Metrolink Wreck

[user 1215]

All CSX crews, as well as NS crews routinely call signals.
BNSF and UP usually do not.

For Amtrak crews operating on the following, at least in southern CA:

BNSF and UP require anything but a "clear"/"proceed" be called by the engineer and acknowledged by the conductor or another member of the operating crew.

SCRRA and SDNR require all signals be called by the engineer, anything but "clear,"/"proceed" must be acknowledged by the conductor or another member of the operating crew.

FWIW AMTK 784 met Metrolink 111 at our usual time and place on Friday. We were the last train to go through that area.

Has anyone else heard the report that a passenger on 111 claims they left CWT on a clear?

~BJG

:::whose trains were annulled Saturday and Sunday, but working Monday:::

Seems like a funny rule - and one that didn't seem to really affect the outcome of this tragedy. What's the consequence of missing a call? Other than certain infringement on an active main, and the horrific result imminent of a red light.

As mentioned several times already, making the call can be responded to by a conductor. But if you miss a call - or two or three - how can the conductor know that you missed the signal?

There's been all sorts of talk about PTC, but what about something simpler? How about just fault detector technology that only broadcasts when you pass a caution or stop signal above a certain speed? It could be localized enough to prevent being heard too far away. That way the conductor AND the conflicting train would be aware of the potential for collision and could at least attempt to do something about it.

Some questions...

1) Is there a deadman's switch in the Metrolink cab?

2) If there was a medical anomole, could the engineer still have had the deadman's switch actuated?

3) A report indicated that the engineer's cell phone couldn't be found - not unreasonable for the amount of damage that ensued, but isn't Metrolink sort of admitting culpability a bit prematurely?

4) I heard Metrolink was going 42 MPH at impact, and I presume that the freight had a full green proceed. Any indications how fast it was going?

5) If the conductor on Metrolink DID feel that there was an anomole with regards to not calling signals, is there an emergency brake in the Bombardier bi-levels?

 

[AlanB]

As mentioned several times already, making the call can be responded to by a conductor. But if you miss a call - or two or three - how can the conductor know that you missed the signal?

The conductor has to know the route as well as the engineer. Basically that means if he looks out the window he has to know exactly where he is based upon the landmarks. Therefore he'd know if the train had gone by a signal without it being called. You also get to the point where you just kind of know that it takes X long to get to the next signal. So again, if you haven't heard something, then you start to wonder.

There's been all sorts of talk about PTC, but what about something simpler? How about just fault detector technology that only broadcasts when you pass a caution or stop signal above a certain speed? It could be localized enough to prevent being heard too far away. That way the conductor AND the conflicting train would be aware of the potential for collision and could at least attempt to do something about it.

Interesting idea, not sure why it hasn't been suggested before. I'll have to think about that more. Although there are other advantages to PTC beyond the "we just missed the signal."

1) Is there a deadman's switch in the Metrolink cab?

Yes, there has to be. All modern engines have one.

2) If there was a medical anomole, could the engineer still have had the deadman's switch actuated?

AFAIK you can't operate the loco without it being activated. Therefore it had to be operational when the trains collided.

3) A report indicated that the engineer's cell phone couldn't be found - not unreasonable for the amount of damage that ensued, but isn't Metrolink sort of admitting culpability a bit prematurely?

Yes, which is why some are questioning the timing of things. Even the NTSB is saying "let's slow down here and wait for the investigation."

4) I heard Metrolink was going 42 MPH at impact, and I presume that the freight had a full green proceed. Any indications how fast it was going?

I saw one unconfirmed report that said the freight was going about 20 MPH.

5) If the conductor on Metrolink DID feel that there was an anomole with regards to not calling signals, is there an emergency brake in the Bombardier bi-levels?

Every passenger car in the US has an emergency brake cord.

 

[access bob]

All CSX crews, as well as NS crews routinely call signals.
BNSF and UP usually do not.

For Amtrak crews operating on the following, at least in southern CA:

BNSF and UP require anything but a "clear"/"proceed" be called by the engineer and acknowledged by the conductor or another member of the operating crew.

SCRRA and SDNR require all signals be called by the engineer, anything but "clear,"/"proceed" must be acknowledged by the conductor or another member of the operating crew.

FWIW AMTK 784 met Metrolink 111 at our usual time and place on Friday. We were the last train to go through that area.

