AS Flight1282: Another Boeing 737 MAX crisis

[flitcraft]

On the anti-icing system problem, it already exists in some existing Boeing planes approved by the FAA for flight. Boeing and the FAA's rationale for allowing this is that pilots are aware of the issue and can turn the system on and off as needed. Unfortunately, all it takes is one flight crew forgetting this, which could easily happen if other matters interrupted their attention, and you could have a nacelle damaged and a crash result. There isn't even a warning light that would remind pilots to do this. And the FAA has given Boeing till 2026 to get the anti-icing system fixed in the planes we are flying on now.

The problem with monopolies like Boeing (or duopolies, factoring in Airbus) is not just that they are too big to fail, they are too critical to the economy to regulate effectively. While even in the most enthusiastic railfan's imagination Amtrak could not cover for a protracted grounding of all of the potentially unsafe planes out there, isn't having some redundancy in the transportation sector a national security matter?

 

[jis]

The one problem I can see with a 757 is that the taller landing gear will cause the cabin floor and door ways to be higher. No problem in the USA with most airports having jet ways. However, in third world countries some portable stairs might not reach floor 757 level.

You mean third world country airports like London Heathrow where we in a 777 were put in a remote stand and then got to get off the plane with cabin baggage in tow, down long stairs to board a bus to the terminal? Why would it be a problem? A 757 is not as high as a 777. Incidentally I have done the same from a 747 at the same airport. Way back in the past such was a regular thing at Hong Kong Kai Tak which had very few aerobridge gates, and mostly remote stands. Been there done that after enjoying the famous Checkerboard Approach.

But there are several other reasons enumerated by others in this thread that made the 757 a non-starter.

 

[JamesWhitcombRiley]

Take it for what it's worth, but I perused Ed Pierson's 737 Max Incident Reports, and it seemed the most common raw, but official, reports and resolutions were:

• Engine readings.
• De-icing cockpit lights staying on, etc. (We know there's no timer.)
• Electrical issues, such as exit lights, often simple, but also cockpit displays that fritz.
• Doors that become too hard to open (adjusted/fixed).

Nothing about a door plug blowing out, by the way. The reports are from four US airlines.

I'm not claiming a real analysis, and it's from data compiled on a somewhat controversial site.

 

[WWW]

Take it for what it's worth, but I perused Ed Pierson's 737 Max Incident Reports, and it seemed the most common raw, but official, reports and resolutions were:

• Engine readings.
• De-icing cockpit lights staying on, etc. (We know there's no timer.)
• Electrical issues, such as exit lights, often simple, but also cockpit displays that fritz.
• Doors that become too hard to open (adjusted/fixed).

Nothing about a door plug blowing out, by the way. The reports are from four US airlines.

I'm not claiming a real analysis, and it's from data compiled on a somewhat controversial site.

Who else flies the 737-900 MAX ? And overwater ?
Perhaps none of those fly overwater for a distance that Alaska Airlines does ?
Still yet flying between cities 300 or so miles apart you will be flying at a altitude
that may easily pop the plug hatch with defective hardware and/or assembly ?

 

[Trogdor]

The one problem I see with the 757 is…it’s too damn heavy, and therefore basically a non-starter as far as airlines are concerned (at max takeoff weight, it actually got “heavy” added to the callsign because ATC had to provide extra spacing for wake turbulence). There’s no new engine in its thrust class (40,000 pounds, vs. 28,000 pounds for the Leap-1B engine powering the 737 MAX, or even 34,000 pounds for the heaviest A321s). That extra weight and thrust (if a new engine were to magically become available) comes at significant cost (i.e., fuel burn), which carriers were not willing to accept.

Despite the desires of aviation fans, the 757 is, in a way, like the 747 of narrowbodies. In other words, it was popular because for a long time it was the only plane in its class that could perform many of the routes airlines wanted it to do (for years, it was the only twin-engined narrowbody that could fly transcontinental US nonstop flights). It’s not that airlines wanted such a bulky plane, it’s that it was the only one available.

It should be telling that as soon as the A320 and 737NG came on the scene, 757 orders dropped almost to zero (and, after 9/11, literally to zero). Seriously, look at the order history. After 1990, it was pathetic.

It’s not because “Boeing priced the 737 cheaper.” Boeing had no reason to undersell their own product (how would that make any sense?). But, instead, the 737NG did most of what the 757 could do for a fraction of the operating cost, and airlines couldn’t justify the higher cost for what really amounted to a small percentage of their network that would take advantage of what the 757 offered. If Boeing didn’t do it with the 737NG, then Airbus would have taken over a lot sooner.

