Ideas for future trains between Florida and Midwest

[George Harris]

This is a start on discussion on the historic Chicago to Florida trains. Much of the timetable specific information comes from a copy I have of the November 1956 Official Railway Guide. This has always been one of my interests so I can go on about this for a while. First a little history:

This had long been a major rail passenger market. Beginning somewhere around 1940, the “Fast Three” were introduced, initially as all coach trains each running every third day. Pullmans were added after only a few years. I do not know the precise dates for these events. These trains were the City of Miami out of Chicago on the Illinois Central, the South Wind out of Chicago on the Pennsylvania, and the Dixieland out of Chicago on the Chicago and Eastern Illinois. Also, sometime later, in the early 50’s(?) the City of Miami and South Wind began operating on alternating days first only in wintertime and then year round after the Dixieland was discontinued, which was sometime between 1957 and 1960. These were all long trains, with the summer time minimum being 4 Pullmans, 4 coaches, a diner and an observation car. In winter cars were added. In the winter, from first hand observation in the 1962-3 and 1963-4 winters the norm for the City of Miami would be 20 cars total, sometimes possibly one or two more. These trains were outstanding examples of multi-railroad company cooperation, as well as competition. The only common players in all routes were the Atlantic Coast Line and Florida East Coast on the south end. While considered quite fast in their day, and in part some they were, these routes were all cross grain to the south end of the Appalachian Chain, so they were not truly fast trains on the order of the New York – Chicago fast trains or the AT&SF western trains.

In November 1956 Official Guide, the City of Miami and Dixieland both left Chicago at 9:00am and arrived at Jacksonville at 9:15am the next morning then Miami at 5:15pm. The South Wind left Chicago at 8:45am, with south end times the same. Northbound, all left Miami at 12:40 noon and Jacksonville at 8:30pm. Arrivals at Chicago were 6:45pm the next evening, except the South Wind’s which was 7:15pm. Remembering time zones, this gave you southbound 23 hours 15 minutes except 23 hours 30 minutes for the South Wind, plus another 8 hours to Miami. Northbound the times were 7 hours 50 minutes Miami departure to Jacksonville departure, plus 23 hours 15 minutes northbound the next evening, except 23 hours 45 minutes for the South Wind.

There were no points common to all three trains north of Jacksonville. Yes, all originated in Chicago, but each from a different station. Even though all three stopped at Waycross GA, the South Wind stop was not at the same location as that of the other two. The South Wind and Dixieland did both use the same station in Nashville. The South Wind and City of Miami both served Birmingham, but not at the same station.

Discussions on routes and average speeds on their various components to follow.

 

[George Harris]

Second Installment on the "Fast Three"

First a couple of comments: Although the Dixieland had the shortest route and matched the City of Miami in time, it appeared to have the lowest passenger counts and was the first to die. The City of Miami lasted until Amtrak, and also appeared to have the largest passenger counts. The South Wind, "sort of" lasted until Amtrak, and was the route chosen by Amtrak. I say "sort of" because Penn Central discontinued through equipment so that for the last year or so pre-Amtrak a change of trains was required at Louisville, and the L&N portion was combined with the Pan American between there and Montgomery AL. Track conditions on both the ICRR and the L&N were circling the drain during that period of time, so both ride quality and reliability were absent in their last pre-Amtrak years. I suspect the South Wind route was chosen because it served more and larger urban areas than the City of Miami. Birmingham AL was the only significant intermediate urban area on the CofM route. The City of Miami route cannot be reinstated as there are segments that have been abandoned and others that have been downgraded to essentially branch line status.

