Brightline Trains Florida discussion

[user 1215]

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Implies that the $79/$149 fares will be increasing?

I don't think it implies it at all. I think it's blunt. These are "starting" and "introductory" prices. They'll adjust as market allows.

 

[jis]

As of June 15....

https://www.thenextmiami.com/tri-rails-first-ever-train-to-downtown-miami-approved-for-next-week/

 

[Anderson]

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View attachment 32851
Implies that the $79/$149 fares will be increasing?

My interpretation is that they'll "pin" the fares to 79/149 for a little while at the start, but those will just be the "base" fares longer-term and higher "buckets" will come into play.

[Lower ones might as well for far-off-peak runs that act to position trains.]

 

[blueman271]

As of June 15....

https://www.thenextmiami.com/tri-rails-first-ever-train-to-downtown-miami-approved-for-next-week/

Millions of dollars and years overdue for 8 miles of existing track and a single new station. Typical south Florida incompetence. Still wonder which happens first, Amtrak to MIA, Tri-Rail to downtown, or a Dolphins playoff victory?

 

[Brian_tampa]

Millions of dollars and years overdue for 8 miles of existing track and a single new station. Typical south Florida incompetence. Still wonder which happens first, Amtrak to MIA, Tri-Rail to downtown, or a Dolphins playoff victory?

Some of the delay can be attributed to Brightline/FECR changing the PTC system as well as changing the dispatching requirements. As far as the delay running test trains, I am not sure if it was negotiations that were tough to agree on by all 3 parties or what was the cause. I would think that since the initial agreement was signed way back in 2017 or maybe 2016, TriRail/Brightline/FECR would have been further along on the test train procedures and had an agreement in place already.

 

[jis]

Some of the delay can be attributed to Brightline/FECR changing the PTC system as well as changing the dispatching requirements. As far as the delay running test trains, I am not sure if it was negotiations that were tough to agree on by all 3 parties or what was the cause. I would think that since the initial agreement was signed way back in 2017 or maybe 2016, TriRail/Brightline/FECR would have been further along on the test train procedures and had an agreement in place already.

They had some loading gauge issues which required modification of platforms and TriRail cars around the doors. That probably took a while.

 

[Brian_tampa]

They had some loading gauge issues which required modification of platforms and TriRail cars around the doors. That probably took a while.

Yes. It took some time to resolve that too. I am not sure that was a TriRail issue or an error on the part of the engineering team hired by Brightline to design the platforms. In addition, the approach bridge designs were questioned as far as maximum load stress on the spans at maximum speed. The consulting engineer, who I believe was not involved in the project, raised issues with the design of the bridge spans and the proper loading factor based on AAR design standards for freight railroad bridge designs. He claimed 200% load was the minimum safe design versus what Brightline said was appropriate for a high speed passenger rail service of 120% load factor design.

 

[Brian_tampa]

https://www.trains.com/trn/news-rev...es-elsewhere-realities-of-railroad-operation/
Seems the USCG has not followed the precedent set at the New River drawbridge in Fort Lauderdale. There seems to be a whiff of politics in this decision.

 

[cirdan]

Yes. It took some time to resolve that too. I am not sure that was a TriRail issue or an error on the part of the engineering team hired by Brightline to design the platforms. In addition, the approach bridge designs were questioned as far as maximum load stress on the spans at maximum speed. The consulting engineer, who I believe was not involved in the project, raised issues with the design of the bridge spans and the proper loading factor based on AAR design standards for freight railroad bridge designs. He claimed 200% load was the minimum safe design versus what Brightline said was appropriate for a high speed passenger rail service of 120% load factor design.

Obviously there are always unpredictable issues that can occur during any construction project. A sinkhole might open or a find of archeological interest be discovered or the shape of the building cause some weird turbulence or the windows cause some freak light reflection that sets people's cars on fire as happened in London once,

But the weight of existing train cars and their loading gauge are known factors that one really shouldn't get wrong.

 

[jis]

Obviously there are always unpredictable issues that can occur during any construction project. A sinkhole might open or a find of archeological interest be discovered or the shape of the building cause some weird turbulence or the windows cause some freak light reflection that sets people's cars on fire as happened in London once,

But the weight of existing train cars and their loading gauge are known factors that one really shouldn't get wrong.

