One Dead, Dozens Injured in Washington (DC) Metro Smoke Incident

[Guest]

From CNN: http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/12/politics/smoke-lenfant-plaza/index.html

One passenger has died after smoke filled the L'Enfant Plaza metro station in downtown Washington on Monday, a Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority spokeswoman told CNN.

The station was temporarily closed after filling with smoke, while a disabled train was evacuated. D.C. Fire and EMS tweeted that one person was critically injured and six others were hurt in the incident after a train filled with smoke and its passengers were evacuated.

The National Transportation and Safety Board was investigating the incident and Metro Transit Police and fire department personnel were at the station examining the problem, WMATA said, but had not yet found the source of the problem as of Monday afternoon.

WMATA spokeswoman Morgan Dye told CNN Monday evening that while everyone in the station had been evacuated, they still were searching for the source of the smoke.

The smoke was thick enough to prompt WMATA to suspend service on several lines, including parts of the Green and Yellow line, which both stop there. Blue, Orange and Silver lines were bypassing the stop.

 

[PRR 60]

One passenger has died, and dozens more have been transported to hospitals (two critical) after an incident filled a Virginia Yellow Line train with smoke. This from the Washington Post:

Metro General Manager Richard Sarles said one of the passengers injured in the tunnel incident has died. The woman has not been identified pending notification of next of kin, he said.

In addition, Sarles said two people were in critical condition at George Washington Hospital; 40 were transported by bus to Howard University Hospital, and another 20 to 25 people were taken to Washington Hospital Center. Sarles said that since the incident involved a fatality, the Metropolitan Police Department would now be involved in the investigation.

Since there is a fatality and multiple injuries, I suspect the NTSB will take over this investigation.

Ironically, General Manager Richard Sarles was brought in to WMATA four years ago to repair the safety culture. By all accounts, he has made a huge difference there. He is retiring on Friday.

 

[guest]

Where there is smoke there is fire?

 

[Ryan]

Not necessarily.

 

[OlympianHiawatha]

Where there is smoke there is fire?

Or Terror

 

[Ryan]

 

[jis]

Where there is smoke there is fire?

Or Terror

Or just maybe overheated transformer

 

[NW cannonball]

Where there is smoke there is fire?

Or Terror

Or just maybe overheated transformer

Indeed. or whatever.

NTSB is on the case. http://www.ntsb.gov/Pages/default.aspx

 

[jis]

They are now saying it was an electric arc in a power cable or something like that.

 

[MrFSS]

They are now saying it was an electric arc in a power cable or something like that.

I heard water on the third rail.

 

[CHamilton]

And authorities now believe they know why the train, which had just left the L’Enfant Plaza station, came to a halt about 800 feet into the tunnel. The National Transportation Safety Board said “an electrical arcing event” occurred about 1,100 feet in front of the train. The event filled the tunnel with smoke, the NTSB said.

The agency said the arcing involved cables that power the third rail. Arcing is often connected with short circuits and may generate smoke. There did not appear to have been a fire.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/trafficandcommuting/1-dead-dozens-hurt-on-metro-car-filled-with-smoke/2015/01/12/e832c0f0-9aa8-11e4-a7ee-526210d665b4_story.html

 

[jis]

The problem seemed to be the lack of existence or at least execution of a coherent evacuation plan in a timely manner.

There may have been exigencies that made quicker evacuation impossible. Such will become clear from the NTSB investigation. In any case whatever it was will need to be fixed so that much more rapid evacuation is possible.

 

[Bob Dylan]

The problem seemed to be the lack of existence or at least execution of a coherent evacuation plan in a timely manner.

That sure sounds like Washington's Metro Management for sure!!

Be interesting to see the NTSB's final report on what kind of toxic smoke ( if it was) caused the death and serious injuries! I used to catch the Metro here all the time, wonder if all the underground stations ( especially Metro Center, the Big One) have this problem??

 

[Anderson]

I agree. From what I've read...quite frankly, I'm stunned that the procedure was not "Kill power to the third rail both ways on the affected track sections and direct passengers to evacuate towards the nearest station away from the smoke."

 

[neroden]

Relevant for the history of Amtrak, the chair of WMATA's board right now -- who is painting an overly rosy picture of the situation -- is Tom Downs, former President of Amtrak who I have really savaged in the past. (I think he was probably the worst Amtrak President ever, and I don't know why he doesn't get more flak on passenger rail fan boards. He was certainly far worse for Amtrak than Warrington.)

By all accounts GM Sarles has improved the safety culture at WMATA, but there seems to have been no safety culture at all to start with, so there's still a lot of change necessary.

