Metrolink Wreck

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A couple of brief quotes from CNN...
Tyrrell said a review of "a number of programs," including the signal system, showed the commuter train's engineer failed to heed a stop signal, Tyrrell said.
Basic railroad question. As I understand it, the Metrolink was proceeding from a double-track section onto a single-track section; the freight was in the single-track section proceeding towards the double-track section. Obviously, in the double-track section the freight would be proceeding onto track A while the Metrolink waits on track B. So the switch should be set so the single-track section connects to track A, not track B. When the Metrolink runs the signal from track B proceeding onto the single-track section--presumably at speed--shouldn't it have derailed on the switch? (Of course, maybe it did; such details won't be reconstructed until later.)
 
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Channel 2 News in L.A. just aired a report about two teenage "train enthusiasts" in Moorpark who knew the Metrolink engineer (perished), and one said he was texting with the engineer moments before the collision. Distraction?

I checked the station's website, but apparently the aired report has not been posted online yet. I'll look again later, but here's the link:

CBS 2

EDIT: If the report is accurate, and what the kid said is true, I'm guessing the NTSB will want to talk with those boys.
 
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Channel 2 News in L.A. just aired a report about two teenage "train enthusiasts" in Moorpark who knew the Metrolink engineer (perished), and one said he was texting with the engineer moments before the collision. Distraction?
I checked the station's website, but apparently the aired report has not been posted online yet. I'll look again later, but here's the link:

CBS 2

EDIT: If the report is accurate, and what the kid said is true, I'm guessing the NTSB will want to talk with those boys.
if its true then both the metrolink driver and the boys are at fault. the driver should not have been texting while driving. same thing if it was a car. the boys could be be charged with causing the wreck and be charged with negligent homicide.
 
A couple of brief quotes from CNN...
Tyrrell said a review of "a number of programs," including the signal system, showed the commuter train's engineer failed to heed a stop signal, Tyrrell said.
Basic railroad question. As I understand it, the Metrolink was proceeding from a double-track section onto a single-track section; the freight was in the single-track section proceeding towards the double-track section. Obviously, in the double-track section the freight would be proceeding onto track A while the Metrolink waits on track B. So the switch should be set so the single-track section connects to track A, not track B. When the Metrolink runs the signal from track B proceeding onto the single-track section--presumably at speed--shouldn't it have derailed on the switch? (Of course, maybe it did; such details won't be reconstructed until later.)
When you run through a power switch, or even a dogged or rigid switch, the rail bends enough to allow a trailing (forward) movement. Where the problem lies is when you try to make a reverse movement after having run through the switch because you have created a gap in the switch points allowing the cars to head in different directions and start derailing.
 
Was the Metrolink conductor supposed to be verifying that the engineer was obeying the signals?

Also, if there had been NEC style cab signals installed along the right of way and in the locomotives of both trains, would this have caused the freight to slow down at some point when the Metrolink train proceeded too far if some sort of automatic train stop hadn't stopped the passenger train?
 
Was the Metrolink conductor supposed to be verifying that the engineer was obeying the signals?
Also, if there had been NEC style cab signals installed along the right of way and in the locomotives of both trains, would this have caused the freight to slow down at some point when the Metrolink train proceeded too far if some sort of automatic train stop hadn't stopped the passenger train?
Unless Metrolink has different rules on their track, west of the Mississippi the engineer doesn't call out signals to the conductor by radio. Of course even if Metrolink does require that, or had this happened east of the Mississippi, the engineer most likely would have called out the wrong signal aspect and therefore the conductor wouldn't have assumed that anything was wrong.

The real questions that remain are, was the signal not operating properly, was the sun in the engineer's eyes preventing him from properly seeing it, was he otherwise distracted (ie. texting), or did he just somehow missread the signal?

As for the second part of your question, had this been the NEC, both trains would have been halted by the PTC aspects of the NEC cab signals long before any collision.
 
was the sun in the engineer's eyes preventing him from properly seeing [the signal]
Doubtful. First, sun still pretty high in the sky here around time of collision. Second, even if low enough to be at an angle to interfere with vision it would already be blocked by the mountains into which the train was heading.

