What train discontinued before Amtrak would you like to see brought back?

[Asher]

I'm thinking two: I'd like to see a train to Clarksville and a Cannonball to the Junction (along with a return of four door Lincoln convertibles).

The last train to Clarksville led to a Cannonball in Vietnam. Jack Kennedys last ride was in a Lincoln convertible, 4 door.
Glad that train has left the station.

 

[Asher]

I'm thinking two: I'd like to see a train to Clarksville and a Cannonball to the Junction (along with a return of four door Lincoln convertibles).

The last train from Clarksville led to a Cannonball in Vietnam, that was shortly after Jack Kennedys last ride in a 4 door Lincoln convertible. Glad that train left the station.

 

[Willbridge]

Not to mention a bunch of SP routes were discontinued before Amtrak was created. The Capitol Corridor was the states answer to the Senator which was discontinued in the mid 60s. Or the Shasta Daylight which took away a day train from Northern California to Oregon. Also we lost trains between San Francisco and Monterrey. Lots of trains were lost before we even got Amtrak, not to mention Amtrak not having adequate resources to keep useful lines it did get going.

Although I have had professional and personal reasons for supporting the Amtrak Pioneer, my favorite pre-Amtrak train would have to be the Shasta Daylight. I first rode it in 1960 when the railroad was transitioning from their slogan "the friendly SP" to the evil SP, so it was still a great ride. Until the PRIIA was introduced to slowly strangle Amtrak, some Oregonians considered redeveloping it as a state-sponsored Talgo train PDX - SAC via the Chico line. Stops would have been added at Crescent Lake, OR and at California's choice to serve Mt. Shasta resorts. (The original Portland -- Oakland ran via the less-populated, but faster, west side of the Valley and was weak in the winter. X-country skiing was not a factor then.)

It's possible that Flix will be running a daylight SFO-PDX run by the end of the year, but modern bus riders want to stick to the interstate highways, so I'm expecting it to run via Medford. Greyhound ran a fast SFO-PDX run on the Shasta Daylight schedule via KFS until the train was taken off. Then their service via KFS began to fade till it vanished.

 

[sttom]

Although I have had professional and personal reasons for supporting the Amtrak Pioneer, my favorite pre-Amtrak train would have to be the Shasta Daylight. I first rode it in 1960 when the railroad was transitioning from their slogan "the friendly SP" to the evil SP, so it was still a great ride. Until the PRIIA was introduced to slowly strangle Amtrak, some Oregonians considered redeveloping it as a state-sponsored Talgo train PDX - SAC via the Chico line. Stops would have been added at Crescent Lake, OR and at California's choice to serve Mt. Shasta resorts. (The original Portland -- Oakland ran via the less-populated, but faster, west side of the Valley and was weak in the winter. X-country skiing was not a factor then.)

It's possible that Flix will be running a daylight SFO-PDX run by the end of the year, but modern bus riders want to stick to the interstate highways, so I'm expecting it to run via Medford. Greyhound ran a fast SFO-PDX run on the Shasta Daylight schedule via KFS until the train was taken off. Then their service via KFS began to fade till it vanished.

Also having a train run up the valley would be a big improvement or trains down to Monterrey Bay, better service east of Sacramento, trains to the North Bay and Inland Empire. California needs to be a lot more serious about expanding train service than it actually is.

 

[Siegmund]

The biggest-bang-for-buck options have already been mentioned, Cincinnati-Columbus-Pittsburgh or Cleveland-NY.

Talked about but never run has been anything from the Northeast to Dallas/Ft Worth. I'm flexible whether you run it through Memphis or Jackson, along the Crescent Line or through Roanoke and Bristol. (I've mentioned in another post that I'd like to see the whole southern tier service reorganized around DFW as the hub rather than NOL: this new train from NYC to DRW; Sunset running via DFW and Atlanta then down to Florida; Texas Eagle as it is now; Lone Star/Texas Chief restored and extended from Houston to New Orleans.)

In the pie-in-the-sky-dreaming category, I would love to be able to ride through Tennessee Pass and Royal Gorge. But I'll be the first to admit that a Kansas City-Pueblo-SLC-OAK train would not draw enough riders to be viable.

 

[chakk]

In the pie-in-the-sky-dreaming category, I would love to be able to ride through Tennessee Pass and Royal Gorge. But I'll be the first to admit that a Kansas City-Pueblo-SLC-OAK train would not draw enough riders to be viable.

