Metrolink Wreck

[WhoozOn1st]

On 1-21-10 the NTSB is expected to release its final report on the Metrolink/UP wreck at Chatsworth:

Final report on deadly Metrolink crash comes down to signal color

"Federal investigators presented evidence about the crash at a public hearing in March. At Thursday’s meeting the board will determine a probable cause and contributing factors, as well as safety recommendations for Metrolink and other rail agencies. Board members have already been briefed on the proposed findings. But those can be debated and amended during Thursday's meeting before the final written report is completed...."

______________________

Note caption on the photo which accompanies the story: "A signal turns red behind a Metrolink train pulling out of the Chatsworth station." In fact, the signals are in FRONT of the train (note headlights), which is shown exiting the Metrolink Death Curve, inbound for ARRIVAL at Chatsworth. EDIT: The error has since been acknowledged online and the caption revised.

The NTSB meeting will be available via live webcast (scroll down).

 

[amtrakwolverine]

once again inept news reporters.

 

[user 1215]

Any pictures anywhere of the new coaches?

 

[DET63]

On 1-21-10 the NTSB is expected to release its final report on the Metrolink/UP wreck at Chatsworth:
Final report on deadly Metrolink crash comes down to signal color

"Federal investigators presented evidence about the crash at a public hearing in March. At Thursday’s meeting the board will determine a probable cause and contributing factors, as well as safety recommendations for Metrolink and other rail agencies. Board members have already been briefed on the proposed findings. But those can be debated and amended during Thursday's meeting before the final written report is completed...."

______________________

Note caption on the photo which accompanies the story: "A signal turns red behind a Metrolink train pulling out of the Chatsworth station." In fact, the signals are in FRONT of the train (note headlights), which is shown exiting the Metrolink Death Curve, inbound for ARRIVAL at Chatsworth. EDIT: The error has since been acknowledged online and the caption revised.

The NTSB meeting will be available via live webcast (scroll down).

Here's the pic in question, with the current caption:

A Metrolink train nears the signal north of the Chatsworth station. (Al Seib / Los Angeles Times /

November 19, 2008)

 

[guest metrolink rider]

Here's the Metrolink report from government via Los Angeles Times The engineer was judged to have screwed up, surprise,surprise...

Investigators: Light was red in 2008 Chatsworth train crash, despite what witnesses said

January 21, 2010 | 10:01 am

Ntsb200

Federal investigators today expanded on the reasoning behind their conclusion that a Metrolink engineer who, records show, had been text messaging ran a red light before the deadly 2008 collision in Chatsworth. Eyewitnesses maintained that the signal was green.

While acknowledging that during post-crash sight tests some investigators could make out a green signal from the station, the National Transportation Safety Board staff said other investigators could not see the light color, which is near the distance limits of human perception.

All of the agency's test evidence, analysis of radio communications and dispatch-center records indicated the signal was red, investigators said. Officials noted that the agency had found that witness perceptions could be at odds with scientific evidence, particularly when they had expectations of what would occur.

And the Metrolink train typically had a green light leaving the Chatsworth station.

Board member Robert L. Sumwalt summed up the findings, saying, "It was likely that those witnesses saw a light but couldn't discern a color and assumed that it was green because it was normally green." In addition, staff experts noted that green lights can be seen from greater distances, and the red light was not visible from the station.

Board members also noted that though the draft report does not cite fatigue as a factor in the crash, they were concerned about grueling split-shift schedules for engineers at Metrolink and other passenger rail services.

Conductors and engineers work a 10-hour shift over a period of 15 hours, board Chairwoman Deborah Hersman said. "To me, 15-hour days seem too long," she said.

Sumwalt said Sanchez would only get about 4 1/2 hours of uninterrupted sleep each work night. "I do worry about the chronic fatigue here," Sumwalt said.

Hersman touched on the text messaging, which will be discussed in the afternoon session, suggesting that the engineer was likely distracted because he had stopped calling out the color of two track side warning signals prior to the crash.

"This engineer really didn't have his head in the game at the time of collision," she said. "He wasn't on top of it."

