Amtrak Passenger services may return to the Gulf Coast

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So, given that, I'm really curious to know what's left that Amtrak could easily do that would cost very little money.
Aah yes, the nattering nabobs of negativism.
In other words, you have no answer to my question.
I think that the really stupid thing is calling someone's question stupid just because one is too stupid to come up with a coherent argumentation... :help:
 
Well George, to answer the question would require a rambling protracted answer that would end up way off topic and would serve no purpose. I appreciate your advanced knowledge of the passenger rail market, but I live where there is little Amtrak service so I see things a bit differently than those that are blessed with ample service. If someone wants to start a string to discuss places where Amtrak service can be improved cost effectively I will be glad to contribute.
Again, what low-cost changes are you talking about?
I believe George has already started to answer that plus the 'new train' proposal that started this all. Do you want even more????????????
Actually yes. I am curious to learn about some ballpark numbers, just to get an idea of what we are facing in the way of budgetary issues for being unable to do a lot with virtually no cost. I don't understand your reticence and name calling when asked that question.

I think it is a good idea to discuss possible ideas and be able to at least ballpark some cost estimates, if not in dollars at least in terms of additional equipment and staffing needs. And if we are just dreaming timetables, that is fine too. But once a claim is made that "so much can be done with little additional resources", the maker of that claim owes at least a cursory explanation of what constitutes "so much" and "little resources" in what is possible. Note that I am not suggesting that such cannot be done. I am just curious as to what can be done with what resources that matches that claim.
 
I thought CSX had rerouted traffic off the Flomation - Jacksonville line through Montgomery to Jacksonville, leaving Flomation - Jacksonville

mostly deserted. I realize that part of the line is dark, but if the SL were restored there should be very few if any delays due to freight

trains. Am I correct that Mobile no longer has a station.

How much does it cost to lay new track? I was thinking of new track once your over into Baldwin County, AL direct to Pensacola. I don't think

you would need more than 30/35 miles of new track and eliminate Atmore and the Flomation dog leg fron the schedule.
 
Ok, you guys asked for this so here goes. Lets start with the Chicago to NY market. Amtrak is now down to just one train a day, the Lake Shore Limited. At one time the NYC and the Pennsylvania RR ran a dozen or more trains between these two cities, plus multiple trains to St Louis and along with the B&O between Washington DC and Chicago. Now you tell me Amtrak can only muster one **** ant train between two of the largest cities in America with fuel costs continuing to rise and airline hassles rising. I just don’t believe it. Do you think the Cardinal at three times a week really rates as transportation between these two cities? Boardman says LD trains are losers and blames Amtrak’s losses on them. Are they even trying? Lets look at another market. NY to Florida should be one of Amtrak’s premium markets. Yet by their own FY2011 reports, which I don’t believe, the Silver trains plus Auto Train lose 130 million dollars a year on revenues generated of 148 million.

I think the SWC route could easily support a second train, say run via the Transcon through Amarillo. Lets look at this train which Amtrak claims loses 68 million dollars a year on revenues of 48 million. I am a CPA, bean counter, accountant, so I like playing with numbers. I can get close to their claim of 48 million in revenue like this. Three coaches on each train each way or 400 passengers a day at $156 for a one way coach ticket Chi to Lax equals something like $23 million. Sleeper class is something else. I don’t know the exact consists of the SWC, but lets assume three sleepers per train. There are 14 roomettes per car, three cars per train, two trains a day at $320 dollars a room equals around $9.8 million a year. There are 5 bedrooms, plus a family room and a handicap room for a total of 7 times three per train times two trains times $1070 per room or around $19.5 million per year. If the bedrooms average two people per room and the roomettes are split evenly between one person and two that is an average of 35 passengers per sleeper time three cars time two trains times the average fare of $156 or $12 million a year. Total sleeper revenue is then $41.2 million for this train and coach revenue 23 million for a total of $64 million at 100% occupancy(Amtrak claims sleeper revenue for FY2011 is $19.4 million). To get this down to Amtrak’s number of $48 million total revenue we have to assume a 75% occupancy rate which is still high, but the train is often sold out and of course passengers get on and off all along the route.

Now look at their expenses which they say are $116.3 million a year. As far as I can see Amtrak does not detail out any of their operating expenses per train like fuel, labor, rent to the railroads, food costs, station costs, etc. The SWC has five train sets operating every day. Fuel costs for two trains running the whole route every day getting .5mpg per locomotive with two on each train gets something like $6.6 million at$4 per gal. Labor costs, 10 per train, 6 days pay @ $60,000 ea is $7.2 million a year. Diner costs. One train each way each day serves 11 meals for perhaps 150 passengers @$25 each or $15 million a year. Now for the real tricky stuff. What are the maintenance costs for the 50 or so cars that it takes to run this train? I used a dollar a mile per car, but a car takes two days to make the trip so maybe $20million a year. Rent. Haha, the big secret. Perhaps our expert George Harris can chime in here I guess it’s $10/mile a day or $22,650 a train set or around $16.5 million a year. Stations, there are 31 outside of Chicago and LAX. Maintenance maybe $10,000 per station per year or $310,000. Station agents @$50,000 ea times maybe 20 is only 1 million a year. Most stations are unmanned. Total operating expenses $67.4 million a year. So I get an annual operating loss of something like $19.4 million.

