Acela II RFP information announcement

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Is RRIF the only way to fund that?
No, Amtrak should be able to get a commercial loan to pay for the Acela II trainsets. The Acelas have an advantage that they generate substantial revenue and an operating profit above the rails. But a commercial loan would be at higher interest rates. Now, it would be better if Congress were to provide some funding for rolling stock purchases, that Amtrak could use for upfront costs and maybe the initial progress payments so they don't have to take on as much debt that has to paid off over the next 20 or how ever many years.
 
Unfortunately it is a little more complicated than that. Amtrak cannot use the same surplus from Acela to both cross-subsidize LD and use as collateral for loans. So for them to be able to use that as the collateral for loans, they will have to find money from elsewhere to pay for LD operations. This may or may not be easy to do considering the political climate. Already they have some amount of the surplus from Regionals locked in for paying for the ACS64's I imagine.
 
Unfortunately it is a little more complicated than that. Amtrak cannot use the same surplus from Acela to both cross-subsidize LD and use as collateral for loans. So for them to be able to use that as the collateral for loans, they will have to find money from elsewhere to pay for LD operations. This may or may not be easy to do considering the political climate. Already they have some amount of the surplus from Regionals locked in for paying for the ACS64's I imagine.
Eh, just speed up the LDs until they're profitable. :)

OK, OK, I kid, I kid. But I've been looking pretty deeply into these for a while. The Boardman presentation with direct costs was very illuminating. A lot of the "costs" we see are actually overhead which can only be covered by expanding operations. The more state-subsidized corridors there are to spread the overhead out across, the better that will get. Meanwhile, most of the eastern long-distance trains are within striking distance of profitability on a direct-costs basis; a few targeted speed improvements and better on-time performance would do the trick.

Only some of the trains require large operating subsidies (CZ, SL, SWC), and even there it's only parts of their routes (Denver-Chicago is pretty good financially, Denver-San Francisco is horrible). Amtrak rejected breaking up routes into connected corridors in the PIPs, but frankly I think it's not crazy to break the CZ at Denver -- except that it would reveal how bad the western half does and how well the eastern half does.

There's a very real sense in which the Amtrak federal operational subsidy, and many of the state operational subsidies (as opposed to the capital subsidies) are for a very specific list of line segments -- ones with particularly slow running. I mentioned the terrible speed of the Crescent south of Atlanta in another thread, and the terrible Indianapolis-Chicago speed is well known. The mountain crossing of the Coast Starlight and both mountain crossings of the California Zephyr have bad running times compared to alternatives, the SWC has awful running times over Raton, and the Sunset Limited has awful running times for most of its distance.

If I were master-planning for Amtrak, I would be tempted to sit down and find out what routes have geometric alignment suitable for continuous 80mph+ running between major cities, and then move heaven and earth to get those lines under passenger-operator control -- and focus all service on those lines. But I suppose in some sense they're doing exactly that in the attempt to get a "South of the Lake" route out of Chicago. Hasn't really succeeded yet.

Anyway, sparked a lot of interesting thoughts though.
 
Unfortunately it is a little more complicated than that. Amtrak cannot use the same surplus from Acela to both cross-subsidize LD and use as collateral for loans. So for them to be able to use that as the collateral for loans, they will have to find money from elsewhere to pay for LD operations. This may or may not be easy to do considering the political climate. Already they have some amount of the surplus from Regionals locked in for paying for the ACS64's I imagine.
I don't think there is a legal reason Amtrak can't use part of the surplus from the Acela to pay for a loan for an Acela II purchase. Doing so would mean a smaller surplus amount to draw on to cover the LD operational losses. A lot depends on what the annual operating subsidy amount provided by Congress stabilizes at. That is, of course, assuming that Congress does not pass a re-authorization bill that forces Amtrak to cut some LD trains. Reducing the losses for the LD trains with a higher cost recovery is the other way to lessen the dependence on the Acela surplus but that is a long slog process.
I'm pretty sure Boardman and Amtrak management have crunched the numbers extensively to determine how much of the current Acela surplus and how much extra projected revenue from the new trainsets they would have to draw on to pay for the first Acela II order. The wild card is the annual funding amounts provided by Congress. With the news that a budget deal has been reached by the House & Senate budget conference, we may find out soon what Amtrak will get for FY14. But the budget deal has to be passed by the House which may prove difficult.
 