Of course. But if you don't know which cars will be placed on the viaduct it might be an issue. In this case the viaduct was constructed originally for Brightline trains which are much lighter modern stock, when no one knew that TriRail would want to run its 20th Century style much heavier multi-level trains on it. That caused an outage from the original design, which was easily fixed with additional strengthening. Such is not unheard of and is indeed quite common as older infrastructure is upgraded for use by heavier trains.

As usual it got politicized in the charged atmosphere of Florida and Miami as every politician and half-informed correspondents looking to fulfill their number of articles quotas, sought out possible opportunities for one upmanship. There were a couple of well informed articles, but most were laughable. But that issue got resolved much before the shaving of platform edges and changing out door plates on TriRail cars could be effected to fix the loading gauge problems.

 

[cirdan]

Of course. But if you don't know which cars will be placed on the viaduct it might be an issue. In this case the viaduct was constructed originally for Brightline trains which are much lighter modern stock, when no one knew that TriRail would want to run its 20th Century style much heavier multi-level trains on it. That caused an outage from the original design, which was easily fixed with additional strengthening. Such is not unheard of and is indeed quite common as older infrastructure is upgraded for use by heavier trains.

As usual it got politicized in the charged atmosphere of Florida and Miami as every politician and half-informed correspondents looking to fulfill their number of articles quotas, sought out possible opportunities for one upmanship. There were a couple of well informed articles, but most were laughable. But that issue got resolved much before the shaving of platform edges and changing out door plates on TriRail cars could be effected to fix the loading gauge problems.

Wasn't the plan to share the station with TriRail there already when the station was constructed?

Or in other words, if the platforms presently earmarked for TriRail were not actually intended for TriRail use, then why were they built as low level platforms?

It seems to me this explanation make things worse, not better.

 

[jis]

Wasn't the plan to share the station with TriRail there already when the station was constructed?

Or in other words, if the platforms presently earmarked for TriRail were not actually intended for TriRail use, then why were they built as low level platforms?

It seems to me this explanation make things worse, not better.

The design of the viaduct had been finalized before Tri Rail came into the picture. Accommodation was kept in the foundation for the TriRail addition, but when the original station construction started it was focused on the three track Brightline station stating that accommodation is made for future extension for TriRail use. Then construction was delayed by a year or two and the TriRail extension was added before the original station construction was completed. Additionally, TriRail was not in a position to enter serious discussions since they had no funding to do so. So Brightline spitballed and added the station without final information about the parameters it must meet knowing that things might need fixing up when TriRail finally engages. Even after TriRail engaged they did not provide all the necessary information. It was only at the 11th hour that TriRail management woke up to the fact that there were issues that need addressing. This caused much finger pointing within TriRail and their management underwent a shakeup as a result, and that is when TriRail got truly serious and started working with Brightline to actually do the necessary fix up, which involved making changes to the viaduct, shaving platform edges and modifying the door plates in TriRail rolling stock.

These bureaucratic faux pas by public agencies is not unusual. For example FDOT forgot to ask for and Amtrak, forgot to provide the necessary information to FDOT on what was necessary at MIC at the Airport, so FDOT went off and built something. And then Amtrak walked in and that led to modification of the road layout around the station and still sits with arguably an inadequate platform. Of course the insufficient head house issue still remains and Amtrak has still not said that it wants a change. Their position is they will make do with whatever is there, so there will never be a Metropolitan Club in Miami and many passengers will have to wait outside. And needless to say Amtrak has still not managed to move in. It is over a decade now.

And the ultimate poster child of such is on the East Side Access (LIRR and Amtrak, New York), Harold Interlocking and Amtrak Bypass, which was delayed over a decade and still counting for the Bypass, and ran up enormous cost over runs, while MTA and Amtrak pointlessly arm wrestled each other.

These would appear to be pretty standard pattern in the US. but I digress.

 

[cirdan]

Even after TriRail engaged they did not provide all the necessary information. It was only at the 11th hour that TriRail management woke up to the fact that there were issues that need addressing. This caused much finger pointing within TriRail and their management underwent a shakeup as a result, and that is when TriRail got truly serious and started working with Brightline to actually do the necessary fix up, which involved making changes to the viaduct, shaving platform edges and modifying the door plates in TriRail rolling stock.

Fair enough.

I would have thought the dimensions and weights of TriRail rolling stock and dimensions of platforms are in the public domain and would have been available to the planners even without full cooperation by TrIRail management.

But maybe that is expecting too much initiative.

 

[jis]

Fair enough.