Greyhound charges fares ranging from $139 to $229 for a one way trip between Chicago and Lax with two transfers. No sight seer lounge car, no diner, cramped seating on a bus. Think maybe Amtrak’s fares are too low? What if the coach base fare was $250? Now Amtrak only loses $3.7million a year on this train. In other words it breaks even on operating costs. So now you ‘smart guys’ can chew on this for a while.

Southwest shows one way fares, nonstop, from $138 advance internet purchase to over $500. But that is no frills, knees in your face, no meals, type flying.

Amtrak was asked to make several studies on things like restoring service on the Pioneer route, the Desert Wind, the Sunset east, etc and they just came up with outlandish exorbitant costs. In other words they just don’t want to do it. Well what the ‘H’ do they want to do?

How do you get money from Congress? First you have to have a plan. Amtrak has no plan. Congress appropriates money for all kinds of stuff, nonsensical to practical. Amtrak can get the money it needs, but first they have to have some kind of a plan. They have none other than preserving the status quo and their jobs.
 
Henry,

One thing that jumps out at me after a quick scan of things is that the SWC only runs with 2 sleepers. Plus they can sell I believe 6 roomettes in the Trans/Dorm. So you will have to adjust your numbers for that.
 
Henry,

One thing that jumps out at me after a quick scan of things is that the SWC only runs with 2 sleepers. Plus they can sell I believe 6 roomettes in the Trans/Dorm. So you will have to adjust your numbers for that.

Well like I said Alan, I wasn't sure on three. But that also eliminates an attendant. So sleeper revenue drops to $31.8 million, so to stay with Amtrak $48m revenue number now the occupancy rate climbs to 87%. In other words, over all results stay the same. I am more interested in what they pay BNSF for track space and Amtrak's maintenance costs for the equipment. Labor costs estimates may be low also when you figure in benefits. But other routes that come to mind besides my fav, the Texas Triangle, are a second train on the Chi-MSP route opposite the EB and a dedicated train Chi-Denver in place of extra cars on the CZ. I am sure there is more.
 
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Also, using your figures, you are assuming that the bedrooms are always sold at $1070 which I guarantee they're not. Not every room is at high bucket, and many will sit empty at one point or another.
 
Henry,

You like counting beans as well as I do. Honestly, we should probably work together on something at some point.

You've actually highlighted two problems: One that's been more or less known for about thirty years concerning train length: Amtrak's trains are just too short to cover the operating costs at anything short of astronomical fares. The other is what I highlighted about the Silvers: Raise the coach buckets substantially while maintaining ridership, and the hole in the operating budget closes.

One point to consider: High bucket Regional fares in coach from WAS-NYP run $153. High bucket coach fares on the Cap, WAS-CHI, run $176. That's $23 difference between a four-hour run on the NEC and a 16-ish hour run from Washington to Chicago. Low bucket is $80 on the Regional vs. $90 on the Cap.

There are trains, such as the LSL, that could probably add several cars and remain pretty close to full (witness Amtrak adding a fifth coach to the Silver Meteor)...but these run into platforming issues. There are also routes where the travel times in one direction are good but the other direction stinks (the LSL also comes to mind here...it would be really nice to have a train from Chicago east that would let you get into New York around lunchtime), and where either the single-train-per-day nature of most of the network locks things up (i.e. anything around Chicago) or where you simply can't add another train that doesn't connect because of what it does to the operating picture.

The other thing is that it would be rather nice if Amtrak had the ability to "drop" cars and pick them up more often, such as what a lot of railroads used to do, in places where they could "save" a car or two on a longer run (witness the idea floated around about dropping cars from the SB Crescent in ATL and then picking them up at the end of the day with the NB Crescent; honestly, you might be able to do the same thing at WAS with the Crescent or Meteor, and at Tampa and/or Orlando with the Silvers [though the latter hits the Hialeah problem]).
 
Thanks for the effort, Henry.

I don't have the insight to see whether or not your assumptions on costs are right. Generally what is killing the economy of the LD's is labor costs, and I think you might have underestimated these. The thing is that OBS have to be paid for 24 hours a day, not just for a work day, plus probably something for layover time away from home too (I don't have knowledge of the specific contracts, but that's how it works for airline crew I know)

But in general I have to ask you why you think that Amtrak puts out fake numbers? It might be that they could run things more efficiently, but why try to pretend that the costs are double of what they actually currently are? Save from some massive fraud operation going on with someone pocketing a lot of money, Amtrak really would have no interest in this. The political pressure would be much easier to handle if numbers were better, and so would the possibility of new services.

You write that Amtrak has no plan. If you mean no plans to expand LD services you are right, but not no plan in general. I think the priorities are pretty obvious and has been stated by leadership several times: Amtrak has a sharp focus on getting new equipment and wants to grow the business through new services or more frequencies on state supported corridors. They often show a better economy, and with 48 possible entities to fund new operations, at least some of them at any given time will probably be rail friendly.