I know a board chairman doesn't micromanage, but you'd think he'd notice that there was no evacuation procedure!! The DC Metro tunnels are actually pretty easy to evacuate through, since they have bench walkways on the sides: they're not like the older NYC or Boston subway tunnels which have zero clearance.

 

[Devil's Advocate]

Where there is smoke there is fire?

Or Terror

Does your knee hurt when it jerks like that?

 

[Anderson]

Relevant for the history of Amtrak, the chair of WMATA's board right now -- who is painting an overly rosy picture of the situation -- is Tom Downs, former President of Amtrak who I have really savaged in the past. (I think he was probably the worst Amtrak President ever, and I don't know why he doesn't get more flak on passenger rail fan boards. He was certainly far worse for Amtrak than Warrington.)

By all accounts GM Sarles has improved the safety culture at WMATA, but there seems to have been no safety culture at all to start with, so there's still a lot of change necessary.

I know a board chairman doesn't micromanage, but you'd think he'd notice that there was no evacuation procedure!! The DC Metro tunnels are actually pretty easy to evacuate through, since they have bench walkways on the sides: they're not like the older NYC or Boston subway tunnels which have zero clearance.

To answer your question on Downs v Warrington, I think the answer is that while Downs made a bunch of errors that were somewhat obscured (maintenance cuts, for example) or that were forced (route cuts), Warrington's errors were highly visible and *ahem* spectacular. They also helped lead directly to a raft of current restrictions (the no new LD routes thing was in no small part due to the mess of routes that Warrington was floating out there that weren't likely to do well...IIRC he was going to manage an impressive amount of east-west connectivity (something like 7-8 daily trains between the NEC and Chicago) but they were going to be mixed trains with a few passenger cars thrown on for legal purposes (if I'm not mistaken, all but the Cap would have been single-level...and given that they were having to toss the Heritage cars, it isn't clear how Amtrak would have been able to run sleepers on even a majority of those trains for too long).

To put it another way, Downs made a bunch of errors but Warrington reminds me of Corridor Capital all too much.

 

[PRR 60]

I agree. From what I've read...quite frankly, I'm stunned that the procedure was not "Kill power to the third rail both ways on the affected track sections and direct passengers to evacuate towards the nearest station away from the smoke."

Evacuating a train carrying several hundred passenger of varying physical capabilities into a smoke-filled tunnel prior to the arrival of help should be the last resort. The first option would be to move the train and passengers out of harms way to safety - in this case back to L'Enfant Plaza station. Since it is not clear what caused the smoke and how that affected the ability to provide traction power to move the train, it's not possible to know if that was or was not a viable option. Until all the varying and conflicting stories are sorted out by the NTSB, all of our opinions of what should have been done are just speculation.

 

[neroden]

(1) Kill the power

(2) Turn on the fans

(3) Evacuate the passengers

Having passengers stay put in a smoke-filled train for 45 minutes is obviously wrong. Sorry to say this, but it's just obviously wrong. Getting people out of the smoke ASAP has to be the priority. Most deaths in fires are due to smoke inhalation.

It was clear within 5 minutes that the train wasn't moving back to the station.

 

[neroden]

To put it another way, Downs made a bunch of errors but Warrington reminds me of Corridor Capital all too much.

Heh. I see what you mean. But of course Warrington was inheriting the unmitigated disaster bequeathed by Downs. Perhaps Warrington's undue optimism and financial engineering were what was needed to get Amtrak back on track. It's interesting to note that Warrington was working directly under Downs, and promoted into Downs's job, at both NJT and Amtrak.

At Amtrak, Downs managed to generate falling ridership, falling revenue, rising costs, and counterproductive cuts to service... in a period which was actually quite good for every other form of passenger rail in the US. He's also the one who invented the line "glide path to profitability".

Downs's record is, unfortunately, bad on one project after another after another; he came to Amtrak after mismanaging the DC Union Station rehab project. I haven't looked into his record running DDOT (DC), TBTA, or NJDOT, but if I recall correctly things went poorly at all three of them while he was there. Downs is now at Veolia's North American transportation division, which of course *also* has a terrible reputation. The only thing which could excuse Downs's record is if he deliberately takes jobs in organizations which he knows to be complete disasters, but that doesn't really explain his record at Amtrak or NJDOT or the DC Union Station project.

I think Downs is a well-meaning guy, and I'd love to have him as part of an advocacy group, but he doesn't seem to be cut out to manage or direct a major operation. Why does he keep getting hired?

 

[PRR 60]

(1) Kill the power

(2) Turn on the fans

(3) Evacuate the passengers

Having passengers stay put in a smoke-filled train for 45 minutes is obviously wrong. Sorry to say this, but it's just obviously wrong. Getting people out of the smoke ASAP has to be the priority. Most deaths in fires are due to smoke inhalation.

It was clear within 5 minutes that the train wasn't moving back to the station.