Well, Friday afternoon is an interesting time to issue a press release on the release of the RFP. Maybe CHSRA is trying to go for a lower profile to have the likely attacks from the political opposition end up in the Saturday newspaper (the least read newspaper of the week). Here is the news release that was posted to the Amtrak website:

AMTRAK AND CALIFORNIA REQUEST BIDS FOR HIGH-SPEED TRAINSETS.

WASHINGTON – Amtrak and the California High-Speed Rail Authority (Authority) today issued a request for proposals to build modern, state-of-the-art high-speed trainsets. The trainsets are essential to meeting Amtrak’s critical short-term need to expand the capacity of its current Northeast Corridor (NEC) high-speed service and meeting the long-term operational needs of both Amtrak and the Authority.

Amtrak is seeking up to 28 high-speed trainsets, each with between 400 and 450 seats, which can meet or exceed current Acela Express trip-times on the existing NEC infrastructure between Washington, New York and Boston. The Authority is seeking an initial order of 15 trainsets which will have a minimum of 450 seats that can meet its planned trip-time requirements for service from the San Francisco Bay Area to Los Angeles on what will be largely brand new infrastructure.

A goal of the procurement is to identify whether established high-speed rail equipment manufacturers have service-proven designs that can meet both the short-term needs of Amtrak and the long-term operational needs of the Authority and Amtrak with little or no modification. It is also hoped that the joint procurement of equipment with a large degree of commonality will result in lower unit acquisition and life cycle costs for both Amtrak and the Authority, while helping expand the U.S. role in high-speed rail equipment manufacturing.

“With packed trains and increasing demand, the need to expand the capacity of Amtrak’s high-speed service cannot be overstated,” said Amtrak President and CEO Joe Boardman. “It is absolutely critical that we get more high-speed trains as soon as possible to provide more service and meet the growing mobility and economic needs of the Northeast region.”

The Authority requires operation at speeds of a minimum of 200 mph which is similar to what Amtrak expects it will need to realize its Vision for High-Speed Rail on the NEC. Initially, Amtrak intends to operate at peak speeds of 160 mph because that is the expected maximum allowable speed permitted by the NEC infrastructure at the time these trainsets are delivered.

“This is a major milestone for California’s high-speed rail project,” said California High-Speed Rail Authority CEO Jeff Morales. “Combining California’s and Amtrak’s orders will help make it worthwhile for manufacturers to locate in the United States, create jobs and deliver 21st Century, state-of-the art trainsets.”

“Today’s announcement is one more step in our efforts to standardize domestic rail equipment and reinvigorate U.S. manufacturing,” said Federal Railroad Administrator Joseph C. Szabo. “Combining orders between Amtrak and the California High-Speed Rail Authority will generate economies of scale and make it more attractive for high-speed rail manufacturers to build factories here in the USA, bringing new high-quality jobs and creating ripple effects throughout our domestic supply chain. The end result means the riding public will have lighter, faster, more energy efficient passenger rail service.”

Only current manufacturers of high-speed rail equipment, which the partners define as manufacturers with equipment in commercial operation at speeds of at least 160 mph (257 kph) for at least two years, will be eligible to submit a bid. Proposals are due May 17 and it is expected that a builder will be selected by the end of 2014.
The bold face emphasis is mine.

Ok, time to speculate who will bid and who might win the contract. ^_^
 
Well, Amtrak posted the username and password to access the RFP document on their procurement portal website. Lots of interesting details for those inclined to access the documents while they are available. I just started to skim the documents. :)

Why Boardman is saying up to 28 trainsets? Because Amtrak is requesting the bidders submit proposals for 4 alternatives and offer how many trainsets they think are needed to meet the Amtrak service operating plans for current level of service and expanded half hourly service. Note that 3 of the 4 alternatives are for replacing the current Acela fleet. Excerpt from the instructions to the offerors:

It is contemplated that this RFP will result in the award of two (2) separate contracts for Amtrak.