On the federal level, not so much. The current congress is able to pass very, very little, and it certainly hasn't been new train lines that has been on top of what little they have been able to pass. If I was Amtrak management I would assess that there's support in Congress to largely support status quo, but that new LD's with poor cost recovery is going to be a very hard sell. Especially as new services in the past have often been earmarks for individual senators or reps, and that is pretty much out of fashion these days. On the other hand Amtrak has some pretty desperate needs on the equipment front, and if I was management, that is where I would try to spend all the political clout I had. Without a renewed and expanded fleet there is limited ways to get a better cost recovery, no way to get new services, and within a few years no way to run the current ones. On top of this comes maintaining and enhancing the service on the NEC, which will take a lot of investment.

In terms on more frequencies on some of the current LD routes I think that almost everybody here agree with you that it would be a good idea. But while probably having a better CR than new services, they don't necessarily come cheaply. First you need extra equipment. Next the host railroads will often require capacity upgrades, and given the lengths of the routes this might be very, very expensive (daily sunset, anyone?). Finally while CR will probably be better as a percentage of operating costs the total subsidy for two frequencies will in most cases be bigger than for the current one.

It might be worthwhile though for Amtrak to try to push a second frequency on one or more of it routes, as the subsidy per passenger should be much lower than now, and that is a political selling point. But it can only happen once equipment becomes available and if they can find routes that don't require hundreds of millions in capital investment. Current train lengths probably have to be maximized first too.

As for corridor services - get your state off its butt! It is probably the most obvious place for new corridor services in the country. Amtrak is legally not allowed to do anything unless Texas engages itself.
 
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CSX did reroute freight traffic via Montgomery, but I have read that CSX reversed the decision -- at least, in part. One problem is that there is no direct connection at Montgomery from the northbound ex-L&N to the southbound ex-ACL. An eastbound train must pull north past Bell Street interlocking and Union Station into the L&N yard, run the power around the train, and then pull south. Another problem is that the ex-ACL between Montgomery and Dothan has significant grades. Another problem is that sidings on the ex-ACL between Montgomery and Dothan are relatively short. Between Dothan and Waycross, however, it is a very flat and very straight line with adequate sidings.

Correct, Mobile would need a new passenger station.

A new railroad line between Mobile and Pensacola would cost a billion dollars. Absolutely unthinkable.
 
Also, using your figures, you are assuming that the bedrooms are always sold at $1070 which I guarantee they're not. Not every room is at high bucket, and many will sit empty at one point or another.
You are right Johnny, but I have no idea what the average price would be. I saw bedrooms going for $1478 and as low as $655. Roomettes ran as high as $547. What would you say the low and high bucket is for bedrooms and roomettes on the SWC? I used a coach fare of $156 but it ran much higher in the summer. What do you think high and low is for coach?
 
Henry,

You like counting beans as well as I do. Honestly, we should probably work together on something at some point.

You've actually highlighted two problems: One that's been more or less known for about thirty years concerning train length: Amtrak's trains are just too short to cover the operating costs at anything short of astronomical fares. The other is what I highlighted about the Silvers: Raise the coach buckets substantially while maintaining ridership, and the hole in the operating budget closes.

There are trains, such as the LSL, that could probably add several cars and remain pretty close to full (witness Amtrak adding a fifth coach to the Silver Meteor)...but these run into platforming issues. There are also routes where the travel times in one direction are good but the other direction stinks (the LSL also comes to mind here...it would be really nice to have a train from Chicago east that would let you get into New York around lunchtime), and where either the single-train-per-day nature of most of the network locks things up (i.e. anything around Chicago) or where you simply can't add another train that doesn't connect because of what it does to the operating picture.

The other thing is that it would be rather nice if Amtrak had the ability to "drop" cars and pick them up more often, such as what a lot of railroads used to do, in places where they could "save" a car or two on a longer run (witness the idea floated around about dropping cars from the SB Crescent in ATL and then picking them up at the end of the day with the NB Crescent; honestly, you might be able to do the same thing at WAS with the Crescent or Meteor, and at Tampa and/or Orlando with the Silvers [though the latter hits the Hialeah problem]).
Hi Anderson. Yes we can discuss anytime you want. The one thing about Amtrak I find frustrating is the lack of cost breakouts for individual trains. They furnish all these stats, but no costs. I guess they consider payments to the host railroads confidential as well as labor costs. Maintenance costs would also be nice to have. I am sure they have an accounting system with cost buckets for individual trains and routes. If not then they are just lost. lol. The Crescent used to drop and pickup cars in Atlanta until the NS revised the track layout around there and Amtrak chose to do nothing about it. Now they want to go back to that, but have to revise the tracks and that takes money and NS participation. I do not undetstand Amtrak's coach ticket pricing. It seems much too low almost everywhere except on the NEC. When their coach ticket price is below Greyhound something is wrong. The sleeper room prices on the SWC are just astronomical. Do they really sell those rooms for that? That they have not kept up on equipment replacements and repairs is really hurting them. When the private railroads ran these LD trains they always added equipment for the summer months. Amtrak seems to be maxed out year round with nothing to add for the summer. On revenues for the SWC, Amtrak shows $48m total but only $44m ticket revenue, so I assume the diff is diner and lounge car revenue.
 