-- Robert J. Lopez and Rich Connell

 

[guest]

January 22, 2010

Expert Says Engineer Sent Text Messages Before Deadly Train Crash

By MATTHEW L. WALD/THE NEW YORK TIMES

WASHINGTON — The Los Angeles commuter train engineer who ran a red signal and hit an oncoming freight train while he was sending cellphone text messages in his cab, killing himself and 24 others, had passed two previous signals warning that he would have to stop ahead, a staff expert told the National Transportation Safety Board in a hearing here on Thursday.

The commuter engineer, Robert Sanchez, who was among those killed, was supposed to notify a dispatcher by radio that he had seen signal indications. According to a tape of the radio transmissions, he had done so for several green signals and one yellow one, which warned that a stop was coming. But the recording did not capture him radioing that he had seen the last yellow signal or the final red signal, investigators said.

“This engineer really did not have his head in the game,” said Deborah A.P. Hersman, the board chairwoman.

The commuter and freight trains hit at a combined speed of 84 miles an hour, investigators said. The trains were visible to each other for only about five seconds before the impact; the engineer of the freight train applied the emergency brakes in the last two seconds, but the commuter engineer never did. The collision, on Sept. 12, 2008, occurred just north of the station in Chatsworth, Calif.

The board is meeting to review a draft report on the incident from its staff, and to vote on the report and its recommendations.

Mr. Sanchez worked a schedule of 6 a.m. to 9:30 a.m., and then 2 p.m. to 7 p.m., with a 70-mile commute from his home at the beginning and end of the day. But Rick Narvell, an expert for the board, said at the hearing that fatigue did not contribute to the crash.

“Yes, I’m concerned about it,” he told the board members, “but the circumstances of this accident indicate we had a fellow here who was alert and texting.”

The engineer sent or received 43 text messages on the day of the crash, including one 22 seconds before the crash, the board has previously said. Less than a month after the crash, Congress passed a law to require “positive train control” — a computer system that senses a train approaching a red signal at high speed and slows it down or stops it if an engineer disobeys the signal — by 2015. But the board, Ms. Hersman noted at the hearing, has been calling for this kind of system for years.

“We would have liked to see positive train control implement sooner,” she said. “Sadly, it took this accident and 25 more lives and an act of Congress to move this technology from testing to reality.”

 

[WhoozOn1st]

I caught the morning session of the NTSB meeting via live webcast, but missed the afternoon stuff covering the texting issue while Team Whooz redeployed (during a serious dust storm on I-10) to Tucson.

NTSB blames engineer for 2008 Metrolink crash, urges railroads to install cameras to monitor train crews

"The board's sharp language and findings blaming the engineer could shift tens of millions of dollars in liability away from Metrolink, a taxpayer-subsidized five-county agency, and onto the private contractor that hired and supervised the engineer, Connex Railroad, some officials said. Connex and Metrolink have sued each other over financial responsibility, and Metrolink has noted that the contractor is responsible for the 'willful misconduct' of its employees."

 

[WhoozOn1st]

Wreck repercussions redux. Amtrak will take over as Metrolink's contract operator on July 1.

Metrolink workers object to personality testing

"Union leaders say the tests are not valid or relevant measures of a trained and experienced employee's ability to safely operate trains. They say they don't object to testing of potential hires who aren't union members. But forcing existing train crews to pass the tests could arbitrarily cost good workers their jobs, they say."

 

[jis]

Wreck repercussions redux. Amtrak will take over as Metrolink's contract operator on July 1.
Metrolink workers object to personality testing

"Union leaders say the tests are not valid or relevant measures of a trained and experienced employee's ability to safely operate trains. They say they don't object to testing of potential hires who aren't union members. But forcing existing train crews to pass the tests could arbitrarily cost good workers their jobs, they say."

If it is part of the standard vetting procedure for working for Amtrak, I don't see why it should not apply to people who are becoming Amtrak employees to continue working on Metrolink. I don't see what it has to do with being a member of Union or not, unless the Union has a specific agreement with Amtrak overriding such requirements. Afterall when I moved to my current employer through a straight acquisition of the previous employer, I did have to go through the usual vetting procedure including drug tests and what nots even though my employment was supposed to flow in with the acquisition.

 

[leemell]

Wreck repercussions redux. Amtrak will take over as Metrolink's contract operator on July 1.
Metrolink workers object to personality testing

"Union leaders say the tests are not valid or relevant measures of a trained and experienced employee's ability to safely operate trains. They say they don't object to testing of potential hires who aren't union members. But forcing existing train crews to pass the tests could arbitrarily cost good workers their jobs, they say."