When Boeing isn’t an organizational mess, they can basically build as many 737s in two years as they built 757s in 25 years. In fact, the only Boeing-designed commercial jet type (i.e., not planes they inherited from McDonnell Douglas) that sold worse than the 757 was the 707 (and the 757 only edged out the latter by 40 planes total).

Romanticizing aside, the 757 was commercially a mediocre performer that was only “good” because its competition was 707s, DC8s, 727s, and either narrowbodies with too-short range, or too-expensive widebodies. Once the A320 and 737 grew into a 150-plus seat transcontinental plane, that’s where the airlines turned their focus, and they never looked back.

The 737 MAX isn’t even a fundamentally bad design. There’s nothing in the design that is causing Boeing and their contractors to build fuselages with hundreds of reported defects per year (this is, after all, basically the same fuselage they’ve been building for decades). There’s nothing in the design that is causing Boeing to shortcut the reporting of addressing those defects. And there’s nothing in a new design that would magically make them start building planes better (787, anyone?). Instead, they’ve screwed things up so many times because the company itself is in crisis, and has been for about 2.5 decades, and in that time, they’ve basically forgotten how to do the one thing that they do: build planes.

 

[B757Guy]

The one problem I see with the 757 is…it’s too damn heavy, and therefore basically a non-starter as far as airlines are concerned (at max takeoff weight, it actually got “heavy” added to the callsign because ATC had to provide extra spacing for wake turbulence). There’s no new engine in its thrust class (40,000 pounds, vs. 28,000 pounds for the Leap-1B engine powering the 737 MAX, or even 34,000 pounds for the heaviest A321s). That extra weight and thrust (if a new engine were to magically become available) comes at significant cost (i.e., fuel burn), which carriers were not willing to accept.

Despite the desires of aviation fans, the 757 is, in a way, like the 747 of narrowbodies. In other words, it was popular because for a long time it was the only plane in its class that could perform many of the routes airlines wanted it to do (for years, it was the only twin-engined narrowbody that could fly transcontinental US nonstop flights). It’s not that airlines wanted such a bulky plane, it’s that it was the only one available.

It should be telling that as soon as the A320 and 737NG came on the scene, 757 orders dropped almost to zero (and, after 9/11, literally to zero). Seriously, look at the order history. After 1990, it was pathetic.

It’s not because “Boeing priced the 737 cheaper.” Boeing had no reason to undersell their own product (how would that make any sense?). But, instead, the 737NG did most of what the 757 could do for a fraction of the operating cost, and airlines couldn’t justify the higher cost for what really amounted to a small percentage of their network that would take advantage of what the 757 offered. If Boeing didn’t do it with the 737NG, then Airbus would have taken over a lot sooner.

When Boeing isn’t an organizational mess, they can basically build as many 737s in two years as they built 757s in 25 years. In fact, the only Boeing-designed commercial jet type (i.e., not planes they inherited from McDonnell Douglas) that sold worse than the 757 was the 707 (and the 757 only edged out the latter by 40 planes total).

Romanticizing aside, the 757 was commercially a mediocre performer that was only “good” because its competition was 707s, DC8s, 727s, and either narrowbodies with too-short range, or too-expensive widebodies. Once the A320 and 737 grew into a 150-plus seat transcontinental plane, that’s where the airlines turned their focus, and they never looked back.

The 737 MAX isn’t even a fundamentally bad design. There’s nothing in the design that is causing Boeing and their contractors to build fuselages with hundreds of reported defects per year (this is, after all, basically the same fuselage they’ve been building for decades). There’s nothing in the design that is causing Boeing to shortcut the reporting of addressing those defects. And there’s nothing in a new design that would magically make them start building planes better (787, anyone?). Instead, they’ve screwed things up so many times because the company itself is in crisis, and has been for about 2.5 decades, and in that time, they’ve basically forgotten how to do the one thing that they do: build planes.

Lots of misinformation here as it pertains to the 757. Orders for the aircraft after 1990 were certainly NOT pathetic in any way. As for the weight and heavy designation, unfortunately, you are wrong there as well. 757's have their own separation standards and are not classified as heavy aircraft. (they had been designated as heavy briefly, but have not been for 15 years)

For reference, I flew the 75/76 for almost 16 years before moving to the 777. Further, the A320 and A321, and all versions of 737NG (non MAX) have been making transcontinental flights for the past 20-some years now.