Thanks for the nice post...

Ok, you guys asked for this so here goes. Lets start with the Chicago to NY market. Amtrak is now down to just one train a day, the Lake Shore Limited. At one time the NYC and the Pennsylvania RR ran a dozen or more trains between these two cities, plus multiple trains to St Louis and along with the B&O between Washington DC and Chicago. Now you tell me Amtrak can only muster one **** ant train between two of the largest cities in America with fuel costs continuing to rise and airline hassles rising. I just don’t believe it. Do you think the Cardinal at three times a week really rates as transportation between these two cities? Boardman says LD trains are losers and blames Amtrak’s losses on them. Are they even trying? Lets look at another market. NY to Florida should be one of Amtrak’s premium markets. Yet by their own FY2011 reports, which I don’t believe, the Silver trains plus Auto Train lose 130 million dollars a year on revenues generated of 148 million.
Boardman said what Amtrak's CPAs have said for a while. The question is of course what makes Amtrak's CPAs say so. :) And it is a legitimate question. But without having access to the raw numbers available to those CPAs we can only guess on some of those.

I think the SWC route could easily support a second train, say run via the Transcon through Amarillo. Lets look at this train which Amtrak claims loses 68 million dollars a year on revenues of 48 million. I am a CPA, bean counter, accountant, so I like playing with numbers. I can get close to their claim of 48 million in revenue like this. Three coaches on each train each way or 400 passengers a day at $156 for a one way coach ticket Chi to Lax equals something like $23 million. Sleeper class is something else. I don’t know the exact consists of the SWC, but lets assume three sleepers per train. There are 14 roomettes per car, three cars per train, two trains a day at $320 dollars a room equals around $9.8 million a year. There are 5 bedrooms, plus a family room and a handicap room for a total of 7 times three per train times two trains times $1070 per room or around $19.5 million per year. If the bedrooms average two people per room and the roomettes are split evenly between one person and two that is an average of 35 passengers per sleeper time three cars time two trains times the average fare of $156 or $12 million a year. Total sleeper revenue is then $41.2 million for this train and coach revenue 23 million for a total of $64 million at 100% occupancy(Amtrak claims sleeper revenue for FY2011 is $19.4 million). To get this down to Amtrak’s number of $48 million total revenue we have to assume a 75% occupancy rate which is still high, but the train is often sold out and of course passengers get on and off all along the route.
Methinks you may be overestimating what they actually get per room. But that's neither here nor there I suppose, since we can choose to believe Amtrak's number on this one.

Now look at their expenses which they say are $116.3 million a year. As far as I can see Amtrak does not detail out any of their operating expenses per train like fuel, labor, rent to the railroads, food costs, station costs, etc. The SWC has five train sets operating every day. Fuel costs for two trains running the whole route every day getting .5mpg per locomotive with two on each train gets something like $6.6 million at $4 per gal. Labor costs, 10 per train, 6 days pay @ $60,000 ea is $7.2 million a year.
Because of the way in which operating staff is allocated to trains, and the fact that there is only one train per day on that route, I suspect that labor cost is much higher than you compute, since it requires way more than 10 people to be kept on the payroll per day to operate the SWC in actuality, together with their current and retirement benefits. I just admit I don;t have precise numbers.

Diner costs. One train each way each day serves 11 meals for perhaps 150 passengers @$25 each or $15 million a year.
150 * 25 * 11 * 365 * 2 = $30,112,500 so call that $30 million a year instead of $15 million a year.

Now for the real tricky stuff. What are the maintenance costs for the 50 or so cars that it takes to run this train? I used a dollar a mile per car, but a car takes two days to make the trip so maybe $20million a year.
Both the actual cost of maintenance and the allocated cost of maintenance facilities and staff needs to be taken into account. I have no clue how to find them accurately.

Rent. Haha, the big secret. Perhaps our expert George Harris can chime in here I guess it’s $10/mile a day or $22,650 a train set or around $16.5 million a year.
Actually this is no secret. There is a published figure for the rolled up cost for rolled up passenger miles on an annualized basis for all of Amtrak. To get a ballpark mean figure, which may or may not be close to what is paid to BNSF, Amtrak in 2010 paid $136.9 million for 26 million train miles according to Amtrak National Facts. That ballparks out to $5.27 per train mile. It should be noted though that any train that is not covered by current contracts, i.e. any new train, will most likely get a rate closer to what you surmise.