I do believe all of the track between Just west of Royal Gorge and just east of Dotsero is now out of service, with most of the signal masts torn out and track rusted badly with trees growing between the rails in many spots.

 

[zephyr17]

Not to mention a bunch of SP routes were discontinued before Amtrak was created. The Capitol Corridor was the states answer to the Senator which was discontinued in the mid 60s. Or the Shasta Daylight which took away a day train from Northern California to Oregon. Also we lost trains between San Francisco and Monterrey. Lots of trains were lost before we even got Amtrak, not to mention Amtrak not having adequate resources to keep useful lines it did get going.

Agree on the Shasta Daylight. However, I would actually like a companion train to the Coast Starlight, not just an Oakland (Eastbay) - Portland train. A through Los Angeles-Seattle train that is roughly shifted 12 hours from the Coast Starlight schedule. It would provide reasonable calling times at Seattle, Sacramento, the Bay Area, and LA, and also serve Sacramento, which the Shasta Daylight did not, using the West Side line.

 

[Mark Meyer]

-- the entire Milwaukee Road Pacific Extension from the Pacific Northwest through Spokane and Montana. The Miwaukee Road was one of the better routes from the Pacific Northwest to Chicago, and large portions were electrified, and it was profitable. This was killed by the ***** Milwaukee Road management looking at phony accounting (much like Amtrak's management is today) -- they were double-booking expenses on the Pacific Extension and accordingly underbooking them on the midwestern "granger" lines. Management thought the granger lines were profitable and the Pacific Extension was unprofitable, but they had it backwards. They dismantled the Pacific Extension, the only profitable part of the railroad, and promptly went bankrupt; the accounting disaster was discovered by the judge during the dissection of the bankruptcy. This was unfortunately ripped out entirely and the ROW would have to be re-acquired. They discontinued passenger service in 1961, and they really shouldn't have.

Sorry, but you have fallen for propaganda created by revisionist historians. The Milwaukee went bankrupt (again) before the Pacific Extension was abandoned. But no matter. When it comes to accounting, figures lie and liars figure. You can believe the Pacific Extension made money, but then you have to explain the WHY of abandoning it, and the why that the Milwaukee then didn't install CTC, install trackside warning devices, lengthen sidings and myriad other things that GN, NP, and later BN were able to do. But even this doesn't matter....what these revisionist historians fail to mention is that the Milwaukee Road Pacific Extension was simply the high-cost route which would have been even more evident had it survived longer to see the even heavier trains that were operated today. The operational inferiority of the Milwaukee Pacific Extension is detailed here: http://trainweb.org/milwaukeemyths/

And also, it is completely logical that the Milwaukee Road discontinued its "transcontinental" passenger service (west of Deer Lodge) in 1961. The Olympian Hiawatha had no Portland section or connection, nor a connection to Vancouver, BC, and was served just about everywhere better by NP trains. This is outlined starting on page 32 of this document: http://www.gngoat.org/GN-MILW-NP.pdf

 

[neroden]

Sorry, but I did check the data, Mark, and you're wrong. The accounting was being misbooked and the Milwaukee Road made a bad business decision as a result. Period.

The operational inferiority to the other railroads is pretty much irrelevant; the fact is that the Pacific Extension was the more profitable part of the company and the granger lines were burning cash like there was no tomorrow. You can argue about why. The answer, IMO, having studied lots of railroad economics. is that clusters of small branch lines are bad for railroads due to diseconomies of scales, and granger lines are especially terrible business due to low-margin goods which are highly seasonal -- true for pretty much every railroad everywhere.

We know why management abandoned it. They were literally looking at phony accounting. This was actually stated outright in the bankruptcy hearings.

You have fallen, Mark, for what I call "diversionary tactics"; your supposed citations are essentially *irrelevant* to my point. No railroad was doing well during that period; the Milwaukee failed earlier than the others due to mismanagement, whereby they threw away their economies of scale and their network connectivity, and focused on the lines with the least economies of scale. The accounting was proven to be incorrect; they also ignored professional advice repeatedly.

The NP and GN weren't doing particuarly well either, but their response was to strip the granger branch lines (many of which are gone now), which was the correct response.