 

[Bob Dylan]

Lots of misinformation here as it pertains to the 757. Orders for the aircraft after 1990 were certainly NOT pathetic in any way. As for the weight and heavy designation, unfortunately, you are wrong there as well. 757's have their own separation standards and are not classified as heavy aircraft. (they had been designated as heavy briefly, but have not been for 15 years)

For reference, I flew the 75/76 for almost 16 years before moving to the 777. Further, the A320 and A321, and all versions of 737NG (non MAX) have been making transcontinental flights for the past 20-some years now.

From someone who knows!

Thanks!

 

[Tlcooper44]

You mean third world country airports like London Heathrow where we in a 777 were put in a remote stand and then got to get off the plane with cabin baggage in tow, down long stairs to board a bus to the terminal? Why would it be a problem? A 757 is not as high as a 777. Incidentally I have done the same from a 747 at the same airport. Way back in the past such was a regular thing at Hong Kong Kai Tak which had very few aerobridge gates, and mostly remote stands. Been there done that after enjoying the famous Checkerboard Approach.

But there are several other reasons enumerated by others in this thread that made the 757 a non-starter.

In Doha, we walked down stairs from a 777 at a remote stand. Must be quite a sight to walk down from a 747.

 

[Bob Dylan]

In Doha, we walked down stairs from a 777 at a remote stand. Must be quite a sight to walk down from a 747.

Been there, done that!

 

[Brian Battuello]

You know how when you build Ikea furniture, you sometimes end up with a few extra pieces? So does Boeing....

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/06/...1.TU0.ima-.Nhn1yo1Dx1Wq&bgrp=t&smid=url-share

 

[Devil's Advocate]

Having outsourced the 737 fuselage to Spirit AeroSystems calling Boeing “The IKEA of aircraft manufacturers” does not sound so crazy.

 

[Alice]

You know how when you build Ikea furniture, you sometimes end up with a few extra pieces? So does Boeing....

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/06/...1.TU0.ima-.Nhn1yo1Dx1Wq&bgrp=t&smid=url-share

Thank you, Brian, for sharing the link in way so non-subscribers could read the article.

 

[Zahmed1094]

The one problem I see with the 757 is…it’s too damn heavy, and therefore basically a non-starter as far as airlines are concerned (at max takeoff weight, it actually got “heavy” added to the callsign because ATC had to provide extra spacing for wake turbulence). There’s no new engine in its thrust class (40,000 pounds, vs. 28,000 pounds for the Leap-1B engine powering the 737 MAX, or even 34,000 pounds for the heaviest A321s). That extra weight and thrust (if a new engine were to magically become available) comes at significant cost (i.e., fuel burn), which carriers were not willing to accept.

Despite the desires of aviation fans, the 757 is, in a way, like the 747 of narrowbodies. In other words, it was popular because for a long time it was the only plane in its class that could perform many of the routes airlines wanted it to do (for years, it was the only twin-engined narrowbody that could fly transcontinental US nonstop flights). It’s not that airlines wanted such a bulky plane, it’s that it was the only one available.

It should be telling that as soon as the A320 and 737NG came on the scene, 757 orders dropped almost to zero (and, after 9/11, literally to zero). Seriously, look at the order history. After 1990, it was pathetic.

It’s not because “Boeing priced the 737 cheaper.” Boeing had no reason to undersell their own product (how would that make any sense?). But, instead, the 737NG did most of what the 757 could do for a fraction of the operating cost, and airlines couldn’t justify the higher cost for what really amounted to a small percentage of their network that would take advantage of what the 757 offered. If Boeing didn’t do it with the 737NG, then Airbus would have taken over a lot sooner.

When Boeing isn’t an organizational mess, they can basically build as many 737s in two years as they built 757s in 25 years. In fact, the only Boeing-designed commercial jet type (i.e., not planes they inherited from McDonnell Douglas) that sold worse than the 757 was the 707 (and the 757 only edged out the latter by 40 planes total).

Romanticizing aside, the 757 was commercially a mediocre performer that was only “good” because its competition was 707s, DC8s, 727s, and either narrowbodies with too-short range, or too-expensive widebodies. Once the A320 and 737 grew into a 150-plus seat transcontinental plane, that’s where the airlines turned their focus, and they never looked back.