Stations, there are 31 outside of Chicago and LAX. Maintenance maybe $10,000 per station per year or $310,000. Station agents @$50,000 ea times maybe 20 is only 1 million a year. Most stations are unmanned. Total operating expenses $67.4 million a year. So I get an annual operating loss of something like $19.4 million.
Calling everything else other than the error in computed food cost a wash make that $19.4 million + $15 million = $34 million and change. I suspect that the labor cost will throw in a significant additional amount while trackage charges will halve, though for a new train will probably stay the same, but my suspicion is labor cost increase will be larger than the trackage cost decrease. Just a guess. But a ballpark overall figure of some $35 to 40 million from the items considered makes sense. If you are doing financial as opposed to cash accounting then we also need to take into consideration depreciation. Even in cash accounting we need to take into account equipment leaseback charge for those pieces of equipment that were sold and are currently leased back. I have no idea what the relevant figures are. Just pointing out that there are other factors to be taken into consideration. There is also the issue of rentals other than trackage charges paid for various facilities that are allocated to SWC wholly or partially. Similarly how service charges for consolidated services like CNOC are allocated to a single train etc. I also do not know how to find those numbers.

Greyhound charges fares ranging from $139 to $229 for a one way trip between Chicago and Lax with two transfers. No sight seer lounge car, no diner, cramped seating on a bus. Think maybe Amtrak’s fares are too low? What if the coach base fare was $250? Now Amtrak only loses $3.7million a year on this train. In other words it breaks even on operating costs. So now you ‘smart guys’ can chew on this for a while.
Well, first we need to get a more complete accounting, which we still don't have, before running off making pronouncements.

Of course Amtrak fares are too low to cover all costs specially for LD trains. However, how much you can raise fares depends on the cost elasticity curve. That is what yield management is all about. Of course I don;t know how good a job Amtrak is doing there, and I bet no one else here does either.

Southwest shows one way fares, nonstop, from $138 advance internet purchase to over $500. But that is no frills, knees in your face, no meals, type flying.
But that is only for a few hours instead of days.

Amtrak was asked to make several studies on things like restoring service on the Pioneer route, the Desert Wind, the Sunset east, etc and they just came up with outlandish exorbitant costs. In other words they just don’t want to do it. Well what the ‘H’ do they want to do?
Could you state why you believe those numbers to be outlandish? Were some of the alleged outlandish numbers that Amtrak came up with? Or was it host railroad jaw-boning, seeing an opportunity to make a few bucks?

Whether the costs are exorbitant or not and to what extent it is Amtrak's doing needs to be analyzed. Would you consider the bill presented by UP to Amtrak an Amtrak exaggeration? That would be so easy to prove if it were so that even the stupidest schemer at Amtrak couldn't come up with that one IMHO.

Amtrak has been told by their paymasters that they are not allowed to start any new LD train without express permission of their paymasters. They have also been told that they have to justify the subsidy for each existing train on a train by train basis to get access to appropriate funds for running those trains. What the 'H' do you exactly expect them to do under those circumstances? Try to save the current network or make pie in the sky plans first?

My main beef with Amtrak is the fact that under the pretext of converting accounting systems they have stopped delivering breakdown of costs. Frankly this has got to be one of the longest accounting system changes in the history of mankind. Basically they do not want to publish those numbers so they are using a random excuse IMHO. It is hard to figure out how a transport company is doing if they refuse to publish even their rolled up RASM and CASM, leaving aside the details for the time being.

How do you get money from Congress? First you have to have a plan. Amtrak has no plan. Congress appropriates money for all kinds of stuff, nonsensical to practical. Amtrak can get the money it needs, but first they have to have some kind of a plan. They have none other than preserving the status quo and their jobs.
I am not sure that the last paragraph enhances your credibility after the excellent analysis presented earlier in the article. I don't see how the last two paragraphs follow from the rest. If one is so convinced that Amtrak can get the money it needs it is time to get at least the legislature in ones state to come up as a starter with a single pro-Amtrak resolution in support of such. ;)

As far as Plans go, it seems to me that the PRIIA Service Improvement plans are pretty reasonable plans for maintaining and improving current service. They do not have a published LD development plan, but then again they would probably pulled up for spending money on inappropriate things if they spent significant money on such at present. They do have rather detailed plans for corridor development both developed by them and in conjunction with State DoTs involved. So to make a blanket statement that Amtrak does not Plans flies in the face of observed reality unfortunately.

But on the whole, excellent stuff with meat that can form the basis of creating a more complete accounting. Unfortunately I am afraid there are significant cost items for which we cannot get accurate numbers as far as I can tell, without Amtrak providing those numbers.
 
Ok, you guys asked for this so here goes. Lets start with the Chicago to NY market. Amtrak is now down to just one train a day, the Lake Shore Limited. At one time the NYC and the Pennsylvania RR ran a dozen or more trains between these two cities, plus multiple trains to St Louis and along with the B&O between Washington DC and Chicago. Now you tell me Amtrak can only muster one **** ant train between two of the largest cities in America with fuel costs continuing to rise and airline hassles rising. I just don’t believe it. Do you think the Cardinal at three times a week really rates as transportation between these two cities? Boardman says LD trains are losers and blames Amtrak’s losses on them. Are they even trying? Lets look at another market. NY to Florida should be one of Amtrak’s premium markets. Yet by their own FY2011 reports, which I don’t believe, the Silver trains plus Auto Train lose 130 million dollars a year on revenues generated of 148 million.

