Metrolink Wreck

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Aloha

Not being considered, that MetroLink train met that freight train in the Chatsworth Station 5 days per week. The Engineer on the MetroLink train that fatal day met the freight train 4 days a week, so why did he leave the station in the first place, without serious question. His signal should not have shown clear, the Conductor should not have given a clear to proceed.
Conductors do not give unconditional clear to proceed. What they are supposed to say is something like "OK to proceed on signal indication". It is upto the engineer to ensure that signal indication allows him/her to proceed past the signal. The signal is not at the station but a little ways down the track, though visible from many parts of the station. This condition allowed the engineer to legitimately pull out of the station and proceed at restricted speed upto the signal since he did not have a clear. Effectively it was a DIB situation if the signal were not visible at all. Since it was visible and red, it was the engineer's choice to either sit at the station or move upto the signal and stop. So there is no fault of the conductor involved AFAICT.
Aloha

I did not intend to suggest the Conductor was at fault, but rather reinforce the fact that the meet was so standard that all involved should have expected the meet in the station and therefor question why it was not happening before proceeding.

A few years ago on the Sunset Limited on the way to LAX the engineer radioed the Conductor that he saw something strange on the track ahead (we were in a station) The Conductor, outside my room, gave permission for the engineer to walk forward to inspect the switch in question. What the engineer found was both points touching the rails. Wee waited a little over 2 hours for a crew to fix the switch.

It is normal to question anything that is contrary to expected events, So Why didn't the engineer do so. By the way, not the final report, did say the signal at the switch was green, for the MetroLink train to proceed
 
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It is normal to question anything that is contrary to expected events, So Why didn't the engineer do so.
I think it's quite evident based on all indications that the engineer was flat-out not paying attention.

By the way, not the final report, did say the signal at the switch was green, for the MetroLink train to proceed
I can't quite figure out what this means.
 
It is normal to question anything that is contrary to expected events, So Why didn't the engineer do so.
I think it's quite evident based on all indications that the engineer was flat-out not paying attention.

By the way, not the final report, did say the signal at the switch was green, for the MetroLink train to proceed
I can't quite figure out what this means.
An early report I read said that the signal located at the switch was showing green to leave the Chatsworth station and proceed. If in fact the signal was green then why did the switch get damaged. This same report said several people had seen the signal as green, it was visible from the station platform.
 
Aloha

Not being considered, that MetroLink train met that freight train in the Chatsworth Station 5 days per week. The Engineer on the MetroLink train that fatal day met the freight train 4 days a week, so why did he leave the station in the first place, without serious question. His signal should not have shown clear, the Conductor should not have given a clear to proceed.
Conductors do not give unconditional clear to proceed. What they are supposed to say is something like "OK to proceed on signal indication". It is upto the engineer to ensure that signal indication allows him/her to proceed past the signal. The signal is not at the station but a little ways down the track, though visible from many parts of the station. This condition allowed the engineer to legitimately pull out of the station and proceed at restricted speed upto the signal since he did not have a clear. Effectively it was a DIB situation if the signal were not visible at all. Since it was visible and red, it was the engineer's choice to either sit at the station or move upto the signal and stop. So there is no fault of the conductor involved AFAICT.
Aloha

I did not intend to suggest the Conductor was at fault, but rather reinforce the fact that the meet was so standard that all involved should have expected the meet in the station and therefor question why it was not happening before proceeding.

A few years ago on the Sunset Limited on the way to LAX the engineer radioed the Conductor that he saw something strange on the track ahead (we were in a station) The Conductor, outside my room, gave permission for the engineer to walk forward to inspect the switch in question. What the engineer found was both points touching the rails. Wee waited a little over 2 hours for a crew to fix the switch.

It is normal to question anything that is contrary to expected events, So Why didn't the engineer do so. By the way, not the final report, did say the signal at the switch was green, for the MetroLink train to proceed
First, it should never be assumed that anything is "normal" with trains. Trains can arrive at unexpected times, anytime.

Second, I seem to recall from what I did read way back when, that normal for these two trains was that the freight was usually already in the siding waiting for the Metrolink train to make its stop so that the freight could proceed further south. On this fateful day, things weren't normal, the freight train wasn't in the siding, it was still out on the main and heading for the siding.

Which is why the Metrolink was supposed to stop & wait and why the switch was set against the Metrolink train.
 
