# Fiscally Constrained System Vision



## Anderson (Nov 7, 2015)

I'm going to begin this by noting that on the NARP "Vision Plan", my greatest criticism is that it is so far removed from what we have now in terms of routes (and in no way speaks to questions of frequency, speed, construction cost, or ridership and revenue) that it isn't really worth considering as a medium-term policy goal.

With this in mind, I've been trying to puzzle out a vision for what could be managed if Amtrak received a one-time grant for non-NEC service expansion of somewhere in the range of, say, $1-10bn (I know that's a large range but it covers several levels of practical expansions) but was limited in how far it could expand its operating deficit outside the NEC. I'm going off of Boardman's presentation numbers (the bar graph that showed the Palmetto, Auto Train, and Meteor in the black and the LSL barely losing money...likely due to capacity issues overall) rather than the Monthly Performance Report numbers. I know that some additional losses might pop up for political reasons (Sunset East comes to mind) but in general I would like to sort out what such a "beefed up" system might look like.

As a note, one of my biggest hand-wringing points is how to approach the Western system: It seems that by most metrics the system's losses are piled up on the Western transcons, but not doing _anything_ there could make for political problems in otherwise fertile areas (Colorado and the West Coast). Equipment renewal and sleeper capacity expansion is one way around that, but I'm not sure that doing so would be sufficient...and adding a Midwest-to-West Coast train is likely to throw $25-40m onto the loss pile, depending on how the train is set up, scheduled, and how it affects the other trains "out there". The East is simply easier to handle for a slew of reasons.

So...where to begin?


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## Anderson (Nov 7, 2015)

Here are the goals I'd have for such a plan:

Fiscal
(1) Meet a cost criteria of <$10bn, including new equipment and capital improvements.

(2) Add no more than $100m to Amtrak's direct operating losses. I think $100m could be "gotten away with" in the context of at least some service expansion in the West.

(3) Not increase direct operating losses on the LD trains on a per-passenger basis. Basically, if you add a loss-heavy train somewhere in the system you need to add another train which either isn't losing much or which has a _lot_ of passengers to offset it.

Operational

(1) Improve overall connectivity within the system (e.g. not require that all trains make all connections on both ends of the route).

(2) Strike a balance between "broadening" the network (e.g. adding route-miles, new cities, or new combinations of city pairs) and "deepening" the network (e.g. adding frequencies on existing routes).

(3) Equipment utility should be maximized where possible (e.g. trainsets sitting in a yard for 20+ hours should be avoided).

(4) "Surge equipment" needs should be considered as part of equipment purchases.

Assumptions

(1) PRIIA 209 will survive in some form. Any short-haul trains will need at least hypothetical state support, though waivers and/or federal start-up grants may be considered as an option.

(2) Some states may be cajoled into supporting a cooperative LD frequency, either operationally or with TIGER applications and the like. This should be discussed on a case-by-case basis.

(3) Outside of limited (and to-be-discussed) state support for LD trains, all operating costs will need to come from federal or rider-supported sources.

(4a) Food service options beyond "standard" diner-and/or-cafe service may be considered. Should be explained. Food service should be considered necessary on any train over a few hours in operation, and food service beyond a microwave should be considered necessary on any train running more than about 12-16 hours (depending on exact timing).

(4b) Pressure to control food service losses will continue. It should be considered desirable to contain said losses where possible, though full elimination is considered impractical.

(5) None of the trains involved should be expected to go over 110 MPH anywhere outside the NEC. 90 MPH is a reasonable top speed to hope for post-PTC, and scattered instances of 110 MPH should be considered where plausible.


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## CHamilton (Nov 7, 2015)

Anderson, this is a great starting point. I suggest that you include non-Amtrak operators. Consider this discussion from Facebook's Silver Star and Silver Meteor group:



> At the Oct. Indy NARP Fall Meeting The Amtrak Marketing Head gave us a glowing report on how the passengers just love not having a diner.
> Ugh. I am beginning to hate the way we are fed pablum by Amtrak at these meetings.
> That presentation was by far the lowest point of the whole meeting. I am increasingly convinced that Amtrak has its collective head in the sand, and that it has no conception of how to run a passenger train system. Iowa Pacific, All Aboard Florida, Texas Central, and XpressWest are going to eat Amtrak's lunch and make it irrelevant if that organization doesn't get its act together.
> Yep. I agree.
> ...


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## jis (Nov 7, 2015)

The first issue to handle will be who will manage this pool. Maybe we should look into setting up equipment owning and leasing company like the ROSCOES in the UK. One needs a well set up corporate governance structure to actually make this work. It is relatively easy to say "let us set up a pool". The devil as usual is in the details etc. We had an example of something like the Pullman Company handling Sleeping Car equipment, so it is not like this is a foreign concept that is NIH. The political questions as usual will be who will bell the cat, and who will make money doing this work?

BTW, why do we believe that the Canadians would be interested in getting involved with the mess in the US? They have a much simpler mess to contend with up North. I am completely dubious about this vision of a North American pool. let us get our own house in order first before trying to destroy someone else's.


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## Anderson (Nov 7, 2015)

Let's consider three categories of such operators:

(1) AAF. Basically a private railroad running their own service, but should be considered part of the national system.

(2) IPH. A third-party operator basically operating under "Amtrak conditions" but with their own OBS. Not _terribly_ different from what's done on the _Downeaster_, FWIW, albeit a bit more *ahem* dramatic.

(3) CAHSR, XpressWest, and Texas Central. Adjunct HSR projects which connect to the national system in places but which are sort-of their "own thing" for various reasons.

#1 is _sui generis_ but I think there's room to sit down and work with them. It's a crying shame that the trains to Florida aren't running on NS tracks or you might be able to "do a deal" there since NS and FEC have a relationship.

#2 is, I believe, a key part of this concept. As raised elsewhere, I think there's a case to be made for establishing some sort of "national equipment pool"; the problem is going to be getting Amtrak to then use equipment from it on "their" trains (e.g. NEC/LD) rather than just having a snit (as they're wont to do). One partial solution would be to grant Amtrak the equipment but have the government (perhaps the DOT, perhaps some other entity along the lines of a ROSCO) retain some sort of interest in it which would preclude misuse (and which might compel proper maintenance as well).

#3 is outside what I'm looking at here due to cost, etc. I'm not opposed to looking at how stuff plugs in, but this is more focused on a beefed-up "national system" in the context of a foreseeable political environment than it is a few one-off bullet trains.