The first Amtrak contract is for the procurement of an alternative number of Trainsets with an option for additional individual vehicles.

Amtrak is requesting a proposal based on the four alternatives, all of which relate to the Operating Plans attached to this Solicitation.

Alternative 1: Phase 1 of the Operating Plan calls for the addition of peak hour half hourly service that requires 6 additional Trainsets to operate alongside the existing Acela. Offeror should state the number of Trainsets needed for these additional 6 services.

Alternative 2: No change to the existing service but replacing the existing Acela fleet with the new Trainsets. Offeror should state the number of Trainsets needed for Amtrak’s current operating plan.

Alternative 3: Replacement of the existing Acela fleet and with the addition of the extra half hourly service set out in Phase 1 of the Operating Plans; the operational requirement is for 22 operating Trainsets each day. Offerors should state number of Trainsets to operate this service.

Alternative 4: Replacement of the existing Acela fleet and the addition of Trainsets to operate the 25 services needed each day outlined in Phase 2 of the Operating Plans. Offeror to state the number of Trainsets required to operate this service.

All the Trainset quantities quoted in the above Alternatives are for Trainsets in service and make no allowance for spare or maintenance cover.
 
I'm pouring over the docs now, but I can't find a copy of the Operating Plan(s). Any advice where I should look?
I do not believe the plans are included in the downloads. The closest thing I could find to that is in the "Acela HSR Mechanical fact sheet" document:
Trainset Schedule

Weekdays - Operate 16 trainsets on 32 frequencies

Saturday - Operate 7 trainsets on 9 frequencies

Sunday - Operate 13 trainsets on 19 frequencies
 
I'm pouring over the docs now, but I can't find a copy of the Operating Plan(s). Any advice where I should look?
I don't see the document either on the site. There is an Amtrak Operating Plan along with route profile spreadsheet files, technical references listed as attachments in the performance specification. Some of those files may be considered confidential, which would only be provided to qualified bidders upon request. Even without all the reference documents, there is a lot of information and specs on the RFP in the available documents.
 
. . . Amtrak cannot use the same surplus from Acela to both cross-subsidize LD

and use as collateral for loans. So for them to be able to use that as the collateral

for loans, they will have to find money from elsewhere to pay for LD operations. . . .

Already they have some amount of the surplus from Regionals locked in for

paying for the ACS64's I imagine.

If I parsed Boardman's interview in Railway Age correctly, he said

that the future operating supluses from the new Acleas would pay

for the new equipment, and help pay for future improvements to the NEC.

I took that as a promise to some in Congress that surpluses from the new

Acleas would not be used to subsidize the LD trains.

But since the new equipment won't arrive for 5 or 6 years if we're very

lucky, presumably the surpluses from the present Acela trains can

continue to be used to subsidize the LD trains for a few more years.

How much cross-subsidy is there anyway? Do we have a good guess?

Isn't this one of the areas where the famed Amtrak accounting may

obscure the view? LOL.
 
. . . Amtrak cannot use the same surplus from Acela to both cross-subsidize LD

and use as collateral for loans. So for them to be able to use that as the collateral

for loans, they will have to find money from elsewhere to pay for LD operations. . . .

Already they have some amount of the surplus from Regionals locked in for

paying for the ACS64's I imagine.

If I parsed Boardman's interview in Railway Age correctly, he said

that the future operating supluses from the new Acleas would pay

for the new equipment, and help pay for future improvements to the NEC.

I took that as a promise to some in Congress that surpluses from the new

Acleas would not be used to subsidize the LD trains.

But since the new equipment won't arrive for 5 or 6 years if we're very

lucky, presumably the surpluses from the present Acela trains can

continue to be used to subsidize the LD trains for a few more years.

How much cross-subsidy is there anyway? Do we have a good guess?