Aloha

Not being considered, that MetroLink train met that freight train in the Chatsworth Station 5 days per week. The Engineer on the MetroLink train that fatal day met the freight train 4 days a week, so why did he leave the station in the first place, without serious question. His signal should not have shown clear, the Conductor should not have given a clear to proceed.
Aloha GG-1,

The Metrolink conductor testified that his signal was GREEN, and his words to the engineer were "Highball on the green!" One of the main problems I have is that everyone here, except you and I, wants to promote the idea that NO safety protocol was even in place, and thus totally vulnerable to a momentary lapse in attention BY A SINGLE INDIVIDUAL. Please read my post #423 if you haven't already - I would appreciate your comments.

RailCon BuffDaddy
 
The Brits would call this a case of "Ding ding and we are off" accident, a very common source of so called SPAD (Signal Passed At Danger) accidents in the UK - driver hears the ding ding from the conductor, and immediately charges off without looking at the signal he is facing. Even if the Conductor orders the train to go past a red signal without having the appropriate paperwork in hand, that is not something that should be carried out without appropriate clearance and paperwork should the protocol require that. If the conductor calls a red signal green, that does not excuse the engineer's following that.

I am wondering if it was this accident that caused the standard language used by conductors to include the phrase "upon signal indication" rather than naming a specific signal indication.
 
Why is it faith-based? Faith that the other train won't run its signals just like driving as Alan said? Or faith that there isn't another train on the track you're being routed into? If the latter, then the very design of the signaling system won't give you a favorable signal if there's a train blocking your path.
The faith involved here is that an engineer will not run a red signal. That appears to be a fundamental assumption behind the design of non positive train control systems. Now if it is inconvenient to deal with that assumption because you absolutely positively want to exonerate an engineer who clearly took actions to toss that assumption out the window then you do have to invoke, faith, pixie-dust and whatever else pleases you to make a case. :cool:
For many years in this country railroads operated on the faith that a train would not go beyond the limits of his authority on non-signaled tracks. YTes, this includes passenger trains. yes, there are passenger trains that operate soelly by manual block with no signals whatsoever today in the USA. Yes, I have ridden trains on lines that I know to have train movements controled by manual block or written orders and done it with complete peace of mind. The engineer is supposed to be a professional and do what is right and correct in his operation of the train, whether he is being watched or not.

By the way, for much of the steam era and the days of 5 man train crews, there was functionally only one man it the cab responsible for the safe movement of the train, the Engineer. The fireman was exactly that, the man tending the fire. The head brakeman was watching the train behind the engine, not the track ahead. The other two men were in the caboose, which could be anywhere between a few hundred feet and a full mile away. There were no radios. Communication between the ends fo the train were very limited. In fact, during the early days of dieseldom, there was only one man in the cab. Without a fire, no fireman. That changed as diesels displaced steam more widely and the operating unions succeeded in getting firemen restored as a job protection matter.
 
In fact, during the early days of dieseldom, there was only one man in the cab. Without a fire, no fireman. That changed as diesels displaced steam more widely and the operating unions succeeded in getting firemen restored as a job protection matter.
The Leesdale Local freight had THREE warm bodies in the cab but the Metrolink had ONE - are you claiming this is due to union featherbedding? Or perhaps does it more accurately reflect the relative worth that UPRR places on its cargo vs Metrolink on its passengers?

RailCon BuffDaddy
 
Metrolink has passenger cars for the conductor to go to (and perform certain duties). The Leesdale Local had...boxcars? Now I'm not a conductor, but if I were, I'd rather ride the cab of a locomotive than a boxcar...unless said boxcar was going 150mph down rough track :lol: :lol:
 
In fact, during the early days of dieseldom, there was only one man in the cab. Without a fire, no fireman. That changed as diesels displaced steam more widely and the operating unions succeeded in getting firemen restored as a job protection matter.
The Leesdale Local freight had THREE warm bodies in the cab but the Metrolink had ONE - are you claiming this is due to union featherbedding? Or perhaps does it more accurately reflect the relative worth that UPRR places on its cargo vs Metrolink on its passengers?

RailCon BuffDaddy
You know, it's posts like these that have earned you the "hostile" reception that you've faced. The reasons for having the number of people in the cab of freight and passenger trains has been explained to you MANY times, and it has absolutely NOTHING to do with "the relative worth that UPRR places on its cargo vs Metrolink on its passengers". Yet you keep on throwing these tin foil hat theories with absolutely no evidence to back them up. Have you given up on the "cell phones are the primary method of communication between engineers one yet, or are you still going to cling to that one in the face of overwhelming evidence?

Yes, inattention by one person in the cab of a passenger train can cause accidents. PTC will make it much more difficult (but not impossible) for the inattentiveness of one person to cause an accident, yet you rail against it (no pun intended). Inattention by one person can (and does with great frequency) also kill people on the roads, in the skies, and all around us in this big scary world.
 