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## CHamilton (Nov 7, 2015)

jis said:


> BTW, why do we believe that the Canadians would be interested in getting involved with the mess in the US? They have a much simpler mess to contend with up North. I am completely dubious about this vision of a North American pool. let us get our own house in order first before trying to destroy someone else's.


Point taken, of course. And maybe VIA will get more support with their new government, so it won't have as much equipment in mothballs.


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## Train2104 (Nov 7, 2015)

CHamilton said:


> Anderson, this is a great starting point. I suggest that you include non-Amtrak operators. Consider this discussion from Facebook's Silver Star and Silver Meteor group:
> 
> 
> 
> ...


Off topic, but does anyone have photos/a summary of said presentation?


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## CHamilton (Nov 7, 2015)

Train2104 said:


> Off topic, but does anyone have photos/a summary of said presentation?


Summary here.

Photo here.


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## Eric S (Nov 7, 2015)

Anderson raises a good point - that politics likely requires that *something* be done west of Chicago. A number of posters have contributed great insight into the particular finances of individual train services and there are numerous posts detailing how many of the trains east of Chicago are close to break-even, and that a restored Broadway Limited, or additional Lake Shore Limited, or restored Silver Palm, or whatnot may well be a break-even or better proposition. And that *generally* the western transcontinental trains are not even close to break-even prospects. But, unless this expansion is almost entirely driven by state-level funding, it's hard to imagine a non-trivial expansion of eastern long/medium-distance train service without some sort of expansion of western long/medium-distance train service.

I believe that Neroden has pointed out that the western trains really struggle financially in their mountain segments, as opposed to the segments closer to Chicago (say east of Interstate 35, or the Mississippi River, or some such point). So, perhaps adding a second daily train over a portion of the route (CHI-MSP, CHI-DEN, CHI-KCY, etc) would be the way to add service west of Chicago without breaking the bank. If the 750-mile rule comes into play, that might make the "second Empire Builder" trickier, as it would have to run fairly deep into ND. A "Denver Zephyr" would work, but perhaps it might be best left until after (if ever) IA starts operating a corridor service through the Quad Cities, Iowa City, Des Moines, and Omaha. A "second Southwest Chief" might be considered as a renewed "Texas Chief" and somehow take over or combine with the Heartland Flyer - but that might just end up running up operating deficits way greater than we should be considering for this exercise. A "second Texas Eagle" - no idea if this is viable, given how little intermediate ridership there is south of St. Louis through AR.

Or does the western expansion take the form of federal start up grants for new and expanded corridor services instead? Something in the Colorado Front Range area? Los Angeles-Indio-Phoenix-Tucson, or portions thereof? Seattle-Spokane? Various Texas corridors? As well as improvements to existing corridors in CA, OR, WA.


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## Philly Amtrak Fan (Nov 7, 2015)

Eric S said:


> Anderson raises a good point - that politics likely requires that *something* be done west of Chicago. A number of posters have contributed great insight into the particular finances of individual train services and there are numerous posts detailing how many of the trains east of Chicago are close to break-even, and that a restored Broadway Limited, or additional Lake Shore Limited, or restored Silver Palm, or whatnot may well be a break-even or better proposition. And that *generally* the western transcontinental trains are not even close to break-even prospects. But, unless this expansion is almost entirely driven by state-level funding, it's hard to imagine a non-trivial expansion of eastern long/medium-distance train service without some sort of expansion of western long/medium-distance train service.
> 
> I believe that Neroden has pointed out that the western trains really struggle financially in their mountain segments, as opposed to the segments closer to Chicago (say east of Interstate 35, or the Mississippi River, or some such point). So, perhaps adding a second daily train over a portion of the route (CHI-MSP, CHI-DEN, CHI-KCY, etc) would be the way to add service west of Chicago without breaking the bank. If the 750-mile rule comes into play, that might make the "second Empire Builder" trickier, as it would have to run fairly deep into ND. A "Denver Zephyr" would work, but perhaps it might be best left until after (if ever) IA starts operating a corridor service through the Quad Cities, Iowa City, Des Moines, and Omaha. A "second Southwest Chief" might be considered as a renewed "Texas Chief" and somehow take over or combine with the Heartland Flyer - but that might just end up running up operating deficits way greater than we should be considering for this exercise. A "second Texas Eagle" - no idea if this is viable, given how little intermediate ridership there is south of St. Louis through AR.
> 
> Or does the western expansion take the form of federal start up grants for new and expanded corridor services instead? Something in the Colorado Front Range area? Los Angeles-Indio-Phoenix-Tucson, or portions thereof? Seattle-Spokane? Various Texas corridors? As well as improvements to existing corridors in CA, OR, WA.


SLC-LAX (Old Desert Wind through Vegas) and DEN-PDX-SEA (Old Pioneer). Certainly one of these options could occur as a split from the CZ so they can run fewer cars west of SLC.

If we're still stuck with the 750 mile rule, maybe the MSP-CHI train can be extended further east to IND or Michigan?


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## Paulus (Nov 7, 2015)

Anderson said:


> As a note, one of my biggest hand-wringing points is how to approach the Western system: It seems that by most metrics the system's losses are piled up on the Western transcons, but not doing _anything_ there could make for political problems in otherwise fertile areas (Colorado and the West Coast). Equipment renewal and sleeper capacity expansion is one way around that, but I'm not sure that doing so would be sufficient...and adding a Midwest-to-West Coast train is likely to throw $25-40m onto the loss pile, depending on how the train is set up, scheduled, and how it affects the other trains "out there". The East is simply easier to handle for a slew of reasons.


The only thing that ought to be done in the West, or elsewhere for that matter, is capex to fund new state supported intercity lines


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## neroden (Nov 7, 2015)

Anderson said:


> As a note, one of my biggest hand-wringing points is how to approach the Western system: It seems that by most metrics the system's losses are piled up on the Western transcons, but not doing _anything_ there could make for political problems in otherwise fertile areas (Colorado and the West Coast).


OK. So, from north to south:-- Minneapolis-Chicago corridor rail (preferably, but not necessarily, via Madison)

-- Iowa's (Chicago-)Moline-Des Moines-Council Bluffs-Omaha 110 mph corridor passenger rail proposal

-- Reroute the CZ via the much-more-populated Des Moines route, and add a second train per day ("Denver Zephyr") from Chicago to Denver along the same route.