The 737 MAX isn’t even a fundamentally bad design. There’s nothing in the design that is causing Boeing and their contractors to build fuselages with hundreds of reported defects per year (this is, after all, basically the same fuselage they’ve been building for decades). There’s nothing in the design that is causing Boeing to shortcut the reporting of addressing those defects. And there’s nothing in a new design that would magically make them start building planes better (787, anyone?). Instead, they’ve screwed things up so many times because the company itself is in crisis, and has been for about 2.5 decades, and in that time, they’ve basically forgotten how to do the one thing that they do: build planes.

https://www.counterpunch.org/2024/02/07/the-downfall-of-boeing-its-planes-and-the-company/

 

[Brian Battuello]

No problem. I get 10 free NYT shares a month and I rarely use them all.

 

[UserNameRequired]

In Doha, we walked down stairs from a 777 at a remote stand. Must be quite a sight to walk down from a 747.

When Khrushchev visited the USA in 1959, I have read that there were no stairs to reach high enough for the TU-114 at Andrews. Picture of a TU-114 with I assume a Soviet set of stairs:

 

[JamesWhitcombRiley]

When Khrushchev visited the USA in 1959, I have read that there were no stairs to reach high enough for the TU-114 at Andrews. Picture of a TU-114 with I assume a Soviet set of stairs:
View attachment 35703

The writing on it says Aeroflot. According to Wiki Commons the photo was taken in Hungary, on the way to the 1959 Paris Air Show: The landing of the Tu-114 long-range passenger plane on its way to the Le Bourget air show in Budapest on June 5, 1959. Fortepan 84680.jpg Then someone didn't read the description carefully and put it on the Slovakian Wikipedia page for the Tu-114 as a picture from the Paris show.

The story of the plane at Andrews AFB, in a book called Khrushchev's Cold War, goes like this:

What was convenient for engines was inconvenient for passengers. As the airplane taxied along the tarmac at Andrews Air Force Base, the grounds crew realized that they did not have a ladder tall enough to accommodate this airship. Khrushchev and his party would have to descend using the emergency escape ladder in the back. “Therefore,” Khrushchev later recalled, “we had to leave the plane not in the formal, dignified way called for by protocol, but practically climbing down using our hands and legs.” [50]

The footnote is to a book by Strobe Talbot, Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament.

The NYT and WP tell a more tempered story. A platform was built, a "specially constructed alighting ramp." The plane was too wide for the taxiway, so parked on the runway, meaning Pres. Eisenhower had to walk 500 feet to greet Khrushchev, "beyond view of the spectators."

Propaganda was at a fever pitch, matched by wild optimism, in that Cold War way. The newspapers were verbose about the extraordinary visit, and many other things of the time. A sky writer drew a cross above DC in protest. Many of the stories were about technology, with wry comments about the plane having propellers, and delayed an hour by headwinds over the Atlantic. One said a crack in the fuselage was detected in Moscow, but Khrushchev went on anyway, though several identical planes were on the runway as cover against subterfuge. The day before, the big story was that a second Soviet probe had landed on the moon, so a missile concern, and the lesser concern of a supposed flag planted there. And the Soviets had an atomic icebreaker in the Arctic. The helicopter in which Ike and "Mr. K" toured DC gets a lot of mention. K was unsure of it, but Ike said he would be on it too.

 

[Brian Battuello]

And flying back to the subject, the NTSB preliminary report on AS 1282 is out:

https://www.flightradar24.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/AS1282-NTSB-Preliminary-Report.pdf

I don't think that's behind a paywall, but if it is, let me know and I'll find the original source.

It has some great details, but I'm surprised they didn't show the pictures of the plug as found on the ground. Still, they had the full story of the construction details and the maintenance before the accident. I was impressed with the pictures of the bent seats in the two rows nearest the exit. I'm updating my list of places I'd rather not be.

FWIW, the full Flightradar24 story on the incident has a lot more details in chronological order and is worth skimming:

https://www.flightradar24.com/blog/alaska-airlines-737-9-max-exit-door-separates-in-flight/

 

[Rover]

PBS Frontline Update on the door that blew out.
Begins at 45:26

 

[Brian Battuello]

I'm not sure which is worse in the news today.

First, a major Boeing whistleblower commits suicide shortly before a key court appearance. I'm not much of a conspiracy guy, but there's no doubt he'd still be alive if Boeing had treated him decently.

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/12/...e_code=1.cU0.Fg-O.3lSjyT3apSg7&smid=url-share

Second, Alaska Air disregarded the advice of their engineers and flew the plane away from their maintenance base for one last loop before checking on the pressurization problems, with the resulting blowout. Management is claiming that the issues didn't (quite) meet the standards for withdrawing the plane from service. They are technically correct but the jury is going to love it.

