Derailment of Cascades #501, DuPont WA, 2017-12-18

[Thirdrail7]

Mark your calendar.

NTSB slates two-day hearing on fatal Amtrak crashes

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) will hold an investigative hearing July 10-11 on two recent Amtrak crashes.

The public hearing will explore issues involved in the Amtrak Cascades derailment in DuPont, Washington, on Dec. 18, 2017; and an Amtrak collision with a freight train on Feb. 4 near Cayce, South Carolina, NTSB officials said in a press release.

The hearing will include testimony from the Federal Railroad Administration; the International Association of Sheet Metal, Air, Rail and Transportation Workers; the Brotherhood of Locomotives Engineers and Trainmen; the Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen; CSX; Sound Transit; Amtrak; the Washington State Department of Transportation; and the Washington State Utilities and Transportation Commission.

The hearing will be held in Washington, D.C., and may be watched live via webcast.

 

[ParanoidAndroid]

When is the bypass reopening?

 

[RPC]

When is the bypass reopening?

Once PTC is installed and operational.

 

[Thirdrail7]

Here's a new wrinkle. Horrific': Amtrak derailment victim sues, alleging neglect

Attorney says an electrical failure was discovered before the train departed Seattle

Please allow a brief fair use quote:

Wetzel filed a lawsuit Thursday in federal court, alleging Amtrak was negligent in sending the train on its route that morning.

His isn't the first lawsuit filed against Amtrak, but it makes a couple new claims: that Amtrak knowingly went ahead with the trip despite an electrical system failure detected the day of the crash, and that the rear locomotive was not properly electronically linked to the front, disabling its braking abilities.

"Amtrak knew that train was not fit for service that day," attorney Jim Vucinovich said, calling it a "conscious decision" to run the train despite its alleged deficiencies.'Horrific': Amtrak derailment victim sues, alleging neglect
Other allegations have been leveled at Amtrak, involving the quality of the track, the training of the operators, the lack of the positive train control (PTC) system that could have slowed the train automatically.The train was believed to be traveling about 80 mph in a 30 mph zone. The PTC system was installed on the train, but not yet enabled.

But the revelations about the electrical failure and the rear locomotive were surfaced by a whistleblower, Vucinovich said. The lack of braking on the rear locomotive could have served to be dead weight at the back of the train and possibly contributed to the accordion effect the train cars took when they derailed.

I'm not sure this aspect will work out. Even if they aren't linked electrically, they can still run them as long as they are linked pneumatically.

 

[Seaboard92]

Here's a new wrinkle. Horrific': Amtrak derailment victim sues, alleging neglect

Attorney says an electrical failure was discovered before the train departed Seattle

Please allow a brief fair use quote:

Wetzel filed a lawsuit Thursday in federal court, alleging Amtrak was negligent in sending the train on its route that morning.

His isn't the first lawsuit filed against Amtrak, but it makes a couple new claims: that Amtrak knowingly went ahead with the trip despite an electrical system failure detected the day of the crash, and that the rear locomotive was not properly electronically linked to the front, disabling its braking abilities."Amtrak knew that train was not fit for service that day," attorney Jim Vucinovich said, calling it a "conscious decision" to run the train despite its alleged deficiencies.'Horrific': Amtrak derailment victim sues, alleging neglect

Other allegations have been leveled at Amtrak, involving the quality of the track, the training of the operators, the lack of the positive train control (PTC) system that could have slowed the train automatically.

The train was believed to be traveling about 80 mph in a 30 mph zone. The PTC system was installed on the train, but not yet enabled.

But the revelations about the electrical failure and the rear locomotive were surfaced by a whistleblower, Vucinovich said. The lack of braking on the rear locomotive could have served to be dead weight at the back of the train and possibly contributed to the accordion effect the train cars took when they derailed.

I'm not sure this aspect will work out. Even if they aren't linked electrically, they can still run them as long as they are linked pneumatically.

The courts will allow it because let's face it they don't understand railroading.

 

[rspenmoll]

Here's a new wrinkle. Horrific': Amtrak derailment victim sues, alleging neglect

Attorney says an electrical failure was discovered before the train departed Seattle

Please allow a brief fair use quote:

Wetzel filed a lawsuit Thursday in federal court, alleging Amtrak was negligent in sending the train on its route that morning.

