Metrolink Wreck

[WhoozOn1st]

I see in the article that Amtrak is already running four Metrolink lines, and no points on them.

Careful! The statement in the article threw me for a moment, and is perhaps kinda confusing:

"Amtrak...already runs passenger trains on four of the seven Metrolink lines, including the Ventura County line."

What this actually means is that Amtrak's OWN trains (Pacific Surfliners, Coast Starlight, Sunset Limited, Southwest Chief - for which you DO get AGR points) run on the same tracks as 4 of the 7 Metrolink Lines, NOT that Amtrak is already operating the Metrolink trains on those lines.

EDIT: In any case, no AGR on Metrolink, even if Amtrak starts operating its trains again. None when Amtrak operated Metrolink before, either.

 

[Ispolkom]

I see in the article that Amtrak is already running four Metrolink lines, and no points on them.

Careful! The statement in the article threw me for a moment, and is perhaps kinda confusing:

"Amtrak...already runs passenger trains on four of the seven Metrolink lines, including the Ventura County line."

What this actually means is that Amtrak's OWN trains (Pacific Surfliners, Coast Starlight, Sunset Limited, Southwest Chief - for which you DO get AGR points) run on the same tracks as 4 of the 7 Metrolink Lines, NOT that Amtrak is already operating the Metrolink trains on those lines.

EDIT: In any case, no AGR on Metrolink, even if Amtrak starts operating its trains again. None when Amtrak operated Metrolink before, either.

I thought that it was funny that Metrolink had two operators for its lines, though I'm sure what the reporter wrote was clear to locals. Thanks for clearing up my confusion, even though it dashes my plans for point runs on Metrolink the next time I'm in LA.

 

[MattW]

I'm assuming this is good for Amtrak as it means more jobs for them and Metrolink will be paying them for the crews?

 

[WhoozOn1st]

I'm assuming this is good for Amtrak as it means more jobs for them and Metrolink will be paying them for the crews?

Certainly Metrolink would be paying for Amtrak crews to operate its trains, but how many NEW Amtrak jobs might result from an operating contract is unclear. Over the years I've talked with several Metrolink engineers, three of whom were Amtrak employees when I first met them (a fourth is also ex-Amtrak, but Connex when first met recently), made the switch to Connex and kept their same runs when Metrolink changed operators, and I suppose might be able to rejoin Amtrak if negotiations pan out and Metrolink returns to Amtrak.

 

[AlanB]

Would this mean AGR points for Metrolink trains?

Probably not. Amtrak provides services to Caltrain, but they are not Amtrak's trains (and you don't get any AGR points)

I think having Amtrak operate Metrolink trains could work, but I would definitely hope that Metrolink and Amtrak work hard to ensure a quality service. IIRC, Amtrak has operated trains for Metrolink in the past before the regional agency went with the company owned Veolia.

You're right, I see in the article that Amtrak is already running four Metrolink lines, and no points on them.

Definately no points. Amtrak runs the MARC services on the NEC and one can even buy a MARC ticket that's issued on Amtrak ticket stock. Still no points.

 

[Green Maned Lion]

One thing it might mean is Amtrak controlling dispatch on Metrolink track. Which may mean greater priority for Amtrak trains running on them.

 

[WhoozOn1st]

Two anniversaries this week. 9/11 everybody knows. 9/12 will mark a year since the Metrolink/UP cornfield meet at Chatsworth. Whether there will be a new spate of articles covering in detail various aspects of the collision we shall see. This one is on the front page of today's L.A. Times.

Metrolink struggles with reform a year after crash

"Upgrades promised after 25 were killed are growing costlier and more complicated."

"A burst of energy to remake the region's Metrolink train operation was unleashed by the deadliest rail collision in modern California history, a watershed event that killed 25, injured 130 and prompted landmark federal mandates to modernize the nation's rail safety systems.

"Today, the rush to reform Metrolink -- a thinly staffed hybrid transportation agency once derided as the political stepchild of the five counties that created it -- is becoming increasingly costly, time-consuming and complicated."