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/12/...e_code=1.cU0.OBln.d5amu2G0KjL9&smid=url-share

Both gifted from behind paywall. You're welcome. I need to go refill my popcorn...

 

[jis]

I'm not sure which is worse in the news today.

First, a major Boeing whistleblower commits suicide shortly before a key court appearance. I'm not much of a conspiracy guy, but there's no doubt he'd still be alive if Boeing had treated him decently.

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/12/...e_code=1.cU0.Fg-O.3lSjyT3apSg7&smid=url-share

Second, Alaska Air disregarded the advice of their engineers and flew the plane away from their maintenance base for one last loop before checking on the pressurization problems, with the resulting blowout. Management is claiming that the issues didn't (quite) meet the standards for withdrawing the plane from service. They are technically correct but the jury is going to love it.

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/12/...e_code=1.cU0.OBln.d5amu2G0KjL9&smid=url-share

Both gifted from behind paywall. You're welcome. I need to go refill my popcorn...

What is even more concerning to me is that Boeing either actually does not have any record of the removal and then reinstallation of that plug at its factory, or it has it and for some reason claims that it does not. At least so far it has not produced them even after multiple requests from the NTSB, I - not a conspiracy theory kinda person - am starting to wonder slowly what other records like installation of fake parts etc. they don;t have because, it is cheaper to use those. Boeing's loss of credibility is getting to the point that even the most forgiving person like me is starting to wonder whether it is time to start boycotting Boeing products built after it became McBoeing. The 787 manufacturing line has already developed quite a checkered reputation, in addition to the series of 737 fiascos.

 

[jiml]

What is even more concerning to me is that Boeing either actually does not have any record of the removal and then reinstallation of that plug at its factory, or it has it and for some reason claims that it does not. At least so far it has not produced them even after multiple requests from the NTSB, I - not a conspiracy theory kinda person - am starting to wonder slowly what other records like installation of fake parts etc. they don;t have because, it is cheaper to use those. Boeing's loss of credibility is getting to the point that even the most forgiving person like me is starting to wonder whether it is time to start boycotting Boeing products built after it became McBoeing. The 787 manufacturing line has already developed quite a checkered reputation, in addition to the series of 737 fiascos.

As someone with millions of flown miles, primarily on Boeing aircraft - a conscious decision over McDonnell-Douglas and later Airbus - it's sad to have to agree with your excellent summary of the current situation.

 

[Bob Dylan]

As someone with millions of flown miles, primarily on Boeing aircraft - a conscious decision over McDonnell-Douglas and later Airbus - it's sad to have to agree with your excellent summary of the current situation.

Ditto!!!

 

[Matthew H Fish]

There was one thing I was trying to find a way to say earlier, both in this thread, and in the thread I made about the economics of low cost airlines. Some of the discussions went into the weeds a bit, but I've found a single phrase to simplify my position:

There is no such thing as a free lunch.

It now looks like a systemic problem at Boeing, not just a maintenance accident.
When I asked how low cost carriers could recoup the cost of a $100 million airplane, people said they don't pay the list price---that they often get them at a steep discount. Well, if a company is selling a $100 million airplane for $50 million---something has to give. Of course there are one-off cases of overproduction and the like, but when a business model constantly pressures ticket prices down, and that pressures aircraft prices down, something has to give.

 

[Rover]

PBS Newshour Report

Boeing remains on the hot seat over questions about its production processes. The head of the National Transportation Safety Board told lawmakers her investigators still don’t know who worked on the door panel that blew out of an Alaska Airlines flight. Meanwhile, NYT reported Boeing and a key supplier failed a number of audits. Aviation correspondent Miles O’Brien spoke on what went wrong.



New details emerge in case of Alaska Airlines plane where door plug blew out
The NTSB said Boeing is blocking it from getting all the information it needs.

https://abcnews.go.com/US/boeing-ov...tage-door-plug-repair-ntsb/story?id=108084196

 

[JamesWhitcombRiley]

The earlier reporting and blogging (Foundation for Aviation Safety, but Ed Pierson has his own website as well), and commenting (Seattle Times) said that Boeing has two systems to log work. The door plug went into the the less serious system, over the objections of some workers. If that is all correct, I'm mystified by the "no records" claim. Maybe the second log can be erased, or only had sporadic notes. Unlike on a financial trading floor, phone calls are probably not recorded.

Speaking of which, the short term concern for the stock price, assuming there was one, did not pan out.