Has anyone else heard the report that a passenger on 111 claims they left CWT on a clear?

~BJG

:::whose trains were annulled Saturday and Sunday, but working Monday:::

Seems like a funny rule - and one that didn't seem to really affect the outcome of this tragedy. What's the consequence of missing a call? Other than certain infringement on an active main, and the horrific result imminent of a red light.

As mentioned several times already, making the call can be responded to by a conductor. But if you miss a call - or two or three - how can the conductor know that you missed the signal?

There's been all sorts of talk about PTC, but what about something simpler? How about just fault detector technology that only broadcasts when you pass a caution or stop signal above a certain speed? It could be localized enough to prevent being heard too far away. That way the conductor AND the conflicting train would be aware of the potential for collision and could at least attempt to do something about it.

Some questions...

1) Is there a deadman's switch in the Metrolink cab?

2) If there was a medical anomole, could the engineer still have had the deadman's switch actuated?

3) A report indicated that the engineer's cell phone couldn't be found - not unreasonable for the amount of damage that ensued, but isn't Metrolink sort of admitting culpability a bit prematurely?

4) I heard Metrolink was going 42 MPH at impact, and I presume that the freight had a full green proceed. Any indications how fast it was going?

5) If the conductor on Metrolink DID feel that there was an anomole with regards to not calling signals, is there an emergency brake in the Bombardier bi-levels?

1.) YES

2.) unlikely but it is probably still possible, but highly unlikely

3.) they will search for the phone, if it is there they probably will eventually find it, Metrolink either knows something and is trying to get it over with, or someone is speaking without talking to their legal dept.

4.) I have heard reported that the closing speed was approx 80MPH so that 42 would sound reasonable, however they have recovered both Metrolink data recorders and the UP data recorder and cab video recorderer so exact readings will be able to be determined.

apparently the UP crew survived, did they "bail out" has anyone heard

5.) Yes the conductor could stop the train in an emergency, however apparently the time would have been very short and they still would have had to contact the freight. check out google earth for the view of the accident site.

Bob

 

[WhoozOn1st]

Los Angeles Times:

Investigators focus on whether signal was broken or missed

Metrolink's grim national record (comparisons with other commuter lines)

 

[Steve4031]

I don't know how to do links. Someone should check out cnn's website. There was a report on there about texting between the engineer and a teenaged train enthusiast.

 

[Steve4031]

That was old news. Sorry about that.

 

[Highballer]

In the accounts I have read, the MetroLink engineer had worked for Amtrak for 10 years. But it sounded like he was working for a contractor who provides engineers to MetroLink. Is that right? And if so, why doesn't MetroLink employ its own engineers?

 

[user 1215]

That's fairly typical. Herzog is a big subcontractor that provides the manpower for both the Trinity Railway Express and the New Mexico Rail Runner. A governed body typically doesn't know how to operate a train, but a specialized group that does it for a living can provide the man power necessary in a turn-key fashion more cost effectively than the city or governing body trying to do it themselves. Note that the engineer didn't work for Amtrak, but for another subcontractor, Veolia.

 

[WhoozOn1st]

In the accounts I have read, the MetroLink engineer had worked for Amtrak for 10 years. But it sounded like he was working for a contractor who provides engineers to MetroLink. Is that right? And if so, why doesn't MetroLink employ its own engineers?

As far as I know (which isn't always very far, and I could be wrong), Metrolink has always had contractors for its operations and maintenance. I believe that for the majority of its existence Amtrak was the operations/maintenance contractor. There was some sort of dispute - probably financial, as usual - and Metrolink switched contractors. However, many of the Amtrak people who were running the trains made the switch to the new contractor and continued their Metrolink duties. Don't know about the maintenance side, but wouldn't be surprised if the situation is similar.

 

[user 1215]

Another concern is from this 2003 Metrolink collision with BNSF. Two people died in that wreck and the deaths were attributed to non-yeilding workstation tables causing severe blunt force trauma to the abdomen. I argued this with the folks at the New Mexico Rail Runner when they were choosing rolling stock, but they pretty decided that the risk was outweighed by the potential.