-- Allow the Texas Eagle to run at the same speed as the Lincoln Service on the same tracks

-- Get the Texas Eagle over onto the TRE tracks pronto

-- Improve the Chicago approach for the City of New Orleans (as well as Illini & Saluki) as planned in CREATE

-- Run the Sunset Limited daily, with the Texas Eagle combination as proposed in the Performance Improvement Plan -- this would have a very small increase in operating costs

-- And on the west side, a separate Bay Area - Reno train,

-- and eventually, after restoring the tracks to Phoenix and putting the Sunset Limited back on those tracks, a separate Phoenix - Los Angeles train.

I believe that these projects would end up being positive for for the operating budget, though expensive in capital costs. And they qualify as "beefing up the western system" although they add no new Transcon service.



> adding a Midwest-to-West Coast train is likely to throw $25-40m onto the loss pile,


So don't do that. Improve the existing Midwest to West Coast trains, while adding more Chicago to the Missouri River trains and perhaps West Coast - Western Desert trains.
There are some decent opportunities for cost-effective improvement in Congressional districts located between the Mississippi and the West Coast without running through Montana or West Texas or across the Rockies.


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## neroden (Nov 7, 2015)

I'm going to suggest a few key conceptual rules for designing such a vision.

I agree with all of Anderson's stated goals, but this is on a more abstract level: these are principles by which you evaluate whether a proposal is going to be good for ridership/revenue/coverage/etc.

First, trains thrive on volume, and have massive economies of scale.

(1) Long trains are desirable, to allow for volume. You can lengthen a train without appreciably increasing the cost; you can't lengthen a bus.

(2) High frequencies are desirable, to allow for volume and to generate volume. You can run a train daily for maybe 1.5 times the cost of running it three times a week, but you get more than twice as much revenue. You can run two trains per day for less than twice what it costs to run one train a day, but you get at least 1.5 times the ridership, often more than twice as much. You can run a train four times a day or six times a day for costs which are not outrageously higher than running it twice a day, and get proportional increases in ridership.

(3) Shared route segments are highly desirable; the costs of Grand Crossing-Chicago Union improvements benefit 3 Wolverines, 2 Pere Marquetts, 2 Blue Waters, 1 LSL, 1 Capitol Limited, 1 CONO, 2 Illini/Saluki, but it's all the same track.

(3a) Double track can support a humungous number of trains per day.

(4) High population cities generate that desirable volume; so a train should run through Des Moines, not through Osceola.

(5) On-board services have to be designed to handle volume. Food service arrangements and food service procedures in particular all have to allow for large volumes. You can't afford to have long lines at the cafe, you can't afford to have long lines at the dining car, you especially can't afford to run out of stock.

(6) Boarding and deboarding have to be designed to handle volume. Funnelling everyone through one door is unacceptable, whether it's one train door (as on the Downeaster) or one "gate" door (as in Penn Station New York). This nonsense has to end, because when the train has volume, this will slow the train down.

Second, trains thrive on speed.

(1) Faster trains mean more riders who are willing to pay more.

(2) Faster trains mean less costs, because employees are paid per hour and much maintenance is per-hour too.

(3) Boarding delays are pure loss, so all platforms should be at train entrance level, no gaps, boarding through all doors (to accomodate volume). Anything else causes delays in boarding and deboarding.

Third, trains are subject to network effects.

(1) Connectivity increases volume (back to volume!) as people make transfers.

(2) Frequency increases effective speed (back to speed!) when transfers are being made.

These principles can be used to prioritize proposals, and also to dismiss really wrong-headed ideas like reviving a three-a-week Pioneer.


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## Anderson (Nov 7, 2015)

Alright, here's what I see as viable:
First and foremost, I'd aim for a large equipment order to backstop a lot of the expansion and to hopefully allow the NEC to get some new non-Acela equipment. The fact that the Regionals are all running with equipment ordered under Richard Nixon and delivered under Gerald Ford is getting a bit embarassing, and we're starting to run into practical capacity constraints that Amtrak is trying to "solve" with rising fares (amid a next-to-zero inflation economy, this is not going to be a long-term winner). Basically I'd look at a Viewliner-based body (which Amtrak is rumored to be looking at anyway) and aim for several hundred coaches alongside a batch of new cafes/diners and sleepers.

-Revive a "Broadway Limited", albeit sharing tracks with the Pennsylvanian (NYP-PGH) and Cap (PGH-CHI).
--New train would aim for an arrival into NYP around 0900. Resulting arrivals in WAS/PHL would be around 0730; departure from PGH would probably be around midnight eastbound.
-Run a section from the Capitol Limited to New York attached to the Pennsylvanian (the existing plan).
--Slide the Cap later in the day (have it as the "cleanup train") with a morning departure from PGH and a mid-afternoon arrival into WAS.
-Seriously look at a second Pennsylvanian with PA, aimed at a time distinct from the above.
--If NS wants an additional track for a train, I've no problem letting them have it...PROVIDED that we can extract some stack of slots in the process (e.g. non-expiring options for 5-6 r/t daily on the route).
-Second Lake Shore Limited. Time one LSL for an "early" arrival into New York (I'm thinking 0900-0930) which would likely translate into an early afternoon departure from Chicago (and thus only connect with regional hub trains) but connect with the Star, Crescent, and Meteor; and the other for something closer to the present arrangement.
-Daily Cardinal. Duh.
--I'd like to see a second train here, but there are complicated issues which make this less-than-likely.

With All Aboard Florida, I'd like to negotiate either some form of thru-ticketing or through cars or something like that. The best option I can come up with here would be to agree to buy perhaps 8 coaches and 8 sleepers for through-service (that would give you a coach and a sleeper on the Star and Meteor) and simply stick the cars onto whatever the next train out of JAX is (put in a large pad by all means but be willing to accept that the cars might go out on a 1400 train instead of a 1300 train so AAF doesn't have to hold their service for connecting equipment).
-I'd also negotiate to extend the Palmetto down to Miami via FEC's tracks, but dispatch it at something more like a freight train (e.g. depart JAX at about midnight and arrive Miami around 0700-0800...look at the heavyweight Havana Special for what I have in mind; hell, if you can get a ferry to through-ticket with it and establish a reliable connection, that's not a bad name).

My thinking is that the above should add no more than $10m to the direct losses of the system (and probably not even that...the "existing" trains would probably see their bottom lines improve and the added through-traffic on various routes should help as well).