Isn't this one of the areas where the famed Amtrak accounting may

obscure the view? LOL.
Several hundred million dollars, from what I can tell. Per the September 2013 Monthly Performance Report, you have the following contributions/losses excluding capital charges:

Acela: $245.4m before OPEBs, $236.9m after OPEBs

Regional: $143.7m before OPEBs, $133m after OPEBs

Short Corridors: ($158.3m) before OPEBs, ($180.8m) after OPEBs

LD Trains: ($593.8m) before OPEBs, ($627.1m) after OPEBs

Total: ($360.0m) before OPEBs, ($435.0m) after OPEBs.

Total sans Corridors: ($201.7m) before OPEBs, ($254.2m) after OPEBs

Put another way, the NEC as a whole is arguably picking up 2/3 of the tab for the LD trains.
 
But since the new equipment won't arrive for 5 or 6 years if we're very

lucky, presumably the surpluses from the present Acela trains can

continue to be used to subsidize the LD trains for a few more years.
If Amtrak can handle the financing for the HSR trainset order, I think the new trainsets would be in service on the NEC sooner than that. Depending on who wins the contract and the cost, Amtrak's hope is probably to have new trainsets entering service in 3 years from contract award. There is a reason Amtrak is seeking as close to off-the-shelf trainsets as possible. I have not found a delivery schedule for Amtrak in the publicly accessible RFP documents, so that is one of competitive parts of the bid. Which companies have manufacturing plants in the US that can build the HSR trainsets without taking years to expand their facility and ramp up on qualified employees?

Another aspect of the joint RFP and stretched production schedules is that the contract winner will need the flexibility to ramp up and down on production of the HSR trainsets. Build a bunch for Amtrak, then a few for CHSRA, then no trainsets for a time, them ramp production up again. That will require a manufacturing plant that has enough other work and space to switch employees to building other equipment orders and than back to HSR trainsets when CHSRA or Amtrak is ready for more trainsets. Siemens with a potentially large order for Next Gen diesel locomotives running through the early 2020s could be able to do that.

Under the options for Amtrak in the Instructions to Offerors, there are these items:

D. FULL BISTRO CAROfferor shall provide pricing and design for a Full Bistro vehicle in place of the half Bistros required in the specification.

E. ADDITIONAL VEHICLES

Offeror shall provide pricing for a spare vehicle of each type provided in the Trainset fully equipped for operational use. Provide prices for additional vehicles to be added to the Fleet at a later date.

F. UPGRADED SPEED CAPABILITIES

Offeror shall provide pricing for the provision of Trainsets that can achieve all the requirements set out in Stage 1 of the Evaluation Criteria (Exhibit A) and have a maximum speed of 186 mph and a further price for Trainsets that can also achieve 220 mph. In addition, Offeror shall provide pricing to upgrade the maximum speed of the Trainset from the speed at which it is delivered (e.g. 160 mph) to both 186 mph and 220 mph.

G. VIDEO SCREENS IN ALL SEATBACKS - ALL CLASSES OF SERVICE

Offeror shall provide pricing for compliant color video screens in seatbacks for all Trainsets consistent with Amtrak’s brand and design vision.
Full sized Bistro car? These will be fixed length trainsets. Don't repeat the mistake made with the waste of revenue space made with the Acela I bistro cars.

Video screens on all seatbacks? By the time, the full set of trainsets are in service, half the people on the train may have Google glasses and most of the others, tablet computers or really large cell phones for their own video source. But this is a price option Amtrak is asking for, not something they are requiring in the base specifications.
 
I wonder which company is the most likely to receive Amtrak's new contract for high speed trains:

Talgo,

Siemens,

or

Bombardier?
 
