Apologies if this sounds crass regarding such a serious subject, but it looks like this topic is on a fast track to 10,000 views and headed north beyond that. That caused me to wonder about the record for topic views in these forums.
Metrolink Wreck
- Thread starter WhoozOn1st
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Looks like the URPA newsletter might well be the leader at over 50,000 views. But I didn't really have time to study things, that was just a quick glance.
Joel N. Weber II
Engineer
I really meant non-pinned topics.
BTW everybody, not too long ago I asked if there had been a spike in AU membership and overall posts lately. Seemed to me that there was, but didn't know for sure. Alan and Anthony do keep tabs on such things, and Alan provided info and graphs which showed that indeed there has been posting and membership growth in the past year. Good deal!
And CHOWDAH!!
Nine thousand nine hundred and and ninety-nine views of the thread on the wall, nine thousand nine hundred and ninety-nine views of the thread.
Take one down, pass it around...
Oh wait, we're counting up, not down.
Take one down, pass it around...
Oh wait, we're counting up, not down.
jis
Permanent Way Inspector
Staff member
Administator
Moderator
AU Supporting Member
Gathering Team Member
I haven't studied the area sufficiently to develop a definitive answer to the question. However, it appears that ICC and then NTSB have consistently thought that this is a very very important area of improvement, and in general I tend not to second guess the NTSB on these matters. That is of course not to say that there aren't other areas where improvements are desirable, namely areas like road/rail interfaces, and it is not like they are not being addressed in parallel too. I don't see anything wrong with the PTC issue being addressed unless of course one's position is we shall do nothing until we have figured out what to do to eliminate all fatalities from all possible sources.
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George Harris
Engineer
As to the initial issue of Sanchez seeing two signals reading such that he should have expected to see the next one at stop:
Yesterday, riding a Caltrain back into San Francisco from Mountain View, I saw this scenario unfold exactly in approach to the four track section just south of Redwood City. (I was standing so I could look out the front.) The train speed felt to be reducing in anticipation of the next being red. When the home signal first came into sight, it was reading as expected, R/R/R. It then change almost immediately to G/R/R, in other words, CLEAR. A few seconds aftet that, we bagan to accelerate. Never did see anything to explain the R/R/R.
I am saying this to say that this sort of stuff happens, so just because the normal script says expect the next signal to read stop, it could be that whatever was in that block is now no longer there, so the signal clears.
At this stage, we do not really know what happened, and it is entirely possible that we may never truly know the full story. Even if the switch had been set for the siding, the rules do not, and connot reasonably, require that the engineer be certain of the position of the switch if he has a clear signal. He can not see it soon enough for such a requirement to be practical. Whether Sanchez could have noticed in time or did would be entirely speculation.
Yesterday, riding a Caltrain back into San Francisco from Mountain View, I saw this scenario unfold exactly in approach to the four track section just south of Redwood City. (I was standing so I could look out the front.) The train speed felt to be reducing in anticipation of the next being red. When the home signal first came into sight, it was reading as expected, R/R/R. It then change almost immediately to G/R/R, in other words, CLEAR. A few seconds aftet that, we bagan to accelerate. Never did see anything to explain the R/R/R.
I am saying this to say that this sort of stuff happens, so just because the normal script says expect the next signal to read stop, it could be that whatever was in that block is now no longer there, so the signal clears.
At this stage, we do not really know what happened, and it is entirely possible that we may never truly know the full story. Even if the switch had been set for the siding, the rules do not, and connot reasonably, require that the engineer be certain of the position of the switch if he has a clear signal. He can not see it soon enough for such a requirement to be practical. Whether Sanchez could have noticed in time or did would be entirely speculation.
I'll add two thoughts to your comments George.
First, while you are correct that signals do get upgraded all the time, the engineer is required to radio that upgrade to the conductor. That does not appear to have happened here.
Second, while I agree that it would be highly unlikely that he would or could notice that the switch was set wrong in time to stop before fouling it, I would think that had he noticed it once he was on top of it that he would have initiated braking at that point or at least gotten on the radio to the dispatcher to find out what was up. Again, neither action appears to have been taken.
And I can't imagine that a good engineer who realized that he had just run a switch would at least take some kind of action, as failing to report it could lead to a major derailment when another train tries to use the switch. Therefore I think that it may well be possible to conclude that Mr. Sanchez was at least distracted enough by the text messaging and/or something else, so as to not notice the switch postion at all.
PTC has been on the NTSB's wish list since its "Most Wanted" list was first developed, in 1990:
NTSB's original "Most Wanted"
Though out of town for Christmas, following the heavy-duty holiday family festivities (everybody else conked out) I was able to read the L.A. Times online and found this:
Metrolink plans live video cameras to monitor train engineers
"The onboard surveillance is intended to enforce safety rules. But the proposal draws criticism from employees and skepticism from California Sen. Dianne Feinstein."
A factual error: Metrolink 111 was not "Ventura-bound." Metrolink's train 111 runs only as far as Moorpark.
Metrolink plans live video cameras to monitor train engineers
"The onboard surveillance is intended to enforce safety rules. But the proposal draws criticism from employees and skepticism from California Sen. Dianne Feinstein."
A factual error: Metrolink 111 was not "Ventura-bound." Metrolink's train 111 runs only as far as Moorpark.
Metrolink conductor raised concerns about engineer's cellphone use
"The only surviving Metrolink crewman in Chatsworth crash tells NTSB of concerns about train's engineer."
Included is a related video from L.A. station KTLA Channel 5, which, like the Times, is owned by the bankrupt (Chapter 11) Tribune Co.
As if I needed another reason to despise cellphones...
