Metrolink Wreck

[RailCon BuffDaddy]

I have learned a few things from this last exchange.

1--I don't know anything at all about trains and railroads. No surprise there as it is not a big interest but there is much that has been said that I had no idea even existed.

2--There are some people here who do know a lot about the above. Good to know when I have a question.

3--What initially looks like a reasonable question (or in this case set of questions) about a subject I know nothing about can be quickly shown to be less than reasonable.

4--This forum can be more entertaining (and educational) than I thought.

Dan

Dan, I'm curious about one thing - HOW CAN AN OBS CHIEF CLAIM NOT TO KNOW ANYTHING AT ALL ABOUT TRAINS AND RAILROADS??? Are you "taking one for the team"?

"Chief of OBS (On-Board Service), a supervisory job ``over almost every aspect of the train, except conductor...

...Most long-haul trains in the system have a chief of OBS to ensure quality service to the passengers. We do everything from crew assignments, proper stocking of the train`s food and equipment, such as cooking utensils, to linens on sleeping cars. We also do visual mechanical inspection of the equipment in the yards before departure, and prior to each trip we take notice of any special services required by a passenger-whether that request be for kosher meals, storage of medications, handicapped assistance, oxygen, etc..."

RailCon BuffDaddy

 

[Trogdor]

3--What initially looks like a reasonable question (or in this case set of questions) about a subject I know nothing about can be quickly shown to be less than reasonable.

To be clear, someone who is truly curious and seeking understanding of certain things can ask questions, even similar to the ones the guest/RailCon was asking, and if their intent is honestly to learn more about the subject, they will generally get good answers.

However, in this case, the poster was not interested in gaining understanding of anything, refused to acknowledge the validity of any of the responses he received, clearly had an agenda (as evidenced by questions such as "Do you really expect a jury to believe..." and such).

He wasn't asking reasonable questions, because he was not interested in reasonable answers.

 

[AlanB]

You might really enjoy

First, no train typically ever has two engineers in the cab. About the only time that would ever happen is if a supervisor was doing an inspection.

Second, freight trains would always have two people in the cab when out on the mainline.

Third, in a yard a freight train would only have an engineer in the cab, as the conductor normally in the cab when out on the mainline, would be on the ground to direct the switching.

And the train in that video was in a yard, when things went wrong. It's one incident in many years. Thousands of yard moves are made in this country every day without incident and only one person in the cab. And in fact, in some yards, there is no one in the cab anymore.

 

[AlanB]

Dan, I'm curious about one thing - HOW CAN AN OBS CHIEF CLAIM NOT TO KNOW ANYTHING AT ALL ABOUT TRAINS AND RAILROADS??? Are you "taking one for the team"?

"Chief of OBS (On-Board Service), a supervisory job ``over almost every aspect of the train, except conductor...

...Most long-haul trains in the system have a chief of OBS to ensure quality service to the passengers. We do everything from crew assignments, proper stocking of the train`s food and equipment, such as cooking utensils, to linens on sleeping cars. We also do visual mechanical inspection of the equipment in the yards before departure, and prior to each trip we take notice of any special services required by a passenger-whether that request be for kosher meals, storage of medications, handicapped assistance, oxygen, etc..."

RailCon BuffDaddy

It's an honorary title. Dan is not really an OBS.

Since this is a forum about Amtrak trains, as one makes posts to this forum, one receives honorary titles based upon the number of posts made. That title has nothing to do with what they actually do for a living. I'm a network/computer consultant. But for the fact that I'm an administrator on this forum which takes precedent, the number of post that I've made would show my title as an engineer. But again, I'm not. I work in computers.

 

[Dan O]

It's an honorary title. Dan is not really an OBS.

Alan. it's only honorary? I guess I'd be over 5.000 Amtrak miles (see signature) if I was an OBS chief for real.

 

[AlanB]

It's an honorary title. Dan is not really an OBS.

Alan. it's only honorary? I guess I'd be over 5.000 Amtrak miles (see signature) if I was an OBS chief for real.

Dan,

You know, I never really look at signatures. So I never noticed that.

 

[AlanB]

Dan, I'm curious about one thing - HOW CAN AN OBS CHIEF CLAIM NOT TO KNOW ANYTHING AT ALL ABOUT TRAINS AND RAILROADS??? Are you "taking one for the team"?

"Chief of OBS (On-Board Service), a supervisory job ``over almost every aspect of the train, except conductor...

