I haven't seen what equipment they're planning, but I've heard both the tried and true (if death trap) MP36 with Bombardier bi-levels, and some sort of DMU (originally CRC, but dunno if their "successor" is still in business).
Suggest that you look into the FRA requirements on vehicles. Anything that by any stretcb of the imagination could be called a death trap simply will not be allowed to run.
George, I have a great deal of respect for you, and will happily defer to you on most rail-oriented topics. However, while I may not be an expert, it doesn't take an expert to recognize bad railcar design when stuff flies apart at the seams instead of crumpling or even accordioning.
I have looked, and I failed to find the section of the crash standards that indicated that railcars should come apart at the seams and telescope into themselves:
The NTSB Chatsworth Collision Report said:
the forward one-quarter of the coach (encompassing the intermediate-level passenger compartment, which is above the lead-end truck) separated at the center sill and telescoped into the carbody,
Unless I'm mistaken, the FRA crash standards to which you refer indicate 800,000 pounds compression statically applied. Which unless I'm interpreting the CFR wrong means essentially: place car in clamp, slowly tighten until scale reads 800,000. That's significantly different conditions than a locomotive suddenly being shoved into the car from a sudden collision. Additionally, CFR Title 49 Part 238.203© states:
When overloaded in compression, the body structure of passenger equipment shall be designed, to the maximum extent possible, to fail by buckling or crushing, or both, of structural members rather than by fracture of structural members or failure of structural connections.
Based on the NTSB report, it appears that structural connections failed when overloaded in compression (by sudden application of locomotive). The only saving grace I see for the BiLevels appears to be back up in (b) of that same part:
Passenger equipment placed in service before November 8, 1999 is presumed to comply with the requirements of paragraph (a)(1) of this section, unless the railroad operating the equipment has knowledge, or FRA makes a showing, that such passenger equipment was not built to the requirements specified in paragraph (a)(1).
Since the original BiLevels were delivered in 1992 when Metrolink started, and/or the design stemming from 1978, are we just
presuming that the equipment is not in fact the deathtrap I claim it to be? Simply presuming that something is safe because it was placed in service before 1999 seems rather unsafe to me and my unexperienced mind.
The railfan side of me hates Metrolink's new crash energy management cars with a burning vengeance, but the practical side of me agrees that such designs is what our rail systems need in the %.00001 chance that our signaling systems fail, or the crew or dispatchers center make a mistake.
Imagine if during a head on collision, the engine of a particular car model had a habit of telescoping into the passenger compartment. Would that not also be a deathtrap and a bad design to be immediately remedied?
Fortunately, there have been very few collisions, which given that the BiLevels are not universally used means few instances of collision, with Glendale and Chatsworth being the only two I know of so, (unfortunately for this discussion) the information about the BiLevel's crash performance is somewhat limited. I am also unable to find the NTSB report on the Glendale collision which was admittedly very different circumstances than the head on collision of Chatsworth, but may have further enhanced either of our positions.
If I am getting this wrong, please enlighten me as I'd actually like to learn, but based on the NTSB report and the CFRs (which I admittedly might be misinterpreting due to my inexperience) the cars do appear to be less than safe.