Milwaukee management may have been obsessed with merger mania or window-dressing to the point where they never bothered to really figure out how well their lines were doing -- there is evidence for many further counterproductive and idiotic moves by the Milwaukee management.

The relevance of this to Amtrak is obvious. Amtrak management, like Milwaukee management, doesn't seem to actually know how well any of its lines are doing. You cannot make sane business decisions that way.

 

[neroden]

Mr. Ploss's book may be overoptimistic about the Milwaukee Road...

https://www.biblio.com/9780961378813

...but the stories of the bad corporate culture, and dishonest accounting leading to gross mismanagement, are all verified.

http://www.trainweb.org/milwaukee/article.html

"The ICC carefully auditted the Milwaukee's own books, which none of the auditors commisioned by the trustee had done, for the years 1976 through 78 and the findings were startling. They found that for some reason the Milwaukee had been double entering expenses on "Lines West". It has never been discovered who authorized this or who was doing it, but the ICC auditors found it and were able to derive accurate figures for profits on "Lines West". What they found was that instead of the terrible cash drain the trustee said it was, the Extension had actually contributed profits of $12.7 million in 1976, $11 million in 1977, and $2.9 million in 1978. It should also be noted that these three years were well into the decline of traffic on the western lines due to deteriorated trackage and transit times and the refusal by the company to supply cars to western customers. The ICC was so startled by these findings, they had another group of auditors go over the books just to be sure the figures were right. They were."
"In 1978, lines west of Miles City MT had generated $150 million in revenues, but what is even more staggering is that the Road turned away $64 million in business due to a "lack of car supply" according to Paul Cruikshank, Vice President-Operations. If an adequate car supply would have been provided, "Lines West" revenues would have equalled those of "Lines East" while having only about 25% of the total route miles and 20% of the employees of the system. The Bankruptcy Court found that, on average, a carload of transcontinental freight contributed $1000 towards overhead while the same carload, handled only on "Lines East", contributed only $100. The ICC concluded that the drop from 1977 to 1978 was due to the trustee's practice of "discouraging traffic", which the Milwaukee's own management had started doing in 1974."
"Unfortunately, this information was found too late as by now it was the end January, 1980."


-----

So, specifically, the Milwaukee Road first discouraged traffic on, and then discontinued, the portion of its system which was contributing the most marginal profit to cover overhead while having the least maintenance and operational costs -- and simultaneously preserved the part which was contributing the least to covering overhead and had the highest maintenance and operational costs. This was because they were looking at phony accounting.

There were lots of other decisions which any accountant would scratch their heads at, detailed in the article. For example, the Milwaukee Road spent more to dieselize "Lines West" than it would have cost to close the electrification gap... during the 1970s oil crisis. A decision to raise costs of operation while reducing speeds.

"In 1975 the SEC would file charges in federal court charging that the management of the Milwaukee had "defrauded the company and it's shareholders by selling assets without informing the stockholders or the SEC, with deferring maintenance on the track facilities without proper disclosure, and of otherwise falsifying the company books."

Stories from people who worked inside the company show that the management had their minds made up and facts didn't matter to them. Gilbert Norman, who shows up here occasionally, worked there, and explains that the corporate culture was fixated on destroying Lines West, facts be damned:

http://www.railroad.net/forums/viewtopic.php?p=453101&sid=6417f975d06660972a7b2011b7290466#p453101

You've got nothing to counter any of this. So I conclude that you've been taken in by diversionary arguments -- and I know what I'm talking about. Consider yourself schooled.

 

[sttom]

Agree on the Shasta Daylight. However, I would actually like a companion train to the Coast Starlight, not just an Oakland (Eastbay) - Portland train. A through Los Angeles-Seattle train that is roughly shifted 12 hours from the Coast Starlight schedule. It would provide reasonable calling times at Seattle, Sacramento, the Bay Area, and LA, and also serve Sacramento, which the Shasta Daylight did not, using the West Side line.

Another alteration would be having the Starlight depart at 8am instead of 10 am (north) and 9:45 (south). That way a 12 hour secondary run off the current schedule would put it getting into Seattle around 8 am and the early departure in at 6 pm (north). And at 7am and 7 pm for the south bound runs.