Ok, onto the Midwest:
-Shift Amtrak to the Des Moines route for the most part. If a train gets left on the Burlington line (perhaps a stub train or split of some sort) that's fine, though it's an open question as to how much business a lone day train on this route with connections would have.
-Add a Denver Zephyr aimed at an evening departure from Chicago WB and a morning arrival into Chicago EB (which would connect legally with the second Lake Shore, Broadway, etc.).
--The result would probably be a mid-afternoon departure from Denver and a mid-late morning arrival into Denver. I'd probably adjust the existing CZ timing slightly to get a "daylight" CHI-OMA market in the deal (e.g. aim for an arrival into Omaha by 2130 at the latest). It might also be worth making the California Zephyr the "late" train while the Denver Zephyr gets the "earlier" slot and is aimed at CHI-OMA/OMA-DEN and CHI-DEN. Eastbound, the later train out of Denver would ideally leave Omaha no earlier than 0700.
-I'd seriously consider a second train into North Dakota if ND was willing to support service, aimed at a daylight timing west of MSP and overnight east of MSP.
--I'd pair this with the MSP-Duluth service and the CHI-MSP service that MN seems to want.
--This is all subject to MN and/or ND supporting such service(s), though I would think we might be able to get them to support some sort of "supplementary train" if PRIIA 209 can be worked around.
-The aforementioned beefing up of CHI-STL service (getting trains going faster, etc.) should proceed. I'd also add a St. Louis/Kansas City section on the Cardinal (as has been looked at).

Out West:
-Daily Sunset. Duh.
--Get the train re-routed into Phoenix. The current Maricopa stop just doesn't cut it and the tracks are still there; this is a good case for a TIGER grant.
-Get a day train LA-Tucson. This would require CA and/or AZ to get on board in some fashion (the shortest extension from LAX that would clear the 750-mile hurdle would be to El Paso, and I don't think there's enough traffic to justify that.
--I'd time this train so Phoenix-Tucson was a good commuter frequency (e.g. arrive PHX 0845, depart PHX 1730); given the size of this market and the distance involved, a non-stop or limited-stop run between the cities probably has the potential to fill the train[1]; if needed, I'd consider a pad on the way into Phoenix to try and ensure reliability. Being about a 10-hour trip overall, you'd get a pretty good timing for the LAX-PSP section that CA has wanted for a while as well.
--And of course, some of this would depend on the status of the AZ commuter rail project which has been slowly advancing. You've got increasing transit on both ends, but I know this is a big project...but having it there could whack a good bit of time off of the through-train.
-Expand service in Washington state. Subject to PRIIA 209, but Washington seems pretty workable.
-Desert Wind to SLC (with through cars). Net hit to direct losses of $10-15m, probably, but adds some good connections and probably helps with the Zephyr's bottom line (SLC-RNO is the "hole" on that route; added capacity CHI-SLC is probably fillable).
-I'd LIKE to see a Pioneer service of some sort, but I'm deeply reticent about both the added costs (I think Amtrak sandbagged their estimates a few years ago) and the prospect of having two "splits" on the Zephyr (I don't want a "City of Everywhere"; that gets operationally hard). I think that with only one train west of Denver, the Pioneer/Desert Wind question is an either/or proposition.

Backing up from the train projects I agree with pretty much all of what Nathanael has to say. In particular, the ASM needs to have some rules laid down about door opening (one door is fine at a small station but if there are more than X pax boarding a second door/door pair should be mandatory). Some of the points about cafe/diner service also come to mind (I know I'd happily take my steak to the SSL or cafe car if capacity was an issue).

I know I haven't hit everything here, but I think this is a decent starting point. I suspect that the western expansions (notwithstanding modest timing improvements and/or beefing up the fleet size a bit) will add to the overall losses while the eastern stuff will be mostly neutral on the direct losses side.

[1] An estimate from 2008 had something like 40,000 people commuting over 90 minutes in the region (http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/0107biz-tucsontophx0107.html); even assuming that only half of that is in a relevant market (e.g. people who live and work somewhere that shifting to transit would make sense), 1% market penetration plus through traffic to the LA area would pack a train pretty good (400 pax/day or 200/frequency); 2-3% penetration would overwhelm a single train (400-600 pax/train would probably effectively require the train to be about 8-9 cars long)


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## CHamilton (Nov 7, 2015)

Anderson said:


> -Expand service in Washington state. Subject to PRIIA 209, but Washington seems pretty workable.
> 
> -I'd LIKE to see a Pioneer service of some sort, but I'm deeply reticent about both the added costs (I think Amtrak sandbagged their estimates a few years ago) and the prospect of having two "splits" on the Zephyr (I don't want a "City of Everywhere"; that gets operationally hard). I think that with only one train west of Denver, the Pioneer/Desert Wind question is an either/or proposition.


The WA and OR rail offices are pretty conservative right now. I've heard folks from both say, separately, that they won't even try to get more trains until the existing ones are 100% full. We all know how bad an idea that is, but it shows you what we're up against in the Northwest. The only expansion in the state rail plans is more Cascades service.

However, both states (for political reasons) recognize the need for service to the east sides of both WA and OR, to serve large college towns, resort areas and such. So if we can get local support, we might be able to cobble together something running Seattle-Ellensburg-Pasco-Spokane-Pullman-Bend-Klamath Falls. (Dig up some sleepers and we could "take the Pullman to Pullman.") And possibly a split at Bend to SLC or DEN via the old Pioneer route.

Frankly, this is pie in the sky stuff right now. But the Northwest is uncomfortably aware of how bad our connections are: Getting to Denver requires a long and uncomfortable connection in SAC, and anything east of CHI means an overnight, since the EB's OTP has been so poor. (Yes, I know that the LSL is a legal connection again, but would you trust it? I don't.)


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## Anderson (Nov 7, 2015)

I'm going to take a charitable interpretation of "100% full" and presume that sellouts at reasonably high frequencies (e.g. not just at Thanksgiving/Christmas) would get them moving. That being said, the impact of the impending service expansions will be interesting...and as you noted, I suspect _something_ will happen heading east, if only for political reasons (it's hard to lavish service on one part of a state when another part has next to none or none).


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## Eric S (Nov 8, 2015)

Any idea, even a W.A.G., as to what a restored Desert Wind would cost, in terms of operating losses? Also, any thoughts as to what the consist would be - something like the Empire Builder, with the Desert Wind akin to the Portland section and the California Zephyr akin to the Seattle section?

I just wonder whether the startup costs and the ongoing operating losses would be worth it, or whether they would be better spent elsewhere, particularly if the Los Angeles area-Las Vegas segment might well see some sort of passenger rail service restored with or without Amtrak. Even if Xpress West, or something like it, proves elusive, some sort of California corridor-type operation between Los Angeles and Las Vegas might make more sense than an LD service through Las Vegas. Or maybe I'm totally wrong here and the costs of the Las Vegas-Salt Lake City segment aren't all that great, once a LAX-LAS service is restored.