I wonder how much of this may be applicable here. This is from the 2003 Report:

A review of the pathology reports on the two fatalities indicated that both persons received severe blunt impact trauma injuries to the chest and upper abdomen. These two fatally injured persons were found near seats 58 and 61 and 66 and 70, respectively, on the upper level of the lead railcar. They were apparently sitting next to each other on the right side of the aisle (relative to the direction of travel) in seats numbered 60 and 61, with both persons facing the direction of travel. (See figures 7 and 8.) These seats are about in the middle of the railcar and are a paired seating set arranged in an opposing (face-to-face) layout with another paired seating set (seat numbers 56 and 57), with a workstation table between them. The workstation table was found to have been pushed forward relative to its normal service location and was partially resting against the seatback of the opposite seat pair set. Although the table pedestal had not fully separated from its attachment to the floor, its attachment joint with the floor was bent and partially separated.13 No one was identified as having been occupying seats 56 or 57 at the time of the collision.

 

[jackal]

There's been all sorts of talk about PTC, but what about something simpler? How about just fault detector technology that only broadcasts when you pass a caution or stop signal above a certain speed? It could be localized enough to prevent being heard too far away. That way the conductor AND the conflicting train would be aware of the potential for collision and could at least attempt to do something about it.

Interesting idea, not sure why it hasn't been suggested before. I'll have to think about that more. Although there are other advantages to PTC beyond the "we just missed the signal."

How much cheaper is it to install ATS versus the more sophisticated systems? A completely new system as described by VentureForth would take years of development and many more years to be tested and approved by the FRA. ATS is an existing system that would provide some of this functionality--I think, since I'm actually not terribly familiar with ATS and ATC beyond what's written in GCOR (which didn't really make a lot of sense to me, since I have no idea how it works--just a bunch of rules about cutting out the high speed whistle **** or something like that).

1) Is there a deadman's switch in the Metrolink cab?

Yes, there has to be. All modern engines have one.

2) If there was a medical anomole, could the engineer still have had the deadman's switch actuated?

AFAIK you can't operate the loco without it being activated. Therefore it had to be operational when the trains collided.

Modern control stands do not have a dead man's switch (something you have to maintain pressure on in order to keep the train from stopping). They have an alerter, which flashes if there has been no input on the control stand (throttle/dynamics, at least--depending on the engine, the air brakes may not count as input) within a certain amount of time, typically around maybe 30 seconds or so. The alerter flashes, and then after 10 or 20 seconds, if it remains unacknowledged, it starts beeping. Only after another 10 or 20 seconds of beeping (I forget the actual times) does it finally put the train into a penalty brake application (a full service application which cannot be reset until the train is stopped). The train can probably go a whole minute without an alert/alive engineer before it finally begins stopping.

 

[the_traveler]

Call me stupid, but if the engineer ran the red signal, wouldn't the switch be set for the other train to pass on the other track. If so, how did the Metrolink train get through that (closed) switch? :huh:

 

[PRR 60]

Call me stupid, but if the engineer ran the red signal, wouldn't the switch be set for the other train to pass on the other track. If so, how did the Metrolink train get through that (closed) switch? :huh:

The switch at the end of the passing track section would have been lined to permit the oncoming UP Freight train to move to the opposite track while the Metrolink train waited for it to clear before the switch was re-lined and the signal cleared. Assuming the Metrolink train ignored the red signal approaching the end of the double track and that switch, the switch would have been lined opposite to the Metrolink's movement in a trailing point direction (the switch diverts moves left and right in the direction opposite to the movement of the Metrolink train). Moving in the trailing point direction, the Metrolink train would force the switch over to permit the train to pass. The force needed to do that is relatively small compared to the force from the train. The engineer of the Metrolink train may not have even noticed the switch being forced over.

Railroaders out there: please correct me if I'm wrong.

 

[Mark]

My question is what was the previous signal aspect? If the Metrolink train was traveling at 40-50mph is it reasonable to believe that his previous signal was a "Clear"? Then the next one, (prior to the accident), indicated "Medium Approach" or something like that? The speed may be a key indicator as to a possible malfunction. For example: If the Metrolink received a "Clear" then the next signal, (prior to the accident), should not have been a "Stop" unless the freight crew entered that section against their signal.

On the other hand the Metrolink would have been traveling according to a published timetable with scheduled stops. Receiving a "Stop" signal for that block may have been very irregular for that time of day so it is possible that the Engineer of the Metrolink missed it.