If it is part of the standard vetting procedure for working for Amtrak, I don't see why it should not apply to people who are becoming Amtrak employees to continue working on Metrolink. I don't see what it has to do with being a member of Union or not, unless the Union has a specific agreement with Amtrak overriding such requirements. Afterall when I moved to my current employer through a straight acquisition of the previous employer, I did have to go through the usual vetting procedure inclduing drug tests and what nots even though my employment was supposed to flow in with the acquisition.

I agree with you. In addition these employees are in a position of affecting public safety. When I was vetted for a sworn public safety position not only did I have to take those tests, had to have a psych exam by a psychologist.

 

[WhoozOn1st]

Here's an L.A. Times editorial on the issue of personality tests for current Metrolink engineers and conductors set to become Amtrak employees when Amtrak returns as Metrolink's contract operator (replacing Connex, a Veolia subsidiary). The editorial gives the date of the changeover as June 26, while the news story posted here last week said it's July 1. Talking with the Metrolink engineer before my run to L.A. last week (day before the news story appeared), he was unclear on the changeover date himself. Apparently there's some sort of contract overlap that has to be negotiated away. Perhaps that has occurred since the news story appeared, and June 26 is the actual change. Guess we'll see!

Safety first at Metrolink

"Metrolink workers say they don't see a connection between the tests and the safe operation of trains, so they fear it's a ruse to get rid of some veteran employees. But in fact it's entirely reasonable for the company to want to screen out potentially risky personnel before entrusting them with the lives of Metrolink passengers. What's less clear, however, is whether testing people who've been on the job for numerous trouble-free years would be an effective way to bring hidden liabilities to the surface."

 

[Rumpled]

I think the Metrolink employees have something of a point that veteran Amtrak employees haven't had to take the tests; just new hires.

Many of these employees are apparently former Amtrak employees as well.

If they disqualify too many; they won't have enough people to run the trains.

 

[user 1215]

They should just submit personal cell phone logs for the last three months...

 

[leemell]

I think the Metrolink employees have something of a point that veteran Amtrak employees haven't had to take the tests; just new hires.Many of these employees are apparently former Amtrak employees as well.

If they disqualify too many; they won't have enough people to run the trains.

The union needs to be careful here, by refusing, they look like they are favoring employee retention over safety. Sometimes it is better accept a loss than win and lose in the court of public opinion. It already sounds like that is happening based on letters in the Times.

 

[WhoozOn1st]

Signs of compromise...

Clash over Metrolink personality tests may be avoided

"Under the changes announced Thursday, existing employees of the departing contractor, Connex Railroad, who plan to stay on with the new operator [Amtrak] would not be automatically disqualified if they fail the tests, said Southern California Regional Rail Authority board chairman Keith Millhouse. Instead, they will be given additional training and testing, he said."

 

[Dan O]

http://www.pe.com/localnews/stories/PE_New...04.4c54f84.html

Metrolink officials say new railcars will save lives

New impact-minimizing passenger cars should be carrying commuters in Southern California later this year and will one day save lives, Metrolink officials said Monday.

 

[WhoozOn1st]

One Metrolink engineer has been barred from operating any train on Metrolink-controlled tracks, and a second is under investigation, for allegedly trying to block the views of new, in-cab cameras. This story includes a video of silent test footage from three of these cameras: One facing out and forward, one on the engineer, and one wider view of the locomotive's cab (showing 4 people in there).

2 Metrolink engineers investigated

"After Metrolink installed its cameras, the National Transportation Safety Board called for all of the nation's passenger trains to carry similar equipment. The Federal Railroad Administration, which implements safety requirements, is reviewing the recommendation. But at this point cameras are not considered a safety appliance subject to either federal regulation or federal enforcement actions involving tampering, said FRA spokesman Warren Flatau."

 

[WhoozOn1st]

"Metrolink and its former train operating contractor on Wednesday offered to pay $200 million to victims of the 2008 Chatsworth rail disaster that killed 25 people, setting the stage for one of the costliest rail accident settlements in the nation's history."

Metrolink proposes crash payout

"The Chatsworth crash is the first accident to bump up against the $200-million liability limit, which Congress adopted in 1997 to keep passenger rail financially viable."