His isn't the first lawsuit filed against Amtrak, but it makes a couple new claims: that Amtrak knowingly went ahead with the trip despite an electrical system failure detected the day of the crash, and that the rear locomotive was not properly electronically linked to the front, disabling its braking abilities.

"Amtrak knew that train was not fit for service that day," attorney Jim Vucinovich said, calling it a "conscious decision" to run the train despite its alleged deficiencies.'Horrific': Amtrak derailment victim sues, alleging neglectOther allegations have been leveled at Amtrak, involving the quality of the track, the training of the operators, the lack of the positive train control (PTC) system that could have slowed the train automatically.

The train was believed to be traveling about 80 mph in a 30 mph zone. The PTC system was installed on the train, but not yet enabled.

But the revelations about the electrical failure and the rear locomotive were surfaced by a whistleblower, Vucinovich said. The lack of braking on the rear locomotive could have served to be dead weight at the back of the train and possibly contributed to the accordion effect the train cars took when they derailed.

I'm not sure this aspect will work out. Even if they aren't linked electrically, they can still run them as long as they are linked pneumatically.

With the rear unit disabled, wouldn't only its air brakes have been operable and not the dynamic brakes? I don't think it would have made much of a difference though considering braking began only about five seconds before the derailment. As for the part about the "accordion effect", the allegation he seems to be making is that jumper cables, when connected, act to arrest the forward motion of a locomotive or railroad car in the event of a sudden deceleration, and that therefore it was negligent to operate the train without the rear unit being connected by jumper cable to the car in front of it, rather than leaving the rear unit behind at the origin station, as this contributed to the rear unit impacting the car in front of it. Is there any truth to that assertion?

 

[Just-Thinking-51]

With the rear unit disabled, wouldn't only its air brakes have been operable and not the dynamic brakes? I don't think it would have made much of a difference though considering braking began only about five seconds before the derailment. As for the part about the "accordion effect", the allegation he seems to be making is that jumper cables, when connected, act to arrest the forward motion of a locomotive or railroad car in the event of a sudden deceleration, and that therefore it was negligent to operate the train without the rear unit being connected by jumper cable to the car in front of it, rather than leaving the rear unit behind at the origin station, as this contributed to the rear unit impacting the car in front of it. Is there any truth to that assertion?

No.
Two sets of wires that run to and from the engine. Hotel power and multi-unit control. The MU control wires not working will in result in engine not been able to supply traction power to the train. The Hotel power wires not working means the unit can not provide the 480 volt power to the railcars. (HVAC, lights, and power to plugs)

The brakes are control by air lines. There two on most Amtrak trains. One smaller supply line, one for braking.

Now about the impacting the car in front of it. Well it a fact that a engine weights more than a railcar. Its also a fact the locomotive by themselves have worse braking distance at speed than locomotive with railcars behind it. So technically having a locomotive top and tail may of caused more damage in this event. However its a non issue for anyone other than the lawyer.

If we lived in a flood zone and I build my house higher than yours and use dirt to angle my yard up to the house. Will I cause your house more damage in a flood? Yes technically it would.

In this case your talking a few feet difference. The problem was a overspeed event and a sharp curve. The lawyer is just fishing.

.

 

[rspenmoll]

With the rear unit disabled, wouldn't only its air brakes have been operable and not the dynamic brakes? I don't think it would have made much of a difference though considering braking began only about five seconds before the derailment. As for the part about the "accordion effect", the allegation he seems to be making is that jumper cables, when connected, act to arrest the forward motion of a locomotive or railroad car in the event of a sudden deceleration, and that therefore it was negligent to operate the train without the rear unit being connected by jumper cable to the car in front of it, rather than leaving the rear unit behind at the origin station, as this contributed to the rear unit impacting the car in front of it. Is there any truth to that assertion?

No.
Two sets of wires that run to and from the engine. Hotel power and multi-unit control. The MU control wires not working will in result in engine not been able to supply traction power to the train. The Hotel power wires not working means the unit can not provide the 480 volt power to the railcars. (HVAC, lights, and power to plugs)

The brakes are control by air lines. There two on most Amtrak trains. One smaller supply line, one for braking.

Now about the impacting the car in front of it. Well it a fact that a engine weights more than a railcar. Its also a fact the locomotive by themselves have worse braking distance at speed than locomotive with railcars behind it. So technically having a locomotive top and tail may of caused more damage in this event. However its a non issue for anyone other than the lawyer.