 

[WhoozOn1st]

With 3 my designated spate threshold, this article as the 1-year anniversary of the fatal Metrolink/UP wreck nears is the second. A memorial to Metrolink victims was unveiled in the rotunda/atrium at the bus end of Los Angeles Union Station on Tuesday, 9-8-09. Besides the bus terminal outside this end of LAUS there are also MTA ticket windows and a Red Line subway entrance. You could hardly put the memorial plaque further away from where Metrolink trains operate - on the station's tracks at the other end facing Alameda street - and still have it inside LAUS. The photo accompanying this article shows the bronze plaque, which depicts the curve where the wreck occurred from what was the UP freight train's viewpoint approaching the collision.

Metrolink memorial

The news story notes a previous Metrolink wreck that also resulted in numerous fatalities:

"In January 2005, 11 passengers died and more than 180 were injured when a Metrolink train derailed near Glendale after slamming into a sport utility vehicle that had been left on the tracks.

"The driver of the SUV, Juan Manuel Alvarez, who was trying to commit suicide but changed his mind at the last minute, was convicted of murder and sentenced last year to 11 consecutive life terms."

______________________

I don't know if any form of Positive Train Control might have prevented that one.

 

[AlanB]

I don't know if any form of Positive Train Control might have prevented that one.

It wouldn't have. Perhaps if he had left the vehicle in the crossing PTC might have at least slowed the train down some prior to the crash. But once he drove the vehicle onto the tracks themselves and out of the crossing area, PTC would have had no clue that there was a problem.

 

[WhoozOn1st]

This article about one of the UP locomotives involved in the cornfield meet doesn't technically count toward the anticipated spate of stories surrounding the 1-year anniversary of the wreck cuz it comes from the local rag, not the L.A. Times. The Ventura County Star story is about UP engine No. 8485, which since shortly after the collision has sat in the tiny yard at Moorpark, Metrolink 111's intended destination. The other UP locomotive involved in the calamity sits in the small yard at Oxnard, only visible if one knows where to look, and sometimes not at all if hidden by freight cars in the yard.

Crews put tarp on damaged locomotive

"Union Pacific was asked by the National Transportation Safety Board to preserve the locomotive in its current post-accident condition, so the railroad asked Metrolink if it could temporarily store it at its nearby Moorpark facility."

_____________________

Coincidentally, AlanB and other members of On Track On Line (OTOL) rode Metrolink 111 - same run as the train involved in the wreck - during their SoCal RailFest 2009 in July. The ride had been part of the planned Fest itinerary since before the disaster.

 

[WhoozOn1st]

With the arrival of the 1-year anniversary of the deadly UP/Metrolink wreck at Chatsworth the story count is now officially a spate. I expect there'll be another round of articles when the NTSB's final report on the calamity is released.

Metrolink still behind on some safety measures

"The public agency has not undertaken a thorough assessment of its management organization or completed a strategic plan, and its board of directors has not gone though a self-assessment of its performance, said Linda Bollinger, facilitator for the peer review panel set up in the wake of the Chatsworth crash that killed 25 and injured 135 one year ago."

A family tries to heal its wounds

"Twenty-four passengers, from 18 to 75 years old, were killed when Metrolink 111 rammed a Union Pacific freight train head-on, one of the state's worst rail catastrophes. The victims will be remembered today in programs at the Chatsworth station and in Simi Valley, where many of the victims were headed."

_____________________

On Friday there was local TV news coverage of a memorial attended by L.A. Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa, who was shown planting a tree next to the rail line behind a private school adjacent to the Metrolink Death Curve at Chatsworth. After the collision the school was used as a triage area and communications center for rescue efforts.

Absent from local reporting - perhaps understandably - is any mention of the huge impact this disaster has had on the entire U.S. rail system. The wreck was clearly the catalyst for swift congressional action mandating Positive Train Control - a back burner issue the freight railroads had been resisting since about forever (and continue to fight in one way or another) - as part of a larger rail safety bill that also included a reauthorization of Amtrak.

 

[user 1215]

Has there been any indication that they will consider medical checks for their engineers and conductors like commercial aviation requires every 6 months for airline pilots?