I think the SWC route could easily support a second train, say run via the Transcon through Amarillo. Lets look at this train which Amtrak claims loses 68 million dollars a year on revenues of 48 million. I am a CPA, bean counter, accountant, so I like playing with numbers. [snip]

Now look at their expenses which they say are $116.3 million a year. As far as I can see Amtrak does not detail out any of their operating expenses per train like fuel, labor, rent to the railroads, food costs, station costs, etc. [snip]
Check the 2010 Performance Improvement Reports for the Capitol Limited, Cardinal, California Zephyr which are available on the Amtrak's Reports and Documents web page. The expense breakdowns for those 3 trains were provided in the appendices of the reports. You are overlooking a number of expense items such as stations, insurance, "passenger inconvenience", police, G&A which are broken out in the expense table to provide some insight into the cost picture.

For the CL, the total cost in FY10 to run the train was $40.1 million, total revenue was $19.0 million for a cost recovery of 47%. The biggest expense was "Maintenance of Equipment" at $10.9 million. My interpretation is that this category is not just the direct cost of the mechanical shops in maintaining the equipment, but the total cost of suppling the equipment (lease payments, depreciation, overhauls, spare parts, shared costs of the maintenance facilities. By paying off the Warrington era leases on the Superliners, Amfleets, Viewliners, the lease costs will come off the total expense category. New equipment, acquired with either direct capital grants or at low interest rates, should be more reliable and, if properly designed & built, have lower maintenance and operating costs.

The second largest expense item for the CL was the labor for T&E ($4.9 million) and OBS ($4.6 million). One way to trim the labor costs is improved on-time performance and faster trip times. In comparison, the largest expense for the CZ was the labor costs with T&E at 17.4 million and OBS at $13.5 million compared to Maintenance at $16.5 million. Fuel cost for the CZ were $12.0 million compared to the CL at $3.0 million. The CZ is a 2 night train covering a lot of miles while the CL is a one night train, so the cost structures for fuel and labor are different.

You are getting into a rather complex topic of the finances of the LD trains. As a general observation, the more state supported and short corridor services that there are that the LD trains can run over, the better the cost recovery will get for the LD trains. The state supported corridors will pay for track and station improvements, which will improve the trip times, reliability, and customer base of the LD train operating a portion of its route over that corridor. The LSL will benefit from improvements to the Empire corridor in NY state on one end. On the Chicago end, the LSL & CL will benefit from the Englewood Flyover & Indiana gateway project (if the funds ever get obligated) that are being done mainly for the Chicago-Michigan corridor trains.
 
Thanks for the effort, Henry.

But in general I have to ask you why you think that Amtrak puts out fake numbers?

You write that Amtrak has no plan.

As for corridor services - get your state off its butt! It is probably the most obvious place for new corridor services in the country. Amtrak is legally not allowed to do anything unless Texas engages itself.
Actually I don't think they are fake, I just can't come up with the level of costs they put in their report. The object of the study I did was to see if the train even covered it's operating costs. Beyond that I know Amtrak loads them up with allocated overhead, depreciation and other non-cash or indirect costs. I probably did underestimate labor costs. The train takes some 40+ hours for each trip so I did use 6 days pay. I just ignored benefits which could double labor costs depending. I checked my figures and if I raise labor costs and also the base coach fare the train comes in about $7m in the hole. Without additional capacity none of the LD routes will ever break even.

As for corridor services in my state..........I wish I could light a fire under them. lol. Texas is into toll roads now days because they can use bonds to finance them and pay them off with toll revenue. Doesn't require any taxpayer money. If they could do the same with passenger trains we would have them in no time. The 'Texas Triangle' is actually 774 miles so technically Amtrak could start it without state participation. haha, as if that would ever happen.
 
While these numbers are fascinating, they do nothing to support the original claim that "They could do so much more with very little effort or costs."
I agree with that point, specially considering introducing any new train would require new equipment, the cost of which rightfully should allocated to said new train apportioned and amortized over 30 years or so admittedly. But the tens of million dollar question is where is the money going to come from in the first place?

BTW see http://reasonrail.blogspot.com/2012/04/amtrak-costs-per-train-mile-per-route.html for a relevant material, though contrary to his claim he did not get those number form the Annual Report, but the from the October monthly report I think. Alas the current monthly reports don't have those detailed numbers because of the year long accounting system alleged upgrade going on at Amtrak.
 
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Just to bring this thing up to date, I reviewed the CZ report and made some adjustments accordingly. Again, I am looking only at est operating costs. Fuel costs, I am sticking by my est. of about $7m. The CZ takes 10 more hours and crosses multiple mountain ranges to get to it's $12m number. I lowered the track rent to $5/mile to come up with rent of $8.3m. Labor costs, I raised to $24m for OBS & T&E. This puts it in line with the CZ costs. Maintenance, I stuck with $1/mile per car for 45 cars or $19m. CZ seems to be around $.61/mile. Since the diner crew is now included under OBS, all we have left is commissary costs of around $5m. SWC has(I am guessing) far fewer manned stations, so that number is far less than the CZ or around $2m. So I get operating costs of $65m vs revenue of $48 for a loss of $17m. If you raise the coach fare to an avg of $250, the train almost breaks even. Of course Amtrak loads on fully allocated overhead of $51m to get their costs of $116m.
 