Back to our regular programming:

City of Miami, Chicago Central Station, via Illinois Central, Central of Georgia, and Atlantic Coast Line,
Now CN+NS+CSX and not all there
Milage on each, 688.5+250.8+187.2 = 1,127 miles Chicago to Jacksonville
Southbound: 9:00amCT to 9:15amET = 23h15m = 48.45mph
Northbound: 8:30pmET to 6:45pmCT = 23h15m = 48.45mph

South Wind, Chicago Union Station, via Pennsylvania, Louisville and Nashville, and Atlantic Coast Line
Now, who knows who, and CSX, and likely some of the northern portion no longer there
Milage on each, 313.1+490+389.9 = 1,193 miles Chicago to Jacksonville
Southbound: 8:45amCT to 9:15amET = 23h30m = 50.77mph
Northbound: 8:30pmET to 7:15pmCT = 23h45m = 50.23mph

Dixieland, Chicago Dearborn Station, via Chicago and Eastern Illinois, Louisville and Nashville, Nashville, Chattanooga and St. Louis and Atlantic Coast Line, now all CSX
Milage on each, 287.2+159+285.2+354.7 = 1,086 miles Chicago to Jacksonville
Southbound: 9:00amCT to 9:15amET = 23h15m = 46.71mph
Northbound: 8:30pmET to 6:45pmCT = 23h15m = 46.71mph
This is the only route still in place in its entirety and it is also maintained to something resembling main line standards throughout, however, to achieve this run time today would require mega millions of dollars.

 

[danasgoodstuff]

Second Installment on the "Fast Three"

First a couple of comments: Although the Dixieland had the shortest route and matched the City of Miami in time, it appeared to have the lowest passenger counts and was the first to die. The City of Miami lasted until Amtrak, and also appeared to have the largest passenger counts. The South Wind, "sort of" lasted until Amtrak, and was the route chosen by Amtrak. I say "sort of" because Penn Central discontinued through equipment so that for the last year or so pre-Amtrak a change of trains was required at Louisville, and the L&N portion was combined with the Pan American between there and Montgomery AL. Track conditions on both the ICRR and the L&N were circling the drain during that period of time, so both ride quality and reliability were absent in their last pre-Amtrak years. I suspect the South Wind route was chosen because it served more and larger urban areas than the City of Miami. Birmingham AL was the only significant intermediate urban area on the CofM route. The City of Miami route cannot be reinstated as there are segments that have been abandoned and others that have been downgraded to essentially branch line status.

Back to our regular programming:

City of Miami, Chicago Central Station, via Illinois Central, Central of Georgia, and Atlantic Coast Line,
Now CN+NS+CSX and not all there
Milage on each, 688.5+250.8+187.2 = 1,127 miles Chicago to Jacksonville
Southbound: 9:00amCT to 9:15amET = 23h15m = 48.45mph
Northbound: 8:30pmET to 6:45pmCT = 23h15m = 48.45mph

South Wind, Chicago Union Station, via Pennsylvania, Louisville and Nashville, and Atlantic Coast Line
Now, who knows who, and CSX, and likely some of the northern portion no longer there
Milage on each, 313.1+490+389.9 = 1,193 miles Chicago to Jacksonville
Southbound: 8:45amCT to 9:15amET = 23h30m = 50.77mph
Northbound: 8:30pmET to 7:15pmCT = 23h45m = 50.23mph

Dixieland, Chicago Dearborn Station, via Chicago and Eastern Illinois, Louisville and Nashville, Nashville, Chattanooga and St. Louis and Atlantic Coast Line, now all CSX
Milage on each, 287.2+159+285.2+354.7 = 1,086 miles Chicago to Jacksonville
Southbound: 9:00amCT to 9:15amET = 23h15m = 46.71mph
Northbound: 8:30pmET to 6:45pmCT = 23h15m = 46.71mph
This is the only route still in place in its entirety and it is also maintained to something resembling main line standards throughout, however, to achieve this run time today would require mega millions of dollars.

Thank you, is there a map that would show these and what Amtrak did/might do? And is the former Amtrak routing mentioned above so much longer because it hits more major population centers?

 

[JamesWhitcombRiley]

Thank you, is there a map that would show these and what Amtrak did/might do? And is the former Amtrak routing mentioned above so much longer because it hits more major population centers?

From Wikipedia.