M

 

[Joel N. Weber II]

In the accounts I have read, the MetroLink engineer had worked for Amtrak for 10 years. But it sounded like he was working for a contractor who provides engineers to MetroLink. Is that right? And if so, why doesn't MetroLink employ its own engineers?

There are very few commuter rail systems in the US that don't hire some company (sometimes Amtrak, but often not) to actually be the railroad. The only ones I can think of where the state is the railroad operate into Manhattan.

 

[guest]

Call me stupid, but if the engineer ran the red signal, wouldn't the switch be set for the other train to pass on the other track. If so, how did the Metrolink train get through that (closed) switch? :huh:

The switch at the end of the passing track section would have been lined to permit the oncoming UP Freight train to move to the opposite track while the Metrolink train waited for it to clear before the switch was re-lined and the signal cleared. Assuming the Metrolink train ignored the red signal approaching the end of the double track and that switch, the switch would have been lined opposite to the Metrolink's movement in a trailing point direction (the switch diverts moves left and right in the direction opposite to the movement of the Metrolink train). Moving in the trailing point direction, the Metrolink train would force the switch over to permit the train to pass. The force needed to do that is relatively small compared to the force from the train. The engineer of the Metrolink train may not have even noticed the switch being forced over.

Railroaders out there: please correct me if I'm wrong.

You're right- its in the reports. I believe an NTSB agent described the switch as being 'bent like a banana' instead of straight... sounds to me like the switch gave way to prevent a derailment. Not a smart switch- mechanically designed to prevent derailment at all costs perhaps?

Oddly, if the switch had derailed the Metroliner- could that have been a saving grace, reducing fatalities and giving time for dispatch to say "there's a derailment ahead" to the freight crew?

 

[chuljin]

. Enough said.

My thoughts are with the unfortunate victims and their families.

 

[-Jamie-]

One thing that really bugged me about the news report I watched last night was the fact that the reported that the engineer did not call out the last two signals (a flashing yellow and a red). I watched the press conference earlier last night and the lady from the NTSB made it perfectly clear that although there was no recording of him calling them out, that it was a possibility that the area was a "dead zone" in which case there would be no recording. They wouldn't know for sure until they could check past records and also interview the conductor. I hate when the media jumps the gun and releases inaccurate or incomplete information.

 

[Tony]

For example: If the Metrolink received a "Clear" then the next signal, (prior to the accident), should not have been a "Stop" unless the freight crew entered that section against their signal.

Now that is a VERY interesting point! I would certainly like to know that answer too. I am sure that the NTSB will look into that.

 

[Green Maned Lion]

1) Is there a deadman's switch in the Metrolink cab?

Yes, there has to be. All modern engines have one.

I was under impression modern ones DON'T have them (especially since they can be very easily defeated, as demonstrated in Silver Streak), but that they instead have something called an Alerter that sounds an alarm at intervals, requiring the engineer to punch a button demonstrating him to be alive and well.

Oddly, if the switch had derailed the Metroliner- could that have been a saving grace, reducing fatalities and giving time for dispatch to say "there's a derailment ahead" to the freight crew?

Metroliners are a different train.

 

[Green Maned Lion]

Los Angeles Times:
Investigators focus on whether signal was broken or missed

Metrolink's grim national record (comparisons with other commuter lines)

I dunno about their records, but those numbers include suicides, which is not fair.

 

[AlanB]

1) Is there a deadman's switch in the Metrolink cab?

Yes, there has to be. All modern engines have one.

2) If there was a medical anomole, could the engineer still have had the deadman's switch actuated?

AFAIK you can't operate the loco without it being activated. Therefore it had to be operational when the trains collided.

Modern control stands do not have a dead man's switch (something you have to maintain pressure on in order to keep the train from stopping). They have an alerter, which flashes if there has been no input on the control stand (throttle/dynamics, at least--depending on the engine, the air brakes may not count as input) within a certain amount of time, typically around maybe 30 seconds or so. The alerter flashes, and then after 10 or 20 seconds, if it remains unacknowledged, it starts beeping. Only after another 10 or 20 seconds of beeping (I forget the actual times) does it finally put the train into a penalty brake application (a full service application which cannot be reset until the train is stopped). The train can probably go a whole minute without an alert/alive engineer before it finally begins stopping.

1) Is there a deadman's switch in the Metrolink cab?

Yes, there has to be. All modern engines have one.