Yes, inattention by one person in the cab of a passenger train can cause accidents. PTC will make it much more difficult (but not impossible) for the inattentiveness of one person to cause an accident, yet you rail against it (no pun intended). Inattention by one person can (and does with great frequency) also kill people on the roads, in the skies, and all around us in this big scary world.
There is also plenty of evidence that inattention by two or more people in the cab can cause accidents. So this whole thing about one or two or three in the cab is just a huge red herring that only distracts from discussing the real issues of ease of use of protocols and failure safety of such, which will actually reduce the chances of accidents occurring.
 
You know, it's posts like these that have earned you the "hostile" reception that you've faced.
(sigh)... If only there were some way to separate the REAL engineers from the "honorary" ones here. I would really like to know what THEY think. GG-1, are you out there somewhere?

RailCon BuffDaddy
 
You know, it's posts like these that have earned you the "hostile" reception that you've faced.
(sigh)... If only there were some way to separate the REAL engineers from the "honorary" ones here. I would really like to know what THEY think. GG-1, are you out there somewhere?

RailCon BuffDaddy
To my knowledge, there are only two people who are members of this forum who have every operated a train, be it freight or passenger, in real life. GG-1 is not one of them however.
 
And here's a quote from a recent story that puts the "train crews communicate by cell phones" theory to bed.

The California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) has adopted a “first-of-its-kind” regulation that bans transit-rail system operators from using personal electronic devices, such as cell phones, commission officials said in a prepared statement.
More can be found here.
 
Yes, inattention by one person in the cab of a passenger train can cause accidents. PTC will make it much more difficult (but not impossible) for the inattentiveness of one person to cause an accident, yet you rail against it (no pun intended). Inattention by one person can (and does with great frequency) also kill people on the roads, in the skies, and all around us in this big scary world.
There is also plenty of evidence that inattention by two or more people in the cab can cause accidents. So this whole thing about one or two or three in the cab is just a huge red herring that only distracts from discussing the real issues of ease of use of protocols and failure safety of such, which will actually reduce the chances of accidents occurring.
Exactly - I was going to go there, but was running late for work this morning. The video of the BNSF collision that RailCon posted is a prime example of that.

You know, it's posts like these that have earned you the "hostile" reception that you've faced.
(sigh)... If only there were some way to separate the REAL engineers from the "honorary" ones here. I would really like to know what THEY think. GG-1, are you out there somewhere?

RailCon BuffDaddy
*sigh* If only you could get through your thick skull that it doesn't take an expert to comprehend the simple concepts that we're presenting. Seriously, this isn't rocket science (and I am a rocket scientist!).
 
To my knowledge, there are only two people who are members of this forum who have every operated a train, be it freight or passenger, in real life. GG-1 is not one of them however.
Dare I ask, then, the basis for the condescension and derision my posts seem to create? I have cited at least two railroad professionals in support of my posts.

RailCon BuffDaddy
 
To my knowledge, there are only two people who are members of this forum who have every operated a train, be it freight or passenger, in real life. GG-1 is not one of them however.
Dare I ask, then, the basis for the condescension and derision my posts seem to create? I have cited at least two railroad professionals in support of my posts.

RailCon BuffDaddy
Because there are numerous others here who work in railroads, though not specifically operating a locomotive.
 
To my knowledge, there are only two people who are members of this forum who have every operated a train, be it freight or passenger, in real life. GG-1 is not one of them however.
Dare I ask, then, the basis for the condescension and derision my posts seem to create? I have cited at least two railroad professionals in support of my posts.

RailCon BuffDaddy
Because there are numerous others here who work in railroads, though not specifically operating a locomotive.
And it's readily apparent that even those of us that don't work in the industry have a far more complete knowledge of how things work than you do.
 
To my knowledge, there are only two people who are members of this forum who have every operated a train, be it freight or passenger, in real life. GG-1 is not one of them however.
Dare I ask, then, the basis for the condescension and derision my posts seem to create? I have cited at least two railroad professionals in support of my posts.

RailCon BuffDaddy
I hope that you'll take this in the way intended and not as a direct attack upon you:

But part of the problem is your fantastic claims on things and your clear lack of understanding on how things operate on a RR. Just because most people here aren't engineers, or even RR employees, does not mean that they all don't know what they're talking about. Yes, some rail fans tend to have fancy ideas that don't meet with reality, but many of the people responding to you have done their homework. They do know what they are talking about; many of them, including me, have hundreds of thousands of miles on Amtrak & other passenger trains.