City of Miami: Chicago - Champagne-Urbana - Cairo - Jackson TN - Corinth - Birmingham - Columbus GA - Waycross - Jax - Miami

South Wind: Chicago - Indianapolis - Nashville - Birmingham - Montgomery - Waycross - Jax - Miami

Dixieland: Chicago - Terre Haute - Nashville - Chattanooga - Atlanta - Waycross - Jax - Miami

In Florida after 1963 the FEC ceased pax rail, so the first two routes moved inland through Orlando, and the third ended entirely.

Amtrak Connect Us in 2021 had no Chicago - Miami Train.

FRA Round 4 LD Study in 2024 had this:



https://fralongdistancerailstudy.or...SS_REVISED_FINAL_Presentation_Round_4_Web.pdf

Sounds like this is the new rail needed:

223 miles of discontinued long-distance routes restored

The "$3 billion" cost breakdown, all in $millions:

Vehicle costs: $650-840
Station and maintenance facility costs: $1,140-1,490
Track class and PTC upgrade costs: $950-1,240
O&M costs (annual): $78-110

Georgia folks always want Atlanta - Savannah, but the study discarded that as a route for the Chicago - Miami train after discussion. (Also the seaport has top priority for the government in place in Georgia. In addition to building a second port at Savannah, with the help of federal funds undoubtedly, it's building 41 miles of truck-only untolled separated express lanes on I-75 around Macon, northtbound only, at $1.8b. And a business group in Chattanooga wants the same thing on I-75 in northwest Georgia.)

 

[JWM]

While no expert, I took the "South Wind" many times between Indianapolis and West Palm Beach. As I recall, the
only" slow" stretch was just south of Louisville and I remember cars and trucks passing the train on what was then the "Kentucky Turnpike" now I-65

 

[rookzie]

A rider’s perception of speed depended largely on boarding point, destination and direction of travel. The Chicago-to- Louisville tracks were the worst on its route; the Louisville-to-Nashville stretch came in second. Slow freight trains helped hold up the train. The Floridian averaged 36 mph. The train that lumbered through Kentucky and Tennessee clipped steadily through central Alabama and southern Georgia. In Florida, it flew, averaging more than 70 mph at stretches.


For the Chicago-Florida route, most of the pre-Amtrak SOUTH WIND routing was selected, but with some alterations. The train originated at Central Station in Chicago and used Illinois Central trackage between there and Kankakee, thence Penn Central via Logansport io Indianapolis. South of Indianapolis, it returned to its old routing of ex-PRR trackage to Louisville, L&N to Montgomery and SCL to its Florida destinations. Penn Central track conditions in Indiana, already showing signs of major deterioration, forced Amtrak to accept a 6-hour-45-minute Chicago - Louisville schedule, nearly an hour slower than that of 15 years earlier. But this was only the beginning, as Amtrak was to find out, and the rerouting of this train, off of PC trackage ultimately became a forced issue.


It was becoming clear in the mid-1960s that the quality of service was eroding, particularly on the SOUTH WIND. The Pennsylvania Railroad became increasingly unhappy with its share of costs for the train, and consequently did nothing to promote ridership. When New York Central and Pennsy merged in 1968 to form Penn Central, the problem accelerated, as the passenger deficit on the combined system was considered totally out of hand, and necessary steps would be taken to eliminate or downgrade as many trains as possible. Late in 1966, PC threatened to discontinue the handling of through cars on the train, requiring all passengers to transfer at Louisville. When PC finally discontinued the through-car operation in November 1969, its substitute train consisted of only three cars, in the form of a Chicago-Louisville connecting train with a rescheduled L&N Pan American. Short of complete discontinuance, it appeared that the level of service had reached bottom. So bad it was, in fact, that Seaboard Coast Line applied to discontinue its portion of the run south of Montgomery. Only the coming of Amtrak forestalled that event, but ultimately, the horrors of Penn Central would continue to bedevil the train until it was finally forced off the Amtrak map by edict of Congress.


