... but they do scatter nicely, and if one is willing to process nanowatt signals, they're there, and if they're digital, so much easier (with analog signals, generally there's not much one can do to improve the s/n ratios).... just seems that there is a huge investment that has been made, is still being made, ie, is only going to get better with time, and for which there is a huge knowledge base regarding, ie, why reinvent the wheel, when they all end out basically round anyway?


On the basic radio channel why do you assume that anything is being reinvented? It is basically the same guys installing a dedicated infrastructure for use by railroads. This has already been done in Europe and is being done in China and India and other places where the European ERTMS has bee adopted and is being installed. In the US similarly it is the railroads that are upgrading their communication networks, this being a part of the bigger activity. Typically their main expenditure and deployment is in the last mile segment. Most of the back-end Comm infrastructure is typically purchased from large network providers like L3 and such.

As far as I can tell the only disagreement that you appear to have with them is that you believe that no further deployment of resources and capacity is necessary. What is already in place is enough. Whereas they believe they need to deploy additional resources to get the reliability, availability and bandwidth and perhaps operational control that they need. So could you perhaps provide some details on why you believe you are right and they are wrong? Thanks.


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## jis (Nov 18, 2013)

ALC Rail Writer said:


> With regards to PTC I still maintain they could do it, Jis, and while I am surprised they're not trying to take a bite out of it I imagine they would if somebody paid them enough. After all, they bent over the NSA for how many million dollars?


Now you are pushing into a territory that I cannot talk about  . Suffice it to say that no publicly audited outfit running a going concern has the kind of money that NSA is able to **** away on random projects. So it is more likely than not that those that need PTC have found cheaper and more timely means to acquire it from other sources. The fact that they are not trying may give you some pause though. But if merely being surprised satisfies you, that is OK too.  All I can say is it does not surprise me at all based on what I know. It really is not the segment that they wish to be in at all purely from a business perspective.


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## gmushial (Nov 18, 2013)

jis said:


> Incidentally, being a member of IEEE-SA I was browsing through the currently active workgroups the other day. Turns out now there is a subgroup 802 which is now working specifically on standards for PTC protocols. For those unfamiliar with IEEE, IEEE is the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers the largest professional body of you know who  . SA is a branch of IEEE that is a US Government accredited standards development organization. 802 is the section that is responsible for local area network based communication protocol standards. For example 802.3 is the old Ethernet Standard, 802.11 handles WLAN standards like our favorite WiFi. This outfit now has a workgroup (802.15) that is working on standardizing the protocols for PTC. Naturally the initial deployment will not be using this standard that is under development. But eventually things will evolve to use the standard that comes out of it. Everybody that is anybody in the industry is involved in this effort.
> 
> I would really urge people to actually spend the time to dig in and learn a bit more about the technology involved. It is actually quite fascinating, and the people involved are not nearly as technically incompetent as some of you seem to think. Way back when I had been involved briefly with the 802.3 folks in the early days of coax and thin wire LANs I was very impressed with the group that I worked with. If the crowd today is anything like they were then, they are really the most top notch people in their field.


Generally IEEE standard are technically quite sound, though sometimes a bit conservative... (I still find it a bit bemusing that in the 802.3 days when is was "obvious" that even 10mps never would be sendable over twisted pairs, that we'd always be using coax, and that glass was going to be the ONLY possible answer for higher bit rates ;-) ... I guess CAT-6 must be magical ). I think a lot of what passes for incompetence has to do with not/under engineered proprietary implementations. [spoken as someone that went to the Intel 4004 intro talk at the Hyatt House on El Camino in Palo Alto (more than a few moons ago)... and has been part of the industry since.]


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## gmushial (Nov 18, 2013)

jis said:


> gmushial said:
> 
> 
> > W/re lack of coverage: yes, and no. If one is trying to get a signal out using cell-phone power levels (10-100mw), absolutely true, but as an old ham radio type that's managed to bounce a 2m signal off the Moon and back, just like the cell phone towers, one simply uses power: rural towers routine use 100w - if one isn't transmitting continuously, then do likewise. That's always been the answer for emergency responders. 200mhz-800mhz signals yes are generally line of sight... but they do scatter nicely, and if one is willing to process nanowatt signals, they're there, and if they're digital, so much easier (with analog signals, generally there's not much one can do to improve the s/n ratios).... just seems that there is a huge investment that has been made, is still being made, ie, is only going to get better with time, and for which there is a huge knowledge base regarding, ie, why reinvent the wheel, when they all end out basically round anyway?
> ...


Not arguing that which is in place is sufficient, arguing: use what's there or will be there, and then only augment were necessary. While on the trains one finds that most of the time most the pax are able to carry on cell phone calls, ie, for a major portion of the routes, there is connectivity. For those area were there "isn't" ie, s/n is too low, maybe one can infact use a little more antenna and get connectivity, and beyond that, then yes, add to the existing.

ps. genesis of comment/thread has to do with BNSF's "need" to put in poles every 2 miles and the conflicts engendered.


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## Phil S (Nov 18, 2013)

Yikes, this thread has legs.

Let me try this once more. All I'm asking is why it's necessary to shut down 3 passenger trains for hours and hours because of a rule violation, no matter how serious. Is the inconvenience to 4-500 passengers plus all the people they connected with really outweighed by any gain in safety? Couldn't the crew be allowed to proceed at reduced speed to the next siding?