 

[toddinde]

A couple things. First, love, love the discussion because when they invent the time machine, I will go back and ride two trains. The first is for sure the Olympian Hiawatha. I grew up in Milwaukee with the Milwaukee Road in the ‘70s. I’m also a lawyer and a student of the whole Milwaukee Road debacle. The reality is that railroads make money by hauling freight as far as possible. Period. The Pacific Extension was the only sensible way for the MR to do that. As soon as they abandoned the Pacific Extension, it was game over for the Road. Accountants will ruin any company if given free run. MR could have had through trains from the Pacific Northwest to Louisville. That’s a long haul! The truth is that Ben Heinemann has it right; a three way merger between the Milw, North Western and the Rock Island could have made a go of it with good management. From the late ‘60s on, the Milwaukee’s strategy was inclusion in BN and as much deferred maintenance as possible until accomplishing that goal. That killed them and the Rock. The talk of too many railroads is ludicrous because it again neglects the natural growth in the nation. We’re a country twice as large as we were in the ‘70s, and we need those rail lines back. Too bad we didn’t have the vision in the ‘70s to save the Milw and the Rock.
To answer the question of a train I want back, it’s the Golden State. Midwest to Southwest makes sense. A variation today would be Minneapolis to Fort Worth version of the Twin Star tying in at Kansas City to the BNSF to Newton, down on the old Texas Chief/Heartland Flyer. The Texas Eagle from Chicago then heads west from Fort Worth through Midland Odessa to El Paso where the Sunset Limited consolidation would take place. The Heartland Flyer/Twin Star could be a St Paul to San Antonio train. The Sunset Limited Route has more population and faster growth than the Northeast Corridor. A daily schedule, good connections, rerouting through Phoenix again, and multiple frequencies in select corridors (Tucson - Phoenix - LA) (San Antonio - Houston - New Orleans), and you would see amazing things happen.

 

[toddinde]

Mr. Ploss's book may be overoptimistic about the Milwaukee Road...

https://www.biblio.com/9780961378813

...but the stories of the bad corporate culture, and dishonest accounting leading to gross mismanagement, are all verified.

http://www.trainweb.org/milwaukee/article.html

"The ICC carefully auditted the Milwaukee's own books, which none of the auditors commisioned by the trustee had done, for the years 1976 through 78 and the findings were startling. They found that for some reason the Milwaukee had been double entering expenses on "Lines West". It has never been discovered who authorized this or who was doing it, but the ICC auditors found it and were able to derive accurate figures for profits on "Lines West". What they found was that instead of the terrible cash drain the trustee said it was, the Extension had actually contributed profits of $12.7 million in 1976, $11 million in 1977, and $2.9 million in 1978. It should also be noted that these three years were well into the decline of traffic on the western lines due to deteriorated trackage and transit times and the refusal by the company to supply cars to western customers. The ICC was so startled by these findings, they had another group of auditors go over the books just to be sure the figures were right. They were."
"In 1978, lines west of Miles City MT had generated $150 million in revenues, but what is even more staggering is that the Road turned away $64 million in business due to a "lack of car supply" according to Paul Cruikshank, Vice President-Operations. If an adequate car supply would have been provided, "Lines West" revenues would have equalled those of "Lines East" while having only about 25% of the total route miles and 20% of the employees of the system. The Bankruptcy Court found that, on average, a carload of transcontinental freight contributed $1000 towards overhead while the same carload, handled only on "Lines East", contributed only $100. The ICC concluded that the drop from 1977 to 1978 was due to the trustee's practice of "discouraging traffic", which the Milwaukee's own management had started doing in 1974."
"Unfortunately, this information was found too late as by now it was the end January, 1980."


-----

So, specifically, the Milwaukee Road first discouraged traffic on, and then discontinued, the portion of its system which was contributing the most marginal profit to cover overhead while having the least maintenance and operational costs -- and simultaneously preserved the part which was contributing the least to covering overhead and had the highest maintenance and operational costs. This was because they were looking at phony accounting.

There were lots of other decisions which any accountant would scratch their heads at, detailed in the article. For example, the Milwaukee Road spent more to dieselize "Lines West" than it would have cost to close the electrification gap... during the 1970s oil crisis. A decision to raise costs of operation while reducing speeds.

"In 1975 the SEC would file charges in federal court charging that the management of the Milwaukee had "defrauded the company and it's shareholders by selling assets without informing the stockholders or the SEC, with deferring maintenance on the track facilities without proper disclosure, and of otherwise falsifying the company books."