A second crew member in the cab of any train on single track where passengers are should also be a requirement.

 

[Green Maned Lion]

Your requirements are silly. The PTC should prevent this type of accident forever more. Also, it wasn't a medical issue. Sanchez was texting with his little kiddie pals, or so phone company records suggest. I've seen morons texting while riding bikes.

Even if he wasn't texting at that precise moment, his mind was probably not on his job.

I wonder, once PTC is installed, what the next defect in the rail system will show itself. PTC won't end collisions. Just this kind of collision.

 

[AlanB]

Actually I wouldn't bet that PTC would have prevented this accident. There is a chance that the train still would have collided with PTC.

However, I will guarantee that the collision would not have been as severe with PTC, assuming that PTC couldn't have prevented it. PTC would have certainly slowed the commuter train considerably before the collision, and possibly even made a dent in the freight train's speed too. Instead of an 80 MPH closure rate, it probably would have been in the range of 20MPH to 30 MPH closure rate, a rate that most likely would have been survivable for all but perhaps Mr. Sanchez.

And for that matter, even without PTC, if Mr. Sanchez hadn't been texting he would have seen that the switch was set against him and would have immediately started braking.

I for one am not at present fully accepting the current NTSB line that the signal was red. I have doubts at this point since there are too many reliable witness' who say it was green. I for one don't understand why they seem to be totally disregarding both the conductor's statements that it was green, as well as statements from two railfans and one security officer who is charged with riding the trains to enforce the fare rules and has some idea how things work.

 

[jis]

Actually I wouldn't bet that PTC would have prevented this accident. There is a chance that the train still would have collided with PTC.

A PTC system with positive train stop would have prevented it. By definition, a positive train stop system stops the train before it passes a signal at danger. I believe the PTC system that is mandated has this property, which is what makes it complex and makes its characteristics different fro safely operating freight trains at freight train speeds vs.passenger trains at significantly higher speeds, since pesky things like distance to next signal and braking curves have to be taken into consideration.

For example ACSES level 2 and above will prevent such a collision. But then again a runaway freight car cannot be protected against without using derailing switches, which Amtrak spent a lot of energy getting rid of at places like Gunpow not long before the Chase accident, one that would not have occurred had Amtrak not gone through the trouble of removing the drailing switches at that interlocking.

 

[AlanB]

Actually I wouldn't bet that PTC would have prevented this accident. There is a chance that the train still would have collided with PTC.

A PTC system with positive train stop would have prevented it. By definition, a positive train stop system stops the train before it passes a signal at danger. I believe the PTC system that is mandated has this property, which is what makes it complex and makes its characteristics different fro safely operating freight trains at freight train speeds vs.passenger trains at significantly higher speeds, since pesky things like distance to next signal and braking curves have to be taken into consideration.

In normal operating circumstances I would agree with you Jishnu, but remember that this accident wasn't quite normal. First, let's talk about normal. In the case of the Metrolink train, had the engineer sailed past the approach signal (the signal right before the red one), at a rate of speed higher than allowed by that signal, then yes PTC would have kicked in and stopped the train prior to the stop signal.

However, in this case that approach signal was just prior to a station stop. Therefore the train was already slowing down to make that stop, therefore no penalty application by PTC. Now the engineer starts back up after making the station stop. By the time he reaches a speed that would be above the maximum allowed by the restricting approach signal, he's probably already covered half the one mile distance to the signal at danger.

Once he gets above the maximum allowed speed, the PTC gives him a warning that he needs to stop/slow the train down. The engineer is given at least 15 to 20 seconds, maybe even a bit more time, to actually start slowing the train. If no action is taken, a loud blaring alarm goes off that would basically wake the dead, warning the engineer that he needs to take immediate action. And again, the engineer is given several seconds, probably 15 to 20 again. By this point, the train has now probably covered another 1/4th of a mile, if not more.

PTC finally has enough of the inaction and it applies the brakes, but with less than 1/4th of a mile left between the switch and the engine, there is no way that this train is stopping before running the switch. UP coming at 40 MPH will slow once its PTC warns the engineer that there is a problem ahead, but again, he's not stopping before colliding with the Metrolink train. Yes, it won't be an 80 MPH collision, but there will almost certainly be a collision.