...Most long-haul trains in the system have a chief of OBS to ensure quality service to the passengers. We do everything from crew assignments, proper stocking of the train`s food and equipment, such as cooking utensils, to linens on sleeping cars. We also do visual mechanical inspection of the equipment in the yards before departure, and prior to each trip we take notice of any special services required by a passenger-whether that request be for kosher meals, storage of medications, handicapped assistance, oxygen, etc..."

RailCon BuffDaddy

It's an honorary title. Dan is not really an OBS.

Since this is a forum about Amtrak trains, as one makes posts to this forum, one receives honorary titles based upon the number of posts made. That title has nothing to do with what they actually do for a living. I'm a network/computer consultant. But for the fact that I'm an administrator on this forum which takes precedent, the number of post that I've made would show my title as an engineer. But again, I'm not. I work in computers.

PS. I forgot to add that the position of OBS no longer exists at Amtrak; it hasn't for several years now.

 

[Dan O]

It's an honorary title. Dan is not really an OBS.

Alan. it's only honorary? I guess I'd be over 5.000 Amtrak miles (see signature) if I was an OBS chief for real.

Dan,

You know, I never really look at signatures. So I never noticed that.

Actually that was more for RailCon BuffDaddy. He was the one that thought I was the OBS chief.

Dan

 

[George Harris]

Dan:

There are several of us on here that have jobs in the industry. Generally we are fairly low key about for who and doing what, as that which is written is around forever and what you say can and will be used against you if someone has an axe to grind.

 

[RailCon BuffDaddy]

You might really enjoy

It appears that you are playing games with job titles in order to obscure that fact that not all trains have functional vigilance switches - otherwise this train could NOT have run away. Furthermore, perhaps you would like to comment on the "fatal flaw" in signal callout protocol - SINCE GREEN SIGNALS ARE NOT CALLED OUT BY THE ENGINEER AND REPEATED BY THE CONDUCTOR, THE CONDUCTOR CANNOT RECOGNIZE INCAPACITATION OF THE ENGINEER IF IT OCCURS PASSING A GREEN SIGNAL.

 

[guest]

Dan:

There are several of us on here that have jobs in the industry. Generally we are fairly low key about for who and doing what, as that which is written is around forever and what you say can and will be used against you if someone has an axe to grind.

All I can say is that those of you responding to RailCon Whatever have had the patience of Job. As a longtime Metrolink rider, I would not have gotten back on the trains if I, and the multitude of my fellow passengers, did not believe the NTSB report and new safety/equipment measures were based on fact. Thanks to you and the others who have posted here for adding reassurance for those of us who regularly ride the system.

 

[AlanB]

You might really enjoy

First, the only one playing games here is you I'm sorry to say! I'm not sure what your game is, but you're clearly not seeking general info and are shopping for something to somehow help in a case against Metrolink or perhaps trying to clear the engineers name. I'm not sure which; but I warn you that my patience is wearing thin with some of these accusations that you've been making.

Second, back in the days of the steam engines, inside the cab on a mainline run you would find only a fireman and the engineer. In the caboose you'd find the conductor and some brakemen. As automation increased, brakemen went away. When diesels came online, to a large extent in this country firemen went away, and on freight trains the conductor moved into the cab. On Amtrak trains when there are two people in the cab, then the second person is still called the fireman, even though he/she doesn't shovel coal anymore.

Next, what the heck is a "functional vigilance switch"?

As for your final sentence, oddly enough RR's on the east coast operate under NORAC rules which require the engineer to call all signals out on the radio to the conductor. The rules in place on the host RR's west of the Mississippi do not require that green or clear's be called. If you don't like that policy, complain to Union Pacific and BNSF, as they set those rules.

Regarding the engineer being incapacitated, the dead man's feature takes care of that problem. The engineer, be it on an Amtrak, Metrolink, or freight engine, must make some input be it changing speed, blowing the horn, ringing the bell, applying the brakes, etc. ever 1 to 2 minutes. It's a random amount of time. If the engineer doesn't make any input within the time limit, the alerter starts beeping. The engineer has about 15 to 20 seconds to hit a button confirming that he's still alive and kicking. If he fails to hit that button within the allotted time, an extremely loud horn that would wake the dead starts going off. No one could sleep through that racket, I've heard that horn go off and it is VERY loud.

Once that horn goes off, he's got another 15 to 20 seconds to respond and hit that button. If he fails to do so, the onboard computers assume that he is indeed incapacitated for some reason and the computer will apply the brakes and bring the train to a halt. And it will sit there until that engineer either recovers to do something about the stop, or rescue workers carry him off the train and a new engineer gets on board to move the train.