A lead co-counsel with the group of victims' attorneys says a legal challenge or legislative effort to alter the federal liability cap would likely be focused on Connex/Veolia, not Metrolink. Deeper pockets, naturally.

 

[WhoozOn1st]

Relatives tell engineer's employer of effects of Chatsworth Metrolink crash

"A federal court last week approved a $200-million settlement that relieves Metrolink and private contractor Connex Railroad, a subsidiary of Veolia, of any additional liability. But attorneys for the victims say costs will far exceed that amount and are seeking, with Rep. Elton Gallegly's help, to raise the liability limit to $275 million.

"On Monday, survivors and relatives of those who died told Veolia officials that the cap — adopted by Congress in 1997 — would mean that those most severely injured might not get needed continuing medical help..."

 

[WhoozOn1st]

"The nation's leading coalition of local transit agencies wants Congress to delay a key rail safety reform prompted by the deadly Metrolink commuter disaster three years ago [this September] in Chatsworth."

Delay sought in rail safety reform plan

"The request, expected to be presented Thursday at a Washington hearing, has drawn fire from California's senior U.S. senator and Southern California's Metrolink rail system, which is racing to complete the nation's first so-called positive train control system, or PTC, by the end of next year."

Metrolink is opposed to any delay...

"Metrolink officials fear that slippage on the national PTC deadline could lead to delays and increased costs for their $200-million system, which is funded largely with local and state money. Federal officials could feel less urgency to resolve radio signal issues, they said. And private companies may have less incentive to swiftly develop new train control technologies needed to link the sophisticated system together. 'When anyone starts talking about pushing back the deadline, that's a threat,' said John Fenton, Metrolink's chief executive officer."

 

[Spokker]

If PTC allows higher speeds then I'm all for it. If nothing about operations changes, it's a lot of money for only a marginal increase in safety. Train travel is pretty safe as it is.

 

[WhoozOn1st]

Anniversary of another deadly September day...

Solemn gathering marks anniversary of Metrolink crash

"Kloster's son Michael was 'nearly cut in half' in the wreck, losing a kidney and suffering massive internal injuries. He may be facing dialysis and, at 51, his life span has been significantly shortened, she said.

"Even with his settlement of $7 million — the second highest among those injured — he'll end up $500,000 in the red after his medical and legal fees, his mother said.

"A 1997 federal law — the Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act — caps liability damages for a single railroad accident at $200 million."

EDIT: The photo that accompanies the story's headline on the L.A. Times homepage shows an Amtrak Pacific Surfliner passing the Metrolink wreck memorial at Simi Valley. Apparently it was not deemed worth even the minimal time and effort that woulda been required to get a shot of the correct type of train; that or plain ignorance.

 

[RailCon BuffDaddy]

I recently found a 2008 article, "Metrolink Chatsworth Crash - Was the Light Green?" at http://laist.com/2008/10/04/investigating_the_metrolink_crash_w.php, after perusing the recently-released NTSB Report on the accident. The report barely addresses the real issues, imho.

(from the Ventura Star) "The NTSB found the PROBABLE (emphasis mine, weasel wording theirs) cause of the Sept.12, 2008 collision that killed 25 and injured nearly 100 was the engineer's failure to stop at a red light. Engineer Robert Sanchez, who was killed in the crash, was texting 22 seconds before the crash." An earlier report by Robert Lopez on the LA Times web site contained the following quote:

"Smith, of the engineers union, said he suspects freight and commuter railroad systems have "kind of been looking the other way" on cellphone use in locomotives. He said wireless phones provide an additional means of communication between train operators and dispatchers, who can be "bombarded" with radio traffic." (this quote seems to have evaporated from the web for some reason)

The powers-that-be continue their relentless attack upon the Metrolink engineer, and the Media continue to peddle the fiction that red signals on shared train tracks are just like red lights on streets, but apparently no longer ask hard questions, like:

DID HE STOP TO PICK UP PASSENGERS AT THE CHATSWORTH STATION? (yes, says NTSB)

WHO WAS HE TEXTING? (Person A, says NTSB)

WAS TEXTING A ROUTINE WAY FOR ENGINEERS TO GET AROUND AN OBSOLETE, OVERLOADED RADIO SYSTEM? (the conductor of the freight train also texted 35 times while the train was moving, says NTSB)