All that said, if PTC had been there that day, it is most likely that Mr. Sanchez would have dropped his cell phone and stopped the train in time. But, if Mr. Sanchez had been somehow incapacitated, it is unlikely that PTC would have prevented an accident. It would have mitigated the consequences of a collision, but I suspect that one still would have happened.

 

[George Harris]

If Mr. Sanchez had been incapacitated, he would not have left Chatsworth, as he would not have opened the throttle.

Since he was supposed to stop short of the signal, PTC would not have applied the brakes on the freight train until he overan the home signal, at which point the freight was only seconds from the point of collision.

Not certain, but since Metrolink was already in a stop-at-next-signal mode when at the station, could he have accelerated to the speed that he did at all? In fact, would the system have let him do anything other than creep forward at restricted speed until the end of circuit just before the home signal?

 

[AlanB]

If Mr. Sanchez had been incapacitated, he would not have left Chatsworth, as he would not have opened the throttle.

Obviously I meant that he had become incapacitated after departing the station. But yes, you are correct in this case.

Since he was supposed to stop short of the signal, PTC would not have applied the brakes on the freight train until he overan the home signal, at which point the freight was only seconds from the point of collision.

Agreed.

Not certain, but since Metrolink was already in a stop-at-next-signal mode when at the station, could he have accelerated to the speed that he did at all? In fact, would the system have let him do anything other than creep forward at restricted speed until the end of circuit just before the home signal?

No, it's highly unlikely that any PTC system would have allowed him to reach 40MPH with a restricted cab speed. But unless the system was designed with a graduated speed control that went lower and lower as he approached the red signal, it would have allowed at least a 20 MPH speed, before it started setting off alarm bells. And given the amount of time that's built in to allow the engineer to do the right thing before the computer takes over, he probably would have reached 25 MPH to 30 MPH, before PTC shut him down. Especially if Mr. Sanchez had the throttle shoved all the way forward.

 

[WhoozOn1st]

Metrolink staffing criticized by Boxer

"The senator is shocked that 87% of trains still have just one crew member in the cab a year after the Chatsworth crash."

"'This is not good,' Boxer said in an interview. She said she was led to believe after the Chatsworth crash that the agency would be adding crew members to all trains until a high-tech collision avoidance system could be deployed."

 

[GG-1]

If Mr. Sanchez had been incapacitated, he would not have left Chatsworth, as he would not have opened the throttle.

Obviously I meant that he had become incapacitated after departing the station. But yes, you are correct in this case.

Since he was supposed to stop short of the signal, PTC would not have applied the brakes on the freight train until he overan the home signal, at which point the freight was only seconds from the point of collision.

Agreed.

Not certain, but since Metrolink was already in a stop-at-next-signal mode when at the station, could he have accelerated to the speed that he did at all? In fact, would the system have let him do anything other than creep forward at restricted speed until the end of circuit just before the home signal?

No, it's highly unlikely that any PTC system would have allowed him to reach 40MPH with a restricted cab speed. But unless the system was designed with a graduated speed control that went lower and lower as he approached the red signal, it would have allowed at least a 20 MPH speed, before it started setting off alarm bells. And given the amount of time that's built in to allow the engineer to do the right thing before the computer takes over, he probably would have reached 25 MPH to 30 MPH, before PTC shut him down. Especially if Mr. Sanchez had the throttle shoved all the way forward.

Aloha

What the two of you covered makes a lot of sense, but leaves out ont thing from the reports I remember, and how would this affect what you wrote. Th train accelerated to 52mph before the yellow signal, and then reduced speed to 43mph with no other speed change before the Accident. In the distance involved it seems that it would have been impossible to reach 50+mph.

Alan, elsewhere raised a credible question about some reports of the signal being green. Sunlight could have mixed with the yellow light and looked green if the viewer was at the right angle. Mr. Sanchez looking at the signal "on axis" would not have this color effect", clearly Mr. Sanchez was not paying attention to duty.

