dixieland train crash guthrie ky 1957 or so

[Harvey Versteeg]

With another Lt friend from Fort Campbell, I followed a parade of emergency vehicles to Guthrie, KY in 1957 and came on the train wreck. I probably took photos but have not looked for them in years. As I remember it, a slow moving freight moving south, lost it's brakes on a slight grade and very slowly hit the left side of a fast moving eastbound passenger train. The locomotive struck the baggage car which flipped the engine sidewise. The rear end of the engine hit the dinning car. The engineer and some dinning car staff died. I walked past a stretcher with a long piece of raw meat hanging out from under the cover. The heavy rail crossing unit was moves several feet southeast and the edge of the concrete passenger platform was sheered off.

Recently I've been interested in seeing how accurate my memory was. Unfortunate the friend who was with me that day has died.

 

[Harvey Versteeg]

Greetings;

Since I wrote for info about the Guthrie. KY June, '57 wreck, that I saw very shortly after it happened, I've read the contents of this forum and answered most of my questions, except the two conflicting lists of casualties.

I used to ride the L & N between Detroit and Clarksville, TN while a Lt. with the 101st Airborne at Fort Campbell, KY (post gate in KY but mostly in TN)

My most memorial train ride was in August of 1953 home from Smokejumper Base, Missoula, MT to Detroit, MI. The ride from Missoula to Chicago was in a swivel chair lounge car on the Milwaukee line, but from Chicago to Detroit was on the NYC in a coach so old it still had arrows sticking out of the sides; no AC and caned benches.

My most spectacular was the White Pass and Yukon up the hill from Skagway, Alaska. When I was there in 1959 Skagway was a near ghost town but the RR ran all the way to Whitehorse. When I visited Skagway on a cruise 15 (?) years ago, it only ran to the top of the pass at the Canadian border and back down, but the town was a summer tourist ship mecca and you could not rent space in it. Interestingly the '98 gold rushers built it in 18 months with picks and dynamite. The modern highway connecting Skagway to the Alcan took 12 years to build with modern engineering and machinery. The trip from Haines to Skagway was 7 miles by seaplane in '59. It was 150 miles by highway in 2000.

I was proud of my first solo train ride in the late '40s. I rode the bus in to Detroit with my father who got off when the bus passed his workplace and I got off at the train station (now long empty), got on the train and transferred at Grand Rapids for Holland, MI where my grand parents met me. I was probably 8-10 (?) at the time. I also carried a puppy in a box as a present for my cousins. Several people on the train tried to buy it, but then my cousin's mother would not let the cousins have the puppy. And I kept humming the song on the radio at the time, "Sentimental Journey Home."

My brother in MI is a member of a group that owns a very large steam locomotive used for excursion trips. Some years back, he came to Maine to ride with us on the first passenger excursion train up the old tracks along the Kennebec River to Augusta. It ran a few times more in summers. Now we have regular multi-daily train service from Boston to Bath, ME. on AMTRAC. Too bad we don't have more RR passenger service. In the late 1800s you could reach nearly any part of Maine via train or trolley. I have an old map of Maine that looks like a highway map at first glance, but does not even show any highways. It only shows RRs & trolley lines covering the state. And that was not even showing the short line logging RRs that only ran from the logging areas to the nearest large lake or river.

Our first train ride on the new AMTRAC in the early '70s, with two small children, was a big disappointment. The train from Chicago missed two Boston connections at NY with only minutes to make the 3rd, and we had no way to tell my in-laws waiting to drive us up to Maine. On the return trip we got to Boston over an hour early and found our scheduled train did not take luggage. Luckily we were early enough to take an earlier train that did. The return to Chicago was over 4 hours late and the pick-up person there could not find out when we were due in. Our coach ran out of water and AC while the lunch car ran out of sandwiches. No wonder people shifted to airlines back before you had to spend an hour checking through security.