February 11, 1975. The FLORIDIAN bade an unceremonious farewell to Penn Central trackage north of Louisville. Another FRA inspection resulted in an unsafe-at-30-MPH decree. The southbound FLORIDIAN didn't arrive in Louisville until nearly noon that day, some five-plus hours late. It would be the last time that the FLORIDIAN would ever traverse that route again, in spite of Amtrak's intentions to return it there when track conditions permitted. Effective with the departure of the southbound run from Chicago that night, the FLORIDIAN was detoured over the same route it assumed when PC was closed down the previous August. Again, this resulted in a loss of 2 to 3 hours running time due to a mostly 40 MPH speed limit and heavy freight traffic. There was some interest in keeping the FLORIDIAN on its ex-C&EI and L&N routing through Hopkinsville, Evansville, Danville, Vincennes, and Terre Haute but slightly over a month later, Amtrak would find a detour route considered more acceptable: the former Monon route between Chicago and Louisville.

March 13, 1975: A derailment and washout on the L&N detour route south of Evansville caused Amtrak to reroute the FLORIDIAN via L&N's ex-Monon between Chicago and Louisville. L&N was at first reluctant to run the PLORIDIAN on this route, mainly due to the operation of the six-axle SDP40F~s, which ordinarily would be restricted to 25 MPH. The FLORIDIAN had been detoured this way on two previous occasions, once with E units and once with SDP's on the point, and the 25 MPH rule had been enforced when the SDP’s were used. But with lighter freight traffic than on the C&EI and an agreement to raise speed limits to 50 MPH and 40 MPH north and south of Lafayette respectively for the SDP's, L&N soon began accepting it on a route that had seen its Last regularly scheduled varnish some 7 1/2 years previous. The rerouting caused a couple of minor operating problems. The first was encountered at 40th Street in Chicago. To reach Chicago & Western Indiana trackage from Union Station, a backup movement was necessary from the original Penn Central route to C&WI track due to the lack of a connecting track leading in the proper direction. This was corrected some 21 months later when a link was constructed between the two roads just south of 21st Street. After running 19 miles on the C&WI, which had a 40 MPH maximum, Monon route trackage was attained at Hammond. Ten MPH speeds were mandatory through Lafayette, Bedford and New Albany due to long stretches of street running which further hindered higher-speed operation. Additionally, Monon trackage consisted mostly of lightweight rail. The approach to Louisville also contributed to slow running, due to the necessity of running over the Kentucky & Indiana Terminal for some 6 miles at 10 MPH and having to contend with heavy Southern Railway freight traffic as well as dealing with a non- interlocked grade crossing with the Illinois Central Gulf. Once L&N tracks were reached, a backup movement of slightly over a mile was required. With the storage mail cars on the rear, this called for the services of a L&N switcher to pull the train into Union Station on its southbound run and out of the depot on its northbound run, a service for which L&N quite naturally billed Amtrak. This was quickly remedied by placing the storage mail cars on the head end, thus permitting a crew member with a backup hose to handle the movement in and out of the station. The Monon route running times were about equal to the former Penn Central times, and frequently arrived in Louisville before the scheduled 6,35 A.M.
Convinced that it would be a long time before Penn Central track was restored to usable standards, Amtrak made the Monon routing a semi-permanent arrangement by establishing intermediate stops at Bloomington and Lafayette.

 

[JWM]

A rider’s perception of speed depended largely on boarding point, destination and direction of travel. The Chicago-to- Louisville tracks were the worst on its route; the Louisville-to-Nashville stretch came in second. Slow freight trains helped hold up the train. The Floridian averaged 36 mph. The train that lumbered through Kentucky and Tennessee clipped steadily through central Alabama and southern Georgia. In Florida, it flew, averaging more than 70 mph at stretches.


For the Chicago-Florida route, most of the pre-Amtrak SOUTH WIND routing was selected, but with some alterations. The train originated at Central Station in Chicago and used Illinois Central trackage between there and Kankakee, thence Penn Central via Logansport io Indianapolis. South of Indianapolis, it returned to its old routing of ex-PRR trackage to Louisville, L&N to Montgomery and SCL to its Florida destinations. Penn Central track conditions in Indiana, already showing signs of major deterioration, forced Amtrak to accept a 6-hour-45-minute Chicago - Louisville schedule, nearly an hour slower than that of 15 years earlier. But this was only the beginning, as Amtrak was to find out, and the rerouting of this train, off of PC trackage ultimately became a forced issue.