"The only surviving Metrolink crewman in Chatsworth crash tells NTSB of concerns about train's engineer."
Included is a related video from L.A. station KTLA Channel 5, which, like the Times, is owned by the bankrupt (Chapter 11) Tribune Co.
As if I needed another reason to despise cellphones...
Right. Altho in this case I think if he had been talking on the phone instead of texting that he may have done a better job. I don't text but it seems like that might require you to look down more than simple cell phone yapping. Neither one good while driving or running a train, but I'd think text messaging might be the worst.
Dan
gdj
Train Attendant
amtrakwolverine
Engineer
big deal alot of engineers have been known to do that. thats not a big shocker.
Maybe so. But this particular engineer was involved in a major deadly wreck. Stands to reason that every aspect is being scrutinized.
NTSB TO OPEN DOCKET ON 2008 CHATSWORTH, CALIFORNIA RAIL ACCIDENT DURING PUBLIC HEARING
Hearing starts Tuesday, 3-3-09, and it appears that's when the docket will be made available online.
Hearing starts Tuesday, 3-3-09, and it appears that's when the docket will be made available online.
Metrolink practices scrutinized
"As a hearing into the fatal Chatsworth crash is set to begin, more red-light violations have raised concerns."
The article also notes a field testing program being done by UP, with whom Metrolink shares substantial trackage.
"As a hearing into the fatal Chatsworth crash is set to begin, more red-light violations have raised concerns."
The article also notes a field testing program being done by UP, with whom Metrolink shares substantial trackage.
Today's NTSB hearing into the wreck is supposedly available via live webcast, but so far I've been unable to get it. Maybe they've broken for lunch already? Or perhaps it's been postponed due to weather conditions? Does anybody know??
For those who might wanna give it a shot:
NTSB Public Hearings
For those who might wanna give it a shot:
NTSB Public Hearings
PetalumaLoco
Conductor
Yeah, I picked it up no problem.
Metrolink engineer let teen take throttle
As this is being posted, the NTSB Board of Inquiry has broken for lunch. When the hearing resumes - in about an hour - there will be testimony from the Federal Railroad Administration and a discussion of Positive Train Control.
As this is being posted, the NTSB Board of Inquiry has broken for lunch. When the hearing resumes - in about an hour - there will be testimony from the Federal Railroad Administration and a discussion of Positive Train Control.
Rail hearing points up lax oversight
"Current field tests fail to prevent violations of safety rules, but officials disagree on how to fix the system."
I listened to most of both days of the hearing (going to video only to see PowerPoint presentations). Though it wouldn't be quite right to call the proceedings contentious at times - that implies a two-way street - Board of Inquiry Chairwoman Kathryn O'Leary Higgins did a pretty good job of reading the Riot Act to railroad witnesses on several occasions. She was largely registering a sense of disgusted disbelief at the answers being heard in response to questions about safety violations and supervision, often regarding the on-duty use of cellphones (including texting) by train crew, which has become such a major focus of the investigation.
The NTSB's Docket of the wreck investigation is now available online: NTSB: Docket Management System
The Docket is essentially an index of the 198 documents, attachments, exhibits, and photos - each individually linked - which comprise the agency's investigation of the wreck. It is not to be confused with a final report. In closing remarks, Chairwoman Higgins expressed confidence that the investigation would be concluded and a final report issued "in a year." Given the general context of her remarks I believe she meant a year from the accident date, not from now. It was also noted in closing that the investigation team remains open to examining any additional information and evidence which may yet come to light. A number of exhibits were introduced and catalogued during the hearing, and I expect these will be added to the Docket in the near future.
"Current field tests fail to prevent violations of safety rules, but officials disagree on how to fix the system."
I listened to most of both days of the hearing (going to video only to see PowerPoint presentations). Though it wouldn't be quite right to call the proceedings contentious at times - that implies a two-way street - Board of Inquiry Chairwoman Kathryn O'Leary Higgins did a pretty good job of reading the Riot Act to railroad witnesses on several occasions. She was largely registering a sense of disgusted disbelief at the answers being heard in response to questions about safety violations and supervision, often regarding the on-duty use of cellphones (including texting) by train crew, which has become such a major focus of the investigation.
The NTSB's Docket of the wreck investigation is now available online: NTSB: Docket Management System
The Docket is essentially an index of the 198 documents, attachments, exhibits, and photos - each individually linked - which comprise the agency's investigation of the wreck. It is not to be confused with a final report. In closing remarks, Chairwoman Higgins expressed confidence that the investigation would be concluded and a final report issued "in a year." Given the general context of her remarks I believe she meant a year from the accident date, not from now. It was also noted in closing that the investigation team remains open to examining any additional information and evidence which may yet come to light. A number of exhibits were introduced and catalogued during the hearing, and I expect these will be added to the Docket in the near future.
In following the info today, it was mentioned that the Metrolink engineer failed to call out the last three signals on his radio. I assume that someone is suppose to be listening to these, right? So, after missing the first two, why didn't someone take some action (like pull the emergency red brake cord?).
Beyond what actually happened, I would think that a silent engineer is a good indication that something is going wrong up in the cab.
Beyond what actually happened, I would think that a silent engineer is a good indication that something is going wrong up in the cab.
Apparently, not only did the Metrolink engineer send a text right before the crash, so did the freight train's conductor.
The conductor is supposed to listen to and acknowledge all signals called out (some railroads, IIRC, don't require the conductor to acknowledge "clear" signals, though the engineer must still call them out). They're supposed to know their territory well enough to know were the signals are, and a call-out is missed, figure out why and, as you said, take any necessary corrective action.
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