I ran history museums for 15 years and since that have done jobs for other museums. One was to do engineering drawings of the Lion, the oldest surviving steam locomotive in Maine. In measuring it in the state museum, to do the drawings, I was amazed at the complexity of the 1846, open platform 0-4-0 locomotive. I also found it interesting that even after restoration, the wooden frame was warped. It had two diagonally opposed high corners and two low corners by a couple of inches. I had to measure both sides and average the heights. If you are ever in the Maine State Museum, you will be faced by the Lion as you enter the lobby. Go around to the labels at the side and see my drawing.

Cheers,

Harvey Versteeg, [email protected]

 

[George Harris]

Copied from: http://dotlibrary.specialcollection.net/Document?db=DOT-RAILROAD&query=(select+3737)

DATE: June 29, 1957
RAILROAD: Louisville and Nashville

DIVISIONS: Evansville Louisville

LOCATION: Guthrie, Ky.

KIND OF ACCIDENT: Side collision

TRAIN INVOLVED: Passenger Freight

TRAIN NUMBERS: 11 121

LOCOMOTIVE NUMBERS: Diesel-electric units 604 Diesel-electric units 806, 703, and

and 612 812

CONSIST: 12 cars 30 cars, caboose

ESTIMATED SPEEDS: 35 m. p. h. 6 m. p. h.

OPERATION: Interlocking

TRACKS: Single; tangent; level Single; tangent; 0.70 percent

descending grade southward

WEATHER: Clear

TIME: 4:45 p.m.

CASUALTIES: 6 killed; 21 injured

CAUSE: Failure to operate Louisville Division train in accordance with signal indications

. . . .

This accident occurred within yard limits of the intersection of the Evansville and Louisville Divisions at Guthrie, Ky. In the vicinity of the point of accident south-bound trains by timetable directions move southeast on the Evansville Division and southwest on the Louisville Division by compass directions. Timetable directions are used in this report. The accident occurred on that part of the Evansville Division extending between Henderson, Ky., and Amgui, Tenn., 136.0 miles, and on that part of the Louisville Division extending between Louisville, Ky., and Paris, Tenn., 246.3 miles. Guthrie is 97.0 miles south of Henderson and 163.9 miles south of Louisville. The lines intersect at an angle of 86 degree 47'. At Guthrie, sidings parallel the main tracks of the Evansville and Louisville Divisions on the east and west, respectively. A highway crosses the tracks of the Louisville Division at grade. The center-line of the highway is located 1,563 feet north of the intersection. In the vicinity of the paint of accident the Evansville Division is a single-track line over which trains are operated by signal indications. The track is tangent throughout a distance of over 3 miles immediately north of the point of accident and a considerable distance southward. The guide is practically level at the paint of accident. In the vicinity of the point of accident the Louisville Division is a single-track line over which trains are operated by timetable and train orders. There is no block system in use. The track is tangent throughout a distance of over 1.5 miles immediately north of the point of accident and a considerable distance southward. The grade for south-bound trains is, successively, practically level 4,000 feet, a vertical curve 800 feet, 1.04 percent descending 500 feet, 1.18 percent descending 1,600 feet, and an average of 0.70 percent descending 400 feet to the point of accident.

Movements over the crossing are governed by interlocking signals. Semi-automatic signals 2171 and 3R, governing south-bound movements an the Evansville Division, are located, respectively, 1.28 miles and 162 feet north of the intersection. Automatic signal 1621 and semi-automatic signal IL., governing south-bound movements an the Louisville Division, are located, respectively, 1.38 miles and 200 feet north of the intersection.

. . . .

Description of Accident

No. 11, a south-bound first-class passenger train, consisted of diesel-electric units 604 and 612, coupled in multiple-unit control, one dormitory-baggage car, two sleeping cars, one dining car, one tavern car, one sleeping car, and six coaches, n the order named. These cars were of lightweight construction and were equipped with tightlock couplers. This train departed from Evansville, Ind., 109.4 miles north of Guthrie, of 2:48 p.m., 3 minutes late, passed Henderson at 3:08 p.m., 5 minutes late, passed signals 2171, and 3R, which indicated Proceed, and while moving over the intersection at Guthrie at a speed of approximately 35 miles per hour the side of the first car was struck by No. 121.