If we lived in a flood zone and I build my house higher than yours and use dirt to angle my yard up to the house. Will I cause your house more damage in a flood? Yes technically it would.

In this case your talking a few feet difference. The problem was a overspeed event and a sharp curve. The lawyer is just fishing.

.

Just to clarify, even the locomotive's dynamic brakes, and not just the train air brakes, are controlled by train line? Also I realize I was very verbose in my question, and I could have phrased it in a less confusing manner. I also meant to include a link that I neglected to. If you look at the actual complaint filed, which I have included a link to at the end of this post, in paragraph 3.11, plaintiff's counsel apparently alleges specifically, unless I am misinterpreting, that the fact that the jumper cable had to be disconnected from the rear unit, and not simply the rear unit's position in the consist increased the severity of the accident. What I was trying to ask is if jumper cable acts in any to arrest forward motion during a rapid deceleration event. I realize this has not been very concise, so if I am misinterpreting you or the complaint, or if we are saying the same thing and talking past each other, I apologize. https://www.scribd.com/document/381290262/Rudolf-D-Wetzel-vs-Amtrak-complaint-for-personal-injuries

 

[jis]

If the locomotive was deadheading powered off where was the dynamic braking going to come from? Would anyone complain if there were three passenger cars instead of a locomotive behind the train providing about the same amount of energy to dissipate through standard air braking?

These are cases of throw everything you can think of up onto the wall and see if anything sticks [emoji57]

This is akin to what is done in patent applications. The claims are structured more generic to specific and often there are hundreds of them in the application. The patent office usually strikes out a bunch but one is still left with a whole pile of them, some of them still patently absurd and obvious or too vague. Then if it is ever litigated, sometimes a few will be found to be invalid, but still a few will hopefully survive. Sometimes one is not so lucky and the whole things gets thrown out. That is the way these legal things work. In case of patents of course, more often than not they are used in packages to trade than to actually litigate.

 

[Just-Thinking-51]

No simple answer.

The short answer is No its irrelevant.

The long answer is Technically Yes, but still irrelevant.

Your deep in the woods. So many questions to be ask before you get to the final results, and then its going to be irrelevant to the accident.

Did the engineer apply the dynamic brakes?

Does the locomotive automatic apply the dynamic brakes when the train is stopping?

What is the set-up time for the dynamic brakes to apply?

Does the locomotive transmit the dynamic brakes order to the following unit automatic in a braking application?

What is the set-up time on a P42 dynamic brakes?

(Older technology)

So in short did the dynamic brakes get applied at all?

Then you can test and see how much the dynamic brakes would of slow the train down. Then rerun the test after the brakes have cool down with the rear unit off line. Measure the distance. Note the difference (if any). Determined the point of brake application from the derailment to the point of that the train stop. See if the dynamic brakes would have the time to apply. Then you can argue why this is important in the case to the Judge.

The attorney is fishing.

 

[rspenmoll]

No simple answer.

The short answer is No its irrelevant.

The long answer is Technically Yes, but still irrelevant.

Your deep in the woods. So many questions to be ask before you get to the final results, and then its going to be irrelevant to the accident.

Did the engineer apply the dynamic brakes?

Does the locomotive automatic apply the dynamic brakes when the train is stopping?

What is the set-up time for the dynamic brakes to apply?

Does the locomotive transmit the dynamic brakes order to the following unit automatic in a braking application?

What is the set-up time on a P42 dynamic brakes?

(Older technology)

So in short did the dynamic brakes get applied at all?

Then you can test and see how much the dynamic brakes would of slow the train down. Then rerun the test after the brakes have cool down with the rear unit off line. Measure the distance. Note the difference (if any). Determined the point of brake application from the derailment to the point of that the train stop. See if the dynamic brakes would have the time to apply. Then you can argue why this is important in the case to the Judge.

The attorney is fishing.

I figured as much.

 

[TinCan782]

Well, we'll see how this plays out ...

https://www.king5.com/article/news/local/engineer-in-deadly-amtrak-crash-had-no-experience-on-new-locomotive/281-571994032

MODERATOR NOTE: The topic "Engineer in deadly Amtrak crash had no experience on new locomotive" has been merged into this main thread.

 

[railiner]

While that may have contributed somewhat to the list of causes, I don't think it was a major cause. If anything, he should have been even more cautious then normal, operating a new piece of equipment, on a new route...

