Metrolink Wreck

[Karl]

Sympathies to all involved.

The comment about the switch being desinged to prevent de railing even if run set for the opposite track makes sense as there are likely hundreds of cases of trains running past a switch for every incident where a train runs a switch AND a collision with an opposing train occurs. Likely there would be more fatalities overall if the trains derailed EVERY time they ran a switch.

PTC should be a priority for all passenger trains. If nothing else the passenger train could get stopped and the engineer be on the radio trying to get the attention of an oncoming freight.

Is the section of track where this wreck occured cab signal territory. I think UP has cab signals in much of the original UP main, do they have it system wide? Could a GPS be connected to a cab signal system to alert the engineer and condutor as an interem patch?

 

[AlanB]

this fact that there was a signal at the far end of the station makes it even more difficult to understand how the engineer passed the signal. It seems to me that the signal malfunction consideration must be seriously considered.signals rarely malfunction and usually fail in the most restrictive position (a dark signal must be assumed to be it's most restrictive position)

the engineer is supposed to visually verify that the switch is set for his train also.

there is also the fact that the train stopped at Chatsworth, should not the conductor who probably stepped off the train to set out the train step or assist passengers. and did he check the signal also before giving the highball. it was only a 3 car change so he should not have had any trouble seeing the signal.

so it does appear very strange that all of these things needed to malfunction for the operator to by pass the signal,

Bob

Bob,

All good questions that we'll most likely have to wait for the investigation to answer. A few things are known though already. Equipment at the switch clocked the train at 42 MPH as it passed through the switch. The dispatcher's board showed that signal at danger and the two prior signals set appropriately for the signal at danger. The dispatcher's board showed the switch set correctly for the freight train and against the Metrolink train. And finally it is confirmed that the Metrolink train bent the switch points as it went through the switch set against it.

According to one poster on a blog, who does appear to know what he's talking about (but still this is unconfirmed), the signal in question is visible from the station to the engineer. No word on whether someone on the platform can see it. Even then the conductor would probably be more concerned with making sure all the passengers detraining had gotten off. The signal, CP Topenga, is about 4,000 ft from the Chatsworth station.

 

[AlanB]

PTC should be a priority for all passenger trains. If nothing else the passenger train could get stopped and the engineer be on the radio trying to get the attention of an oncoming freight.

Karl,

I'm not sure about your other question, but if that line had PTC, then both the commuter train and the freight train would need to be equiped with it. Therefore as soon as the Metrolink violated the signal, both the Metrolink and the UP train would have gone into emergency. Having their train suddenly braking would get the attention of the UP crew. :lol: But there would be no need to radio them to warn them, they'd be stopping long before a human could pick up the radio.

 

[Joel N. Weber II]

PTC should be a priority for all passenger trains. If nothing else the passenger train could get stopped and the engineer be on the radio trying to get the attention of an oncoming freight.

Karl,

I'm not sure about your other question, but if that line had PTC, then both the commuter train and the freight train would need to be equiped with it. Therefore as soon as the Metrolink violated the signal, both the Metrolink and the UP train would have gone into emergency. Having their train suddenly braking would get the attention of the UP crew. :lol: But there would be no need to radio them to warn them, they'd be stopping long before a human could pick up the radio.

If that line had NEC style signaling and only the passenger train had automatic stop integrated with the cab signal system, it appears that that probably would have been sufficient to prevent this particular accident, but the system would certainly be most effective if the freight train also had automatic stop; the second worst Amtrak accident ever probably could have been prevented by automatic stop in the freight locomotive, and in that case what was in the passenger locomotive basically didn't matter.

 

[Joel N. Weber II]

The comment about the switch being desinged to prevent de railing even if run set for the opposite track makes sense as there are likely hundreds of cases of trains running past a switch for every incident where a train runs a switch AND a collision with an opposing train occurs.

I thought it was actually pretty rare for a derailment to cause a death, though.