I would have thought the dimensions and weights of TriRail rolling stock and dimensions of platforms are in the public domain and would have been available to the planners even without full cooperation by TrIRail management.

But maybe that is expecting too much initiative.

Approximations may be, but the actual numbers are not. The stuff on Wikipedia are not necessarily accurate for the purposes of designing anything, even though us armchair engineers got to town with them Who knows? maybe they did use some pubic domain numbers or best guesses. Remember the recent discussion about the power of ACL-42s and supplying HEP or not doing so? We all though we knew, but when asked in detail, apparently we did not, and the numbers are nowhere to be found outside of bilateral contracts!!!

 

[Brian_tampa]

Of course. But if you don't know which cars will be placed on the viaduct it might be an issue. In this case the viaduct was constructed originally for Brightline trains which are much lighter modern stock, when no one knew that TriRail would want to run its 20th Century style much heavier multi-level trains on it. That caused an outage from the original design, which was easily fixed with additional strengthening. Such is not unheard of and is indeed quite common as older infrastructure is upgraded for use by heavier trains.

As usual it got politicized in the charged atmosphere of Florida and Miami as every politician and half-informed correspondents looking to fulfill their number of articles quotas, sought out possible opportunities for one upmanship. There were a couple of well informed articles, but most were laughable. But that issue got resolved much before the shaving of platform edges and changing out door plates on TriRail cars could be effected to fix the loading gauge problems.

I never heard of remediation being done on the TriRail bridges to the Miami Central Station. Is there a link you can post to this work? I would be interested in seeing what was done. I always assumed that once a bridge was constructed, that it would be difficult to strengthen. These bridges use the Florida I beam construction design. So not sure how they can be strengthened.

 

[jis]

I never heard of remediation being done on the TriRail bridges to the Miami Central Station. Is there a link you can post to this work? I would be interested in seeing what was done. I always assumed that once a bridge was constructed, that it would be difficult to strengthen. These bridges use the Florida I beam construction design. So not sure how they can be strengthened.

I don’t know if any additional physical work was done to get them certified for the higher weight. The whole issue was discussed quite murkily, but whatever was necessary to get them certified for the higher weight was done apparently, since they are now certified apparently.

 

[Brian_tampa]

I don’t know if any additional physical work was done to get them caertified for the higher weight. The whole issue was discussed quite murkily, but wharever was necessary to get them certified for the higher weight was done apparently, since they are now certified apparently.

Yeah, the whole bridge loading issue has kind of been brushed aside and ignored. I follow Brightline extensively and never saw any reports of the bridges being certified for higher load ratings. I wonder if this is just the usual Florida way of doing business? I suppose a request for documents under the Sunshine law from FDOT or maybe the FRA (FOIA) might shed some light.

 

[jis]

https://www.progressiverailroading....ne-wraps-up-Orlando-route-construction--69514

 

[user 1215]

https://www.progressiverailroading....ne-wraps-up-Orlando-route-construction--69514

Yes, the single track extension is now complete. I hope to see bookings open sooner than 9/1.

I don't think I'd characterize it as "wrapped up". There is still a lot of work going on along the entire route from WPB to MCO. There are many activities related to double tracking all the way. I had previously wondered why they already installed signals for two sets of tracks along 528 when only a single set was being built. Its almost as if there is going to be double track for a good chunk of the route - except for overpasses.

On another note, I got to see for the first time yesterday, Brightline pulling out of MCO. I was parallel to it for a short time as it was going pretty slow. I passed it and wondered if I was going to see it fly by me. By the time I got to Innovation Way, it zipped by. I don't think it was going 120, but 90 would be my guess.

Anyone have a timetable with the speed limits for Cocoa-Orlando?

 

[Brian_tampa]

Yes, the single track extension is now complete. I hope to see bookings open sooner than 9/1.

I don't think I'd characterize it as "wraps up". There is still a lot of work going on along the entire route from WPB to MCO. There are many activities related to double tracking all the way. I had previously wondered why they already installed signals for two sets of tracks along 528 when only a single set was being built. Its almost as if there is going to be double track for a good chunk of the route - except for overpasses.

On another note, I got to see for the first time yesterday, Brightline pulling out of MCO. I was parallel to it for a short time as it was going pretty slow. I passed it and wondered if I was going to see it fly by me. By the time I got to Innovation Way, it zipped by. I don't think it was going 120, but 90 would be my guess.

Anyone have a timetable with the speed limits for Cocoa-Orlando?