Stories from people who worked inside the company show that the management had their minds made up and facts didn't matter to them. Gilbert Norman, who shows up here occasionally, worked there, and explains that the corporate culture was fixated on destroying Lines West, facts be damned:

http://www.railroad.net/forums/viewtopic.php?p=453101&sid=6417f975d06660972a7b2011b7290466#p453101

You've got nothing to counter any of this. So I conclude that you've been taken in by diversionary arguments -- and I know what I'm talking about. Consider yourself schooled.

My friend, you are correct. Your reply is carefully researched, and spot on. Could the BN have competed against a well run Milwaukee Road? That is another question. Without coal, BN might have had some trouble. BN did everything to kill the Milw. That is a factor that cannot be downplayed. A lot of curious personnel transitions between those lines.

 

[Mark Meyer]

You've got nothing to counter any of this. So I conclude that you've been taken in by diversionary arguments -- and I know what I'm talking about. Consider yourself schooled.

Not schooled. Not fooled. This article has been around for years and I am very familiar with it. There simply is no reason to take it as the definitive description about "What Really Happened" and ignore everything else. And it has totally been "countered" at: http://trainweb.org/milwaukeemyths/

There are many things wrong with the article, such as the WHY of the supposed misrepresentation of the profits of the Pacific Extension and where the money went. And the salient point is that if the railroad was such a cash cow, why didn't someone step in and save it? Others in this thread have bemoaned the loss of the Rock Island, but its Golden State route was largely saved in spite of the condition of the infrastructure. Why didn't that happen with the Milwaukee? Additionally with regard to electrification in the article, nowhere does it touch on the three greatest costs of modifying locomotive power: Locomotive dwell, locomotive and equipment cycle time delay, and manpower to make the modifications. The article simply doesn't sufficiently address the most important aspect with regard to cost: Operations.

In spite of what this article states, it's important to remember the realities: The Milwaukee Road was in uniformly poor shape pretty much everywhere (so if the money was siphoned off the "profitable west end, where did it go, conspiracy theories notwithstanding?) In spite of the suggestion (in the article) that the Hill Lines were in poor shape financially, why where they able to upgrade their infrastructure (CTC, power switches, lineside warning detectors, longer sidings, etc.) and the Milwaukee didn't....anywhere?

The biggest problem with this article is it ignores the operational inferiorities of the Milwaukee Road Pacific Extension: Very poor feeder network of branch lines and that its profile made it the high cost route. The Milwaukee had poor access to Portland, Great Falls, and Vancouver, BC, and no access to places like the Tri-Cities, Yakima, and Willamette Valley. Even if they "made" money on a shipment, BN (and predecessor lines) made more because prior to deregulation, competing railroads had to charge the same rate between the same two points and BN and predecessor lines almost always had the shorter, less steep route. Had the Pacific Extension survived beyond 1980 to deregulation, the situation would have been even more dire. When railroads were allowed to compete with regard to rates, BN and other railroads would have certainly been able to undercut what the Milwaukee would have needed to maintain its infrastructure, a situation that would have been exacerbated as trains grew in weight and length. Even if the Milwaukee magically could have sidings, double track,CTC, and lineside safety equipment appear comparable to that of BN, its route over St. Paul Pass, lack of a water-level crossing of the Cascade mountains, and continued poor access to markets like Portland and Vancouver, BC would have doomed it.

One can certainly argue that certain routes that are no longer with us should have been kept for possible future use, such as the Big Four route from Chicago to Cincinnati for passenger trains. This, of course, would have required a national transportation policy that designated certain routes to be maintained (somehow) regardless of a carrier's desire to use them. That has merit, but is not where we are today.

In the end, the accounting aspect of the Pacific Extension in the 1970s is irrelevant. Strong routes survive, such as the ex-Rock Island Golden State route west of Kansas City as it is operationally comparable (or even superior) to the competition. It is irrefutable that the Milwaukee Pacific Extension was operationally inferior - the high cost route. That's why we won't see freight trains over Raton or Tennessee Passes again. It's also why UP doesn't operate transcontinental traffic via its ex-D&RGW route through Moffat Tunnel. (And if traffic increases the point that the route through Wyoming can't handle it, that route will be upgraded, not the inferior route.)