WAS HE TRYING TO LET THE ONCOMING FREIGHT TRAIN ENGINEER KNOW HE WAS DEPARTING BECAUSE HIS SIGNAL WAS GREEN (as witnesses have stated) WHICH MEANT THE TRACK WAS CLEAR? (perhaps "Person A" could answer that one)

HOW COULD HE AND THE CONDUCTOR (who survived, btw) HAVE IGNORED THE FACT THAT NO SCHEDULED FREIGHT TRAIN HAD PASSED BY WHEN HE LEFT THE CHATSWORTH STATION? (which is what they would have been waiting for if the signal was red)

IF THE SIGNAL WAS RED (meaning the switch was set "open" to allow the scheduled freight train to pass), HOW COULD HE HAVE BENT THE RAIL ENDS OF THE SWITCH WITHOUT HE, THE CONDUCTOR OR THE PASSENGERS EVEN NOTICING, LET ALONE GETTING DERAILED BY SUCH AN EVENT? (photo of switch in NTSB report does NOT show obvious damage, imho)

WHO THROWS THE SWITCHES? IS THIS NOT DONE REMOTELY, BY THE DISPATCHER? IF THE SIGNAL WAS GREEN, AS WITNESSES HAVE STATED, DOES THIS NOT IMPLICATE THE DISPATCHER? (the request to throw the switch, giving Metrolink a "green" signal, was "stacked" in the Digicon system, says NTSB on p.24 - (And the testimony of the multiple witnesses that Metrolink had a green signal was ignored WHY, exactly???)

WHY WAS THE SPEED LIMIT 40 MPH FOR TRAINS EXITING A TUNNEL WITH A METROLINK STATION LOCATED JUST AROUND A BLIND CORNER? (Over 40 years ago, from the top of Stony Point, I watched in horror as two juvenile delinquents dragged a cross-tie over the tracks just in front of a freight train exiting the same tunnel - it made a huge noise, but fortunately did not derail the train, which was moving slowly enough to stop within the track curve.)

AND FINALLY, see footnote 40 on page 28 of the NTSB Report - "Investigators were not able to locate the engineer’s wireless device after the accident." (dead men tell no tales - and neither do their missing cell phones...)

I doubt the whole truth of this awful event will ever come out - and certainly not if the NTSB has anything to say about it. I realize that other posts may have dealt with at least some of these questions, and I welcome all sincere responses.

Just sign me,

RailCon BuffDaddy

 

[George Harris]

I am just going to talk about a few things, mainly the most obvious since it is late and I do not have a copy of the accident report or other information in front of me.

I recently found a 2008 article, "Metrolink Chatsworth Crash - Was the Light Green?" at http://laist.com/2008/10/04/investigating_the_metrolink_crash_w.php, after perusing the recently-released NTSB Report on the accident. The report barely addresses the real issues, imho.

(from the Ventura Star) "The NTSB found the PROBABLE (emphasis mine, weasel wording theirs) cause of the Sept.12, 2008 collision that killed 25 and injured nearly 100 was the engineer's failure to stop at a red light. Engineer Robert Sanchez, who was killed in the crash, was texting 22 seconds before the crash." An earlier report by Robert Lopez on the LA Times web site contained the following quote:

"Smith, of the engineers union, said he suspects freight and commuter railroad systems have "kind of been looking the other way" on cellphone use in locomotives. He said wireless phones provide an additional means of communication between train operators and dispatchers, who can be "bombarded" with radio traffic." (this quote seems to have evaporated from the web for some reason)

The powers-that-be continue their relentless attack upon the Metrolink engineer, and the Media continue to peddle the fiction that red signals on shared train tracks are just like red lights on streets, but apparently no longer ask hard questions, like:

for the following:

DID HE STOP TO PICK UP PASSENGERS AT THE CHATSWORTH STATION? (yes, says NTSB)

Yes

WHO WAS HE TEXTING? (Person A, says NTSB)
WAS TEXTING A ROUTINE WAY FOR ENGINEERS TO GET AROUND AN OBSOLETE, OVERLOADED RADIO SYSTEM? (the conductor of the freight train also texted 35 times while the train was moving, says NTSB)

WAS HE TRYING TO LET THE ONCOMING FREIGHT TRAIN ENGINEER KNOW HE WAS DEPARTING BECAUSE HIS SIGNAL WAS GREEN (as witnesses have stated) WHICH MEANT THE TRACK WAS CLEAR? (perhaps "Person A" could answer that one)

To do so would be pointless.