But since the new equipment won't arrive for 5 or 6 years if we're very

lucky, presumably the surpluses from the present Acela trains can

continue to be used to subsidize the LD trains for a few more years.
If Amtrak can handle the financing for the HSR trainset order, I think the new trainsets would be in service on the NEC sooner than that. Depending on who wins the contract and the cost, Amtrak's hope is probably to have new trainsets entering service in 3 years from contract award. There is a reason Amtrak is seeking as close to off-the-shelf trainsets as possible. I have not found a delivery schedule for Amtrak in the publicly accessible RFP documents, so that is one of competitive parts of the bid. Which companies have manufacturing plants in the US that can build the HSR trainsets without taking years to expand their facility and ramp up on qualified employees?
Another aspect of the joint RFP and stretched production schedules is that the contract winner will need the flexibility to ramp up and down on production of the HSR trainsets. Build a bunch for Amtrak, then a few for CHSRA, then no trainsets for a time, them ramp production up again. That will require a manufacturing plant that has enough other work and space to switch employees to building other equipment orders and than back to HSR trainsets when CHSRA or Amtrak is ready for more trainsets. Siemens with a potentially large order for Next Gen diesel locomotives running through the early 2020s could be able to do that.

Under the options for Amtrak in the Instructions to Offerors, there are these items:

D. FULL BISTRO CAR

Offeror shall provide pricing and design for a Full Bistro vehicle in place of the half Bistros required in the specification.

E. ADDITIONAL VEHICLES

Offeror shall provide pricing for a spare vehicle of each type provided in the Trainset fully equipped for operational use. Provide prices for additional vehicles to be added to the Fleet at a later date.

F. UPGRADED SPEED CAPABILITIES

Offeror shall provide pricing for the provision of Trainsets that can achieve all the requirements set out in Stage 1 of the Evaluation Criteria (Exhibit A) and have a maximum speed of 186 mph and a further price for Trainsets that can also achieve 220 mph. In addition, Offeror shall provide pricing to upgrade the maximum speed of the Trainset from the speed at which it is delivered (e.g. 160 mph) to both 186 mph and 220 mph.

G. VIDEO SCREENS IN ALL SEATBACKS - ALL CLASSES OF SERVICE

Offeror shall provide pricing for compliant color video screens in seatbacks for all Trainsets consistent with Amtrak’s brand and design vision.
Full sized Bistro car? These will be fixed length trainsets. Don't repeat the mistake made with the waste of revenue space made with the Acela I bistro cars.
Video screens on all seatbacks? By the time, the full set of trainsets are in service, half the people on the train may have Google glasses and most of the others, tablet computers or really large cell phones for their own video source. But this is a price option Amtrak is asking for, not something they are requiring in the base specifications.
I don't know, I sort of like the idea of chilling in a full bistro car with my meal before I return to my seat for the rest of the journey. I know that, alternatively, you can take your food back to your seat and eat there, but sometimes I just want to chill with my food elsewhere. That aside, I believe that the additional seats they are gaining from the lack of two power cars (301 -> ~420) is plenty of revenue growth without the half bistro car. In addition, there is already a provision, as you've probably read, for the addition of (I'm guessing) two business cars in the future to increase trainset capacity by 33%. Honestly, I don't foresee the loss of half of a car (~30 or so seats) stemming from going from a half bistro to a full bistro to be a terrible problem.
 
I wonder which company is the most likely to receive Amtrak's new contract for high speed trains:

Talgo,

Siemens,

or

Bombardier?
Talgo is disqualified, they don't have the relevant experience or vehicles. Alstom is eligible as well as the various Japanese companies, but I think that Siemens will win and force all the rail fans to sing Deutschezug über alles.

Video screens on all seatbacks? By the time, the full set of trainsets are in service, half the people on the train may have Google glasses and most of the others, tablet computers or really large cell phones for their own video source. But this is a price option Amtrak is asking for, not something they are requiring in the base specifications.
It's pretty much an expectation from the airlines that they'll be competing against and it also allows them to do other things not necessarily doable with Google Glasses or smartphones/tablets like at-seat meal ordering (technically doable with smartphones/tablets, but implementation will not be as elegant or as reliable). Remember too that bandwidth and connectivity are always going to be a bit of an issue with trains; 400 people trying to stream Netflix all at once will result in complaints, but people streaming videos from an on train server is added customer revenue and satisfaction.

