As usual, no consideration for the fact that the long distance routes lock up an absurd amount of equipment which could be better used for more frequent corridor service. No discussion of the costs of providing sleeper service, merely of the revenue.
Connecting passengers generated 89% more revenue than this route would have if operated as an isolated, stand alone corridor.
Or: State supported corridors and the NEC are responsible for nearly half of all long distance revenue (unless they're counting the revenue on those corridors of course).
Consider the route between Chicago and Cleveland. This route currently has just two trains a day in each direction—both with unattractive late night or early morning arrival and departure times at Cleveland. More than 11 million Americans live within 25 miles of one of the nine stations on this 341-mile corridor. 24This market should have hourly departures with a transit time of less than three hours. But this level of service will require long stretches of track dedicated to passenger trains. There will be substantial lead times to design, finance and construct this needed infrastructure.
A relatively low cost and low risk method to ex- pand service in this market would be to work in partnership with the Norfolk Southern and CSX railroads to add daytime frequencies to the existing Chicago–New York Lake Shore Limited route with stops in Toledo, Cleveland, Buffalo and 14 other cit- ies. If scheduled correctly, the trains would make it possible to schedule a reasonable day trip to all cit- ies. Even with a low share of the Chicago–Cleveland market, this long distance service would still gener- ate economically viable volumes because it would serve 171 city pair markets instead of just 36.25
Every additional frequency on the Lake Shore Limited would require three additional sets of equipment.
Looking here, that's 13 cars and two locomotives per set. Let's cut it down to just the New York section, Boston only gets overnight service, that'll bring us down to a single locomotive and 8 cars. That's a minimum capital investment of $75 million per frequency, not including the cost of spare cars and locomotives nor the infrastructure investment costs (which, yes, CSX and NSC are going to demand, and in large sums). More than one, perhaps two, additional frequencies and I'd lay money on it being cheaper to simply run Chicago-Cleveland. This is ignoring, of course, the fact that the longer the trip, the more likely it will be to be delayed.
As for this being low cost, low risk, and relatively quick, just how many decades has California been trying to bring back the Coast Daylight again? That's a simple second frequency of the Starlight from Oakland to Los Angeles and yet it is taking amazingly long to get it going.
A diesel-powered passenger train can move nearly two and one-half times more people per gallon than a typical automobile.
Amtrak really doesn't do well when it comes to fuel efficiency and long distance trains are probably no more fuel efficient than a typical automobile due to FRA inspired heavy locomotive weight and low seating density. Unfortunately Amtrak doesn't break it down any better than nationally. However, on a national level, Amtrak is only about as green as driving a Prius by oneself.
Because trains use fuel efficiently and do not have a significant fuel penalty for stops, the cost of train travel is not as heavily influenced by fuel prices as the cost of air and road travel.
Metrolink's fuel related fare increases would beg to differ.
Long distance trains are cost efficient—a finding that may surprise many. Despite years of neglect, underinvestment and retrenchment, Amtrak’s cost to move one passenger one mile (the accepted industry measure of efficiency) is roughly the same for both long-distance and in-state routes on corridors outside the Northeast. This parity is not obvious in Amtrak’s financial reports because these reports include state—but not federal—payments for service as revenue.
More due to a higher load factor on LD than on state (which has some incredibly low load factors for California routes, which heavily contribute to both passenger and seat mile figures) as well as government imposed subsidies by host railroads with below market MOW and access costs. From Amtrak's FY2012 figures:
NEC cost per passenger mile: $0.418
Corridor cost per passenger mile: $0.413
Long distance cost per passenger mile: $0.386
NEC cost per seat-mile: $0.216
Corridor cost per seat-mile: $0.180
Long distance cost per seat mile: $0.241
So seat for seat a long distance train is 33% more expensive to run than a corridor train and 15% more expensive to run than the NEC.
Breaking things out somewhat:
Acela
Passenger mile: $0.477
Seat mile: $0.298
Northeast Regional
Passenger mile $0.379
Seat mile: $0.183
The Acela is an expensive train to run due to the small number of seats (only 304), high level of service, and probably extravagant energy consumption. However, it has a fairly significant number of passengers paying quite a large sum, making for high revenue to offset said costs.
Capitol Corridor
Passenger mile: $0.665
Seat mile: $0.191
Pennsylvanian
Passenger mile: $0.318
Seat mile: $0.191
The Capitol Corridor has the single worst occupancy ratio in the entire national train system; note how it inflates the per passenger mile cost compared to how it is with the Pennsylvanian, which is fairly healthy in terms of occupancy ratio. Since the second worst one is the Surfliner, the third is the Empire, #6 is the San Joaquin with the Keystone just edging above it, which represents the five routes with the highest frequencies and 38% of the corridor passenger miles, it's a bit unsurprising that per passenger-mile costs will look a touch higher than long distance trains. A certain degree of low occupancy is probably an unavoidable feature of higher frequencies, but quite frankly, marketing is abysmally low as well (California's current marketing contract calls for only $9 million over three years). However, note that these trains, despite low occupancy, generally recover more of their costs than do the long distance trains, even without state subsidies.
A comprehensive national system with more routes and greater frequencies will require a higher level of public support. But since many of these costs are fixed, expanded service would increase efficiency and lower the public cost per passenger mile.
Fixed overhead really isn't that big of a deal for the long distance trains; the killer for them is the wage costs which will remain disproportionately high for them because they have disproportionately large crews.
Congress could lower this cost even further by funding the purchase of modern, high performance trains to replace Amtrak’s aging long distance fleet and to provide the capacity needed to add extra cars to existing trains and to launch new service. New equipment costs less to maintain.
Eh, this is mealy mouthed. Congress
has to fund the purchase of modern, high performance trains order to provide the expanded service that they want in the first place. Though high performance and long distance sleeper train really don't belong in the same sentence.
The fact that NARP includes a picture of a Chinese HSR sleeper is absolutely ridiculous. They make sense given the length of the Chinese high speed rail network; they do not make sense in any American context.
Frequently sold-out trains indicate that the demand exists to justify greater capacity.
Frequently sold-out trains also indicate that demand exists for higher priced trains.
Edit: Not sure how much this changes things, but the short distance corridors also get hit with the costs of moving all the equipment via Hoosier State, which inflates cost per seat mile and cost per passenger mile.