If the only answer is that these rules were instated because prior attempts at using more flexible rules were abused, well - so be it but it's a sad commentary on the state of our country.

Googling Shinkansen operations produced nothing useful. A look at British rrs was more informative:

http://www.railway-technical.com/atpsurvey.shtml

Seems like in all the dozens of systems they describe throughout Britain and Europe, speed and signal violations require drivers to at worst come to a full stop, after which they can proceed at greatly reduced speed. But maybe that's practical only because all these systems are much more fully automated than CSX?


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## ALC Rail Writer (Nov 18, 2013)

WellTrained said:


> Yikes, this thread has legs.
> 
> Let me try this once more. All I'm asking is why it's necessary to shut down 3 passenger trains for hours and hours because of a rule violation, *no matter how serious*. Is the inconvenience to 4-500 passengers plus all the people they connected with really outweighed by any gain in safety? Couldn't the crew be allowed to proceed at reduced speed to the next siding?


The rules exist for a reason. Here the reason:



In all seriousness the reason is because if things had gone from there being a less than 1% risk of a serious accident to over 1% when the rules were broken. If the dominoes had fallen another way, if the dispatcher had given clearance to proceed (which could have happened if they were distracted or busy, otherwise not paying attention) then those 4-500 people wouldn't be inconvenienced they would be at risk of death or injury.

Is it worth a few hours and some vouchers to prevent the possibility of a multi-million dollar accident with possible deaths? To Amtrak and CSX it is.


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## NW cannonball (Nov 18, 2013)

WellTrained said:


> Yikes, this thread has legs.
> 
> Let me try this once more. All I'm asking is why it's necessary to shut down 3 passenger trains for hours and hours because of a rule violation, no matter how serious. Is the inconvenience to 4-500 passengers plus all the people they connected with really outweighed by any gain in safety? Couldn't the crew be allowed to proceed at reduced speed to the next siding?
> 
> ...


The shutdown was not only because of the rule violation.

Looking at the situation on #80/16 as originally posted here -

The train in question was running on single track with the signaling system shut down for maintenance.

The dispatcher got conflicting information from the electronic track occupied display and the train crew. At least one of those had to be wrong.

Stopping all the traffic until both human and electronic systems independently checked - a total no-brainer for the dispatcher and his/her supervisors.

So, yes, having better train control systems in place, as people here have been discussing, that would help.

As for the incident that started this thread, the inquiry has only just started.


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## Phil S (Nov 18, 2013)

Stop the train, sure. Complete stop. Communicate. Make sure everyone understands the situation and what needs to happen (blame for, and causes of the screw-up, can wait for the inquiry). Even if this takes an hour. But 3-4 hours? How would safety compromised by letting them proceed to a siding or even to the next station, if there's room there for them to get out of the way?

Sorry -- I don't think delaying 2 other trains 4 or 5 hours is a reasonable response. Maybe the problem here, though, is inevitable when we try to run passenger trains on infra-structure owned and controlled by freight companies. There are alternatives, you know.


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## Just-Thinking-51 (Nov 18, 2013)

"The dispatcher got conflicting information from the electronic track occupied display and the train crew. At least one of those had to be wrong.

Stopping all the traffic until both human and electronic systems independently checked - a total no-brainer for the dispatcher and his/her supervisors. "

This part is key. Something gone wrong stop everyone and find out what. There was a thread about a junction with multi trains. The dispatcher got creative with a plan to get the trains by each other. The crew were doing there jobs and calling out signals. The crew saw strange signals that seem to be incorrect / conflict with each other. They stop all movement at the junction and call out the Supervisers and maintance people. After a hour or two it was determine the route and signals were correct. The dispatch creative solution worked and was safe, but the crews question the signals and every thing stop into they had time to double check the equipment, and the route. Safety first.

The dispatcher was not out to get anyone, just doing her/his job. Better to stop and find out what going on rather have a train hit another train. It seem the Amtrak crew might be in the wrong here. Just as easy the dispatcher could of been the one to screwed up. Stop and ask question.


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## ALC Rail Writer (Nov 18, 2013)

WellTrained said:


> Stop the train, sure. Complete stop. Communicate. Make sure everyone understands the situation and what needs to happen (blame for, and causes of the screw-up, can wait for the inquiry).


You said "stop the train" yet they were both stopped. The issue was 80 being stopped in a signal block they said they had cleared, and that 92 was waiting to receive orders to proceed. Luckily somebody caught their (multiple) mistakes and there was no further incident.


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## gmushial (Nov 18, 2013)

From post #6 - since the crew was disbarred from further operations, maybe the protracted shutdown, was because it took that long to find a replacement crew?


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## Phil S (Nov 18, 2013)

ALC Rail Writer said:


> WellTrained said:
> 
> 
> > Stop the train, sure. Complete stop. Communicate. Make sure everyone understands the situation and what needs to happen (blame for, and causes of the screw-up, can wait for the inquiry).
> ...


Oops, I thought I made it clear that I was aware of what happened, though of course clueless as to why, but maybe I didn't. So do you think a 4-5 hr delay is reasonable? And, yes, AFAIK, it was due mainly to the time it took to get a crew assembled and driven to the middle of nowhere.


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## Ryan (Nov 18, 2013)

If that's how long it takes to scratch up a crew that can be trusted to operate within the rules, yes.