Here you go... it contains a track chart with maximum speeds for each segment. This document is Brightline's PTC development plan.

 

[jis]

I just got my ticket for Brightline trip from Orlando to Miami and back on 2nd September.

Even the first run 5am on Sept 1 is available but I am past the stage where I would drive out at 3:30am to try to catch that train

BTW, the Brightline web site is extremely broken in many ways. In particular, it is a good idea to either print out the ticket or at least jot down the ticket number so as to be able to find the thing on the website later.

 

[user 1215]

Here you go... it contains a track chart with maximum speeds for each segment. This document is Brightline's PTC development plan.

Thanks! This is what I've gathered from that info. Average speed will be right at 60MPH:

Miles from Cocoa	Speed	Time in Block (Min:Sec)
38.97​	30​	0:36​
38.67​	20​	0:19​
38.56​	35​	1:48​
36.93​	30​	1:02​
35.91​	50​	0:19​
35.64​	60​	0:32​
35.1​	70​	0:18​
34.75​	90​	4:02​
30.21​	100​	0:26​
29.48​	125​	19:14​
10.26​	120​	1:34​
9.14​	125​	2:11​
6.67​	100​	1:41​
5.54​	70​	0:43​
4.7​	80​	0:27​
4.1​	90​	2:24​
2.01​	65​	1:16​
0.64​	60​	0:38​
0​
	Total Time Cocoa - MCO:	39:30

 

[George Harris]

They had some loading gauge issues which required modification of platforms and TriRail cars around the doors. That probably took a while.

Yes. It took some time to resolve that too. I am not sure that was a TriRail issue or an error on the part of the engineering team hired by Brightline to design the platforms. In addition, the approach bridge designs were questioned as far as maximum load stress on the spans at maximum speed. The consulting engineer, who I believe was not involved in the project, raised issues with the design of the bridge spans and the proper loading factor based on AAR design standards for freight railroad bridge designs. He claimed 200% load was the minimum safe design versus what Brightline said was appropriate for a high speed passenger rail service of 120% load factor design.

There appears to be some confusion here between "Loading Gauge" and structural capacity. Loading Gauge means defined clearances. There are usually two parts to this: Structural outlines and distances to other facilities, and then such things as platform offsets. For structural capacity the defining values are found in AREMA. (American Railway and Maintenance of Way Association) manuals. The AAR (Association of American Railroads) defines clearances and weights for vehicles, primarily for freight cars. Here is where we find such animals as "Plate C", etc. Generally rapid transit systems each have their own sets of standards both for clearances and for structural capacity. Since TriRail operates on the former SAL and other railroad lines and would be using standard railroad equipment for maintenance, it would seem that they would be following AREMA standards for structural loading. As to this "Consulting Engineer" who was not involved in the project: What is his basis for his claims? Would he even know a good railroad if he fell over it? There are always people like this wandering around making such claims. This is 200% or 120% of what? A year or so ago there was someone running around in California claiming there were defects in the design standards that could cause derailments. No details given. Being as I wrote the alignment standards, including details, it would be interesting to know the basis of his claims. If they are true then I should turn in my PE license, but it seems that all the systems I have worked on are doing nicely, including the Taiwan HSR, could it be that he does not know what he is talking about?

However, I will add that over the years I have see quite a few "why on earth did they do it that way" things, and I will admit to a few, OK that works, but I should have done it differently things, some of which still bug me.

 

[bonzoesc]

I just got my ticket for Brightline trip from Orlando to Miami and back on 2nd September.

Even the first run 5am on Sept 1 is available but I am past the stage where I would drive out at 3:30am to try to catch that train

BTW, the Brightline web site is extremely broken in many ways. In particular, it is a good idea to either print out the ticket or at least jot down the ticket number so as to be able to find the thing on the website later.

Nice re: the trip, I'm hoping to take it to an event in Orlando not long after that.

The website is pretty frustrating (sent them an email about how annoying it used to be to rebook the last-mile transportation if your train schedule changed), but I've never had an issue with a ticket disappearing from my account, ones from September and October 2022 are still there.

 

[jis]

Nice re: the trip, I'm hoping to take it to an event in Orlando not long after that.

The website is pretty frustrating (sent them an email about how annoying it used to be to rebook the last-mile transportation if your train schedule changed), but I've never had an issue with a ticket disappearing from my account, ones from September and October 2022 are still there.

Well they lost my entire account. So that is there too