 

[GG-1]

this fact that there was a signal at the far end of the station makes it even more difficult to understand how the engineer passed the signal. It seems to me that the signal malfunction consideration must be seriously considered.signals rarely malfunction and usually fail in the most restrictive position (a dark signal must be assumed to be it's most restrictive position)

the engineer is supposed to visually verify that the switch is set for his train also.

there is also the fact that the train stopped at Chatsworth, should not the conductor who probably stepped off the train to set out the train step or assist passengers. and did he check the signal also before giving the highball. it was only a 3 car change so he should not have had any trouble seeing the signal.

so it does appear very strange that all of these things needed to malfunction for the operator to by pass the signal,

Bob

Bob,

All good questions that we'll most likely have to wait for the investigation to answer. A few things are known though already. Equipment at the switch clocked the train at 42 MPH as it passed through the switch. The dispatcher's board showed that signal at danger and the two prior signals set appropriately for the signal at danger. The dispatcher's board showed the switch set correctly for the freight train and against the Metrolink train. And finally it is confirmed that the Metrolink train bent the switch points as it went through the switch set against it.

According to one poster on a blog, who does appear to know what he's talking about (but still this is unconfirmed), the signal in question is visible from the station to the engineer. No word on whether someone on the platform can see it. Even then the conductor would probably be more concerned with making sure all the passengers detraining had gotten off. The signal, CP Topenga, is about 4,000 ft from the Chatsworth station.

Aloha

I normally like to trim quotes but was afraid to here.

Question

Whether or not, a red signal, was visible from the station, could the Metrolink train accelerate to the estimated speed of 42 mph in the estimated distance of 4000 feet?

Mahalo

 

[PRR 60]

The signal in question is 5000 feet east of the Chatsworth platform. At that distance, in a bright sun, with several trees partially overhanging the right-of-way, the signal might not be readily visible from the train stopped at the platform nearly a mile away.

Regardless, the train should have been under an restricted signal as it sat in the station. The engineer should have been expecting the stop signal and the wait for the eastbound freight to clear. Why didn't he? I think I'll let the NTSB do their job and figure that out.

 

[AlanB]

PTC should be a priority for all passenger trains. If nothing else the passenger train could get stopped and the engineer be on the radio trying to get the attention of an oncoming freight.

Karl,

I'm not sure about your other question, but if that line had PTC, then both the commuter train and the freight train would need to be equiped with it. Therefore as soon as the Metrolink violated the signal, both the Metrolink and the UP train would have gone into emergency. Having their train suddenly braking would get the attention of the UP crew. :lol: But there would be no need to radio them to warn them, they'd be stopping long before a human could pick up the radio.

If that line had NEC style signaling and only the passenger train had automatic stop integrated with the cab signal system, it appears that that probably would have been sufficient to prevent this particular accident, but the system would certainly be most effective if the freight train also had automatic stop; the second worst Amtrak accident ever probably could have been prevented by automatic stop in the freight locomotive, and in that case what was in the passenger locomotive basically didn't matter.

But the point of PTC is that all locos that operate on that section of the tracks must have ATS and the PTC equipment. That's one reason that many commuter lines haven't installed it for themselves, because they'd also have to end up paying for the freight co's to equip their locos too.

And the second worst Amtrak accident only had cab signals in place, which weren't working correctly on the freight train. AFAIK there was no PTC in either loco, freight or Amtrak.

 

[Guest_George Harris_*]

Description and some other information from employee timetables with a little from other sources:

This line is the ex Southern Pacific Coast Line. Now the ownership is split between UP and Metrolink. The accident location is on Metrolink owned track.

Union Pacific’s Santa Barbara subdivision is regarded as running north-south and is mostly single track, ABS with CTC from Santa Barbara south. The maximum speed limit is 79P/60F, but there are numerous speed restrictions down to 40 mph. Only 18 miles allows 79 mph, mostly in 2 and 3 mile long segments other than one 9 mile long section just north of Santa Barbara. All is single track except for 3.1 miles at San Luis Obispo and 3.6 miles (365.0 to 368.6) at Santa Barbara. There are 5 sidings between Santa Barbara and Las Posas. Stations are located at:

248.7 San Luis Obispo

355.8 Elwood (begin CTC – not a station)

358.2 Goleta

367.4 Santa Barbara

?-?.? Carpinteria

394.8 Ventura (mileage at north end siding)

399.6 Montalvo (mileage at north end of siding)

404.0 Oxnard (mileage at north end of siding)

412.5 Camarillo (mileage at north end of siding)

423.1 Las Posas – end Union Pacific ownership

Milepost Equation: 423.1 Union Pacific = 426.4 Metrolink

Metrolink ownership covers the rest of the line to Los Angeles Union Station.