No. 121, a soul-bound second-class freight train, consisted of diesel-electric units 806, 703 and 812, coupled in multiple-unit control, 30 cars, and a caboose. This train departed from Strawberry Ky., 158.0 miles north of Guthrie, at 12:43 p.m., 3 hours 43 minutes late, departed from Russellville, Ky., the last open office, 20.2 miles north of Guthrie, at 4:23 p.m., 3 hours 26 minutes late, passed signal 1621, which indicated Prepare-to-stop-at-next-signal, passed signal IL., which indicated Stop, and while moving at a speed of about 6 miles per hour it struck the side of the first car of No. 11.

No. 11 stopped with the front end of the locomotive 678 feet south of the intersection. There were no separations between the units of the train. The first to the sixth cars, inclusive, and the front truck of the seventh car were derailed and stopped upright approximately in line and on the track structure. The fourth car was destroyed, the first and the fifth cars were badly damaged, the second, the third, and the sixth cars were considerably damaged, and the seventh car was slightly damaged. The first and second diesel-electric units of No. 121 were derailed and separations occurred between the units. The first unit stopped on its right side. The front and rear ends of this unit were, respectively, 98 feet and 147 feet south of the intersection, and 15 feet and 5.5 feet east of the Evansville Division main track. The front end of the second unit struck the side of the fourth car of No. 11. This unit stopped on its left side with the front end on the Evansville Division track structure and the rear end of the Louisville Division track structure. No other equipment of the train was derailed. The first and the second diesel-electric units were badly damaged and the third unit was slightly damaged.

The engineer of No. 121 was killed. The conductor of No. 11 was injured.

The weather was clear at the time of the accident, which occurred at 4:45 p.m.

The diesel-electric units of No. 121 were equipped with 24RL brake equipment. The regulatory devices were adjusted to maintain a maximum main reservoir pressure of 140 pounds and brake-pipe pressure of 90 pounds. The first unit of the locomotive was equipped with a speed-recording device but the device was not provided with a speed-recording tape.

Discussion

As No. 11 was approaching the point where the accident occurred the enginemen were in the control compartment of the first diesel-electric unit. The conductor was in the first car and the flagman was in the rear car. Signals 2171 and 3R indicated Proceed. The speed of the train was reduced to about 35 miles per hour to comply with the speed restriction at the interlocking. The engineer said that as the train approached the intersection he observed the operators at the station moving away from the track in a manner which indicated to him that something was wrong with the train. He initiated an emergency application of the brakes. The collision occurred immediately afterward. The fireman said that he observed No. 121 after it had passed signal IL. He estimated that the speed of that train was about 6 miles per hour when the collision occurred.