So, unless you can show how the Milwaukee could have handled those copper concentrates off the SP and Portland to Butte in the 1970s cheaper than a routing on BN, or show how a 16,000-ton grain train today could operate from Sioux Falls to Kalama with less cost on a Milwaukee Road than today's BNSF, you cannot make your point.

 

[fredmcain]

The one train that would be at the top of my list is not pre-Amtrak but from the Amtrak era itself: The Floridian, discontinued during the “Carter cuts” of 1978.

Other than air travel, there is a real public transportation void between Chicago and the Upper Midwest and Florida. I have known people living in my area who have actually taken the train from Elkhart, IN to Florida but it involves a change of trains (and quite a bit of downtime) at Washington, DC. It is also very circuitous since it evolves going around two sides of a triangle to reach your final destination.

This is a most unsatisfactory state of affairs. A direct Chicago-Florida train would be nice and most welcome. I seem to vaguely remember that near the end of the Graham Claytor Jr. period, Amtrak was studying this. But, sadly, it just never came to pass.

I am also a realist or at least try to be. I realize that as long as Anderson’s in there, there is absolutely NO hope for this. He doesn’t even want to keep many of the current LD trains never mind adding a new one.

Still, it might happen someday but it will probably be too late to help me much.

Regards,
Fred M. Cain

 

[fredmcain]

As an afterthought to my above post, there has been another thread running lately concerning the demise of the Hoosier State. A new Floridian, if it ran on that line, could also provide daily service in the Indianapolis-Chicago corridor. It is my understanding that the track south of Indy to Louisville has been rebuilt in recent years although the speed limit is prbly still 40 MPH.

Regards
Fred M.Cain

 

[basketmaker]

The one train that would be at the top of my list is not pre-Amtrak but from the Amtrak era itself: The Floridian, discontinued during the “Carter cuts” of 1978.

Other than air travel, there is a real public transportation void between Chicago and the Upper Midwest and Florida. I have known people living in my area who have actually taken the train from Elkhart, IN to Florida but it involves a change of trains (and quite a bit of downtime) at Washington, DC. It is also very circuitous since it evolves going around two sides of a triangle to reach your final destination.

This is a most unsatisfactory state of affairs. A direct Chicago-Florida train would be nice and most welcome. I seem to vaguely remember that near the end of the Graham Claytor Jr. period, Amtrak was studying this. But, sadly, it just never came to pass.

I am also a realist or at least try to be. I realize that as long as Anderson’s in there, there is absolutely NO hope for this. He doesn’t even want to keep many of the current LD trains never mind adding a new one.

Still, it might happen someday but it will probably be too late to help me much.

Regards,
Fred M. Cain

Would agree 100%. Rode the Floridian to Miami in the waning days (Nov. '77) after moving my sister to Nashville. Moved to Nashville myself late '78 for 28 years. Hated the 3 hour drive to Fulton, KY to catch the City of New Orleans for east-west connections at Chicago and a couple at New Orleans. Specially in the middle of the night (01:02 north/03:12-south). Would make visits to family and friends more palatable both in Nashville and Miami. Chicago-Indianapolis-Louisville-Nashville-Chattanooga-Jacksonville-Miami would be great!

Been in the Denver/Ft. Morgan area since '06 so I have easy access to the CZ and it is about the same drive to catch the Chief at La Junta as to Fulton. I usually board at Ft. Morgan (free parking) same travel time (1-hour) after fighting traffic and finding parking in Denver.

Will say I miss The Pioneer and the Desert Wind legs off the CZ. Both were nice rides.

 

[Ziv]

The one train that would be at the top of my list is not pre-Amtrak but from the Amtrak era itself: The Floridian, discontinued during the “Carter cuts” of 1978.

Other than air travel, there is a real public transportation void between Chicago and the Upper Midwest and Florida. I have known people living in my area who have actually taken the train from Elkhart, IN to Florida but it involves a change of trains (and quite a bit of downtime) at Washington, DC. It is also very circuitous since it evolves going around two sides of a triangle to reach your final destination.

This is a most unsatisfactory state of affairs. A direct Chicago-Florida train would be nice and most welcome. I seem to vaguely remember that near the end of the Graham Claytor Jr. period, Amtrak was studying this. But, sadly, it just never came to pass.

I am also a realist or at least try to be. I realize that as long as Anderson’s in there, there is absolutely NO hope for this. He doesn’t even want to keep many of the current LD trains never mind adding a new one.

