I think the railfans's like Claytor because of his former years on The Southern, where he maintained fine service on their remaining trains, as well as supporting the steam excursion trains. But he was also a skillful politician, who knew how to play the game, manipulating Congress to open the purse-strings a bit wider, or raise public ire with threatened discontinuances in their districts.... That was the problem with former Amtrak CEO, Paul Reistrup....he was an excellent passenger train supporter, but lacked political skills necessary for an Amtrak CEO....
We gonna discuss Amtrak CEOs?
My ratings:
Roger Lewis (1971–1974) -- made the biggest mistake in Amtrak's history. When asked what Amtrak would do with a billion dollars, he said they couldn't use it. (Seriously -- "We'd buy some tracks from Penn Central and make them high speed" -- why was that so hard?). Apart from that, however, it seems he did OK.
Paul Reistrup (1974–1978) -- did very well in many ways, as far as I can tell. Seems to have presided over the introduction of Amfleets and ordered the Superliners; also got the NEC & Keystone Corridors for Amtrak. The national Amtrak network in 1978 was a pretty decent one, and it would be a pretty reasonable goal for restoration of national routes. Government funding went up... but so did service levels. He did this in an atmosphere of slightly-rising ridership.
Alan Stephenson Boyd (1978–1982) -- ruinously awful, probably the worst. Maybe that's what his bosses wanted, though. The Carter Cuts and a bunch of other really bad cuts happened under him; perhaps he was hired as a hatchetman, I don't know. The network in 1982 was a mess which had lost a lot of key links; ridership collapsed. He inherited a railroad in decent condition and handed over a wreck.
W. Graham Claytor, Jr. (1982–1993) -- did really quite well for a very long time on a shoestring. Left quite a bit of a mess for Downs, though. Ridership was up.
Thomas Downs (1993–1998) -- awful. He recognized many of the problems he'd inherited, and he was well-meaning, but he didn't know how to fix them, and made quite a lot of things worse. He tried "three a week everywhere", among other things, and service quality cuts. He ordered the Acelas, which was good, but the procurement was a mess. The infamous "Glide Path" to profit is from a Downs speech. The ridership drops during this period are also noticeable.
George Warrington (1998–2002) -- did his best cleaning up after Downs. Made a lot of questionable and controversial "Hail Mary" moves -- some failed (the freight & express), others succeeded (he got a lot more federal funding than Downs did), others are debatable (the borrowing, which I consider a success but was a pain to get out from under later). Ridership was up.
David L. Gunn (2002–2005) -- also did his best cleaning up after Downs and Warrington. Made some questionable decisions (should never have cut the Three Rivers), but on the whole OK. Ridership was up.
David Hughes (interim) (2005–2006) -- did nothing, which is desirable for "interim"
Alexander Kummant (2006–2008) -- attempted to stay the course (which is OK)
William Crosbie (interim) -- did nothing, which is desirable for "interim"
Joseph H. Boardman (2008–present) -- did pretty well, on the whole, despite (as usual) some questionable decisions. Ridership has been up.
---
When people are ragging on -- or praising -- Amtrak CEOs, I'm not sure why nobody ever talks about the Alan Boyd or Thomas Downs administrations, which were the two most clear disaster periods for Amtrak. Every Amtrak buff has opinions about Claytor and Warrington and Gunn and Boardman, and often Reistrup and Kummant as well. People just don't seem to talk about Boyd or Downs at *all*. Honestly, I think all the others did a pretty decent job; for those two, the best I can do is to make excuses.