My main beef with Amtrak is the fact that under the pretext of converting accounting systems they have stopped delivering breakdown of costs. Frankly this has got to be one of the longest accounting system changes in the history of mankind. Basically they do not want to publish those numbers so they are using a random excuse IMHO. It is hard to figure out how a transport company is doing if they refuse to publish even their rolled up RASM and CASM, leaving aside the details for the time being.

How do you get money from Congress? First you have to have a plan. Amtrak has no plan. Congress appropriates money for all kinds of stuff, nonsensical to practical. Amtrak can get the money it needs, but first they have to have some kind of a plan. They have none other than preserving the status quo and their jobs.
I am not sure that the last paragraph enhances your credibility after the excellent analysis presented earlier in the article. I don't see how the last two paragraphs follow from the rest. If one is so convinced that Amtrak can get the money it needs it is time to get at least the legislature in ones state to come up as a starter with a single pro-Amtrak resolution in support of such. ;)
The missing accounting data in the monthly reports with the statement "Due to a financial system conversion this data is not yet available." is indeed getting ridiculous. Part of it has likely been waiting on the finalization of the new cost structure allocation policy for the states and Amtrak. With the STB granting its approval of the new cost allocation rules, maybe we will finally see the restoration of the route financial performance numbers in the April or May monthly reports.

As for plans, Amtrak has released the FY2012-FY16 5 Year Financial Plan, the FY12 and FY13 Budget and Comprehensive Business Plans, the Strategic Plan FY2011-FY2015, the V3.1 Fleet Strategy Plan, the NEC Master Infrastructure Plan, all of which are available on their website. I don't follow henryj's complaint that Amtrak has no plans.
 
I think there's a difference between "fake" numbers and "dubious" numbers. I don't think Amtrak puts out any of the former, but I sure see a lot of the latter. I think my favorite example was in one of the 2010 PIPs, when I spotted different CR numbers for a train within the same report. One metric used is "avoidable cost recovery" (which presumably primarily ignores some overhead), another is cost recovery in general, and so on.

Having done cost accounting before, I'd sure love to get inside Amtrak's cost accounting system and have a look around; in particular, I'm wondering how heavy the overhead burdening is on wages and salaries.

As to the capacity issues: Henry, you're spot on. Amtrak is having the same problem now that they were having back in '79 (when, IIRC, they said that they probably turned over a million people away for want of space on trains). In the case of the Silvers, coach fares have been jumping sharply as of late (I think the fare hike in January was around 13%). On this front, the biggest problem that Amtrak is facing, however, is that even sharp hikes are rather hard to use to offset smaller increases in costs when your CR is in the 50s. And Amtrak isn't likely to acquire equipment that is going to sit idle for 4-5 months out of the year.

The old RR situation would be comparable to if Amtrak had retained a substantial pool of Heritage cars and was pressing them into use during the summer and Thanksgiving/Christmas travel seasons. A lot of the RRs would make sure their passengers had rides...but it would often be on a reworked interwar heavyweight rather than a postwar streamliner. Sadly, Amtrak doesn't even have the benefit of such a pool because of the dump toilet problem (though I don't think Amtrak would have been too keen on keeping a fleet of a hundred or more Budd cars in use, it's also quite possible that they could have pooled maintenance costs with VIA insofar as propping up a few suppliers/specialist manufacturers...VIA has just over 200 non-baggage Budds, so I have to wonder at what point a supplier pool would have reached a scale benefit...assuming another 200 Amtrak cars, would 400 have cut it on this front?).
 
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It is going to be tough for any single outfit to keep a mostly idle fleet of 200 cars for occasional use. The RoI on those will be horrible.

The consideration for creating a shared pool and keeping it available while not burdening any single TOC (Train Operating Company) with the total cost was the reason that the Brits came up with the idea of ROSCOs (ROlling Stock COmpanies) which own the equipment and lease them to the TOCs. The ROSCOs are able to balance out supply and demand and move their owned rolling stock around all over the country to meet demand and make the best of it. Theyc arry the risk on the RoI. They determine what equipment can actually be justified by the overall demand for them rather than the TOCs and the TOC's are relieved of the burden of that risk.

Unfortunately the passenger business in the US has become such a centralized and yet divided into watertight partitions bureaucratic clusterf**k with everyone defending their fiefdoms beyond reason, that using such market forces is beyond thinkable at present it seems. At present only very limited redeployment of rolling stock takes place on a one to one basis say between NJT and Amtrak or MARC and Amtrak. But there is no real framework for it to happen spanning the country.
 
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It is going to be tough for any single outfit to keep a mostly idle fleet of 200 cars for occasional use. The RoI on those will be horrible.

The consideration for creating a shared pool and keeping it available while not burdening any single TOC (Train Operating Company) with the total cost was the reason that the Brits came up with the idea of ROSCOs (ROlling Stock COmpanies) which own the equipment and lease them to the TOCs. The ROSCOs are able to balance out supply and demand and move their owned rolling stock around all over the country to meet demand and make the best of it. Theyc arry the risk on the RoI. They determine what equipment can actually be justified by the overall demand for them rather than the TOCs and the TOC's are relieved of the burden of that risk.