Yes, having people stay on the train for 45 minutes (or whatever the time actually was) was wrong. I didn't say it wasn't wrong. I simply said that evacuating a train, unsupervised, into a dark and smoke-filled tunnel should not be the first option (as had been suggested). It should be the last option. Evacuating a trainload of passengers unsupervised is dangerous (people will panic), and the level of danger in the tunnel was not known (smoke, water, you name it). Even knowing which direction was the safe direction may not have been known.

Trying to move the train should be the first option. Getting help to the train should be the second option. Telling the passengers to get themselves off the train as best they can and head in some direction that is maybe safe, or maybe not, should be the last option. That last option should occur quicker than 45 minutes, but it still should be the last option. Yes, sitting here two days later, knowing some (but far from all) the facts, some things may now be "obvious." At that moment, for the operator of the train and the dispatchers in the control center, there was nothing obvious.

 

[jis]

Basically, for all underground systems there should be a well planned drill documented, in place and practiced, just like there is for airlines and for outfits like Eurostar through the Channel Tunnel. I don't know what the state of affairs is at any of the underground systems in the US. I guess we will learn from the NTSB when they are done investigating.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/another-disaster-for-dcs-metro-system/2015/01/13/60c539a6-9b2d-11e4-a7ee-526210d665b4_story.html?hpid=z7

http://blogs.rollcall.com/hill-blotter/lenfant-metro-incident-raises-questions-about-d-c-emergency-response/?dcz=

 

[Blackwolf]

I am certain that procedures and policy for all nature of emergency situations taking place in one of the three environmental areas the Metro operates in (Elevated Trackway, At-Grade, Below-Grade Subway) exists in large volumes. They must have them, because the Federal Government requires them to. The question should instead be, why were they not executed in the manner prescribed? I think I can answer this to a small degree, and would be curious to see if any NTSB report says the same:

In our Post-9/11 Every-Emergency-Is-A-Terrorist-Act world, especially so in the Capitol, when the call came in that there was a problem with smoke and fire involving a train I'll bet the very first thing that occurred was a reaction toward a security mindset. Procedure to that effect was likely instituted, and all manner of flip-charts in dispatch and HQ as well as terrorist attack mitigation training by field personnel went into effect. Namely, secure the scene, detain any suspects, deny entry and wait for the Army to arrive.

Meanwhile, the much longer-standing policies and procedures regarding life safety and evacuation of the public spaces (stations, effected train(s)) in an emergency are commonly in conflict with the newer anti-terrorism guidelines. For the Bay Area Rapid Transit System (BART), which is the grandaddy of WMATA, tunnel fire procedures involving an occupied revenue train underground between stations are well-known and used to be intensively studied. The January 1979 Transbay Tube fire put them to the test, and in a situation that turned out to be much more challenging than what sounds like this is, all passengers successfully escaped. Unfortunately responding firefighters suffered casualties, including the death of one due to his breathing air being exhausted and disorientation setting in with a smoke-filled 0% visibility situation. As a result, improvements were made and there are constant drills every month with surrounding emergency agencies dealing with all manner of these emergency types.

If the issue was with the 3rd rail, then traction power would/should have been cut early on. However, all of those train cars, if they are like the BART fleet, have battery-powered emergency propulsion and should have been able to move back to the previous station in "limp mode." And if there was an issue with one of the cars not having propulsion, moving passengers into cars that still have propulsion capability and then cutting the damaged car from the consist is the next action to take. The very last action anyone should take is the evacuation of passengers into the tunnel. Though, as I also believe will be reported, a number of passengers "self-evacuated" at the first sign of smoke by opening emergency exit doors/windows without instruction from the train crew to do so. Such is human nature.

 

[Bob Dylan]

You know the answer Cliff, the guy is known and "liked" by the powers that be

in the Transportation/ Government marriage!

Same reason so many incompetents keep getting appointed to jobs in government and hack politicians keep getting re- elected!

 

[Paulus]

To put it another way, Downs made a bunch of errors but Warrington reminds me of Corridor Capital all too much.

Heh. I see what you mean. But of course Warrington was inheriting the unmitigated disaster bequeathed by Downs. Perhaps Warrington's undue optimism and financial engineering were what was needed to get Amtrak back on track. It's interesting to note that Warrington was working directly under Downs, and promoted into Downs's job, at both NJT and Amtrak.

At Amtrak, Downs managed to generate falling ridership, falling revenue, rising costs, and counterproductive cuts to service... in a period which was actually quite good for every other form of passenger rail in the US. He's also the one who invented the line "glide path to profitability".

Keep in mind that Downs inherited an incredible backlog of deferred maintenance from Claytor (who apparently decided to run a brand new fleet into the ground).