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## jis (Nov 8, 2015)

It might be worthwhile setting goals on how one splits the $x billion between Capital and Operations. In the past even when equipment has been potentially available through capital investments on refurbishment and new purchases, the lack of operating subsidies have gravitated towards not expending the capital, and basically burning the capital money by sleight of hand as operating funds and then being left with nothing beyond a few years of operation leading to discontinuance of services started with much fanfare. The operations and maintenance budget needs to be taken off of the shaky foundation of wishful thinking and grounded in reality. The way that brits have done it could hold some lessons for us. There has to be commitment over a long period of time for adequate operating subsidies to make the big scheme successful. It worries me when people pull numbers esentially out of their hats to try to convince themselves and others that there will only be minimal to no need for operating subsidies. this has proved to be false through the ages for almost everything. So might as well carefully plan for providing the necessary subsidies on an ongoing basis instead of pretending that they will be unnecessary or minimal.


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## Anderson (Nov 8, 2015)

Well, that's why I put a (somewhat arbitrary) limit on increased direct losses (e.g. the numbers given in that bar graph presentation a few years ago). My presumption is that you'd have a set of funds allocated _to be spent for X new cars and locomotives_, a set of funds _to be spent on trackwork_, and that said funds would only become fungible once the equipment orders were fulfilled.

I'm going with direct losses because accounting is a total nightmare and that's the only thing I think you can properly nail down to the addition of new trains (overhead shouldn't expand much; even with the plan I tossed up there you'd likely be expanding commissaries, etc. at maybe 3-5 locations (DEN, MSP, STL, BUF, and TUC).

On the Desert Wind, per Amtrak's CZ PIP the estimate was somewhere around $15m.


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## jis (Nov 8, 2015)

The thing that was not clear to me is that the operating budget was considered to be an annual thing. Not a one shot capital infusion deal, which is what it takes to fix up a bunch of tracks and get a bunch of rolling stock into the system.

I agree that the only concrete number we have is the direct profit/loss of operating a train. The overheads grow at some unknown fractional amount per additional service.

There is a rather good explanation of how Amtrak accounts for allocating cost of maintenance of rolling stock to individual set of trains in the document that you pointed to. Backroom stuff like reservation systems etc are another matter and probably are a relatively small cost when distributed over a large number of trains/service anyway.


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## neroden (Nov 8, 2015)

CHamilton said:


> The WA and OR rail offices are pretty conservative right now. I've heard folks from both say, separately, that they won't even try to get more trains until the existing ones are 100% full. We all know how bad an idea that is, but it shows you what we're up against in the Northwest.


Well, WA still has some increased frequency "baked in" to the rail plan -- the frequencies which they already paid for the slots for and already promised in their PRIIA applications for funding. So at least we should get the added Portland-Seattle frequency. Once Point Defiance Bypass is up and running, along with all the Vancouver Rail Yard works, on-time performance should go way up and ridership will probably skyrocket thanks to that.
Regarding operating costs, I really do think that the east coast / Chicago plan -- start with the LSL/CL rescheduling, Pennsy-CL through cars, and daily Cardinal from the PIP, and add a second LSL and a Broadway -- would probably be close to breakeven for the operating budget. I'm not saying they don't require subsidies -- they already do! I'm saying that the current situation is an inefficient use of those subsidies. Increasing from 1-a-day to 2-a-day tends to double ridership, but it doesn't double costs, at least if you have your equipment utilization plans worked out right. It certainly doesn't double the overhead, and this plan with no new stations and no new commissaries wouldn't increase overhead noticeably.

If we start applying capital charges for rolling stock maintenance, I think we go from $10-$15 million / year for the East Coast - Chicago network today (very rough estimate) to a bit less than double that. The trains are mostly breaking even on direct costs already. The increased ridership & revenue from increased frequency should not only cover the new direct costs, but should defray the added maintenance costs too. I think the increased net cost, if any, will be smaller than normal year-to-year fluctuation.

It's also worth emphasizing that each of these service improvements can be accomplished one at a time, independently, piecemeal, and each one should be independently beneficial. So you don't have to bite it all off at once if one of them has serious obstacles.

The plan would, however, have substantial one-time capital costs. For one thing, I do not want to try to run additional trains unless we first eliminate the major delay-causing bottlenecks on the routes, since poor OTP can sink ridership and revenue. South of the Lake is almost certainly the most important, since *all* of these trains would run through there. But there are other things: Livingston Avenue Bridge needs to be repaired/replaced, the bridge east of Toledo Union Station needs to be repaired/replaced, and several stations should be upgraded with station sidings and/or new platforms. (Toledo and Erie probably have enough trackbeds but new platforms. Buffalo needs a whole new station.) There would likely also be some need for added sidings or third track in some places other than stations.

----

If the money is available -- the long-term plan -- I would tweak the plan to run some of these trains from Toledo through Detroit on the Michigan Line, which would probably require (a) additional double-track on the Michigan Line, (b) acquiring and building track in the Detroit-Toledo ROW, and © resignalling and upgrades of interlockings Detroit-Toledo. I'd actually prefer to run nearly all the trains on the Michigan Line, which has stations in much better condition than Bryan/Waterloo/Elkhart/South Bend. South Bend and Elkhart passengers would have to drive to Niles (very short) and Fort Wayne passengers would have to drive to Toledo instead of Waterloo -- but Ann Arbor / Dearborn / Jackson / Battle Creek / Kalamazoo passengers wouldn't have to drive at all any more, and the drive would be much shorter for Detroit, Lansing & Grand Rapids passengers, so I think it's a net benefit.

(The Fort Wayne line would be a worthy line to run on but it needs to be rebuilt nearly from scratch for its entire distance, so that's a *lot* of money.)

And if a really large grant of money came through, I'd build a tunnel from Lewiston to State College and reroute all passenger trains Lewiston-State College-Tyrone; this avoids a large hunk of Norfolk Southern's slowest and twistiest track and would probably be easier than building third tracks on the existing route! It also takes the Tyrone and Lewiston stations off the freight mainline while closing only Huntingdon; State College is a greatly superior source of ridership to Huntingdon. This would cement the use of trains in the interior of Pennsylvania.