Still, it might happen someday but it will probably be too late to help me much.

Regards,
Fred M. Cain

Fred, what was the trip like? It seems like it would be really slow since the direction of travel is going through 2 or 3 mountain ranges, albeit small ones. Seems like they would make the trip really slow but scenic. It seems like the Crescent runs parallel to the mountain ranges while the Floridian ran right through them. Not that I know that much about the area, just looking at maps...

 

[jis]

For a while the Floridian had the dubious distinction of being the LD train that is most prone to derailments. The tracks condition of the route that it ran was much worse than was desirable.

 

[Ziv]

Just looked up the schedules for the Floridian vs. the older streamliner, The South Wind. Floridians route length was similar but average speed was right around 41 mph vs. the South Wind at 53 mph. Wow.

 

[neroden]

Not schooled. Not fooled.

Your reply makes it very clear that you were, and are, fooled.

This article has been around for years and I am very familiar with it. There simply is no reason to take it as the definitive description about "What Really Happened" and ignore everything else. And it has totally been "countered" at: http://trainweb.org/milwaukeemyths/

Actually, that didn't counter ANY of it! Not one thing! It was a long list of unrelated and irrelevant stuff! I read all of it. Did you actually? Even if it's all true (and much of it has no evidence and is just vague assertions), it doesn't counter any of the detail in the article about the accounting errors at all.

There are many things wrong with the article,

No there aren't.

such as the WHY of the supposed misrepresentation of the profits of the Pacific Extension and where the money went.

The accounting SNAFU, while making the Pacific Extension lines look worse, artificially inflated the granger lines, causing the mismanagement to think that the granger lines were profitable. The granger lines were a money pit.

And the salient point is that if the railroad was such a cash cow, why didn't someone step in and save it?

That's actually detailed in the article. First, they scrapped the electrification (which was crucial to the line's economics) during the exact decade when it became more valuable. Then, they actually refused one of the possible mergers which would have made it work.

Nobody wants to work with a nutty management. By the time the management was totally removed, it was the 1980s, everything had fallen into disrepair, and everyone was ripping out lines, even really good lines.

In spite of what this article states, it's important to remember the realities: The Milwaukee Road was in uniformly poor shape pretty much everywhere (so if the money was siphoned off the "profitable west end, where did it go, conspiracy theories notwithstanding?)

It went to the massive money-drain of granger operations on the east end, as well as the usual corporate interest payments.

The problem was that Milwaukee management didn't know where the money was coming from or going to. They killed the best part of the railroad while retaining the worst dogs of the railroad, *because they had their accounting wrong*.

Consider, by contrast, an alternative world in which they aggressively petitioned to abandon all the granger lines in favor of trucking.

One can certainly argue that certain routes that are no longer with us should have been kept for possible future use, such as the Big Four route from Chicago to Cincinnati for passenger trains. This, of course, would have required a national transportation policy that designated certain routes to be maintained (somehow) regardless of a carrier's desire to use them.

Agreed.

The Montana-PacNW section of the Milwaukee Road had a business model; it was viable. Maybe it wasn't super profitable, but it could have been maintained. State and local subsidies for passenger service are a thing which developed nationwide, and Montana cities would likely have ponied up. (Nobody was interested in subsidizing the freight-only granger lines, which had no business model.)

In the end, the accounting aspect of the Pacific Extension in the 1970s is irrelevant.

You seem to have missed the point entirely. I think it's extremely relevant to *Amtrak*, which has been prone to making equally stupid decisions, cutting off more-profitable lines while retaining less-profitable lines *because Amtrak also has got their accounting all wrong*.

Maybe the Milwaukee Road would never have been "net profitable"; it might have ended up needing state support, as many railroads did (including literally every single railroad in the Northeast). Probably it would always have done worse than the BN -- I don't really care. But the management decision to keep the financially-worst parts of the railroad and dismantle the financially-best parts of the railroad is what doomed it to scrapping, rather than shortline or secondary line or mothballed-by-UP status. The management actions would be analogous to Penn Central dismantling the Water Level Route and the Broadway Limited Route while retaining all the commuter branch lines -- but Penn Central knew better.

Maybe you didn't understand what my point actually was. Since I've made and proved my point, but you seem to think I was arguing something else.