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## ALC Rail Writer (Nov 18, 2013)

WellTrained said:


> ALC Rail Writer said:
> 
> 
> > WellTrained said:
> ...


Yes it is and here is why... if a man stops his truck on a one-lane highway, and for no apparent reason declares that he is not blocking the highway and begins to wave motorists to keep going while creating a traffic jam, then in all likelihood this man is going to be ticketed and his car towed. That is more or less what happened. Trains have even stricter operating rules and much less leeway than cars, for good reason. The "driver" of this train proven that s/he was not only confused and/or disoriented but also oblivious to the dangerous situation they had caused, that demonstrates the modicum of irresponsibility necessary to be removed from operating a train on a Class I railroad. I do empathize with those who were delayed, but it was for their safety.

Think about it another way... Under normal operations Amtrak travel your risk of death or injury is less than 1%. (I say this having taken Amtrak over a hundred times and never been injured or killed). However after a rule is broken the probability of an accident increases, however slightly. There was more than one rule broken, so the odds of an accident increased more than one time. If there was signal maintenance on the line that increases it. So now after all this those passengers risk of injury or death has increased from under 1% to what 3%, 5%? At what point is risk worth the inconvenience? Amtrak and CSX, and for that matter the NTSB and FRA, etc, have experience with accidents and litigation and have understandably set the bar pretty low.

What it comes down to is that for a few moments there was perhaps a 1 in 20 or a 1 in 10 chance that we would have been discussing an accident instead of a rule violation.


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## NW cannonball (Nov 19, 2013)

WellTrained said:


> Yikes, this thread has legs.
> 
> Let me try this once more. All I'm asking is why it's necessary to shut down 3 passenger trains for hours and hours because of a rule violation, no matter how serious. Is the inconvenience to 4-500 passengers plus all the people they connected with really outweighed by any gain in safety? Couldn't the crew be allowed to proceed at reduced speed to the next siding?
> 
> ...


"this thread has legs"

True-

Because several "memes" collide here (sorry about "collide" couldn't resist :unsure: - won't apologize for "memes" even old-timers know what those are by this time))

Like - "international standards and differences" - "the sorry state of Amtrak running on mostly freight lines" "comparative economics of transport modes with different demographics" "the state of PTC legislation in America" "ancient operating rules delay trains" "Why doesn't Amtrak have relief crews standing by at every station" "why didn't '*airline have a plane waiting when my flight to * stopped at *" -- oh and "gorram gubmint rules and union slackers" -- possibly - maybe not.

That's why this thread has legs. But it's better to split these issues out, and post only if they affect your likely Amtrak journey, or warn others of possible problems.

The incident in question will be no doubt be investigated, no doubt inconvenienced many people, (for the RR employees concerned, is the "career limiting move" meme still out there?)

A few points to consider.

The original incident is still under investigation.

Any indication that a train operator is disoriented - as to place, person, or time -- is a serious concern http://www.neuroexam.com/neuroexam/index.php. Especially if there's no remote way to stop the train she/he is controlling. Or to relieve crew of duties expeditiously.

Any indication that "an electronic system" malfunctioned -- even management knows that can happen. Cellphones time out even in the big city. Big software projects fail all the time. When some crew you never even met is working the the system you rely on -- watch out.

Whatever operating crew or management want, if you are the dispatcher, rules is rules, but a collision on your territory is the end of a career, or more. And if the end of other people's lives -- naah -- don't want to think about that.

Running passenger trains on "dark territory" and "form D" requires much more awareness on the part of train crew and dispatchers compared to running on lines with Automatic Train Stop or ATC or cab signals or any of the better late 20th Century methods. (or 21st century methods, as far as that goes, it's only been 13 years) [airlines got "instrument control" decades and decades ago]

Ancient railroads, ancient technology, ancient rules -- but those old rules mostly work when running ancient railroads. Or new trains on ancient railroads.

Newer technology -- consider Shinkansen.

*Never* single-track operation on Sanyo-Tokaido-Tohoku. *Never* operating passenger trains with "signal system shut down for maintenance" (all scheduled maintenance is done in a 4-6 hour overnight window when passenger trains are locked out.

No possible way to compare modern operations with 19th century technology on the track where this incident happened.

Inquiry may tell.

Minimal apologies for loquaciousness -- or [/end rant] -- whatever.


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## jis (Nov 19, 2013)

Thank you. I think you have covered the complex web of issues involved as well as possible in a brief presentation. Very constructive IMHO.


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## gmushial (Nov 19, 2013)

NW cannonball - I think you enjoyed crafting that post


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## NW cannonball (Nov 19, 2013)

Yup, spent over an hour on it, -- this thread touched so many issues, or "memes" -- tried to summarize many thoughts.

Hope summary useful. Thanks.


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## Phil S (Nov 19, 2013)

ALC Rail Writer said:


> WellTrained said:
> 
> 
> > ALC Rail Writer said:
> ...


Exactly - for a few moments. Then it was over. Not 3-5 hours. Unless we're actually concerned that both conductors and the engineer were high as kites or delusional, which I think could have been ruled out with some radio coms and phone calls.