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## neroden (Nov 8, 2015)

On Anderson's specific route proposals, the only one I want to comment on is the Desert Wind. I really think that would require a market study to figure out how much of a market there is. (Is Sin City to Mormonland a major travel pair?) I suspect it's a bad idea to include it.

In the case of LA - Las Vegas, we should simply support Xpresswest.

I don't think we want to take a $10-15 million hit on yearly direct losses on *one train* in a fiscally constrained plan. That's more than what we expect the net yearly cost of the entire East Coast - Chicago network expansion to be. If we're willing to spend another $10 - $15 million in federal funding on direct losses, it shouldn't go to a single train running through three states like the Desert Wind; I think it needs to go to an area which can get more bang for the buck, both in terms of ridership and revenue, *and* politically.

For the West? Daily Sunset is obviously correct but is still going to increase direct losses according to all estimates so far. The Denver Zephyr might also increase direct losses some.

The only value to a Desert Wind or a Pioneer is connectivity, and I think they're a poor value for connectivity due to the low intermediate-point population and long distances.

* For those who are willing to fly, you can fly Seattle/Portland/LA/Las Vegas to Denver or SLC. SLC and Denver Airports both have urban rail links to their train stations.

* For those who aren't willing to fly, the "Sacramento Hurdle" of connecting via the Coast Starlight is tolerable... and it gets better from SoCal when CAHSR is built.

If we're thinking about increasing connectivity, I want to look to the Southeast with its much larger population centers, and the great big gap there: you can't get from New Orleans to Florida without ludicrous backtracking and you can't get from Chicago to Florida efficiently. The South and Appalachia are also potentially promising.

Or we could look at the Great Plains and the inability to travel north-south without going through Chicago. Not as fertile territory as the Southeast but more potential than the Nevada desert.

So, looking at the Southeast. Dallas-Shreveport-Vicksburg-Jackson-Meridian has already been proposed. (Primarily Kansas City Southern track.) Lots of connectivity provided by that.

Something from the Midwest to the Southeast would provide a lot of connectivity, especially if it swings through Atlanta on its way to Jacksonville.

There are alternatives with or without Macon, and north of Atlanta there are numerous possible routes. I have preferences...

Personally I favor this one:

Jacksonville-Macon-Atlanta-Chattanooga-Lexington-Cincinnati-Dayton-Columbus-Cleveland

For the following political reasons:

* The "Cleveland-Columbus-Cincinnati" route already has a lot of support and research behind it. All three cities are strong sources of support. Reviving this political support would be easy, even though Kasich is hostile.

* Cincinnati-Lexington-Chattanooga is *owned by the city of Cincinnati* and merely leased to NS, which gives the city lot of leverage for forcing NS to accept passenger trains.

* Lexington has a history of wanting railroad service.

* Chattanooga has an association with railroad service and its government has been wishing it had service for tourism reasons.

* There's an alternative route (mostly CSX, partly NS) Cincinnati-Knoxville-Chattanooga.

* There are two viable Chattanooga-Atlanta routes (NS or CSX).

* There are two viable Atlanta-Jacksonville routes (NS or CSX, though NS is preferable because it runs through Macon.)

* There are two viable Atlanta-Macon routes (both NS).

* If (as we might expect) Georgia is unhelpful, and Ohio is also unhelpful, the Atlanta-Cleveland portion is still quite useful on its own. And if Ohio is unhelpful, Cincinnati-Atlanta is still quite useful.

This means you aren't held hostage to any one class I railway or indeed any one state, and you've got solid support from lots of municipalities along the line.

Anyway, winning votes from Kentucky and Tennessee is nothing to sneeze at, politically.

I think a prerequisite for anything remotely like this is getting a better station facility at Atlanta, however.

Anyway, the thing is, even this (which I think is a good idea) would eat up a *lot* of funding, and has a decent chance at an operating loss. I don't think connectivity is worth spending *that* much on, when we can get more "bang for our buck" with frequency.

Grand Rapids-Lansing-Ann Arbor-Dearborn-Toledo is an example of a route which would add a massive amount of connectivity for relatively little funding. That's the sort of route we should be targeting when thinking about connectivity, at this point.


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## WoodyinNYC (Nov 11, 2015)

The potential LD route *Most Likely To Succeed* will run D.C./Richmond-Lynchburg-Roanoke-Bristol-Knoxville-Chatanooga-Atlanta.

Succeed because Virginia is pushing it, and they have a helluva record for getting rail done.

This from a July 10 article in the _Cleveland Daily Banner_, (Tenn.)



> The Cleveland Urban Area Metropolitan Planning Organization approved a memorandum of understanding in connection with a passenger rail system that will connect Louisville, Ky., with Atlanta.
> 
> “What is approved at this point is an extension down to Roanoke (Va.),” said MPO coordinator Greg Thomas. “The gist of the MOU seems to be that governments in the four states along this corridor agree to support the project.”
> 
> ...


Another article (sorry, it's past my bedtime now) discusses the Y-shaped plan.

One train coming down the NEC thru Lynchburg-Roanoke-Bristol-Knoxville-Chattanooga-Atlanta on one leg, and a train coming down Louisville-Frankfort-Lexington-Knoxville-Chattanooga-Atlanta.

Apparently the state of Kentucky was (_was_, they've had an election since these articles appeared) looking at Louisville-Frankfort-Lexington as a corridor train at first, growing to Knoxville-Chattanooga-Atlanta later.

Note how two LD trains running Knoxville-Chattanooga-Atlanta would put two frequencies on the section, the beginnings of corridor service.

Virginia's Memorandum of Understanding plan creates the basis of a Chicago-Florida route. It could feed passengers to the weak lower segment of the _Crescent_. For connectivity or network effects it feeds into the Chicago hub. The MoU plan gives very strong support to upgrading the _Hoosier State_ route, where the study said $200 million could cut half an hour out of the Indiana segment alone. (Giving hope of taking half an hour out of the _Cardinal_ timetable, and putting its arrival a bit earlier in the day than it is now.)

The MoU plan at Washington and/or Richmond (remember the proposed TransDominionExpress to run Bristol-Richmond-Norfolk?) could connect to the _Carolinian,_ the _Star_, the _Meteor_, the _Palmetto_, the _Cardinal_'s eastern and central segments, and feed traffic to the NEC. It adds the population centers of Louisville, Knoxville, and Chattanooga to the markets served by Amtrak. The MoU plan would likely gain support from CongressCritters from a hitherto hostile region. It invites log-rolling in the Tennessee legislature: "Hey, Memphis, if you'll support our Appalachian train, we'll support your second frequency of the _CONO _to Chicago." (Nashville could start to clamor for an Amtrak route just to keep up with their rival cities. LOL.).

