So I reran my usual attempt to back out the overhead and get direct costs numbers for the so-called long-distance trains.
For 2014 I was able to extract a "total overhead allocated to LD trains" number from one of Amtrak's reports -- 507.7 milion. I have been unable to do that for 2015 or 2016 -- the information is too well hidden and too deeply buried -- so I'm still assuming that total overhead is the same as it was in 2014 (a bad assumption). I'm also assuming that the allocation of overhead, percentage-wise, is the same as it was in *2012*, which is actually probably a pretty good assumption given what we know about Amtrak's "do it the same way we did last year" accounting, but probably has some errors. This is because 2012 is the last year we had direct-costs numbers released in any way whatsoever, which is unfortunate.
Anyway, the results, and because of the above, remember these are very approximate:
-- Auto Train: 36.8 million profit (worse than last year, but still good)
-- Silver Star: 15.5 million profit
-- Silver Meteor: 15.1 million profit (these two have "averaged out"; Meteor previously did better than Star).
-- Palmetto: 14.4 million profit
-- LSL: 3.8 million profit
-- Crescent: roughly breakeven (my numbers claim 0.5 million profit)
-- Coast Starlight: roughly breakeven (my numbers claim 1.8 million loss, slightly worse than last year)
-- Cardinal: 3.2 million loss (would be a profit if it were daily -- daily should improve results by about 4.2 million)
-- Empire Builder: 3.5 million loss (slightly worse than last year; I expected this, it's because BNSF is now getting paid for OTP again)
-- CONO: 4.1 million loss
-- CL: 4.7 million loss (those Pennsy-Cap through cars would definitely help, and this probably generates connecting revenue greater than that)
-- TE: 8.7 million loss
-- SWC: 10.2 million loss
-- CZ: 10.4 million loss
-- SL: 13.2 million loss (daily should reduce this to 10.8 million)
It's interesting that the Transcons other than the EB are normalizing, so that the SWC, CZ, and SL are all in the same position more or less.
It is worth noting that every single-level train except the Cardinal is a cash generator, profitable before overhead allocation. The Cardinal would be if it were daily. The Viewliner sleepers will generally benefit the trains which are already performing the best.
This means that it may actually be viable for Amtrak to take out an RRIF or commercial loan to buy more Viewliner sleepers, or buy Viewliner coaches, as they would be incrementally profitable on trains which are already incrementally profitable; it's possible to compute payback periods (and they're short). No such chance for the bilevel trains, where only the Auto Train is really generating cash. (Perhaps the Auto Train could be re-equipped with new equipment through a commercial loan and have its old equipment cascaded to the other trains.)
It will be interesting to see what happens in 2017 and 2018. The Viewliner diners should help the already-doing-well Eastern trains, provided Amtrak isn't as stupid about the food served in them as it has been recently. The completion of a bunch of station & track projects should eventually boost revenues and ridership, particularly on the LSL (Rochester, Schenectady, Albany, Springfield) and CS (Cascades and California improvements). Improvements in Chicago should help everything going through Chicago. New local connecting rail services in Kansas City, Denver, and Fort Worth will help the SWC, CZ, and TE respectively.
I suspect that the Heritage diner maintenance costs are mindlessly allocated to the entire system, so their retirement should really show up as reduced overhead (which is going to be hard to spot). If they're actually allocated to the specific trains, then it'll benefit the numbers of the single-level trains, again.
On the other hand, All Aboard Florida will probably decimate Orlando-Miami traffic on the Silvers. Frankly the Hialeah maintenance site is looking stranded to me. It's threatened by rising sea levels and flooding; it's very remote from the LSL, Cardinal, Crescent, and Palmetto routes which use Viewliner and Amfleet II equipment; and the Silver Star and Silver Meteor are going to be losing business at the Miami end. Long term planning should call for the relocation of heavy maintenance (as opposed to overnight cleaning) much further north, perhaps in the vicinity of Orlando or Jacksonville, or perhaps all the way to Albany NY (which has no flooding risk).