HOW COULD HE AND THE CONDUCTOR (who survived, btw) HAVE IGNORED THE FACT THAT NO SCHEDULED FREIGHT TRAIN HAD PASSED BY WHEN HE LEFT THE CHATSWORTH STATION? (which is what they would have been waiting for if the signal was red)

Not quite sure of your point. Freight trains usually have no published schedule.

IF THE SIGNAL WAS RED (meaning the switch was set "open" to allow the scheduled freight train to pass), HOW COULD HE HAVE BENT THE RAIL ENDS OF THE SWITCH WITHOUT HE, THE CONDUCTOR OR THE PASSENGERS EVEN NOTICING, LET ALONE GETTING DERAILED BY SUCH AN EVENT? (photo of switch in NTSB report does NOT show obvious damage, imho)

The passenger train was going through the turnout in the trailing direction. The engineer could probably have seen the way the switch was set before going over it, but no one else would be able to see it, certainly not at all from inside the train, which would be the location of the conductor. There would probably have been no noticable bump going over the switch.

WHO THROWS THE SWITCHES? IS THIS NOT DONE REMOTELY, BY THE DISPATCHER? IF THE SIGNAL WAS GREEN, AS WITNESSES HAVE STATED, DOES THIS NOT IMPLICATE THE DISPATCHER? (the request to throw the switch, giving Metrolink a "green" signal, was "stacked" in the Digicon system, says NTSB on p.24 - (And the testimony of the multiple witnesses that Metrolink had a green signal was ignored WHY, exactly???)

A piece of an answer: The switch is thrown by the dispatcher. The switch cannot be thrown with a train on the approach circuit. Therefore, if the system was set to throw the switch to permit Metrolink to go through, it would not happen until the freight cleared the circuit.

WHY WAS THE SPEED LIMIT 40 MPH FOR TRAINS EXITING A TUNNEL WITH A METROLINK STATION LOCATED JUST AROUND A BLIND CORNER? (Over 40 years ago, from the top of Stony Point, I watched in horror as two juvenile delinquents dragged a cross-tie over the tracks just in front of a freight train exiting the same tunnel - it made a huge noise, but fortunately did not derail the train, which was moving slowly enough to stop within the track curve.)

Why not? Trains do not operate by line of sight on this piece of railroad, but by signal idication.

AND FINALLY, see footnote 40 on page 28 of the NTSB Report - "Investigators were not able to locate the engineer’s wireless device after the accident." (dead men tell no tales - and neither do their missing cell phones...)
I doubt the whole truth of this awful event will ever come out - and certainly not if the NTSB has anything to say about it. I realize that other posts may have dealt with at least some of these questions, and I welcome all sincere responses.

Just sign me,

RailCon BuffDaddy

Do not understand your suspicion of the NTSB.

 

[RailCon BuffDaddy]

I do not have a copy of the accident report or other information in front of me

Perhaps you should get one

yes

Thereby rendering the status of previous signals irrelevant - otherwise they would still be waiting in Chatsworth

To do so would be pointless.

Ya think? Well, maybe so - if the signal was green, Metrolink was going to collide with the freight train, even if it never left Chatsworth. Thanks for helping make this point, even if you did not mean to. You don't happen to know "Person A", do you? And how about addressing the second question - is texting on the job ROUTINE FOR ENGINEERS (and conductors)?

Freight trains usually have no published schedule.

Waiting for that particular freight train in Chatsworth was an almost daily occurrence for the Metrolink, as numerous published accounts reveal.

There would probably have been no noticable bump going over the switch.

When I posed this question to a real live conductor standing near his train, he said it might derail or tip over, but there was no way it would go unnoticed.

The switch cannot be thrown with a train on the approach circuit.

]
Gee, then PTC is already built into the system?

Why not? Trains do not operate by line of sight on this piece of railroad, but by signal idication.

I assume you meant "indication". Then we don't need engineers and their pesky unions at all, do we? Just award a nationwide PTC contract to Lionel...

Do not understand your suspicion of the NTSB.

The NTSB who failed to recover the Metrolink engineer's cell phone? That one?