I can't find anything on the operating plans either, but I suspect that the 25 additional services refers to an additional 25 Acela frequencies. Hourly BOS-WAS and half hourly NYP-WAS throughout the day perhaps?
 
I don't know, I sort of like the idea of chilling in a full bistro car with my meal before I return to my seat for the rest of the journey. I know that, alternatively, you can take your food back to your seat and eat there, but sometimes I just want to chill with my food elsewhere. That aside, I believe that the additional seats they are gaining from the lack of two power cars (301 -> ~420) is plenty of revenue growth without the half bistro car. In addition, there is already a provision, as you've probably read, for the addition of (I'm guessing) two business cars in the future to increase trainset capacity by 33%. Honestly, I don't foresee the loss of half of a car (~30 or so seats) stemming from going from a half bistro to a full bistro to be a terrible problem.
30 seats is 7.5% of capacity, which is a fairly large ding, and with current Acela pricing and occupancy, is ~$15.88 in revenue per train mile (and, across the whole fleet, over the course of a year, is $16.8 million in lost revenue potential. This does assume a certain lack of elasticity of course.
 
I don't know, I sort of like the idea of chilling in a full bistro car with my meal before I return to my seat for the rest of the journey. I know that, alternatively, you can take your food back to your seat and eat there, but sometimes I just want to chill with my food elsewhere. That aside, I believe that the additional seats they are gaining from the lack of two power cars (301 -> ~420) is plenty of revenue growth without the half bistro car. In addition, there is already a provision, as you've probably read, for the addition of (I'm guessing) two business cars in the future to increase trainset capacity by 33%. Honestly, I don't foresee the loss of half of a car (~30 or so seats) stemming from going from a half bistro to a full bistro to be a terrible problem.
30 seats is 7.5% of capacity, which is a fairly large ding, and with current Acela pricing and occupancy, is ~$15.88 in revenue per train mile (and, across the whole fleet, over the course of a year, is $16.8 million in lost revenue potential. This does assume a certain lack of elasticity of course.
There must be another factor then, of course, to offset the potential loss in revenue that they are considering if they are exlporing pricing options for a full bistro.
 
. . . I sort of like the idea of chilling in a full bistro car with my meal . . . Honestly, I don't foresee the loss of half of a car (~30 or so seats) stemming from going from a half bistro to a full bistro to be a terrible problem.
30 seats is 7.5% of capacity, which is a fairly large ding, and with current Acela pricing and occupancy, is ~$15.88 in revenue per train mile (and, across the whole fleet, over the course of a year, is $16.8 million in lost revenue potential. . . .
There must be another factor then, of course, to offset the potential loss in revenue that they are considering if they are exlporing pricing options for a full bistro.
It would be a helluva thing if Amtrak went from making big

losses on food service to turning the bistro car into a profit center!

Couple other things: If they are increasing the number of seats

and passengers on the new Acelas, . . . [edited to remove error]

they'll need to increase the size of the bistro car simply to hold

the same ratio of total passengers/bistro seats. Going from ½ car

bistro to ⅔ car bistro seems silly, so might as well go whole hog.

Certainly the bistro car conveys an upscale image of comfort

and space that is an important marketing feature, so the bistro car

has value beyond the products and services offered therein.

One of the major advantages of rail travel over planes and cars

is that you can get up from your seat and walk a bit to stretch.

Going to the bistro car is a good excuse to take that walk and

loosen up. Simply going to the john, or walking aimlessly from

one end of the coach to another, is boring, and it doesn't fill

that need to reward yourself.

I'm impressed by the figures Paulus provides on the potential

foregone revenue. But if Amtrak runs the numbers and goes

with a full-car bistro, I won't be angry about it.
 
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. . . Amtrak cannot use the same surplus from Acela to both cross-subsidize LD

and use as collateral for loans. So . . . they will have to find money from elsewhere

to pay for LD operations.
Eh, just speed up the LDs until they're profitable. :)

OK, OK, I kid, I kid. . . . The Boardman presentation with direct costs was

very illuminating. A lot of the "costs" we see are actually overhead

which can only be covered by expanding operations. . . .