Besides the ROSCOs, the UK does have spot-hire companies such as Waterman Rail who have fleets of heritage equipment that can be made available for special hire. As I guess this is equipment that would otherwise be scrapped and that sees only intermettent use I guess the capital outlay is low and maintenance costs should also be fairly manageable.
 
It is going to be tough for any single outfit to keep a mostly idle fleet of 200 cars for occasional use. The RoI on those will be horrible.

The consideration for creating a shared pool and keeping it available while not burdening any single TOC (Train Operating Company) with the total cost was the reason that the Brits came up with the idea of ROSCOs (ROlling Stock COmpanies) which own the equipment and lease them to the TOCs. The ROSCOs are able to balance out supply and demand and move their owned rolling stock around all over the country to meet demand and make the best of it. Theyc arry the risk on the RoI. They determine what equipment can actually be justified by the overall demand for them rather than the TOCs and the TOC's are relieved of the burden of that risk.
Besides the ROSCOs, the UK does have spot-hire companies such as Waterman Rail who have fleets of heritage equipment that can be made available for special hire. As I guess this is equipment that would otherwise be scrapped and that sees only intermettent use I guess the capital outlay is low and maintenance costs should also be fairly manageable.
US does have a semblance of spot hire companies for passenger rolling stock, but it is not a very well developed segment either, and the equipment pool available for such is very very limited and specialized.

There are other conceivable possibilities. For example the outfit that acquired a lot of the ex Santa Fe Hi Level cars, has just been sitting on them gathering dust. They have made no attempt whatsoever to create a leasing business out of any of them, which suggests that the bureaucracy and fiefdom protection is so rampant that it is impossible to create and sustain such a market. NJTransit has been in the business of leasing its retired cars to some extent, but that is a pretty odd one.
 
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It is going to be tough for any single outfit to keep a mostly idle fleet of 200 cars for occasional use. The RoI on those will be horrible.

The consideration for creating a shared pool and keeping it available while not burdening any single TOC (Train Operating Company) with the total cost was the reason that the Brits came up with the idea of ROSCOs (ROlling Stock COmpanies) which own the equipment and lease them to the TOCs. The ROSCOs are able to balance out supply and demand and move their owned rolling stock around all over the country to meet demand and make the best of it. Theyc arry the risk on the RoI. They determine what equipment can actually be justified by the overall demand for them rather than the TOCs and the TOC's are relieved of the burden of that risk.
Besides the ROSCOs, the UK does have spot-hire companies such as Waterman Rail who have fleets of heritage equipment that can be made available for special hire. As I guess this is equipment that would otherwise be scrapped and that sees only intermettent use I guess the capital outlay is low and maintenance costs should also be fairly manageable.
US does have a semblance of spot hire companies for passenger rolling stock, but it is not a very well developed segment either, and the equipment pool available for such is very very limited and specialized.

There are other conceivable possibilities. For example the outfit that acquired a lot of the ex Santa Fe Hi Level cars, has just been sitting on them gathering dust. They have made no attempt whatsoever to create a leasing business out of any of them, which suggests that the bureaucracy and fiefdom protection is so rampant that it is impossible to create and sustain such a market. NJTransit has been in the business of leasing its retired cars to some extent, but that is a pretty odd one.
There's also the NEC clearance issue, which in turn creates a lot of compatibility issues. Yes, you can use a Transdorm to connect a bilevel section with a single-level section. Yes, you could in theory "split" a train and have coach and the sleepers be separate. But none of this gets around the fact that you simply cannot run bilevels past WAS, so you can't (for example) pull cars off of the Zephyr or Builder in winter and move them to the Silvers (which is what I suspect Amtrak did, more or less, in its early years).

I don't think it's "fiefdom protection" that's messing things up...again, let's be honest: There wasn't exactly a need for all of this ten years ago, when Amtrak ridership was stuck in the low 20 million range and the LD trains were staggering back from the damage Warrington's fare hikes inflicted. I very much doubt that Amtrak was pressed enough for equipment to need "regular" equipment leases between the 1980s and the early 2000s (when we started seeing sleepers cut for want of equipment...the Three Rivers, the Twilight Shoreliner, and the Silver Palm all went under Warrington IIRC). Before that, the demand would have been at most a few sleepers (which have been a bit more chronically short over the years). So there wasn't the business to justify a substantial leasing operation for about 20 years.

Basically, the problem is that there's occasional use and there's seasonal use. You can't build a business model on Thanksgiving week and the Christmas season...whether you can do so on that plus a "long summer" (that is, April or May to August) is a much more open question, since if what I've seen in the reports is correct, Amtrak's ridership is bumping up close to limits for most of the summer.
 
the Three Rivers, the Twilight Shoreliner, and the Silver Palm all went under Warrington IIRC
The Three Rivers lost was discontinued (and lost its sleeper shortly before that) under Gunn. The last incarnation of an overnight WAS-BOS train with a sleeper also had said sleeper disappear under David Gunn.

Warrington was around when the decision was made to strip the Silver Palm of its sleeper.
 
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