 

[zoltan]

Metrolink staffing criticized by Boxer"The senator is shocked that 87% of trains still have just one crew member in the cab a year after the Chatsworth crash."

"'This is not good,' Boxer said in an interview. She said she was led to believe after the Chatsworth crash that the agency would be adding crew members to all trains until a high-tech collision avoidance system could be deployed."

How many people are responsible for driving the average car, bus or truck as they travel unguided, largely unsignalled except at a proportion or intersections, over space shared by other cars, buses, trucks, pedestrians, and occasionally trains?

Once you decide that for safety reasons you need to increase the cost of providing train services, investment in more trains becomes less effective, fewer people are persuaded out of their cars, and therefore continue to use a mode of travel that is far less safe than trains are. And more people are killed and injured. But when did politicians ever look past the most immediate and direct consequences of their actions?

 

[George Harris]

Metrolink staffing criticized by Boxer"The senator is shocked that 87% of trains still have just one crew member in the cab a year after the Chatsworth crash."

"'This is not good,' Boxer said in an interview. She said she was led to believe after the Chatsworth crash that the agency would be adding crew members to all trains until a high-tech collision avoidance system could be deployed."

Yeah, and the other senator from California was shocked to find that passenger trains and freight trains both run in both directions on one track. She is (both of them actually) a POLITICIAN ! ! ! That means that almost any reality that is normal to the rest of the world is shocking to them.

 

[WhoozOn1st]

This story doesn't appear in my Saturday L.A. Times, but is apparently online as part of the Sunday edition (hits stands today).

Using the Chatsworth wreck as a sort of reference/starting point, the article takes a broader look at Metrolink safety issues, with a focus on grade crossings and comparisons with the MTA's approach. Interesting video about a particular grade crossing and its peculiarities.

Metrolink system's toll: 244

"The regional rail agency is criticized for paying too little attention to safety -- including dangerous crossings -- on tracks it owns and uses."

And now if you'll excuse me, I have a train to catch!

 

[alanh]

Wow, interesting article.

Metrolink's position and Pasadena's position is that the should do nothing because (a) the intersection will be rebuilt as an overpass as part of an I-5 project Real Soon Now, and (b) the drivers broke the law and they can't do anything about that.

The I-5 project was mentioned in the NTSB report (PDF). However, the date was 2006 then; the earliest date for starting is now 2010. It's seems dumb to wait when some simple things could be done.

As for the drivers breaking the law.... It's true they did run the RR signals. However, it's not true that nothing can be done. If there's a disproportionate violation of a signal at a particular intersection, it usually means there's a design problem. For example, the problem of people going around a gate can be addressed with a median barrier, which is exactly what the NTSB suggested here. Increased enforcement is also possible, such as cameras at crossings to record violators.

I've never been a fan of the all-red-flashing preemption, and apparently the NTSB isn't either. The justification for it is that it allows a vehicle that's stopped on the tracks to move forward, whereas a car or truck facing a solid red would just stay stopped. If one direction has flashing red signal, then the others cannot have a regular green signal so they have to flash red or yellow also. However, if there's a green clearance period (the light turns green for a few seconds after the gate goes down so traffic between the gate and signal can go) that should be less of a problem. Movements with that conflict with the railroad can then get a solid red which motorists are more likely to obey.

I wonder if anyone has ever considered ditching the the RR flashers and replacing them with a standard traffic light.

 

[George Harris]

As for the drivers breaking the law.... It's true they did run the RR signals. However, it's not true that nothing can be done. If there's a disproportionate violation of a signal at a particular intersection, it usually means there's a design problem. For example, the problem of people going around a gate can be addressed with a median barrier, which is exactly what the NTSB suggested here. Increased enforcement is also possible, such as cameras at crossings to record violators.

maybe yes, maybe no. As to the median barrier, this is a requiremetn for a whistle free crossing. As to the cameras, they are useful as a defense to the inevitable lawsuit, not much else unless the violators get a ticket that they have to pay.

I wonder if anyone has ever considered ditching the the RR flashers and replacing them with a standard traffic light.

This has been disussed many times over the years by those that analyze traffic control devices.