Now in the case of that runaway train, when yard work is being done, the alerter system is disabled because there can be periods where nothing is happening and the engineer has left the cab and because everything is done at low speeds. And under normal circumstances in the yard, people would quickly notice if the engineer were incapacitated. I don't recall the specifics right now on the CSX runaway incident and I'm not going looking for them as I'm about to start my journey home by train. But I do recall that there were a series of mistakes made that led to that incident, mistakes unlikely to ever be repeated again, especially after what happened with CSX.

 

[RailCon BuffDaddy]

First, the only one playing games here is you I'm sorry to say! I'm not sure what your game is

THE TRUTH

Second, back in the days of the steam engines, inside the cab on a mainline run you would find only a fireman and the engineer. In the caboose you'd find the conductor and some brakemen. As automation increased, brakemen went away. When diesels came online, to a large extent in this country firemen went away, and on freight trains the conductor moved into the cab. On Amtrak trains when there are two people in the cab, then the second person is still called the fireman, even though he/she doesn't shovel coal anymore.

The presence of any one of these, along with the engineer, would have prevented the CSX runaway - or will you argue that point, as well?

Next, what the heck is a "functional vigilance switch"?

Please see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dead-man%27s_vigilance_device - functional means working; operational; not defeated in some manner.

As for your final sentence, oddly enough RR's on the east coast operate under NORAC rules which require the engineer to call all signals out on the radio to the conductor. The rules in place on the host RR's west of the Mississippi do not require that green or clear's be called. If you don't like that policy, complain to Union Pacific and BNSF, as they set those rules.

I think "catastrophically" is more appropriate than "oddly". And three warm bodies in the freight cab, but only one in the Metrolink. But look at all the money and radio bandwidth they save...

Now in the case of that runaway train, when yard work is being done, the alerter system is disabled because there can be periods where nothing is happening and the engineer has left the cab

By most accounts that's what happened - except the train was moving when he jumped off to throw a switch so he would not run through it, and the train then speeded up, preventing him from getting back on board.

One final point - local residents interviewed after the Chatsworth accident stated that it was normal for the Leesdale Local freight to speed through the Chatsworth Station on the main (East) track - the SAME track the Metrolink departed on the day of the accident. The presence of TWO signals at CP Topanga, with one cropped out of the NTSB report, becomes ever more curious...

Thank you for your response.

RailCon BuffDaddy

 

[George Harris]

I don't recall the specifics right now on the CSX runaway incident and I'm not going looking for them as I'm about to start my journey home by train. But I do recall that there were a series of mistakes made that led to that incident, mistakes unlikely to ever be repeated again, especially after what happened with CSX.

The series of event is by safety professionals called the "Cascade of Events". the exact words may be wrong, but normally when there is a serious accident there is no sigle cause. For every serious accident, there are normally a certain number of minor accidents, I think the normal ratio is about 30, and for each minor accident, there are normally a certain number of near misses and rules violations.

The normal mindset of safety professionals borders on paranoia, and if that is mentioned, there usual answer is to the effect, "Yes, but am I being paranoid enough?" Thye usually go beyond the "rare as chicken teeth" concerns to wanting to have a dentist on call in case one those chicken teeth develops a cavity.

When we look at the number of train meets that we have on single track railroads the percentage of accidesnt approaches the vanishing point. It is far below the rate of road accidents. In fact, every form of public transportation is safer than driving.

Maybe RailCon is unaware that there are people out there whose profession is to ensure safety and analyze accidents aaand rule violations far more than just the NTSB. If the NTSP report had any errors of significance, any number of these people would be screaming foul and pointing out the errors. I am NOT talking about those that have an interst in twisting the outcome for their own advantage, but those whe have nothing to gain by disputing the findings of the NTSB.

Yes thing still happen, but that is because we a imperfect humans, not God. With the best of efforts and intentions things will go wrong and be done wrong from tiem to time.

We also need to recognize that reality to avoid "By striving fro perfection we drive out the good."

An outstanding example of doing this would be to so burden railroad passenger service with major costs for minor safety benefits that the economics become unacceptable even for governments, thereby driving travel more to roads with their much less controlled environment and their much higher accident rates.

 

[AlanB]

First, the only one playing games here is you I'm sorry to say! I'm not sure what your game is

THE TRUTH

Sorry, but NO! You're not interested in the truth; if you were, then you wouldn't be here making the statements you're making and ignoring those who've responded to you. If Metrolink had reached the conclusion that you did, then fine I could understand your suspicion. The NTSB is an independent, impartial third party. They aren't prone to lying, and as George pointed out, there are any number of other experts who would by crying foul at this point in there were problems in the NTSB report.