With a $10 Billion pot for infrastructure (dare I say, a second Stimulus), I'd put as much as $1 Billion here. But the way Congress keeps rearranging the pots, funds authorized for state-supported corridors could pay for most of the work here: Chicago-Indy-Louisville one corridor, Louisville-Frankfort-Lexington another corridor, Knoxville-Chattanooga-Atlanta a third. Only Lexington-Knoxville thru the hills and hollows of KY would need "Amtrak LD money", along with Roanoke-Bristol-Knoxville.

The weakest part of this plan is Atlanta. But if they can't figure out how to do a station, take the dayum train Chattanooga-Huntsville-Birmingham-Mobile-Biloxi-New Orleans. That'll learn 'em. LOL.

+++++

Edit: added date to article cited; tweaked sentences and cut words.


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## Anderson (Nov 11, 2015)

I remember going over the timetables on this route with Bill Haithcoat. There are two general issues:
(1) There's a lot of slow track in those areas. I'm seeing 10 hours Roanoke-Chattanooga (Birmingham Special) and 14 hours Roanoke-Atlanta (Pelican, with one hour time change accounted for). Roanoke-Chattanooga is only about 5:30 on the interstate and Chattanooga-Atlanta is about 2:00 on the interstate. To be fair, Chattanooga-Atlanta seems to be faster on the old schedule than the above would indicate (the Pelican may have been run "tactically slow" to achieve desired times at key stations) but there's a general point to be had that south of Roanoke (and especially south of Bristol) the track conditions quickly get slow-and-winding.

(2) With a lot of these routes, "restore service" is not quite the same thing as "establish a through train all along the route". I can _easily_ envision a situation where Tennessee opts to run a day train Bristol-Atlanta while Virginia runs a day train Bristol-New York.

Kentucky has long had the "vision thing" for train service into the state (at least insofar as a north-south train goes, IIRC; the Kentucky Cardinal was supposed to grow from Chicago-Louisville into a state-spanning train if I'm not mistaken), and Tennessee has been pretty open to it as well (the state was also looking at significant-sized plans back in the late 90s, testing four possible corridors). In both cases, isolation is the problem: Memphis is served at dubious times for connections, and anywhere else you've got to punch through lots of mountains. It's not unlike the situation Utah and Colorado face (both are generally pretty pro-rail but are geographically isolated from most other destinations that would generate lots of traffic).

Edit: A third issue worth mentioning is that in all of these cases, the state share of a major project is likely to be only in the 20-50% range (and only at the high end in unusual cases; 20-25% seems more common). This in turn leads to a fourth issue, which is that I suspect if a group of states was putting up, say, $250m of their own cash as part of a $600m project (a reasonable, if upper-end, share but also one that presumes Amtrak would be covering the equipment for the LD train in some form) they would probably want some sort of federal commitment that "their" LD train would be a long-term commitment and they wouldn't wake up one morning to find that Amtrak was unable to pay for their link to insert-area-here. Nobody wants to kick in nine figures for a new/restored train only for Amtrak to pull out two years later due to a budgeting fight.


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## neroden (Nov 11, 2015)

WoodyinNYC said:


> The potential LD route *Most Likely To Succeed* will run D.C./Richmond-Lynchburg-Roanoke-Bristol-Knoxville-Chatanooga-Atlanta.


Good route conceptually. Slooooooow track, and completely non-time-competitive right now -- but it's running parallel to the mountains, so it could be made faster if a few billion were poured into it by Tennessee.


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## west point (Nov 12, 2015)

Roanoke - Bristol - Knoxville - Chattanooga several problems.

1. Roanoke - Bristol very low population base. N&W stopped at many places to get very few passengers.

2. Bristol - Would need to add Johnson City with East Tennessee State University. Kingsport not on proper route but many persons. Passenger service only a single Clinchfield RR train stopped shortly after WW-2. This whole Tri-cities area has 500,000+ population.

3. Bristol - Knoxville best RR time was ~ 3:45 that was still faster than US 11E or US 11w. Time might improve because there was always a lot of head end traffic on the SOU - N&W - SOU trains. RPO discontinuance quickly caused trains to be cancelled.

4. Knoxville - Chattanooga many possible stops slowing down service.

5. Chattanooga - Atlanta requires 25 mile backtrack to Ooltewah on NS or 15 mile back track on CSX. Both CSX & NS go Chattanooga - Dalton, Ga with about same passenger running times.

Note: Have lived in area and much information from old timers.


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## WoodyinNYC (Nov 14, 2015)

All I know is what I read in the papers:

http://clevelandbanner.com/stories/amtrak-linethrough-areagets-new-look,13181



> “What is approved at this point is an extension down to Roanoke (Va.),” said MPO coordinator Greg Thomas. “The gist of the MOU seems to be that *governments in the four states *along this corridor *agree to support the project*.”


So why is Virginia getting states and cities to sign on to the Memorandum of Understanding if they think it will never happen?


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## Anderson (Nov 14, 2015)

WoodyinNYC said:


> All I know is what I read in the papers:
> 
> http://clevelandbanner.com/stories/amtrak-linethrough-areagets-new-look,13181
> 
> ...


Per some discussions I've had over the years, it basically comes down to this:

(1) The Bristol extension needs to remain in the state's plans (and is desirable) for political reasons but not operational ones. Put another way, Bristol-Roanoke is a hole into which money is likely to be poured at present...VA wants it but it complicates the state's picture financially (tossing $5-10m/yr into a train in that part of the state pulls it out of the capex side of things).

(2) Extending further (to Knoxville, Chattanooga, etc.) does one of two things: Either it fills that hole with through traffic or it splits the cost up with the other state(s). Either of these makes VA's extension to Bristol more viable.

Therefore VA is going to be more than happy to offer whatever encouragement they can to this: The state is going to be in favor of it if it _can_ happen and if there are too many practical obstacles...well, that's not VA's problem, is it? Also, it's an MPO in Tennessee that is getting them to sign on...and from my understanding of the politics in that part of the state, this is coming from the local governments on up (Roanoke is more likely to get additional trains if some of them are continuing _to_ somewhere, for example, and Bristol just wants their train back) not from the DRPT on down.


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## neroden (Nov 15, 2015)

Chatanooga has a particular tourism reason to want their train back even if it's slow.

...so the localities might be able to pull this off. I really don't know how fast they can make the Roanoke-Bristol and Bristol-Knoxville track though. It seems worth of an Actual Study.