We can agree to disagree but I don't think anyone here has given a coherent reason as to why they couldn't have been allowed to proceed to a more reasonable bail-out point at reduced speed. The one explanation I've heard is that more flexible rules were tried but people and especially rr companies abused them. Well, fine, but I think that's better solved by education and realistic and fair enforcement policies, not by just making rules more restrictive. (Read the horror stories about rr violation "trials" on the parallel TO thread.) This reminds me too much of trying to solve highway safety problems by simply lowering speed limits while more making enforcement even more random than it already is.

Cheers,


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## Devil's Advocate (Nov 19, 2013)

Several posts have helped clarify the issue.

Like many folks at first the five hours did indeed sound rather excessive to me. Then I considered when I've seen two or more critical processes at work that contradicted themselves in some way and weren't cleared to resume normal operations for several hours as the experts from each affected group reviewed the failure.

Any one of the issues mentioned from the scheduled signal maintenance to the active workaround to the passenger emergency to the verbal block clearance to the would seem to be a minor inconvenience in and of itself. But as each minor adjustment added another deviation to the standard operating procedure the combined impact grew into a potentially serious problem. As soon as these processes started to contradict themselves the call to halt all activity was justified.

If I was in charge of maintaining the detection system and received notice that the system had potentially failed it might take me an hour or two to run some tests, review the event logs, and confirm the functionality remained in full compliance. Dispatching folks would be reviewing their own logs to ensure protocols were being followed correctly, and the operational staff would be doing likewise.

By the time every system had been cleared of failure and each process involved had been reviewed for potential problems and the true location of the train had been determined without question it could easily be two or even three hours later. By the time a replacement crew was assembled, transferred on-site, and given clearance to resume operations five hours doesn't seem so crazy anymore.

Some of this delay is probably a bit of CYA, but I'd rather have that than lose a train along with days or weeks of bad publicity followed by months or years of investigations and repairs.


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## Ryan (Nov 19, 2013)

"I don't think anyone here has given a coherent reason as to why they couldn't have been allowed to proceed to a more reasonable bail-out point at reduced speed."

Because you don't trust a crew that has lied to you once to move the train anywhere at any speed. They have already demonstrated that they are unwilling or unable to comply with the rules.


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## TVRM610 (Nov 19, 2013)

RyanS said:


> "I don't think anyone here has given a coherent reason as to why they couldn't have been allowed to proceed to a more reasonable bail-out point at reduced speed."
> 
> Because you don't trust a crew that has lied to you once to move the train anywhere at any speed. They have already demonstrated that they are unwilling or unable to comply with the rules.


Exactly Ryan.

This was not a minor violation... this was a major violation... and it will be interesting one day to read how long it took the dispatcher to realize this and if the Conductor made any comments to the Engineer (the dispatcher would probably not be able to hear the Conductors hand held).


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## NW cannonball (Nov 19, 2013)

WellTrained said:


> ALC Rail Writer said:
> 
> 
> > WellTrained said:
> ...


Sorry,

Train crew - no one says delusional -- no no no -- * disoriented. That diagnosis can not be confirmed by radio or phone* .

When a train operating crew reports that they are somewhere, and they are actually *not *where they say they are, and they are obviously, by being qualified to run that track, familiar with that stretch of track --

*Then *-- either they are delusional, disoriented, or maybe the track moved. Or the electronic system is wrong.


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## cirdan (Nov 19, 2013)

NW cannonball said:


> When a train operating crew reports that they are somewhere, and they are actually *not *where they say they are, and they are obviously, by being qualified to run that track, familiar with that stretch of track --
> 
> *Then *-- either they are delusional, disoriented, or maybe the track moved. Or the electronic system is wrong.


Either they were knowingly cutting corners, providing a false location to avoid further work steps or something like that, which is highly dangerous and should not be tolerated.

Or there was a genuine failure / breakdown of protocol or misunderstanding. Communications protocols are generally designed to rule that out, but any protocol that relies on two people talking on a radio link inherently has room for them to mis-interpret or mis-understand what is being said. A protocol should furthermore be designed to fail in the safest possible mode if it does fail. So if for example a conductor fails to accurately repeat an order, then the train should be stopped. Simply replying to an order with yes or no is not sufficient. Especially if it is a fallback protocol, ie, one the crew are maybe not using on a regular basis, there is room for them to forget protocol details and thus not perform the protocol as it was designed. This is thus a question of training and of regularly refreshing and practicising all protocols that they may encounter. If this has not been done, then management must also share part of the blame.


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## ALC Rail Writer (Nov 19, 2013)

NW cannonball said:


> When a train operating crew reports that they are somewhere, and they are actually *not *where they say they are, and they are obviously, by being qualified to run that track, familiar with that stretch of track --
> 
> *Then *-- either they are delusional, disoriented, or maybe the track moved. Or the electronic system is wrong.


Exactly, this isn't like when mom and dad break out the road maps and try and figure out if they missed the last exit. These are professionals who were each engaged in weeks of supervised training on this specific stretch of railroad, told to memorize every sign, every signal, every big tree on the side of the track-- and for some reason they told the dispatcher that they had left the area where they actually were, and then stopped there, knowing that they had another train behind them on a one track line.

That is the modicum of irresponsibility/impairment/disorientation necessary to have one removed from actively operating a train. This is because when people don't catch these mistakes (like in Chatsworth in 2008) people die.


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## Shortline (Nov 19, 2013)

WellTrained said:


> ALC Rail Writer said:
> 
> 
> > WellTrained said:
> ...