Second, back in the days of the steam engines, inside the cab on a mainline run you would find only a fireman and the engineer. In the caboose you'd find the conductor and some brakemen. As automation increased, brakemen went away. When diesels came online, to a large extent in this country firemen went away, and on freight trains the conductor moved into the cab. On Amtrak trains when there are two people in the cab, then the second person is still called the fireman, even though he/she doesn't shovel coal anymore.

The presence of any one of these, along with the engineer, would have prevented the CSX runaway - or will you argue that point, as well?

Yes, they would have prevented it. However, ever since the end of steam there would never more than one person have been in the CSX cab while in the yard. And had the engineer followed the rules that are there for a reason, there would have been no runaway. Instead he left the cab to prevent his getting caught for one violation and created an even bigger problem and violation that probably got him fired.

Next, what the heck is a "functional vigilance switch"?

Please see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dead-man%27s_vigilance_device - functional means working; operational; not defeated in some manner.

I don't think that I've ever heard anyone working in the industry refer to it as such.

As for your final sentence, oddly enough RR's on the east coast operate under NORAC rules which require the engineer to call all signals out on the radio to the conductor. The rules in place on the host RR's west of the Mississippi do not require that green or clear's be called. If you don't like that policy, complain to Union Pacific and BNSF, as they set those rules.

I think "catastrophically" is more appropriate than "oddly". And three warm bodies in the freight cab, but only one in the Metrolink. But look at all the money and radio bandwidth they save...

Again, SOP for the freight would have been two. It was just an oddity that three happened to be in the cab that day.

As for the rules, if the engineer of Metrolink thought that he had a clear signal, he would have radioed that info to the conductor and the result would still be the same. So whether or not they call the clear signals west of the Miss is irrelevant to this discussion.

One final point - local residents interviewed after the Chatsworth accident stated that it was normal for the Leesdale Local freight to speed through the Chatsworth Station on the main (East) track - the SAME track the Metrolink departed on the day of the accident. The presence of TWO signals at CP Topanga, with one cropped out of the NTSB report, becomes ever more curious...

No, the cropping of the pictures still makes no difference.

First, nothing is ever normal on a RR. Rule #1 is expect a train at any time in any direction. Trains don't always run on the same schedule. And what happened yesterday is no indication of what will happen today. That's why the signals are there. And the only signal that matters is the one that the Metrolink engineer ran. There are places where there are 6 even 8 signals because of the number of tracks. Every engineer knows which track they are on and which signal they must look at and obey.

 

[Trogdor]

One final point - local residents interviewed after the Chatsworth accident stated that it was normal for the Leesdale Local freight to speed through the Chatsworth Station on the main (East) track - the SAME track the Metrolink departed on the day of the accident.

Local residents wouldn't know what the "Leesdale Local" is, wouldn't know a main track from a siding, and know about as much about railroading as you do (that is to say, absolutely nothing).

The presence of TWO signals at CP Topanga, with one cropped out of the NTSB report, becomes ever more curious...

Curious, in what sense? Curious in the sense that you don't know a damn thing about what signals are for, or how to read them?

The fact that there are two signals (actually three, if you count the one for eastbound traffic) at CP Topanga is a non-issue. It was never an issue, and never will be an issue.

I don't know what the CSX runaway train has to do with this case, unless you're just scraping the bottom of the barrel looking for anything at all that will defend your position (which, honestly, I still don't know what your position is).

 

[George Harris]

One final point - local residents interviewed after the Chatsworth accident stated that it was normal for the Leesdale Local freight to speed through the Chatsworth Station on the main (East) track - the SAME track the Metrolink departed on the day of the accident.

The chance of this statement ibeing accurate is little to mone. Whether it did or not is a non-issue. The issue is solely what was supposed to happen at the particular time of the accident, which has been well established beyond doubt and question.

And the significance of this statement is??? NONE WHATSOEVER.

The presence of TWO signals at CP Topanga, with one cropped out of the NTSB report, becomes ever more curious...

Ever heard the expression "beating a dead horse?" Continuing to ramble on about the presence of two signals but only one showing in the picture is exactly that. The issue and consequences (none at all) have been exhaustively explained any yet you persist in bringing it up. There had to be two signals because there were two tracks. The one to the right of the track and only that signal had any significance to the operation of the Metrolink train.