Not impossible, but pretty unlikely.
 
Apparently texting his young teenage rail buddies was more important than preparing to navigate his heavy locomotive through a winding tunnel.

What a wild and crazy guy!
 
As for the second part of your question, had this been the NEC, both trains would have been halted by the PTC aspects of the NEC cab signals long before any collision.
Didn't the second worst Amtrak accident ever involve a freight locomotive on the NEC that had the cab signal equipment installed, but with the cab signal equipment in the freight locomotive somewhat broken and disabled?
 
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As for the second part of your question, had this been the NEC, both trains would have been halted by the PTC aspects of the NEC cab signals long before any collision.
Didn't the second worst Amtrak accident ever involve a freight locomotive on the NEC that had the cab signal equipment installed, but with the cab signal equipment in the freight locomotive somewhat broken and disabled?
Yes, that is correct IIRC. However cab signals should not be confused with PTC. They do work to together, but they aren't the same thing. Cab signals simply show the engineer the aspect of the last signal that they passed. PTC looks at that cab signal and in conjunction with a computer, software, and other trackside equipment, decides whether or not the engineer is obeying the cab signal. If it decides that the engineer is not obeying that signal, then it triggers an emergency stop.

AFAIK the PTC overlay was not yet in place at the time of that accident. PTC was instituted because of that accident.
 
Cab signals simply show the engineer the aspect of the last signal that they passed.
I don't think that's exactly correct. The track circuits on the NEC can show a signal indication change as soon as the signal changes; updates do not have to wait for the train to reach the next signal mast. IIRC, this is very clearly explained in the paper that jis mentioned and I found a link to about the ACESS overlay.

If the cab signal was showing the current aspect of the signal most recently passed, it would almost always be indicating that the block is occupied (by the train which is recieving the signal via the track circuit) and signal for an immediate stop, so it can't be that.
 
Unless Metrolink has different rules on their track, west of the Mississippi the engineer doesn't call out signals to the conductor by radio. Of course even if Metrolink does require that, or had this happened east of the Mississippi, the engineer most likely would have called out the wrong signal aspect and therefore the conductor wouldn't have assumed that anything was wrong.
Apparently Metrolink engineers do call signals to conductors. Here's a post on the L.A. Times' "Bottleneck Blog." It's by Steve Hymon, the guy who writes the "Road Sage" columns to which I often link at the "L.A. Rail News Updates" topic.

Metrolink crash: How trains navigate the tracks
 
Cab signals simply show the engineer the aspect of the last signal that they passed.
I don't think that's exactly correct. The track circuits on the NEC can show a signal indication change as soon as the signal changes; updates do not have to wait for the train to reach the next signal mast. IIRC, this is very clearly explained in the paper that jis mentioned and I found a link to about the ACESS overlay.

If the cab signal was showing the current aspect of the signal most recently passed, it would almost always be indicating that the block is occupied (by the train which is recieving the signal via the track circuit) and signal for an immediate stop, so it can't be that.
cab signals show what the upcoming signal is before the train gets to it.
 
And the first comment there is about radio interoperability. While I understand that is a real issue for police / fire radios in most parts of the country, I thought there was a standardized set of railroad frequencies, and that the freight train would have had a radio that could operate on whatever frequency Metrolink's dispatching uses for that area.
 
And the first comment there is about radio interoperability. While I understand that is a real issue for police / fire radios in most parts of the country, I thought there was a standardized set of railroad frequencies, and that the freight train would have had a radio that could operate on whatever frequency Metrolink's dispatching uses for that area.
That commentor has no idea what he's talking about. The freight train by FRA rules must be able to talk with the Metrolink dispatcher on the Metrolink frequency. If he can't, then he can't operate the train on those tracks.

And yes, there are 96 AAR defined frequencies typically used by Amtrak, freight RR's, and many commuter RR's.
 