Decertification events typically happen because of a loss of situational awareness. So, for whatever reason, a member of the crew lost focus on the task at hand and violated a rule so critical, the FRA requires a 30 day suspension. After the event, now the crew that already had a distraction of one sort or another, is facing a 30 day loss of employment, without pay. How much focus do you thnk they will have at that point? I would consider that to be quite a distraction, knowing when you do tie this up, you're off without pay for the next month (or so, depending).

On top of that, the FRA requires it. See part 240.307 (b) (1)-Upon receipt of reliable information indicating the person's lack of qualification under this part (violation of a prohibited conduct rule), *immediately* suspend the person's certificate;

.


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## Phil S (Nov 19, 2013)

What can I say? Mostly you guys are explaining the rules and situation to me, over and over, which I already understand. It's the rules I'm disagreeing with. Just trying to think logically here, if I could talk with all 3 crew on the phone, get any sort of coherent and consistent explanation as to what happened, I'd be just fine letting them proceed at reduced speed to the next siding or start of double-track -- and with no other movement on the block until the board, the crew, and GIS (if it's actually available to dispatch) all agree that they're really clear of the block. Of course if they tried to play down the violation, I'd do exactly what was done, whether it was required by FRA law or not.

More generally, and I welcome actual information to the contrary, I think we're running US railroads by an archaic system that's been over-engineered with rules instead of technology. Other railroads worldwide simply don't work this way yet maintain just as good (or better) safety records. I'd suggest that we're also suffering from running passenger trains on freight railroads following freight operation rules that don't adequately take into account the realities of trying to provide passenger service that people can depend on.

Moving right along......

(edited to just fix three typos)


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## NW cannonball (Nov 19, 2013)

WellTrained said:


> ALC Rail Writer said:
> 
> 
> > WellTrained said:
> ...


I'm quoting "welltrained" only to suggest - not assert - that the WellTrained has been taken over by some troll.

"Exactly - for a few moments. Then it was over. Not 3-5 hours. Unless we're actually concerned that both conductors and the engineer were high as kites or delusional, which I think could have been ruled out with some radio coms and phone calls."

As I said before - and any competent person who ever dealt with a parent having stroke no phone calls can rule out impairment and/or disorientation. The former poster named welltrained would have got that small clue.

The former poster, who seems to be hijacked, had screen name welltrained, would never be so stupid to say l -- either there was no problem - or "both conductors and the engineer were high as kites or delusional,"

The former poster "welltrained" would never present this as "either or | no problem, or else all operating crew were stoned out of there minds.

The former poster "welltrained" would never have posted "then it was over-- moments, not hours." -- and demanded that a whole rail line get back on schedule in a minute.

I suggest the "welltrained" has been hijacked - does his belong here on or the website improvement page? or PM the mods.


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## George Harris (Nov 19, 2013)

The only comment I am going to make on this whole thing is that Chatsworth is not a good example for comparison. At Chatsworth the Metrolink ran past a red signal and trailed through a switch that was set against him. Either of these should have been firmly slapping him in the face that he should stop. We had a long thread quite a while back trying to drum up excuses for the Metrolink mostly revolving around that he did not know which signal applied to his movement. That is completely bogus. Any person qualified on the line would know which signal applied to him in any state of conciousness. Yes, you can tell the position of the switch point as you approach it, although the gap is less than 6 inches. If you have ever been in the cab and know track that is clearly understood.

This case appears to be overrunning your athority in what sounds to be a manual block style operation.


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## NW cannonball (Nov 19, 2013)

Sorry people - responded to a fraudl ent troll - got to clean my systems.



WellTrained said:


> What can I say? Mostly you guys are explaining the rules and situation to me, over and over, which I already understand. It's the rules I'm disagreeing with. Just trying to think logically here, if I could talk with all 3 crew on the phone, get any sort of coherent and consistent explanation as to what happened, I'd be just fine letting them proceed at reduced speed to the next siding or start of double-track -- and with no other movement on the block until the board, the crew, and GIS (if it's actually available to dispatch) all agree that they're really clear of the block. Of course if they tried to play down the violation, I'd do exactly what was done, whether it was required by FRA law or not.
> 
> More generally, and I welcome actual information to the contrary, I think we're running US railroads by an archaic system that's been over-engineered with rules instead of technology. Other railroads worldwide simply don't work this way yet maintain just as good (or better) safety records. I'd suggest that we're also suffering from running passenger trains on freight railroads following freight operation rules that don't adequately take into account the realities of trying to provide passenger service that people can depend on.
> 
> ...


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## Ryan (Nov 19, 2013)

George Harris said:


> This case appears to be overrunning your athority in what sounds to be a manual block style operation.


Not exactly, it was a case of fraudulently reporting clear of a block that they were still in. Fortunately, the dispatcher could see that the block was still occupied and didn't authorize the train behind them into the block.
The connection to Chatsworth is that if you fail to follow the rules, there's a not insignificant chance people die.

I've got no idea what NW cannonball is going on about anymore.


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## NW cannonball (Nov 19, 2013)

RyanS said:


> George Harris said:
> 
> 
> > This case appears to be overrunning your athority in what sounds to be a manual block style operation.
> ...


Don't sweat NWC being incomprehensible.