As No. 121 was approaching the point where the accident occurred the engineer, the fireman, and the front brakeman were in the control compartment of the first diesel-electric unit, and the conductor and the flagman were in the caboose. The fireman, who was promoted to the position of engineer on February 2, 1951, was operating the locomotive. The brakes of this train had been tested and no exceptions were taken to the condition of the brake equipment. No difficulty was experienced in controlling the speed of the train en route. Signal 1621 indicated Prepare-to-stop-at-next-signal. The fireman said that the speed of the train was about 55 miles per hour approaching the signal and that he initiated a service brake application before the train passed the signal. He said that he released the brakes when the speed of the train was reduced to about 25 miles per hour at a point approximately 600 feet south of the signal. The throttle was in No. 3 position at that time. As the train was approaching signal IL the fireman received instructions from the conductor by radio to stop the train at signal IL instead of the customary stopping point immediately north of the highway crossing. The conductor said that when switching operations were to be performed at Guthrie it was his practice to stop the train at signal IL provided the train was of such length that the rear of the train would be south of the highway after the train stopped. Signal IL can first be seen from the control compartment of a south-bound locomotive at a point 4,974 feet north of the signal. The fireman said that the signal indicated Stop. He said that he made an 8-pound brake-pipe reduction when the train was about 2,000 feet north of signal IL but the brakes did not appear to function properly, He estimated that the speed of the train was 25 miles per hour at that time. He said that when the train was about 1,200 feet north at the signal he applied the brakes in emergency, closed the throttle, and operated the sanding valve. The engineer called a warning o the fireman. The fireman and the brakeman alighted before the collision occurred. The fireman said that the speed of the train was about 8 miles per hour when the collision occurred. The brakeman said he thought that the brakes were applied in emergency at a point about 600 feet north of signal IL. He estimated that the speed of the train at that time was about 15 miles per hour and that it was reduced to about 6 miles per hour when the collision occurred. The conductor said he thought that the train was about 500 feet north of the signal when the brakes became applied in emergency and that the speed of the train at that time was about 15 miles per hour. The flagman said that he observed the brake-pipe gauge in the caboose after the fireman made the 8-pound brake-pipe reduction and it indicated that brake-pipe pressure was then between 70 and 75 pounds. He said that he was closely observing the location of the caboose in order to notify the engine crew by radio when the caboose was south of the highway crossing. He said that the brakes became applied in emergency when the rear of the train was about 800 feet north of the highway crossing. He estimated that the speed of the train at that time was about 15 miles per hour.

The statements of the members of the crew are conflicting regarding the speed and the location of the train at the time the brakes became applied in emergency. However, it is apparent from then statements that the fireman was mistaken and that the emergency brake application was made at a point nearer signal lb. than he estimated.

The broke cylinders and brake pipes of the first two diesel-electric units of No. 121 were damaged as a result of the accident. The undamaged brake equipment of the first unit was tested after plugging broken pipes and it was found to function properly. The control and relay valves of the second unit were removed and applied to another unit of the same type and were found to function properly. The brake equipment of the third unit functioned properly. The brake equipment of the cars of No. 121 was tested and it was found that the brakes of the ninth car were cut out, and that the brake-cylinder piston travel of seven cars and the caboose was excessive, measuring 10 inches or more. As a result, the brakes of only about 75 percent of the cars of the train were in proper condition at the time of the accident. Although no exceptions were taken when the brakes were tasted at Strawberry, it is apparent that the brakes of the ninth car were cut out and that excessive brake-cylinder piston travel existed at that time.

Under the rules of the carrier, after No. 121 passed signal 1621 it was required to be operated at medium speed and in such manner that the train could be stopped before passing signal IL.

Cause

This accident was caused by failure to operate the Louisville Division train in accordance with signal indications.

Dated at Washington, D. C., this twenty--second day of October, 1957.

By the Commission, Commissioner Tuggle.

(SEAL) HAROLD D. McCOY,

Given that this a 55 year old document and a govenment publication I would think it safe to quote large chunks of it.

 

[james winders]

This is very interesting, I stumbled across it while looking at train engines with my son. I was born in 1965 and have been in Guthrie since late 60s. As a child the big train wreck was big talk around here. I often played at what was left of the old depot which was nothing but concrete pads, sidewalk and handrails. The city of Guthrie is in the process of renovating on old building downtown which will be a railroad museum. It would be interesting if someone who was aactually a passenger happened to show up at our grand opening. I'd certainly like to meet you

 

[railpost]

Even though this is a relatively "old thread" I found it quite informative as I have had an interest in the Dixieland and Dixie Flagler through services to Florida for many years and I like several of you couldn't help but wonder why the Dixieland (alias Dixie Flagler) was discontinued so soon as it was using new equipment and was competive with the both the Southwind and the City of Miami which both lasted until Amtrak or in the case of the South Wind, shortly before Amtrak as about a year before Amtrak ,during 1970, the South Wind had lost its status as through Chicago to Florida Train and the portion of route from Chicago to Louisville had become a Chicago to Louisville train on the Penn Central where you would have to physically change both trains and railroads once you arrive in Louisville.
When Amtrak started the Southwind route was chosen as their route from Chicago to Florida as it served more major cities and therefore more population Centers.