The Metrolink Ventura Subdivision is defined as running east-west, with the west end being CP Las Posas at milepost 426.4. The east end is at CP Burbank Junction, milepost 462.8. It is single track with four sidings between Las Posas and CP Raymer at milepost 453.1 and double track from there the rest of the way to CP Burbank Jct. All turnouts at ends of sidings and the end of double track at CP Raymer are shown as allowing 45P/40F, which suggests that they are number 20 turnouts. Allowed speed in sidings is 45P/40F. Stations are at:

427.1 Moorpark

437.9 Simi valley

445.5 Chatsworth

449.3 Northridge

455.0 Van Nuys

460.6 Burbank-Bob Hope Airport

The remainder of the trip to LA is on the Valley Subdivision which is now mileposted out from Los Angeles Union Station.

Zooming into the accident vicinity, Chatsworth is in the middle of a 11,300 foot siding that extends from milepost 444.4, CP Topanga to milepost 446.8, CP De Soto. (The mileposted length of siding will always be longer than the timetable length, as the timetable length is maximum clear length and the milepost length runs from point of switch to point of switch.) The next siding west is a 7,625 foot siding extending from milepost 439.2, CP Santa Susana to milepost 440.8. CP Davis. In the 3.6 miles between these sidings are three tunnels:

Tunnel No. 26, 7,369 feet long, mileposts 441.2 to 442.6,

Tunnel No. 27, 924 feet long, mileposts 442.9 to 443.1,

Tunnel No. 28, 537 feet long, mileposts 443.9 to 444.0.

Speed Limits:

Freight train speed limits are 60 mph between mileposts 429.8 and 437.7 and 40 mph for the remainder of the subdivision east of that point. Between Simi Valley and Chatsworth, passenger train speed limits are:

60 mph – 437.7-438.0

70 mph – 438.0-440.0

60 mph – 440.0-440.9

50 mph – 440.9-442.6

40 mph – 442.6-444.5

70 mph – 444.5-453.1 (remaining single track to begin double track portion)

The 40 mph speed restriction includes the two easternmost tunnels and the curve between tunnel 28 and the turnout at CP Topanga. I have no information on the degree of curve of this curve or its approximate radius, but given the speed limit and that it turns roughly 90 degrees in the 0.4 miles between the end of tunnel 28 and the turnout at Topanga, it is likely to be about a 3 degree to 4 degree curve. ( that is, somewhere between 1200 feet and 2000 feet in radius)

Unless the Metrolink engineer was speeding, the speed of both trains had to be 40 mph or less. That some of the witness statements talk about 60 mph does not suggest that the train was really going that fast. Passenger estimates of train speed are notorious for their inaccuracy in both directions.

 

[tp49]

In an interesting development reporterd in the LA Times it seems that the Metrolink spokeswoman resigned on Monday under pressure (read either she resign or she be fired.) I would bet that legal most likely didn't like her statement proclaiming the Metrolink train at fault, at least until the conclusion of the NTSB's investigation. The article also stated that when LA's mayor heard of the plan to make that statement he declined to participate in it.

The statement while refreshing was quite premature and and unnecessarily exposed Metrolink to liability considering the investigation barely started at that point and was nowhere near completion. Though there is blame to go around since the chief executive of Metrolink authorized the statement. I found it interesting (but not surprising) that the spokeswoman was forced out.

LA Times Article.

 

[PRR 60]

In an interesting development reporterd in the LA Times it seems that the Metrolink spokeswoman resigned on Monday under pressure (read either she resign or she be fired.) I would bet that legal most likely didn't like her statement proclaiming the Metrolink train at fault, at least until the conclusion of the NTSB's investigation. The article also stated that when LA's mayor heard of the plan to make that statement he declined to participate in it.
The statement while refreshing was quite premature and and unnecessarily exposed Metrolink to liability considering the investigation barely started at that point and was nowhere near completion. Though there is blame to go around since the chief executive of Metrolink authorized the statement. I found it interesting (but not surprising) that the spokeswoman was forced out.

LA Times Article.

There is, of course, a more cynical way to look at that original statement by the Metrolink PR person. She took blame for the accident on behalf of Metrolink, and then immediately passed the blame to the engineer and the engineer's employer Veolia. This without any knowledge that the signals were working properly (a Metrolink issue), or whether the engineer had been worked to the point of fatigue (a Metrolink problem), or whether there were any medical issues involved, or any of dozens of factors that could have contributed to the tragedy. In short, the statement that a signal had been passed may be factual, but solely blaming the engineer may or may not be.