NW cannonball is *not* bipolar. Sometimes he/she gives good practical advice, Sometimes is incoherent. Like almost all posters on this very valuable forum - maybe has more extremes between coherent and out of it. Love the good data, Sometimes we, even you, helpful steady mods, don't get some clues.

BUT - good people here - even the ""heh heh - very few of us who are incoherent at times"

When NWC posts garbage, ignore. (like for anyone) or if relevant, ask for clarification.

When NWC is offensive -- complain or ignore or PM and then ignore. If really offensive, ban the booger.

Like this forum.

If you love (not me,the false name) chastise me.

Thanks to all AU posters --

Sometimes incoherent -- NWC


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## Phil S (Nov 19, 2013)

Sorry if I tripped your breakers, Canonball, but I really wonder of you read what I wrote. Or maybe once again I'm not being very clear -- ,maybe. But thanks for giving me the benefit of the doubt.

May I suggest we move on? I've no doubt this topic will return.


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## PaulM (Nov 19, 2013)

RyanS said:


> "I don't think anyone here has given a coherent reason as to why they couldn't have been allowed to proceed to a more reasonable bail-out point at reduced speed."
> 
> Because you don't trust a crew that has lied to you once to move the train anywhere at any speed. They have already demonstrated that they are unwilling or unable to comply with the rules.


You didn't really address the question. Your response gives valid reasons for punishing those responsible, not the passengers.

The whole back and forth here reminds me of the frequent track walker death threads, except that no one questions why it takes 3-4 hours to investigate whether the train was on the tracks or not, what the engineer saw, and whether he put on the brakes. This brought to mind a recent incident of this type near Everett, WA caused the usual 3-4 hour delay but also prevented a commuter ferry from unloading a large number of unhappy rush hour passengers. I have a feeling that if hundreds of motorists, rather than rail passengers, were inconvenienced by trespasser, rule violation, and dead on hours situations, better solutions would be found.


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## ALC Rail Writer (Nov 19, 2013)

RyanS said:


> George Harris said:
> 
> 
> > This case appears to be overrunning your athority in what sounds to be a manual block style operation.
> ...


Yeah George I was referencing Chatsworth as an example of what happens when rules are broken, I am not making any direct comparison between the specifics of the two events--just that when rules get broken people *can* end up in a bad way.


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## gmushial (Nov 19, 2013)

PaulM said:


> RyanS said:
> 
> 
> > "I don't think anyone here has given a coherent reason as to why they couldn't have been allowed to proceed to a more reasonable bail-out point at reduced speed."
> ...


I think you've missed the operative point: according to the rules, the crew is no longer qualified to operate the train, and it takes some time to find and assemble an alternative crew, that then will move the train up the line. As you point out, the rest of what has to happen might take a half hour at most... but without a crew, it's not going to go too far very fast (or at least one hopes).


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## jebr (Nov 19, 2013)

PaulM said:


> RyanS said:
> 
> 
> > "I don't think anyone here has given a coherent reason as to why they couldn't have been allowed to proceed to a more reasonable bail-out point at reduced speed."
> ...


I'll repeat what he said: Because you don't trust a crew that has lied to you once to move the train anywhere at any speed.

It took three to four hours to get a competent crew there. If there would have been a new crew faster, I'd bet that the train would have continued its route faster.


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## ALC Rail Writer (Nov 19, 2013)

You're on a plane about to take off and the pilot commits a rule violation which put people in jeopardy and will cost him a month's unpaid leave and possibly his career, he is going to be grilled by various people and is hounded with questions from all sides for a half hour while the mess is sorted out. Now that you've scrambled his brains, do you let him take off with a planeload of people?


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## me_little_me (Nov 19, 2013)

PaulM said:


> RyanS said:
> 
> 
> > "I don't think anyone here has given a coherent reason as to why they couldn't have been allowed to proceed to a more reasonable bail-out point at reduced speed."
> ...


That happens regularly when someone decides to jump off an overpass on to the freeway. They close the freeway in many cases.


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## Ryan (Nov 19, 2013)

jebr said:


> PaulM said:
> 
> 
> > RyanS said:
> ...


Yes, this.
"Punishing the passengers" doesn't have anything to do with it.


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## Rule G (Nov 19, 2013)

The relief crew would have come from either Richmond Va or Raleigh NC.

If you are on the extra board and called for a job, you have 2 hours to get to your crewbase. Then you must gather the required paperwork, hold a job briefing and get transported to the scene.

So... how long after the "Stop your train" order was give did the crew get the call?

And how long does it take to get to the scene from either of those crewbases?


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## ALC Rail Writer (Nov 19, 2013)

Rule G said:


> The relief crew would have come from either Richmond Va or Raleigh NC.
> 
> If you are on the extra board and called for a job, you have 2 hours to get to your crewbase. Then you must gather the required paperwork, hold a job briefing and get transported to the scene.
> 
> ...


The answer to your second question is somewhere around four hours.

/sarcasm


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## Ryan (Nov 19, 2013)

Funny how that works out, that.


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## ALC Rail Writer (Nov 19, 2013)

RyanS said:


> Funny how that works out, that.


If you were referring to my response I was being sarcastic, I don't know how long the relief crew took. Incidentally couldn't the relief crew have been a CSX one?


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## Ryan (Nov 19, 2013)

I missed the sarcasm, sorry.

Richmond - Delmar is a little over 3 hours.