As for your cites of RR professionals, first, it is your claim that you've spoken to these people. We can't verify that, and since you seem to be determined to bash rail, naturally those claims are going to be met with considerable doubt.

And in the case of talking to a conductor about crossing a switch set against him, again I can assure you that he's either talking out of his hat or felt that he was somehow easing your mind by lying to you. I've been on a train that's gone across a spring switch many times, and it feels no different than a regular switch. The only difference between a spring switch and the switch run through at CP Topenga, is that the CP Topenga switch didn't spring back into position after the run through. It was permanently bent and needed replacing.

But it would have felt no different to the conductor than any other switch around. The engine did the bending, and even there it's unlikely that the engineer would have felt it (think of a car crushing a soda can, you wouldn't notice that either), but in the coaches no one including the conductor would have noticed anything. Once the switch was bent into the new position by the engine, it acted just like any switch that was correctly positioned for normal movement through that switch. Put another way, the engine bent the switch into the correct position, and therefore to those in coach, it felt normal.
 
To my knowledge, there are only two people who are members of this forum who have every operated a train, be it freight or passenger, in real life. GG-1 is not one of them however.
Dare I ask, then, the basis for the condescension and derision my posts seem to create? I have cited at least two railroad professionals in support of my posts.
Engineers of the train driving kind (as well as Conductors) are just the users of the control system signals, track circuits, magic detectors, PTC etc.). They don't necessarily know how they work, they know the procedures to follow when they receive indications from the system. In course of this thread issues were raised about whether PTC works or not and how track circuits work etc., and some absolutely unfounded wild claims were made by some. No Engineer of the train driving kind or similar professionals, could explain e.g. under what circumstances PTC would work or fail. That requires an Engineer of a different kind, ones who develop, debug, deploy and maintain control systems - CS&S guys in the railroad. And there are a few of us here who are Engineers of the latter kind too, not necessarily on railroads but quite familiar with the technology. So if you are going to dump on others in areas that you apparently, as evidenced by statements made here, know very little about, citing professionals who also are not experts in that area, you should not be surprised if you are dumped right back upon in kind. :cool: Be considerate of others and you'll receive likewise.
 
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Now that I think about it again, it was the freight train that had just come out of the tunnel and was halfway through the curve when to the crews surprise there was a Metrolink train where it shouldn't have been, right in front of them.
Maybe you'd like to answer this question, from my original post -

WHY WAS THE SPEED LIMIT 40 MPH FOR TRAINS EXITING A TUNNEL WITH A METROLINK STATION LOCATED JUST AROUND A BLIND CORNER? (Over 40 years ago, from the top of Stony Point, I watched in horror as two juvenile delinquents dragged a cross-tie over the tracks just in front of a freight train exiting the same tunnel - it made a huge noise, but fortunately did not derail the train, which was moving slowly enough to stop within the track curve.)

RailCon BuffDaddy
Others have responded to this question, but let me help out our friend RailCon BuffDaddy:

Trains cannot stop on a dime. Large freight trains may take a mile or more to stop, even when operating at moderate speeds. Usually, you cannot see that far down a track. Therefore, signals are used to inform train engineers (or operators, especially on some subway and light-rail systems) whether or not another train is occupying track that may be (and probably is) out of view. As for hooligans vandalizing a track, there is little that can be done to anticipate that. If trains went slow enough to stop in time for any potential hazard that would not be detected by a signal, they would only be going about 5-10 mph in many places. That, for obvious reasons, would simply not be practical.
 
Trains cannot stop on a dime. Large freight trains may take a mile or more to stop, even when operating at moderate speeds. Usually, you cannot see that far down a track. Therefore, signals are used to inform train engineers (or operators, especially on some subway and light-rail systems) whether or not another train is occupying track that may be (and probably is) out of view. As for hooligans vandalizing a track, there is little that can be done to anticipate that. If trains went slow enough to stop in time for any potential hazard that would not be detected by a signal, they would only be going about 5-10 mph in many places. That, for obvious reasons, would simply not be practical.
You might want to review Trogdor's posts #590 & 593, Alanb's #592, and jis' #600. Therein, the claim is that engineers don't even NEED to know about another train occupying the track, they only need to do what the signals tell them - and a yellow over yellow signal out here apparently doesn't even tell them WHAT the "prescribed speed" is. Further, jis states that the Metrolink was cleared to leave the Chatsworth station and proceed at "restricted speed", whatever that is, to the signal at CP Topanga. However, the Metrolink was traveling at 42 mph (the posted speed limit on that track section) at impact - this means that the Metrolink engineer did not merely ignore a red signal, HE SAW A GREEN SIGNAL, AND SO DID THE CONDUCTOR (or else there was NO callout safety protocol even in effect). And let's not forget that the freight had THREE warm bodies in the cab to read signals and watch the tracks, but the Metrolink had ONE. And all the Amtrak hacks here want us to think train travel is safe, instead of compromised daily for cheaper freight service. And PTC would not have even prevented the Chatsworth disaster - but putting the track signal and sensor further away from the switch WOULD have. Umm, unless the signal was really green, that is...