The cause of the accident will be determined. If it runs true to form it will be complex with multiple factors contributing. Blaming the engineer prior to knowing all the facts was not just premature, it was the easy way out. If the Metrolink spokesperson did that on her own, she should have been fired outright. If the Metrolink CEO authorized it, they both should be fired.

 

[amtrakwolverine]

In an interesting development reporterd in the LA Times it seems that the Metrolink spokeswoman resigned on Monday under pressure (read either she resign or she be fired.) I would bet that legal most likely didn't like her statement proclaiming the Metrolink train at fault, at least until the conclusion of the NTSB's investigation. The article also stated that when LA's mayor heard of the plan to make that statement he declined to participate in it.
The statement while refreshing was quite premature and and unnecessarily exposed Metrolink to liability considering the investigation barely started at that point and was nowhere near completion. Though there is blame to go around since the chief executive of Metrolink authorized the statement. I found it interesting (but not surprising) that the spokeswoman was forced out.

LA Times Article.

There is, of course, a more cynical way to look at that original statement by the Metrolink PR person. She took blame for the accident on behalf of Metrolink, and then immediately passed the blame to the engineer and the engineer's employer Veolia. This without any knowledge that the signals were working properly (a Metrolink issue), or whether the engineer had been worked to the point of fatigue (a Metrolink problem), or whether there were any medical issues involved, or any of dozens of factors that could have contributed to the tragedy. In short, the statement that a signal had been passed may be factual, but solely blaming the engineer may or may not be.

The cause of the accident will be determined. If it runs true to form it will be complex with multiple factors contributing. Blaming the engineer prior to knowing all the facts was not just premature, it was the easy way out. If the Metrolink spokesperson did that on her own, she should have been fired outright. If the Metrolink CEO authorized it, they both should be fired.

sounds like a cover up. i bet theres more going on behind the scenes then metrolink is letting on. shes basically saying its the engineers fault case closed lets move on.

 

[user 1215]

Next, if I understand things correctly (and those more familiar with the line please correct me if I'm wrong), after passing the second yellow signal, he made a station stop at Chatsworth. After that stop, with the signal in question in sight, the engineer accelerated the train through that signal, the switch set against him, and reached at least 40 MPH.
So the only real question is, was that last signal operating correctly?

Wow, this is becoming even more unbelievable. They didn't change crews at the Chatsworth station, did they? Was the engineer trying to beat the freight train "at the pass"? Was this a suicide?

Very interesting point. Why not allow the freight to pass while the train is still at Chatsworth? So the train has to stay in the station for a couple extra minutes, but we're talking about a couple thousand feet from the station to the turnout. I would imagine that it would be better all the way around if the sum of the stops along a route were in stations rather than at signals. Really, this train should have never left Chatsworth until that Freight had passed - especially if this is a common occurance.

As for my previous deadman switch question, an Alerter is hardly a deadman's switch (as I understand it). As Alan mentioned and as is my experience, I figured that positive pressure on the throttle at all times AND a seat switch would be bare minimums to the safe operation of a passenger train. It would certainly make texting much more difficult (if that were indeed the case). I don't know what they use on the F59PH, PHI, F40PH and the Cab Cars. I presume they are all different. Which loco was in this wreck?

 

[amtrakwolverine]

Which loco was in this wreck?

F-59PH 855

 

[WhoozOn1st]

Make the rails safer

L.A. Times editorial.

 

[Walt]

This without any knowledge that the signals were working properly (a Metrolink issue), ...

Well, to be fair, the Metrolink spokeswoman didn't make her comment until after "Higgins (Kitty Higgins, an NTSB board member) also said tests at the crash site showed the signals are working properly and there were no obstructions that may have prevented the engineer from seeing the red light."

 

[user 1215]

But you don't make a statement that admits culpability. Even my auto insurance carrier tells me that. This article shows that the knee jerk reaction to that statement could actually jeapordize life. Besides, there are already rules restricing cell phone use. Unlikely that a harsher rule would actually be harder to break.

