Safety and Security: Amtrak expects Positive Train Control will be interoperable with other railroads but could better measure system reliability

[Steve4031]

SAFETY AND SECURITY: AMTRAK EXPECTS POSITIVE TRAIN CONTROL WILL BE INTEROPERABLE WITH OTHER RAILROADS BUT COULD BETTER MEASURE SYSTEM RELIABILITY

https://amtrakoig.gov/audit-documen...m_campaign=ptc&utm_source=pr&utm_medium=email
This report came from a link behind the pay wall in trains magazine's website. The report came from the Amtrak Inspector Genera's office. The issue is that Amtrak employees have to manually input information about speed restrictions and work orders, etc into the PTC system. The report recommends that Amtrak uses an electronic device to accomplish this with more accuracy.

I wonder how the freight railroads do this. Do they have such a device? If not then apparently the PTC system can be compromised by inaccurate data entry on any train on any day.

How is this done on the NEC? I know that they use a system that has been in place for years, and that some aspects of PTC have been added to meet the new requirements.

 

[RebelRider]

The report came from the Amtrak Inspector Genera's office. The issue is that Amtrak employees have to manually input information about speed restrictions and work orders, etc into the PTC system. The report recommends that Amtrak uses an electronic device to accomplish this with more accuracy.

I wonder how the freight railroads do this. Do they have such a device? If not then apparently the PTC system can be compromised by inaccurate data entry on any train on any day.

First, it is inaccurate to state Amtrak employees are manually inputting speed restrictions or work authorities. OIG is referring to train dispatchers entering restrictions in the computer. As far as I'm aware, nowhere in the country does any train crew member on any railroad manually enter any restrictions into PTC on a train. It all comes from the Computer Aided Dispatch System. These are temporary restrictions. They have to be entered by someone, somewhere either on the dispatcher's console or some railroads allow MOW supervisors to input the details directly in the field with an electronic device. To me, it feels like OIG is grasping at straws regarding data entry errors on restrictions.

It seems we're rapidly moving towards a mentality that running trains without PTC is very dangerous business and people will die every day if it isn't working 100%. I think it is fair to step back and look at history. Yes, there have been terrible accidents and lives lost to human error. Statistically, though, trains are still one of the safest forms of transportation - certainly safer than highway transportation by car or bus. Yet we're approaching a time where a random, unplanned PTC failure will result in train cancellation pushing passengers to substitute highway transportation with a statistically higher chance of injury or death.

Over the past 10 years, PTC might have prevented four passenger train accidents and 17 deaths. Are we so hell bent on having 100% protection that we're willing to cancel and delay trains due to an equipment failure? Given Amtrak's modus operandi of "Canceled - no alternate transportation" that means people who would otherwise be perfectly safe on a train are probably getting in a car. And they might give up on the train entirely and take a car every time, statistically increasing their chance of death.

 

[jis]

I agree that it is a fairly poorly written article which suggests that the writer does not have full understanding of PTC systems and how they work. Also s/he does not seem to know of the existence of different types of PTC systems that do not and will never interoperate with each other except through back office integration between hardware for both types deployed on a track segment.

 

[Steve4031]

I certainly am not an expert. And I regret questioning the competence and professionalism of any railroad employee. My thinking at the time was that management was cutting costs.