It was becoming clear in the mid-1960s that the quality of service was eroding, particularly on the SOUTH WIND. The Pennsylvania Railroad became increasingly unhappy with its share of costs for the train, and consequently did nothing to promote ridership. When New York Central and Pennsy merged in 1966 to form Penn Central, the problem accelerated, as the passenger deficit on the combined system was considered totally out of hand, and necessary steps would be taken to eliminate or downgrade as many trains as possible. Late in 1966, PC threatened to discontinue the handling of through cars on the train, requiring all passengers to transfer at Louisville. When PC finally discontinued the through-car operation in November 1969, its substitute train consisted of only three cars, in the form of a Chicago-Louisville connecting train with a rescheduled L&N Pan American. Short of complete discontinuance, it appeared that the level of service had reached bottom. So bad it was, in fact, that Seaboard Coast Line applied to discontinue its portion of the run south of Montgomery. Only the coming of Amtrak forestalled that event, but ultimately, the horrors of Penn Central would continue to bedevil the train until it was finally forced off the Amtrak map by edict of Congress.


February 11, 1975. The FLORIDIAN bade an unceremonious farewell to Penn Central trackage north of Louisville. Another FRA inspection resulted in an unsafe-at-30-MPH decree. The southbound FLORIDIAN didn't arrive in Louisville until nearly noon that day, some five-plus hours late. It would be the last time that the FLORIDIAN would ever traverse that route again, in spite of Amtrak's intentions to return it there when track conditions permitted. Effective with the departure of the southbound run from Chicago that night, the FLORIDIAN was detoured over the same route it assumed when PC was closed down the previous August. Again, this resulted in a loss of 2 to 3 hours running time due to a mostly 40 MPH speed limit and heavy freight traffic. There was some interest in keeping the FLORIDIAN on its ex-C&EI and L&N routing through Hopkinsville, Evansville, Danville, Vincennes, and Terre Haute but slightly over a month later, Amtrak would find a detour route considered more acceptable: the former Monon route between Chicago and Louisville.

March 13, 1975: A derailment and washout on the L&N detour route south of Evansville caused Amtrak to reroute the FLORIDIAN via L&N's ex-Monon between Chicago and Louisville. L&N was at first reluctant to run the PLORIDIAN on this route, mainly due to the operation of the six-axle SDP40F~s, which ordinarily would be restricted to 25 MPH. The FLORIDIAN had been detoured this way on two previous occasions, once with E units and once with SDP's on the point, and the 25 MPH rule had been enforced when the SDP’s were used. But with lighter freight traffic than on the C&EI and an agreement to raise speed limits to 50 MPH and 40 MPH north and south of Lafayette respectively for the SDP's, L&N soon began accepting it on a route that had seen its Last regularly scheduled varnish some 7 1/2 years previous. The rerouting caused a couple of minor operating problems. The first was encountered at 40th Street in Chicago. To reach Chicago & Western Indiana trackage from Union Station, a backup movement was necessary from the original Penn Central route to C&WI track due to the lack of a connecting track leading in the proper direction. This was corrected some 21 months later when a link was constructed between the two roads just south of 21st Street. After running 19 miles on the C&WI, which had a 40 MPH maximum, Monon route trackage was attained at Hammond. Ten MPH speeds were mandatory through Lafayette, Bedford and New Albany due to long stretches of street running which further hindered higher-speed operation. Additionally, Monon trackage consisted mostly of lightweight rail. The approach to Louisville also contributed to slow running, due to the necessity of running over the Kentucky & Indiana Terminal for some 6 miles at 10 MPH and having to contend with heavy Southern Railway freight traffic as well as dealing with a non- interlocked grade crossing with the Illinois Central Gulf. Once L&N tracks were reached, a backup movement of slightly over a mile was required. With the storage mail cars on the rear, this called for the services of a L&N switcher to pull the train into Union Station on its southbound run and out of the depot on its northbound run, a service for which L&N quite naturally billed Amtrak. This was quickly remedied by placing the storage mail cars on the head end, thus permitting a crew member with a backup hose to handle the movement in and out of the station. The Monon route running times were about equal to the former Penn Central times, and frequently arrived in Louisville before the scheduled 6,35 A.M.
Convinced that it would be a long time before Penn Central track was restored to usable standards, Amtrak made the Monon routing a semi-permanent arrangement by establishing intermediate stops at Bloomington and Lafayette.