 

[Walt]

But you don't make a statement that admits culpability. Even my auto insurance carrier tells me that. This artile shows that the knee jerk reaction to that statement could actually jeapordize life. Besides, there are already rules restricing cell phone use. Unlikely that a harsher rule would actually be harder to break.

Well, it is difficult to toggle between on specific example, and an overall general rule.

All I was defending, was the claim that the Metrolink spokeswoman had no knowledge if the signals were working or not. Whereas, a member of the NTSB had already announced the results of their initial testing that showed that the signals were indeed working. It might have been wrong for the NTSB to release those results. It might be that the NTSB was missquoted. It might be the NTSB was repeating someone else's claim.

As to cell phone usage, at least conductors on Amtrak use theirs all the time. I know that when I was stuck on a non-moving train for 24 hours due to a freight train derailment up ahead, ALL of the info the conductor got duing those 24 hours, came from the calls he made on his cell phone.

 

[Crescent ATN & TCL]

But you don't make a statement that admits culpability. Even my auto insurance carrier tells me that. This artile shows that the knee jerk reaction to that statement could actually jeapordize life. Besides, there are already rules restricing cell phone use. Unlikely that a harsher rule would actually be harder to break.

Well, it is difficult to toggle between on specific example, and an overall general rule.

All I was defending, was the claim that the Metrolink spokeswoman had no knowledge if the signals were working or not. Whereas, a member of the NTSB had already announced the results of their initial testing that showed that the signals were indeed working. It might have been wrong for the NTSB to release those results. It might be that the NTSB was missquoted. It might be the NTSB was repeating someone else's claim.

As to cell phone usage, at least conductors on Amtrak use theirs all the time. I know that when I was stuck on a non-moving train for 24 hours due to a freight train derailment up ahead, ALL of the info the conductor got duing those 24 hours, came from the calls he made on his cell phone.

I can understand using a cellphone for work related purposes but not for anything else.

 

[MrFSS]

But you don't make a statement that admits culpability. Even my auto insurance carrier tells me that. This artile shows that the knee jerk reaction to that statement could actually jeopardize life. Besides, there are already rules restricting cell phone use. Unlikely that a harsher rule would actually be harder to break.

Well, it is difficult to toggle between on specific example, and an overall general rule.

All I was defending, was the claim that the Metrolink spokeswoman had no knowledge if the signals were working or not. Whereas, a member of the NTSB had already announced the results of their initial testing that showed that the signals were indeed working. It might have been wrong for the NTSB to release those results. It might be that the NTSB was missquoted. It might be the NTSB was repeating someone else's claim.

As to cell phone usage, at least conductors on Amtrak use theirs all the time. I know that when I was stuck on a non-moving train for 24 hours due to a freight train derailment up ahead, ALL of the info the conductor got duing those 24 hours, came from the calls he made on his cell phone.

I can understand using a cellphone for work related purposes but not for anything else.

All I have is a cell phone - no land line, so I use mine only for personal stuff.

 

[tp49]

In an interesting development reporterd in the LA Times it seems that the Metrolink spokeswoman resigned on Monday under pressure (read either she resign or she be fired.) I would bet that legal most likely didn't like her statement proclaiming the Metrolink train at fault, at least until the conclusion of the NTSB's investigation. The article also stated that when LA's mayor heard of the plan to make that statement he declined to participate in it.
The statement while refreshing was quite premature and and unnecessarily exposed Metrolink to liability considering the investigation barely started at that point and was nowhere near completion. Though there is blame to go around since the chief executive of Metrolink authorized the statement. I found it interesting (but not surprising) that the spokeswoman was forced out.

LA Times Article.

There is, of course, a more cynical way to look at that original statement by the Metrolink PR person. She took blame for the accident on behalf of Metrolink, and then immediately passed the blame to the engineer and the engineer's employer Veolia. This without any knowledge that the signals were working properly (a Metrolink issue), or whether the engineer had been worked to the point of fatigue (a Metrolink problem), or whether there were any medical issues involved, or any of dozens of factors that could have contributed to the tragedy. In short, the statement that a signal had been passed may be factual, but solely blaming the engineer may or may not be.

The cause of the accident will be determined. If it runs true to form it will be complex with multiple factors contributing. Blaming the engineer prior to knowing all the facts was not just premature, it was the easy way out. If the Metrolink spokesperson did that on her own, she should have been fired outright. If the Metrolink CEO authorized it, they both should be fired.