Raleigh - Delmar is a little over an hour.

Add in the 2 hour call time, and it's pretty obvious that the train is going to sit there for a while.


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## gmushial (Nov 19, 2013)

Doesn't one also have the added inconvenience, of not being to get the crew there by rail, ie, with the venue locked down? And if they were really in the middle of nowhere, then that might add some time to getting there.... ie, if one is going to screwup, don't do it in the middle of the Gore Canyon (CZ) or somewhere of the kin. .... ;-) ON ... and what took you so long? Well... we had to walk the last 15 miles, in that there aren't no roads in this area. ;-) OFF


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## Rule G (Nov 19, 2013)

ALC Rail Writer said:


> RyanS said:
> 
> 
> > Funny how that works out, that.
> ...


No

Under the new law regarding conductor certification.

A "Certified Passenger Conductor" is required to move an occupied passenger train.


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## ALC Rail Writer (Nov 19, 2013)

Rule G said:


> ALC Rail Writer said:
> 
> 
> > RyanS said:
> ...


Fair enough.


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## VentureForth (Nov 20, 2013)

Rule G said:


> ALC Rail Writer said:
> 
> 
> > RyanS said:
> ...


This is where I would like to see a separate passenger conductor from an in-cab operations conductor used on Amtrak trains. In the latter scenario, a CSX crew would theoretically get the train to the next station where at least the passengers aren't stuck onboard the train while the crew situation is figured out...

And I know that I'm a bit late to the conversation, but if a pilot violates a rule at altitude, it's generally missing a clearance. If that happens, Air Traffic Control has the ability to warn other planes to get them out of the way until the wayward aircraft is corrected back on course. This happened with Payne Stewart's Learjet which eventually crashed back in 1999.


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## jis (Nov 20, 2013)

VentureForth said:


> This is where I would like to see a separate passenger conductor from an in-cab operations conductor used on Amtrak trains. In the latter scenario, a CSX crew would theoretically get the train to the next station where at least the passengers aren't stuck onboard the train while the crew situation is figured out...


Amtrak does not have any in cab operations Conductor. The only Conductor on any train is in the back with the passengers.


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## Trogdor (Nov 21, 2013)

VentureForth said:


> This is where I would like to see a separate passenger conductor from an in-cab operations conductor used on Amtrak trains. In the latter scenario, a CSX crew would theoretically get the train to the next station where at least the passengers aren't stuck onboard the train while the crew situation is figured out...


I guess we have to weigh the cost of having a second person in the cab of every Amtrak locomotive system-wide against the once-in-a-great-while situation where an Amtrak crew is unexpectedly removed from service and a relief crew is hours away.


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## railiner (Nov 21, 2013)

One other angle, though not related to the incident in discussion, as to comparison between FRA and FAA .......what about Amtrak train attendants.....are they required to have certification like flight attendants are? In things like emergency evacuation, operation of doors, etc.? I know their job is not nearly as critical, nor their training as extensive,, but just wondered if they also carry certification.....


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## SHORTLINE (Nov 21, 2013)

Not "certification" per se, but yes, the FRA also addresses training required for on board personnel regarding evacuation, emergency preparedness, equipment familiarization, etc. see 49 CFR 239.101.


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## cirdan (Nov 21, 2013)

I understand that on some European railroads, crews without route knowledge of the specific route are allowed to take trains provided (a) the dispatcher is informed of the situation and approves it - he may brief the replacement crew of any route-relevant specifics they need to know (b) the train operates at a speed lower than otherwise permitted (as strictly defined in the rule book). This is often preferable to having a train sit out in the middle of nowhere for hours until a fully qualified replacement crew can be brought in. Does the FRA make similar allowances?


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## railiner (Nov 21, 2013)

SHORTLINE said:


> Not "certification" per se, but yes, the FRA also addresses training required for on board personnel regarding evacuation, emergency preparedness, equipment familiarization, etc. see 49 CFR 239.101.


Took a look at it......really not all that much there....just kind of a generalization without much in the way of specifics. They mentioned equipment required on passenger cars,..surprised they did not include an AED besides the first aid kit....

Looks like they pretty much left it up to the railroads to determine just what the initial and bi-yearly recurrent training were to consist of, and testing standards....


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## jis (Nov 21, 2013)

Apparently the rail OBS roles are not viewed as much as a safety critical role as airline cabin crews are?


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## Agent (Nov 21, 2013)

jis said:


> VentureForth said:
> 
> 
> > This is where I would like to see a separate passenger conductor from an in-cab operations conductor used on Amtrak trains. In the latter scenario, a CSX crew would theoretically get the train to the next station where at least the passengers aren't stuck onboard the train while the crew situation is figured out...
> ...


Sometimes I hear the _California Zephyr_ has a conductor (or perhaps an assistant conductor or the like) in the cab with the engineer. This allows the crew to copy a warrant "on the fly" from the BNSF dispatcher. If there isn't anyone in the cab with the engineer, the train has to be stopped for the crew to copy a warrant.


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## jis (Nov 21, 2013)

Amtrak requires two engineers in cab when the crew territory is longer than some threshold, which I forget off the top of my head. Such occurs in the west much more often than in the east. In the east the crew territories tend to be short enough. But I believe at least the Auto Train does have crew territory that is long enough to require two members in the cab.