Those Indianapolis-Louisville tracks today are too slow to accommodate passenger trains. It is operated by the
Louisville and Indiana. I thought that after Kankakee, the "South Wind" and the "James Whitcomb Riley" came
down the former "Big Four" tracks from Lafayette to Indianapolis via Lebanon not Logansport. I stand corrected.

 

[Metra Electric Rider]

Trying to figure out when we took the train to Miami (probably boarding in Hammond - or would it have been elsewhere in NW Indiana at the time?) - I think it was 1974 which a quick google tells me the likely convention/conference my dad was attending occurred. I just remember waking up and seeing water and palm tree's from the train as we were getting close to Miami. Don't remember anything else about the train ride itself - I was three at the time - though I remember a lot of other weird details of the trip (Fontainebleau Hotel iirc, brown rental card, keys, some garden with minah birds with my mom).

 

[zephyr17]

Amtrak made the Monon routing a semi-permanent arrangement by establishing intermediate stops at Bloomington and Lafayette.

Too bad that former Monon route is entirely gone south of Cloverdale, IN. Not an option now.

 

[39kartma]

.I have several Official Guides from the early to mid 1950s. While the southbound schedules stayed pretty consistent, the northbound trains fluctuated a bit more. For example, in the summer of 1952 the South Wind and Dixie Flagler departed Miami at 12:01 PM while the City of Miami left at 5:40 PM; in the summer of 1954, the South Wind and Dixie Flagler departed Miami at 12:50 PM, with the City of Miami still departing at 5:40 PM. However, my winter timetables from 1955, 1956, and 1957 show all three trains departing Miami 12:40 PM or 1:00 PM depending on the year.

Another interesting factoid: the 1952 schedule of the Dixie Flagler showed an arrival time into Dearborn Station at 5:30 PM. With an hour and half connection to the 7:00 PM departure of the Super Chief, this is the quickest westbound schedule between Miami and Los Angeles that I have come across: 71 hours 45 mins from Miami to Los Angeles over a distance of 3675. 8 miles, giving an average speed of 51.45 MPH.

 

[railiner]

For the Chicago-Florida route, most of the pre-Amtrak SOUTH WIND routing was selected, but with some alterations. The train originated at Central Station in Chicago and used Illinois Central trackage between there and Kankakee, thence Penn Central via Logansport io Indianapolis. South of Indianapolis, it returned to its old routing of ex-PRR trackage to Louisville,

The Amtrak South Wind route, did shift over to Central Station, using the same route to Indianapolis as the former New York Central’s “Big Four” James Whitcomb Riley did, using trackage rights over the Illinois Central to Kankakee, thence Big Four trackage via Lafayette into Indianapolis. The PRR route via Logansport was not used until later, except for when Amtrak moved all its trains from Central Station to Union Station and used the St. Charles Air Line to access the IC.

http://www.timetables.org/full.php?group=19710712&item=0025


One other point, the PC merger was in 1968.

 

[rookzie]

The Amtrak South Wind route, did shift over to Central Station, using the same route to Indianapolis as the former New York Central’s “Big Four” James Whitcomb Riley did, using trackage rights over the Illinois Central to Kankakee, thence Big Four trackage via Lafayette into Indianapolis. The PRR route via Logansport was not used until later, except for when Amtrak moved all its trains from Central Station to Union Station and used the St. Charles Air Line to access the IC.

http://www.timetables.org/full.php?group=19710712&item=0025


One other point, the PC merger was in 1968.