I was under impression modern ones DON'T have them (especially since they can be very easily defeated, as demonstrated in Silver Streak), but that they instead have something called an Alerter that sounds an alarm at intervals, requiring the engineer to punch a button demonstrating him to be alive and well.

Guys, I wasn't making a distinction between the more modern alerter and the old style pressure switch. I wasn't even sure if the OP knew that there are two different types of dead man controls. And just for the record, subway cars and LIRR, MN MU cars still do require constant pressure on the controller to operate the train.

The bottom line is that no train operating in the US operates without some form of dead man protection.

 

[AlanB]

My question is what was the previous signal aspect? If the Metrolink train was traveling at 40-50mph is it reasonable to believe that his previous signal was a "Clear"? Then the next one, (prior to the accident), indicated "Medium Approach" or something like that? The speed may be a key indicator as to a possible malfunction. For example: If the Metrolink received a "Clear" then the next signal, (prior to the accident), should not have been a "Stop" unless the freight crew entered that section against their signal.

First, the engineer actually passed two signals that warned him he would have to stop at the signal right before the single track section, at least according to what Metrolink has said. It remains unconfirmed by the NTSB. But in theory, he had plenty of warning.

Next, if I understand things correctly (and those more familiar with the line please correct me if I'm wrong), after passing the second yellow signal, he made a station stop at Chatsworth. After that stop, with the signal in question in sight, the engineer accelerated the train through that signal, the switch set against him, and reached at least 40 MPH.

So the only real question is, was that last signal operating correctly?

On the other hand the Metrolink would have been traveling according to a published timetable with scheduled stops. Receiving a "Stop" signal for that block may have been very irregular for that time of day so it is possible that the Engineer of the Metrolink missed it.

According to one retired engineer and a few other people interviewed, it was actually very common to meet that freight train there or shortly thereafter. So the engineer should have been expecting a meet to occur.

 

[Tony]

Next, if I understand things correctly (and those more familiar with the line please correct me if I'm wrong), after passing the second yellow signal, he made a station stop at Chatsworth. After that stop, with the signal in question in sight, the engineer accelerated the train through that signal, the switch set against him, and reached at least 40 MPH.
So the only real question is, was that last signal operating correctly?

Wow, this is becoming even more unbelievable. They didn't change crews at the Chatsworth station, did they? Was the engineer trying to beat the freight train "at the pass"? Was this a suicide?

 

[access bob]

My question is what was the previous signal aspect? If the Metrolink train was traveling at 40-50mph is it reasonable to believe that his previous signal was a "Clear"? Then the next one, (prior to the accident), indicated "Medium Approach" or something like that? The speed may be a key indicator as to a possible malfunction. For example: If the Metrolink received a "Clear" then the next signal, (prior to the accident), should not have been a "Stop" unless the freight crew entered that section against their signal.

First, the engineer actually passed two signals that warned him he would have to stop at the signal right before the single track section, at least according to what Metrolink has said. It remains unconfirmed by the NTSB. But in theory, he had plenty of warning.

Next, if I understand things correctly (and those more familiar with the line please correct me if I'm wrong), after passing the second yellow signal, he made a station stop at Chatsworth. After that stop, with the signal in question in sight, the engineer accelerated the train through that signal, the switch set against him, and reached at least 40 MPH.

So the only real question is, was that last signal operating correctly?

On the other hand the Metrolink would have been traveling according to a published timetable with scheduled stops. Receiving a "Stop" signal for that block may have been very irregular for that time of day so it is possible that the Engineer of the Metrolink missed it.

According to one retired engineer and a few other people interviewed, it was actually very common to meet that freight train there or shortly thereafter. So the engineer should have been expecting a meet to occur.

this fact that there was a signal at the far end of the station makes it even more difficult to understand how the engineer passed the signal. It seems to me that the signal malfunction consideration must be seriously considered.

signals rarely malfunction and usually fail in the most restrictive position (a dark signal must be assumed to be it's most restrictive position)

the engineer is supposed to visually verify that the switch is set for his train also.

there is also the fact that the train stopped at Chatsworth, should not the conductor who probably stepped off the train to set out the train step or assist passengers. and did he check the signal also before giving the highball. it was only a 3 car change so he should not have had any trouble seeing the signal.

so it does appear very strange that all of these things needed to malfunction for the operator to by pass the signal,

Bob