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## WoodyinNYC (Nov 15, 2015)

neroden said:


> Chattanooga has a particular tourism reason to want their train back even if it's slow.


Sounds like a winner:


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## WoodyinNYC (Nov 15, 2015)

For a long time, Virginia has been promising a train to Bristol, _eventually_, while trying to get support in the legislature to fund its higher priority projects D.C.-Richmond, D.C.-Lynchburg, and D.C.-Norfolk, and, again in the _eventually_ category, Richmond-Petersburg-Raleigh over the shortcut.

Having talked about it for so long, VA DOT can't stop talking about it without inflaming folks in that far southwest corner of the state. Or giving politicos a reason to not believe them. Uh oh.

When I read about Virginia getting three other states and various cities and counties to sign on to a Memorandum of Understanding for an ambitious plan D.C.-Bristol-Knoxville-Chattanooga-Atlanta (plus Louisville-Knoxville-Chattanooga-Atlanta), I know they're looking some years ahead. But they are looking, and have a good record of getting train stuff done.

Yeah, it would take another Stimulus, manna from Heaven sort of Billion dollar windfall to pay for such a route. Or, it could take years and years of incremental smallish steps, like Lynchburg-Roanoke.

The $100 million plus (is the remembered figure in the ballpark?) that it's costing to get from Lynchburg to Roanoke is only the first step, of course. Then there'd be more revenue on that portion if it were also carrying riders to/from Bristol, after the next step gets there. Both those segments would perform much, much better if carrying pax to/from Knoxville -- as well as Chattanooga and Atlanta or Kentucky.

I certainly expect the Bristol extension to become a real thing. That will only be after much more is invested D.C.-Richmond, D.C.-Norfolk, Richmond-Petersburg, and Richmond-Petersburg-Raleigh (and, of course, after Amtrak has enuff single-level equipment for the trains).

*So, not soon, but not never either.*

Anyway, the opening post for this thread gave us $10 Billion in chips to invest. I'm still ready to put $1 Billion here. And it still beats the pants off reviving the _Pioneer_, _Desert Wind_, or _Sunset East_. LOL.


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## jphjaxfl (Nov 17, 2015)

I have ridden Amtrak frequently every year for the past near 45 years. When Amtrak started, they discontinued all but a bare bones long distance system. In the early 1970s some of the Senators and Congressmen who were involved in setting up Amtrak were able to bring back a few routes. In the late 1970, the long distance system shrank more. Since then not much has changed on the long distance scene. Ironically the last long distance route started was the extension of the Sunset Limited from New Orleans to Miami. What has changed is the corridor services from the Northeast Corridor to state supported Corridors where some have more trains than pre Amtrak. It is interesting to speculate about new Long Distance routes, but history and reality say different. A test Amtrak train was run from Miami to Jacksonville via the Florida East Coast several years ago, the first passenger train on that route since 1967. There was a lot of local excitement, but nothing has happened. Except for some rail fans, most people doubt any new service will actually happen. In 2 years, we will have the Brightline from Miami to Orlando. That should give people more confidence that a new successful passenger rail passenger is possible.


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## DesertDude (Nov 17, 2015)

neroden said:


> On Anderson's specific route proposals, the only one I want to comment on is the Desert Wind. I really think that would require a market study to figure out how much of a market there is. (Is Sin City to Mormonland a major travel pair?) I suspect it's a bad idea to include it.


If you lived in the Intermountain West, you would know that Las Vegas has a substantial mormon population. Mormons settled in the Las Vegas valley as early as 1855, and there's a large mormon community there today (a private college catered to mormon students is being planned for the Moapa Valley, which is also in Clark County). An average of 12 non-stop flights go from SLC International to McCarran on any given day.

A better reason for not running the Desert Wind between Las Vegas and SLC is that the UP line goes through a very, very desolate region (much more desolate than anywhere on the Pioneer route). To illustrate my point:* The combined population of Milford and Caliente is less than 3,000 people. *Yes, that's 3,000 and not 30,000. Even if you wanted to include towns that are within a 90 minute driving distance of stops in Milford and Caliente, you're probably only looking at a ridership base of 70,000 people to draw from (and that's being very generous). That segment might have more success if the train went SLC - Provo - Las Vegas (as opposed to the old Desert Wind that went Provo - SLC - Las Vegas). But the potential ridership from the Provo area would be cut the moment Allegiant Air offered direct flights from Provo to Vegas (which I have a hunch will happen sooner rather than later).


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## Anderson (Nov 17, 2015)

SLC-Las Vegas was also in the Xpress West "system vision". I agree that the intermediate area is very empty; the issue back in "the day" IIRC was that there was a _lot_ of LAX-Vegas traffic which tended to crowd out through SLC-LAX traffic. It's not unlike the Reno-Bay Area or Denver-Grand Junction/Glenwood Springs markets (or, really, _any_ of the major "bookend" markets on LD trains which have the potential to overwhelm the route) in that regard.


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## neroden (Nov 18, 2015)

So, 12 airplane flights per day.

But from everything I've read there's little or no road traffic going from Las Vegas to SLC -- Google Maps aerials show a pretty empty highway north of the split from I-70.

Google thinks it's 5 hrs. 34 min. without traffic or 6 hr. 5 min. with traffic (which is probably urban traffic).

I assume that the airplanes are so much faster on time that they're beating the roads. The plane is 1 hr 10 min -- even if you add an hour at each end for airport access (which is probably really excessive, since Salt Lake's airport is practically in the middle of downtown), that's 3 hours.

Which means that a non-high-speed train is a bad bet, because the train is going to go at roughly the speed of the roads. The last schedule was 6 hrs. 35 min. southbound, 8 hrs. 25 min. northbound. Minor improvements could bring this up to car speed, but not to plane speed.

Here on the Lake Shore Limited route, the road routes are busy and crowded year-round day and night. So the train doesn't have to beat the plane on time, it just has to beat the car.

Looks like that is not the case for SLC-Las Vegas. It looks like the train would have to be time-competitive with the plane. A high speed rail route could do so (especially since it wouldn't need to make any intermediate stops); a rail route on a freight-owned track *definitely* could not.

Worth Noting: if CAHSR is finished, and XPressWest Las Vegas-LA is finished, the trip time from San Francisco to Las Vegas will drop to less than 4 hours. That changes everything, because then travelling SLC-Las Vegas by conventional train and Las Vegas-San Francisco by HSR, becomes faster than travelling direct from SLC - Reno - San Francisco by car.


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