I agree that she should not have made the statement she made. I'm sure Metronlink's legal team was none too happy when it was made knowing that the statement would most definitely be used in any civil action against them.

I gathered that the CEO did not authorize the exact statement that was made but instead was for a more neutrally worded one.

 

[Guest_Spokker_*]

Found this post on another forum of a transit advocacy organization. It's a summary of some coverage on a news station here in Los Angeles.

Just listened to the great coverage of Eric Leonard on KFI 640 while I was driving home.
Good news first: It looks like Metrolink will face $0 liability for the accident. The contractor, a French company, is assuming full liability according to their agreement.

The NTSB spokeswoman said that they were only able to partially analyze one of the Metrolink data recorders so far. These are the numbers:

Freight Train/Metrolink

Speed 25/42 MPH

Time after applying emergency brakes 2/0 seconds

Sight distance 1,000 feet

Metrolink -- Speed when passed red light (last signal of system of three --

50+ MPH, then slowed down to 42 MPH -- did not apply brakes.

The engineer was diabetic.

Another interesting note: There was a suicide on the same line a few days ago. A terminally ill man stepped in front of the train and smiled at the engineer just before he was killed by the train. They don't know if it's the same engineer since the records are currently protected. They say this could have devastated Robert Sanchez if he was the same engineer.

If Robert Sanchez was able to brake, the collision could still happen, but chances are that the effects would be much less devastating.

They didn't rule out suicide. Hijacking is currently ruled out because they didn't find a second body in the completely crashed engineer's compartment.

Metrolink was also criticized for having very old trains with weak chassises.

The throttle on the Metrolink trains they say is not dead-man's throttle but it's quasi-dead-man's throttle. The engineer needs to periodically touch the throttle; otherwise, it will gradually lower and come to zero within a minute or two.

Something happened between Metrolink's Engineer and Conductor September 2, 2008, (might have been suicide talk) -- they were working together since April -- Conductor had nothing but praise for Engineer.

 

[Guest_George Harris_*]

The signal in question is 5000 feet east of the Chatsworth platform. At that distance, in a bright sun, with several trees partially overhanging the right-of-way, the signal might not be readily visible from the train stopped at the platform nearly a mile away.
Regardless, the train should have been under an restricted signal as it sat in the station. The engineer should have been expecting the stop signal and the wait for the eastbound freight to clear. Why didn't he? I think I'll let the NTSB do their job and figure that out.

While the signal was west of the station in the railroad sense of the track being designated as eastbound/westbound, if you look at a map of the area you will see that the track is oriented almost precisely north south at this location, so the signal was due north of the train. Sun in the eyes seems unlikely. Also, aerial phot, maybe a fewy years old shows no trees. Usually line of sight to signals is considered most important. I am not going to speculate on cause otherwise.

 

[Dutchrailnut]

very interesting youtube video of train traveling same route from Chatworth to crash scene. The crash happed at the 3 containers 25 seconds past the homeboard.

http://nl.youtube.com/watch?v=CNuzZI-7h4U&...feature=related

 

[sam.dirksen]

The signal in question is 5000 feet east of the Chatsworth platform. At that distance, in a bright sun, with several trees partially overhanging the right-of-way, the signal might not be readily visible from the train stopped at the platform nearly a mile away.
Regardless, the train should have been under an restricted signal as it sat in the station. The engineer should have been expecting the stop signal and the wait for the eastbound freight to clear. Why didn't he? I think I'll let the NTSB do their job and figure that out.

While the signal was west of the station in the railroad sense of the track being designated as eastbound/westbound, if you look at a map of the area you will see that the track is oriented almost precisely north south at this location, so the signal was due north of the train. Sun in the eyes seems unlikely. Also, aerial phot, maybe a fewy years old shows no trees. Usually line of sight to signals is considered most important. I am not going to speculate on cause otherwise.

This Youtube video http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cCiZjjCeovM shows a northbound Metrolink arriving and departing Chatsworth, taken from a mid-platform perspective. Beginning at 1:10 into the clip, the signals at the north end of the passing siding can be seen in the distance. I'm not claiming that this demonstrates that the signal could have been read by an engineer at the platform from 5000 feet away - I'm content to leave that task to professional investigators - but it does appear to confirm that there was a line of sight from the platform to the signal as of the date that the video was made.

Sam