What is your purpose with all these questions and claims?

 

[RailCon BuffDaddy]

One final point - local residents interviewed after the Chatsworth accident stated that it was normal for the Leesdale Local freight to speed through the Chatsworth Station on the main (East) track - the SAME track the Metrolink departed on the day of the accident.

The chance of this statement ibeing accurate is little to mone. Whether it did or not is a non-issue. The issue is solely what was supposed to happen at the particular time of the accident, which has been well established beyond doubt and question.

And the significance of this statement is??? NONE WHATSOEVER.

The presence of TWO signals at CP Topanga, with one cropped out of the NTSB report, becomes ever more curious...

Ever heard the expression "beating a dead horse?" Continuing to ramble on about the presence of two signals but only one showing in the picture is exactly that. The issue and consequences (none at all) have been exhaustively explained any yet you persist in bringing it up. There had to be two signals because there were two tracks. The one to the right of the track and only that signal had any significance to the operation of the Metrolink train.

What is your purpose with all these questions and claims?

As has been mentioned, there are THREE signals at CP Topanga, including the one that would have been seen, albeit too late to matter, by the Leesdale Local crew. The NTSB report states that the prior intermediate signal the Leesdale Local crew saw was "yellow over yellow". How very helpful - one one track there is an opposing commuter train, and the other is clear - the next signal will tell you (TOO LATE). And if you think all railroad professionals know what "yellow over yellow" means, read THIS. If you want to get an engineer's view, watch THIS.

RailCon BuffDaddy

 

[Ryan]

You're so completely wrong on this it's mind boggling.

An internet discussion amongst people not qualified on the territory in question proves nothing. Knowing what the signal aspects mean is a core competency for holding an engineer/conductor position.

The signal just before the siding isn't "TOO LATE", it isn't like the engineer steers the train onto one track or another based on the signal. The direction the train is going to take is set by the dispatcher.

I'll defer to a real engineer, but my understanding is that the y/y aspect means "diverging approach" in that territory, so the engineer does in fact know that he'll be taking the siding at the next signal.

This pretty much makes every single one of your statements factually incorrect.

And I ask again - what is your point? What is your alternative theory? Rather than tell us that you think the NTSB is wrong, try telling us what you think actually happened, and why it's important?

Edit: And just so we're abundantly clear, RailCon - even though it says "engineer" under my name over there (and I am an engineer), I'm not really a locomotive engineer. I'm just a guy that likes riding trains. The fact that I'm not certain about what a signal aspect 3,000 miles away means doesn't mean that real locomotive engineers trained on that territory don't know what it means.

Edit2: Watched the video and it proves my point. The first signal passed is y/y meaning that the train is going to go into the siding at the next switch. As he approaches that siding, you can see that the switch is lined to go into the siding, and the signal is showing red over green - a "diverging clear", meaning that he's going to go into the siding and that the way ahead is clear after that. At the last second, you see the signal change to red over red, because the oncoming train has gotten too close to the switch and there is a chance of collision (which is exactly what happens).

 

[AlanB]

At the last second, you see the signal change to red over red, because the oncoming train has gotten too close to the switch and there is a chance of collision (which is exactly what happens).

The signal changes to red over red because the other train is now in the same block as the train about to take the siding; not because it's too close to the signal. The other train crossed the point where it went from the block that it was supposed to stop within and into the block that it was not supposed to be in.

I can't watch that video from the train, need more band width, but I suspect that I've seen the video in question. And the signals worked properly and the train crew from the train from which the video was shot did everything correctly. It was the opposing crew that screwed up and violated their stop signal causing the accident. There was only one cause of this accident, and that was the inattention of the crew in the oncoming train. I've never gone looking for the accident report for this accident, but it is quite clear even to this non-expert what happened and who screwed up.

 

[RailCon BuffDaddy]

The signal changes to red over red because the other train is now in the same block as the train about to take the siding; not because it's too close to the signal. The other train crossed the point where it went from the block that it was supposed to stop within and into the block that it was not supposed to be in.

What do we have here, differing opinions of signal interpretation? And WHAT magic sensor decides when the oncoming train is in the wrong block? And WHY is there NO margin of error or warning time for the approaching train? Could it be that the more warning margin provided, the LESS room to squeeze another carlength into a siding? And the PTC boosters want to peddle HIGHER TRAIN SPEEDS as a reason to invest untold billions, while ignoring the more mundane safety solutions such as uniform, unequivocal and timely signaling.