RailCon BuffDaddy
 
If you clowns are going to try and use me for a punching bag, at least have the guts to post my last response.

RailCon BuffDaddy
 
Trains cannot stop on a dime. Large freight trains may take a mile or more to stop, even when operating at moderate speeds. Usually, you cannot see that far down a track. Therefore, signals are used to inform train engineers (or operators, especially on some subway and light-rail systems) whether or not another train is occupying track that may be (and probably is) out of view. As for hooligans vandalizing a track, there is little that can be done to anticipate that. If trains went slow enough to stop in time for any potential hazard that would not be detected by a signal, they would only be going about 5-10 mph in many places. That, for obvious reasons, would simply not be practical.
You might want to review Trogdor's posts #590 & 593, Alanb's #592, and jis' #600. Therein, the claim is that engineers don't even NEED to know about another train occupying the track, they only need to do what the signals tell them -
Well an engineer can generally assume that the other track is occupied by a train, but yes they don't actually need to know that or what train it is.

and a yellow over yellow signal out here apparently doesn't even tell them WHAT the "prescribed speed" is.
False!

I can't tell you what speed is indicated by yellow over yellow, but it is indicated in the rule book and the engineer is required to know what speed is indicated by that signal aspect.

Further, jis states that the Metrolink was cleared to leave the Chatsworth station and proceed at "restricted speed", whatever that is, to the signal at CP Topanga. However, the Metrolink was traveling at 42 mph (the posted speed limit on that track section) at impact - this means that the Metrolink engineer did not merely ignore a red signal, HE SAW A GREEN SIGNAL, AND SO DID THE CONDUCTOR (or else there was NO callout safety protocol even in effect).
You've reached two false conclusions here. The first being that the conductor saw any signal, much less a green one. The conductor cannot see a signal from inside the train.

And there is zero evidence at hand that proves that the engineer saw a green signal. There was some evidence that it is possible that he saw a green signal, but the NTSB discounted that evidence.

And let's not forget that the freight had THREE warm bodies in the cab to read signals and watch the tracks, but the Metrolink had ONE.
A useless point that you keep repeating over and over! Maybe we should start putting 3 drivers into every car in the hope that people will stop running red lights on the roads.

And all the Amtrak hacks here want us to think train travel is safe, instead of compromised daily for cheaper freight service.
And you seem to want us all to believe that train travel is the deadliest form of transportation around, when I've already shown that you are far more likely to be killed driving your car. Yet you wish to keep hiding from that fact and harping on one small accident for what ever twisted reasons you have. GET OVER IT!

If you want to protect people's lives, do something useful and fight for better roads, safer cars, and better enforcement of the rules of the road.

And PTC would not have even prevented the Chatsworth disaster -
False!

It has been proven more than adequately that PTC would indeed have prevented this accident, so you need to stop repeating this lie.

but putting the track signal and sensor further away from the switch WOULD have. Umm, unless the signal was really green, that is...
No it wouldn't have prevented the tragedy! If indeed the engineer was distracted by texting, he still would have run the train right past the signal and into the path of the freight train. The location of the signal would not have changed anything. It's your complete failure to understand anything about how RR's work that permits you to believe that moving the signal would have changed things.
 
If you clowns are going to try and use me for a punching bag, at least have the guts to post my last response.

RailCon BuffDaddy
I have patiently explained to you more than once how guest posting works around here. And I've mentioned that a few of the staff members had already decided that they had had enough of your nonsense and therefore were ignoring your posts and leaving them for me. It's been just about 3 hours since you made your last post which is a reasonable delay considering that there are only 6 staff members and we don't spend every waking hour on the forum waiting for you to make a post, in fact several of us actually have jobs that take us away from the forum for hours on end.

Since you are clearly incapable of understanding these simple facts above, despite my having explained it more than once quite nicely to you, and continue to make stupid, goading statements like this current post you are now finished here! :angry: There will be no more of your posts approved by me or any other staff member since you refuse to play nice and follow the rules.

GOODBYE!
 
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