For clarity, originally, the South Wind did use the Schererville, Logansport route on the northern Panhandle, and this lasted throughout its years prior to Amtrak. It used the Pennsy Chicago line between CUS and South Chicago, then via the SC&S (South Chicago and Southern - [aka the "Bernice Cutoff]) to Hammond Jct. and to the IL-IN state line, where it then joined the Panhandle.

And yes the Big Four became the route Kankakee-Lafayette, once Amtrak took over and ran it out of IC Central. That route proved to be deteriorated badly, so it then got moved back over to the PRR line, which by then would have been the assumed route out of CUS.

 

[Palmland]

Those Indianapolis-Louisville tracks today are too slow to accommodate passenger trains. It is operated by the
Louisville and Indiana.

They were in bad shape but CSX has made a significant Investment in the L&i. It’s used as an alternate route to take some of the pressure off the Louisville to Cincinnati line.

 

[leccy]

My understanding is that the L&I between Seymour and Louisville is now rated for 49mph for freight so presumably up to 59mph for passenger would be permitted.

 

[PatchesC]

My understanding is that the L&I between Seymour and Louisville is now rated for 49mph for freight so presumably up to 59mph for passenger would be permitted.

Seymour-Louisville is 49mph freight, and was upgraded with the intent to increase capacity to 15 or so trains/day. We see nowhere near that, max I've seen is maybe 8. The Indianapolis-Seymour section was improved as well, but last I knew the Flat rock bridge needed improvements before it could go over 10mph.
L&I recently requested money from Kentucky to improve their communication network as well.

 

[Stevenz]

One story had it at $510m for the Duluth interchange. For some context, the county is 201K, and metro Duluth including the Wisconsin side is 327K. That's not quite in top 100 in the US, but it's the second largest metro MN. And the city is built below a cliff in the Iron Range.

A good part of the project is for trucks going to the port. The volume at the port has stagnated, due to decreases in coal and grain, with ore still the bulk of it. The powers that be are investing in container facilities. While this might explain some things, it's still clear MN has so far only added one single frequency train; its cost saving is apparently why that train runs with Horizon cars; and getting back a minimal train to Duluth will take a while. Choices. It's hard to emphasize that frequency works, in those circumstances. "An empty highway is seen as a sign of success, an empty train as one of failure."

Now, expensive interchanges. I did find one at $900m, the NJ side of Philly. And it's had other problems.

One mega project in cost is the Tacoma HOV lanes, $1.8b. Fully separated HOV lanes look a lot like rail corridors, and must cost more. They are safer than 10-lane freeways, but not as safe as trains.

I too was surprised at the $3b number for setting up Amtrak between Chicago and Florida via Atlanta. It seemed low. Brightline Florida cost several billion, how much ever went to tracks and bridges, and two tunnels under a highway, and rebuilding the highway's ramps. (The new corridor part was only 20 miles of the project.) In Virginia the NER is a big success, but the payouts to NS and CSX have been in nine figures several times, and the distances are not large. There was almost no choice as I-95 is about maxxed out in width, including separated lanes. (To make passenger volume, rail in VA is oriented to the NEC, as it is in NC for travel outside the state, in the state-supported category. That's to make volume, a different goal would be to make network. Another would be to serve more small places. Bring back flag stops!)

As the Transit Costs Project said, English-speaking places consistently come in high, including Hong Kong and Singapore. And for some reason, the Netherlands. Back around 1960 in the U.S. there was hue and cry over the "million-dollar-a-mile" cost the interstate highway system had risen to. At the time, the federal gasoline tax at the pump was about 50%. It's now 18.4 cents. Perhaps there was some postwar pride mixed with bemusement at not being able to control costs.

Edit: 9 figures, not 6 to upgrade tracks

Yes, late to this thread but the title caught my eye. A right now project.

Milwaukee freeway rebuild, 3.5 miles. Way way overbuilt but has massive political support from suburban legislators. That's what rail lacks.
"The current estimate for the preferred alternative in those future year dollars is approximately $1.74 billion" Or, $500 million/mile.

https://wisconsindot.gov/Documents/...udy/2024/I-94EastWestSpringNewsletter2024.pdf

Oh but there is $25-30 million in there for transit. OK then.