And the first comment there is about radio interoperability. While I understand that is a real issue for police / fire radios in most parts of the country, I thought there was a standardized set of railroad frequencies, and that the freight train would have had a radio that could operate on whatever frequency Metrolink's dispatching uses for that area.
That commentor has no idea what he's talking about. The freight train by FRA rules must be able to talk with the Metrolink dispatcher on the Metrolink frequency. If he can't, then he can't operate the train on those tracks.

And yes, there are 96 AAR defined frequencies typically used by Amtrak, freight RR's, and many commuter RR's.
Whoops, I read that too fast. He's talking about the UP dispatcher being able to talk with the Metrolink dispatcher. That's a totally different thing. He's probably correct, they wouldn't be able to talk to one another by radio, and frankly they wouldn't want to either. It would be far easier for them to just pick up a phone and call one another.

The UP engineer however had to be able to communicate on the Metrolink frequency. And therefore the Metrolink dispatcher could have called the freight train on the radio to order it to stop immediately assuming that the dispatcher realized that the Metrolink train had run the signal.
 
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Just Googled "Metrolink wreck," and this topic came up third on the list. Problem is, the link actually goes here:
Empire Builder-Sleepers sold out

What gives with Google??
Well I can't speak as to why Google presented you with that link, when you asked for a search on the tragedy. But Google spends several hours each day indexing this site. As a general rule, the Google bots make an average of 10,000 hits on this site each day.
 
cab signals show what the upcoming signal is before the train gets to it.
The cab signaling system on the NEC actually shows what the state of the signal just passed would be had you not passed it yet. The aspect that is displayed is transmitted from the signal that you are approaching but reflecting what the corresponding aspect would be of the signal that you just passed - i.e. the governing aspect for the block that you are in.

Unless this were the case, as soon as you enter a block at the end of which is a stop signal the ATC would try to stop your train dead on the track way before you got to the signal.

The signal aspect is continuously transmitted so even if the signal aspect changes while you are in the middle of the block that will be reflected in the cab, and the corresponding speed enforced as soon as the change occurs (subject to the usual warning etc.).

For a very good explanation of the entire system on the NEC (current and planned evolution), the original PRR system, the 9 aspect overlay and the ACSES overlay on top of that including ACSES I (using track mounted transponders) and ACSES II (which adds the use of transmission based control), take a look at Full PTC Today with Off the Shelf Technology: Amtrak’s ACSES Overlay on Expanded ATC" by Hoelscher and Light.
 
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Just Googled "Metrolink wreck," and this topic came up third on the list. Problem is, the link actually goes here:
Empire Builder-Sleepers sold out

What gives with Google??
Well I can't speak as to why Google presented you with that link, when you asked for a search on the tragedy. But Google spends several hours each day indexing this site. As a general rule, the Google bots make an average of 10,000 hits on this site each day.
See above edit, Alan. Bots not so swift?

EDIT (again): Google has right topic, wrong link for it. Try it: Google search result page
 
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Meanwhile, the California high speed rail folks probably still think those Metrolink coaches are ridiculously overbuilt, and probably still want their high speed trainsets to have permission to be built to lesser crashworthiness standards. The Implementation Plan goes into some detail about wanting an exemption to the usual US crashworthiness standards.
The California High Speed Rail trains will run on dedicated tracks - i.e. no sharing with freights. So there's no need to meet the FRA standards, which exist because of passenger rail sharing tracks with freights.
That's not true.

For example, it is currently planned for high-speed rail to share Caltrain's tracks into San Francisco. Caltrain is required to accommodate Union Pacific's customers on the Peninsula line. This sometimes means that, not only is there a freight on the tracks, but also that it sometimes runs during the day.

I once has the unusual experience of passing a short UP train (two engines, a tank car, and a gondola, as I recall) going the same direction as my train, having them pass us at a station stop, and then passing them again -- during my commute home. I waived at the engineer and conductor on the second go.
 
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