My point is they scrapped the part of the railroad they should have kept, while keeping the part they should have scrapped, largely because their accounting was all wrong. It would be very desirable if Amtrak did not repeat this mistake.

 

[fredmcain]

My point is they scrapped the part of the railroad they should have kept, while keeping the part they should have scrapped, largely because their accounting was all wrong. It would be very desirable if Amtrak did not repeat this mistake.

Neroden,

I wasn’t going to get into this discussion on the PCE at first because I argued about this at length a couple of years ago on both the TRAINS Magazine forum and the old Milwaukee Road Historical Association’s Yahoo! e-group.

But since you’ve delved into it (it’s kinda OT for Amtrak) I guess I’m gonna bite.

First of all, I believed in 1980 as I continue to believe today, that the loss of the Pacific Coast Extension (PCE) was and is a national tragedy that should’ve NEVER happened. It reduced competition and now today we are paying for it with severe congestion on the BNSF lines that remain. Back when I argued this on those other forums the congestion was much, much worse that it is today. It has indeed subsided some. However, that severe congestion will no doubt just return in a few years I’m sure.

Look, probably 98% or better of the abandoned PCE right of way is completely intact sans rails. Most of the tunnels and viaducts are intact. I think that a good case can be made for rebuilding the line.

A rebuilt PCE by the UP, the CP or the CNR would be most desirable and would return a much higher level of competition to the Pacific Northwest. The added capacity would also make it easier to divert truck traffic to rail.

Putting us back on topic for Amtrak, the Empire Builder would make better time with reduced congestion. A new Amtrak LD operation over a rebuilt PCE would also be a dream come true but maybe I’m pushing my luck there.

I believe rebuilding the PCE is a good idea that would be good for the country but, unfortunately, also a very expensive idea. Surely the states would have to help some. But if given the alternative of rebuilding the PCE or adding more lanes to Interstate Highways, I think that would be a good way to go as well.

The final problem would be dealing with all the NIMBYs. Out in the wilds of Montana, that wouldn’t be much of a problem. Some Montanans even want the line back (I have determined that). But in central and western Washington state you’d prbly encounter NIMBYs. Then again, the state of Washington has become so liberal that perhaps a case could be made that the railroad could “reduce the carbon footprint” over trucks. Especially if it were electric.

Regards,
Fred M. Cain

 

[fredmcain]

Fred, what was the trip like? It seems like it would be really slow since the direction of travel is going through 2 or 3 mountain ranges, albeit small ones. Seems like they would make the trip really slow but scenic. It seems like the Crescent runs parallel to the mountain ranges while the Floridian ran right through them. Not that I know that much about the area, just looking at maps...

Actually, I didn’t do this myself (take the train from Elkhart to Florida that is). My neighbors did it and from what I understand they enjoyed it pretty well. But if you get a sleeper, it does add a second night on the road which is a little salty.

A re-instated Floridian could probably do it in 30 hours or less which would mean two days and overnight with only one night in a sleeper.

I don’t know why more people don’t push for this. It seems like neither the RPA or other pro-rail groups in the Midwest are really on top of this issue much.

Then again, there has been a lot of political capital and energy put into the re-extension of the Sunset Limited into Florida and they don’t even seem to be able to do that.

So, I am optimistic that this could well happen someday since I believe it’s justified but I don’t think it’s gonna happen anytime in the next ten years. But I could be mistaken. A change of government in the U.S. that would be more pro-rail might change the outlook on things – but – I’m speculating there, of course.

Regards,
Fred M. Cain

 

[Anderson]

At least part of the issue with the Floridian is that, IIRC, you'd need to do a lot of work to get the tracks back up to decent condition.

 

[fredmcain]

At least part of the issue with the Floridian is that, IIRC, you'd need to do a lot of work to get the tracks back up to decent condition.

Well, I'm not so sure about that. I think if you'd try to put it back on the *EXACT* same route it ran on before it was discontinued in 1978 then, well, yes, you might have an issue. But surely another good route could be found that's in good condition. What is the primary routing for mainline freight from the Southeast to Chicago? I don't know exactly; I don't keep up on that much but we could probably find out.

I think that a much greater problem would be that the station facilities have been gone and/or disused for decades and it would cost a shiny penny to rebuild all the passenger handling facilities on the ground. But that could be done *IF* people wanted it. Or, more accurately, want it enough to pay for it.

Regards,
Fred M. Cain