 

[jis]

There will be a webcast meeting hosted by NTSB on May 21, 2019, Tuesday at 1pm EDT to present the final report on the Cascades derailment on Dec 17, 2018 near DuPont WA.

https://www.ntsb.gov/news/press-releases/Pages/NR20190516.aspx

Live media coverage will be available at http://ntsb.windrosemedia.com/ starting a little before the meeting.

 

[jis]

Have been listening to the hearing. Quite interesting. They took apart the certification process for equipment, route and operating personnel. Now they are comprehensively taking apart the standard operating procedure of railroads referring to the safety practices in the aviation industry.

One thing is clear that the entire certification process for the commercial run that day was quite broken, and surprisingly, no one seemed to be in charge as the final approver of anything.

 

[Willbridge]

I've been following it, too. They're on break at the moment:
http://ntsb.windrosemedia.com/

A friend of mine was one of those killed and it was hard listening to the details of his death. From my former work I know the site.

The staff has done their work well and some of the commissioners have drawn out new points. I am particularly impressed by Commissioner Homendy. A couple of other members have the habit of using aviation terminology, which implies that they haven't as thoroughly gone through the subject matter.

 

[jis]

Yes. Commissioner Homendy has shown greater depth of understanding than some of the others.

 

[desertflyer]

Mr. Hiller from the NTSB sounds like he really doesn't like the Talgo equipment's performance in a crash. To me the fix is easy...prevent the crash. It seems like Talgos perform really well in other places they are used. Unfortunately this could be used as a reason to keep using outdated, heavy, custom, overbuilt passenger rail equipment in the United States.

 

[jis]

There is no denying that there are serious issues with Talgo 6s. Taking those out of service using some reasonable process should not cause outdated equipment to be used since the new FRA regulations allow modern equipment with minor modifications to be used.

Talgo 8 is an entirely different story.

 

[desertflyer]

Fair enough. I think that preventing derailments in the first place should be the priority and some of the talking points seem like tangents. But I guess that should be part of any investigation.

 

[jis]

Fair enough. I think that preventing derailments in the first place should be the priority and some of the talking points seem like tangents. But I guess that should be part of any investigation.

That is where PTC comes in. This was a poster child of a PTC preventable accident. This was mentioned at least half a dozen times if not more during the hearing.

 

[Willbridge]

The frustrating thing about the NTSB process is that they can't address the higher level problems that set up this situation, such as lack of routine orders for locomotives and cars for passenger service that would introduce updates and let older equipment be taken out of service for retrofits. Related to that is Amtrak's perennial shortage of equipment when a state comes forward to request a service. And related to that comes the idea of robbing the long-distance service to fill out regional trains (for which the Superliners were not designed).

Also not in their process is the suspicions that the FRA's concerns about European standards were akin to the Chinese tactics to protect their economy, that lack of PTC implementation may be used to kill non-NEC routes, and the traditional concern that being in the "Far Corner" means a lack of interest by people in the Nation's Capitol.

 

[desertflyer]

That is where PTC comes in. This was a poster child of a PTC preventable accident. This was mentioned at least half a dozen times if not more during the hearing.

Yes, I get that. I watched the hearing as well.

 

[Willbridge]

A couple of other omissions. The process does not get into the "why" of PTC implementation not moving quickly, so we have the NTSB and Congress saying "do it now" while the FCC plodded along and the railroads coped with a myriad of spot issues, such as concurrence from tribal governments and urban frequency spectrum squatters.

An omission which could have been covered within the NTSB's purview was the likely reason for implementation in mid-December. The chairman checked again on the red herring of project funding deadlines. What should have been asked was whether the urgency was the imminent holiday rush. In previous years, holiday service was supplemented with extra trains to overcome the fixed capacity of the articulated Talgo's. The new schedule included an increase anyway, so why jump through hoops at holidays and then again in January? (There is a lot of internal work in a transport organization around schedule changes, sometimes resulting in accidents.)

And back in the 1960's there was another decision made by WashDOT's predecessor that contributed to the accident. That was to design the I-5 overpass for slow rail speeds. Passenger service had been discontinued a decade before, so the NP apparently accepted the state''s curve.

 

[flitcraft]

Apparently the Talgos are going away ASAP, though how the Cascades runs can continue in the meantime is unclear. Also, the Point Defiance route will be run for the indefinite future.