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## AlanB (Nov 21, 2013)

jis said:


> But I believe at least the Auto Train does have crew territory that is long enough to require two members in the cab.


Your belief is correct. With only the one stop overnight, they run long enough to put 2 people in the cab.


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## battalion51 (Nov 21, 2013)

It is not unusual for the Conductor to be on the head end if there is only one Engineer and the situation would necessitate him to be there. I would imagine a signal suspension and one Engineer is enough to put him on the head end and leave the AC on the rear to handle the people. Its particularly easy with this train since the Conductor can just walk through engine. From what I know the current Engineer's contract if an Engineer is to scheduled operate one train for less than six hours, then it is not required for there to be a second Engineer. I believe 80 changes Engineers at RGH, RVR, and WAS, so at no point would there be a need for two Engineers contractually.


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## VentureForth (Nov 21, 2013)

jis said:


> VentureForth said:
> 
> 
> > This is where I would like to see a separate passenger conductor from an in-cab operations conductor used on Amtrak trains. In the latter scenario, a CSX crew would theoretically get the train to the next station where at least the passengers aren't stuck onboard the train while the crew situation is figured out...
> ...


 I know.  That's why I said "I would like to see". I know that the Silvers operate with two engineers on board. My point is that there should be a conductor that has the same responsibilities that a freight conductor has - with the authority to move the train - in the cab, with the engineer. This should be the case on ALL passenger trains that share with the freights. It would have prevented the Chatsworth incident where the conductor "called" a green, even though he can't possibly see it from inside the passenger coaches. A separate conductor - with the same authority, but different responsibilities - should be then IN the train handling the revenue and pursor duties.


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## MattW (Nov 21, 2013)

The problem with a second head-end conductor in all passenger trains is in some cab cars, there's only room for the engineer short of the conductor just standing in front of the door used for passage between cars.


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## jis (Nov 21, 2013)

After we place the additional staff on the train we will get henryj to start working out how the earnings from the train go to hell too.  There is a reason that firemen were gotten rid of, and the economics of things have not changed. The trend will,be towards fewer staff not more.


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## Trogdor (Nov 21, 2013)

jis said:


> Apparently the rail OBS roles are not viewed as much as a safety critical role as airline cabin crews are?


Evidently not. There are regulations that require flight attendants on planes with more than 19 passenger seats, and beyond that there is a 1-per-50-seats requirement.

On the other hand, there is no requirement for any OBS to be on board a train at all.


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## Devil's Advocate (Nov 21, 2013)

Trogdor said:


> jis said:
> 
> 
> > Apparently the rail OBS roles are not viewed as much as a safety critical role as airline cabin crews are?
> ...


The 1:50 rule is one I thought would be modified or dismantled long ago.

Personally I'm more concerned about the large numbers of frail and aging staff handling intercontinental flights on US airlines. Those people don't look like they're going to be saving anyone in an actual emergency. Maybe they could direct and supervise someone else doing the actual saving. Then again the idea that these folks would be able to muster enough energy to shout over a mass of panicking passengers seems unlikely to me.


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## ALC Rail Writer (Nov 21, 2013)

Well Amtrak generally has one or two more operating crew than a domestic flight does, and for that matter a LD train has as many as some international flights.


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## railiner (Nov 22, 2013)

Trogdor said:


> jis said:
> 
> 
> > Apparently the rail OBS roles are not viewed as much as a safety critical role as airline cabin crews are?
> ...


Also.....flight attendants are subject to Hours of Service regulation...I don't believe that applies to train attendants...


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## zephyr17 (Nov 22, 2013)

railiner said:


> Trogdor said:
> 
> 
> > jis said:
> ...


HOS only applies to T&E crew (engineers, conductors, ACs). It doesn't apply to the service attendants.


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## Rule G (Dec 1, 2013)

The train crew has been banned by CSX form operating on that railroad.


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## Bob Dylan (Dec 2, 2013)

Rule G said:


> The train crew has been banned by CSX form operating on that railroad.


Does this mean that their Railroad Careers are effectively Over or Can they use Seniority to Bid on another Route on a Different Road or Even Yard Duty??


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## Just-Thinking-51 (Dec 2, 2013)

Amtrak and FRA have a say. CSXT will not allow them on CSXT track. Even if Amtrak say never again. Long as the FRA does not ban them. (Not even sure they can or do). The crew can find work moving freight..

.


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## abcnews (Dec 2, 2013)

Rule G said:


> The train crew has been banned by CSX form operating on that railroad.


Just wondering, where was this info regarding the crew being banned from CSX? Is it correct? Was there a news release? Or is it speculation?

Is that a permanent ban, or just until the FRA settles the original matter...


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## OBS (Dec 3, 2013)

abcnews said:


> Rule G said:
> 
> 
> > The train crew has been banned by CSX form operating on that railroad.
> ...


This type of decision being made is not unusual for the host railroads, when it comes to rule violations. It was my assumption that this type of ban might be the outcome. This info is generally not public info, and thus, I would assume Rule G has some intimate knowledge of the situation.


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## abcnews (Dec 3, 2013)

OK - I see…. So actually, no apparent verification - but someone posted this, so we most likely think that they know the inside story. But as far as we know officially - the crew has not been permanently banned by CSX.

When does this ever become public?


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## jis (Dec 3, 2013)

Typically it does not become public in an official quotable sense.


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