New York City Subway derailment 1/4/24

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find it odd that no one has mentioned that unless one train ran a stop signal, it could only mean a faulty track circuit.
as has happened at Marble hill a long time ago on Metro North
The article says the second train had only four workers on board. This might suggest it was some sort of service move, maybe for operator instruction or training or infrastructure inspection possibly, or maybe even to attend to some problem on the line. Either way, this may have led to some switching operation or use of rare track that may have been contributory to the problem.

Just speculating of course, but I think it is an interesting detail that one of the trains involved was clearly not a regular move.
 
The article says the second train had only four workers on board. This might suggest it was some sort of service move, maybe for operator instruction or training or infrastructure inspection possibly, or maybe even to attend to some problem on the line. Either way, this may have led to some switching operation or use of rare track that may have been contributory to the problem.

Just speculating of course, but I think it is an interesting detail that one of the trains involved was clearly not a regular move.
From the article:
The out-of-service train had been stuck because someone pulled a number of emergency stop cords and the workers were on board to reset the brake cords, said Richard Davey, president of New York City transit for the MTA.
 
NTSB briefing describes in great detail exactly what occurred (but not why):
  1. Train consisted of 2 5-car trainsets coupled together
  2. Unruly passenger pulled emergency brake on multiple cars
  3. Crew tried to reset brakes, but 3rd car brakes would not reset
  4. Crew was instructed to cut out brakes and power in 1st 5 cars, and proceed to yard
  5. Passengers were evacuated to station platform
  6. Operator was in cab in 6th car; 2 crew members were "up front" as "eyes & ears"
  7. Train passed 2 Approach signals and 1 Home signal (signal status is undetermined at this time)
  8. Train struck the in-service train at a crossover exiting the station
Description of incident starts at 3:05

 
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Very interesting accident. Are shove moves common on the MTA? I used to do shove moves all the time at a tourist railroad and we had lots of rules like calling switches and signals, calling the number of cars clear, etc. - I'm wondering if shove moves are so rare, that the crew was confused or didn't establish proper communication - and of course with no working brakes the crew directing the shove couldn't stop the train.
 
Very interesting accident. Are shove moves common on the MTA? I used to do shove moves all the time at a tourist railroad and we had lots of rules like calling switches and signals, calling the number of cars clear, etc. - I'm wondering if shove moves are so rare, that the crew was confused or didn't establish proper communication - and of course with no working brakes the crew directing the shove couldn't stop the train.
It's also possible, as one of the reporters asked in the Q&A, that the mechanical brake trip that's activated when a train runs a signal had absolutely no effect, as there were no brakes in the lead 5 cars. The NTSB head said they didn't know yet.
 
With a 5-car train why does the inability to reset the brake system of one car cause all brakes on the 5 cars to not be operable? That makes no sense from a design point of view.
 
These are link-barred 5 car sets. The couplers, cabs, and trip cocks in the intermediate 51' R62 cars have long since been stripped. Only the lead truck in the lead car in each set has a tripc0ck. Brakes were cut out in the first 5 cars. By the time the 6th car would hit the trip arm and stop, 255 feet of train were ahead of it and fowled the interlocking. Rules to proceed were broken. Trucks were damaged beyond repair and cars have to be retrucked in the tunnel to move them.

This is a repeat of the 1970 IND Roosevelt Avenue disaster, but there it was dealing with married pairs of 60' R40 cars.

Many heads will roll for this one.
 
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IIRC the in service train was crossing over from the express track, which they used to get around the out of service train, to the local track. Sounds like the out of service train passed the stop signal before the interlocking and hit the in service train.
 
By the time the 6th car would hit the trip arm and stop, 255 feet of train were ahead of it and fowled the interlocking.
Not that you don't know this, but that only answers the question of why the E-brakes didn't stop the train when passing a signal. Did the flagmen fail to communicate? Did the flagmen understand the signals? Was there a failure with the communication system they were using?

And of course, as you also know... a shove move with half the trains breaks cut out should never have been attempted in the first place haha.
 
I have observed the trip arms retract once a train gets in its circuit. That is so it would not activate other car's stop trip. So, the pushing part of the train would have never encountered a raised trip arm.

Even if the trip arm stayed up, by the time the 6th car would have hit it, several of the front cars may have already have blocked the crossover.
 
Train operator who was in lead car recounts his experience:

(Note: initial footage is of a 2nd derailment that occurred on the Elevated at Coney Island.)



There's just a bit more of the interview in this later report:



Tragedy a young guy with kids is too traumatized to go back to work with a near death experience, needs a new career, and it was no fault of his at all.

This is a repeat of the Roosevelt Avenue accident in 1970 which was a fatal catastrophe with 2 subway cars pulverized (an R40 and an R16). One train was arranged as married pairs being driven from the 3rd car.

I am sure new rules will be put in place. If lead cars are not operable, they should have found another 5 car set to back into it, lead the 15 car train to the nearest siding or shop, and stop all service in that direction until that is all done.
 
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I find it sad that the linked report was written in a way to lead you to think the derailment was a far more important aspect of the event than the collision. Talk about burying the lede. I can just imagine a report of some future incident where they'd say trains collided, several cars damaged beyond repair, hundreds injured but thankfully, nothing derailed.

Of course, my own experience is the general public associates derailments with cars scattered across the countryside. I operate at a midwestern railroad museum. One day, I had my trailing car of a two-car electric train pick a switch at very low speed (yard move putting them away). One axle on the ground next to the rail. We had it re-railed and in the shop within an hour; car was inspected and back in service as soon as the shop had time. Mentioned it to a non-railroad friend a few days later and friend immediately assumed I had scattered cars across the countryside and could not understand how this really wasn't a big deal.
 
If they were going to rely on portable radio communication, the off-duty train should have been required to stop just prior to the crossover and wait for the engineer to receive the “all clear” message before proceeding, instead of depending on an emergency message to be received. Even highway flaggers know to confirm that oncoming traffic has stopped.
 
Whenever Regular RRs have shoving moves the conductor usually say how many cars to go. If engineer does not hear any further confirmation, he stops train once that length is met. Subway moves should be same. Example: 200 feet to next red signal, 100 feet to yellow now, and so forth. No follow up transmission, stop the shove.
 
Whenever Regular RRs have shoving moves the conductor usually say how many cars to go. If engineer does not hear any further confirmation, he stops train once that length is met. Subway moves should be same. Example: 200 feet to next red signal, 100 feet to yellow now, and so forth. No follow up transmission, stop the shove.
The railroad I worked for was half the distance. "Clear for 20 cars" meant the engineer would stop or ask for further communication after 10 cars. Of course we also had an emergency brake in working order as well.

The new rule should be no subway train moves unless the first car is fully working. In this case, back another 5 or 10 car train into it, then pull away. No more operating from the middle of the train.

Shove moves are very common. Shove moves without working air brakes should never happen.
 
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