Only some of the trains require large operating subsidies (CZ, SL, SWC),

and even there it's only parts of their routes (Denver-Chicago is pretty good

financially, Denver-San Francisco is horrible). . . .

Anyway, sparked a lot of interesting thoughts . . .
Sorry, Nathanael, but I missed this post back in December.

It sparked some thoughts on mine, tho, when I did read it.

But to comment here would go completely off-Acela-topic.

Would you please post your comment to start a new thread?

(I could start one quoting you a lot, but that seems clumsy.)
 
Amtrak also tends to like one-car one-purpose for their single-level trains. Bilevel cars can have two "purposes" given that upstairs and downstairs are basically two cars.
 
Whole car Bistros, half car, or two thirds, whatever -- the steel enemas that are supposed to pass for seating, and the tiny tables, gotta go.

Suggestions: use the Amdinettes and/or Viewliner Diners as models, also the Metroliner Conference Car #9800 has very nice seating for two or four that is comfortable and has a small footprint on taking up space inside. Also, crescent bench seating that clashes on the Cross Country Cafes would work nicely on this high speed train, because it's a short-medium distance corridor route and not one that will see the same passenger visit three or more times during his or her overnight journey.
 
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Amtrak also seems to generally want one car to have one purpose, at least on single-level trains. Note the long-standing trend against BC or coach in snack/cafe cars, even where doing so could pull in another slab of revenue.
 
How much cross-subsidy is there anyway? Do we have a good guess?

Isn't this one of the areas where the famed Amtrak accounting may

obscure the view? LOL.
Several hundred million dollars, from what I can tell. Per the September 2013 Monthly Performance Report, you have the following contributions/losses excluding capital charges:Acela: $245.4m before OPEBs, $236.9m after OPEBs

Regional: $143.7m before OPEBs, $133m after OPEBs

Short Corridors: ($158.3m) before OPEBs, ($180.8m) after OPEBs

LD Trains: ($593.8m) before OPEBs, ($627.1m) after OPEBs

Total: ($360.0m) before OPEBs, ($435.0m) after OPEBs.

Total sans Corridors: ($201.7m) before OPEBs, ($254.2m) after OPEBs

Put another way, the NEC as a whole is arguably picking up 2/3 of the tab for the LD trains.
Unfortunately, about 1/3 to 2/3 of the "costs" on most of those trains are unavoidable overhead, so the overhead allocation completely muddies the picture. And we don't know how Amtrak chose to allocate overhead.
Some of the long-distance trains look worse than they should due to allocation of overhead. Others look better. We got a clue about "direct costs" from that one Boardman presentation. But The Acela and Regionals may also be artificially inflated in profitability by allocation of *less* overhead than appropriate, and we don't have a clue about "direct costs" there.

I don't think we can get a good picture of the actual cross-subsidy unless we have numbers without overhead attached. Key questions for me:

- Does the NEC actually cover the overhead necessary to run it? If we (very roughly) count half of all costs as being overhead, then it doesn't cover all the system overhead. *Some* of the overhead isn't necessary for the NEC -- but how much?

- Is the federal government actually subsidizing the overhead for the system, as well as the direct operating costs of the long-distance trains? If so, I can't call it a cross-subsidy.

The dominance of overhead, financially speaking, leads to a few straightfoward conclusions. It means that the only sensible way for Amtrak to go forward is to expand the system while using the same overhead -- i.e. longer trains, extra frequencies on the same routes, etc. Obstreperousness by the freight railroads means that extra frequencies are quite difficult for routes where the state government has not gotten involved. To get back to the initial topic here, running more and longer Acelas is a sensible response to the dominance of overhead.
 
In this discussion is the concept of "allocated cost" being conflated with "overhead cost"? If so that will lead to confusion in analysis, since all allocated costs are not overhead. There are the variable allocated costs that would disappear from the overall account if a train does not run. The fixed costs will not. It would help to clearly identify what exactly is being talked about when the term "overhead" is used.
 
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