I can't watch that video from the train, need more band width, but I suspect that I've seen the video in question. And the signals worked properly and the train crew from the train from which the video was shot did everything correctly. It was the opposing crew that screwed up and violated their stop signal causing the accident. There was only one cause of this accident, and that was the inattention of the crew in the oncoming train. I've never gone looking for the accident report for this accident, but it is quite clear even to this non-expert what happened and who screwed up.

Why don't you? At ONE CRITICAL INSTANT, the conductor thought he saw a signal turn red, but the engineer thought it was still "clear" (which means green, is that clear?). At sunrise, no less. What a wonderful margin for error - now let's ship all our nuclear waste by train...

RailCon BuffDaddy

 

[Ryan]

Yes, that's the video. I used "too close to the switch" because I didn't want to get into blocks with the guy - from a layman's perspective they're the same thing, if you get too close to the switch you go into the next block.

 

[RailCon BuffDaddy]

Come on, it's all of you against me - surely you are not too scared to post my last message, are you? Or do you need to wait until you can gather enough responses to bury it first?

RailCon BuffDaddy

 

[AlanB]

The signal changes to red over red because the other train is now in the same block as the train about to take the siding; not because it's too close to the signal. The other train crossed the point where it went from the block that it was supposed to stop within and into the block that it was not supposed to be in.

What do we have here, differing opinions of signal interpretation? And WHAT magic sensor decides when the oncoming train is in the wrong block? And WHY is there NO margin of error or warning time for the approaching train? Could it be that the more warning margin provided, the LESS room to squeeze another carlength into a siding? And the PTC boosters want to peddle HIGHER TRAIN SPEEDS as a reason to invest untold billions, while ignoring the more mundane safety solutions such as uniform, unequivocal and timely signaling.

What we have here is two rail fans using different wording to describe things. Remember, we don't work for any railroad. I'm a computer consultant who just happens to like trains and know something about them.

And yes, there is a wire loop attached to the tracks with a very low current that runs through it. When the train passes that spot in the track, the wheels & axles close that loop, indicating to the signal circuits that a train has passed into the block.

I can't watch that video from the train, need more band width, but I suspect that I've seen the video in question. And the signals worked properly and the train crew from the train from which the video was shot did everything correctly. It was the opposing crew that screwed up and violated their stop signal causing the accident. There was only one cause of this accident, and that was the inattention of the crew in the oncoming train. I've never gone looking for the accident report for this accident, but it is quite clear even to this non-expert what happened and who screwed up.

Why don't you? At ONE CRITICAL INSTANT, the conductor thought he saw a signal turn red, but the engineer thought it was still "clear" (which means green, is that clear?). At sunrise, no less. What a wonderful margin for error - now let's ship all our nuclear waste by train...

RailCon BuffDaddy

Which part of "I'm currently on a train" did you not understand? I'm using a cell phone connection to get online as I roll along the Mississippi River on my to Chicago and my next train home. Watching videos takes more data and band width than I wish to use at this time for this discussion.

And shipping nuclear waste by train is far safer than shipping it by truck. Trucks have many more accidents than do trains.

I asked you this once before and you still haven't answered it; why aren't you as concerned about automobile safety as you are with trains? We kill many, many more people with cars & trucks than we ever kill with trains. Where is your outrage and concern about this?

 

[Ryan]

What do we have here, differing opinions of signal interpretation?

Nope, just differing ways of descriping the same thing to someone that's demonstrated a profound refusal to listen to those explanations.

And WHAT magic sensor decides when the oncoming train is in the wrong block?

Alan described it above, and it operated exactly as designed.

And WHY is there NO margin of error or warning time for the approaching train?

Because the "magic" sensor can't see into the future to see that the oncoming train is going to creep farther forward than it's supposed to. As soon as it does, the signal facing the video camera turns red.

Could it be that the more warning margin provided, the LESS room to squeeze another carlength into a siding?

Nope. Given the timing involved, there's no signal system in the world that would have stopped that collision, it's simple physics. You can't stop a train on a dime.

And the PTC boosters want to peddle HIGHER TRAIN SPEEDS as a reason to invest untold billions, while ignoring the more mundane safety solutions such as uniform, unequivocal and timely signaling.

Actually, the PTC boosters cite increased safety. PTC may have stopped the Chatsworth crash, but it wouldn't have done a thing in the crash depicted in the video.

Why don't you? At ONE CRITICAL INSTANT, the conductor thought he saw a signal turn red, but the engineer thought it was still "clear" (which means green, is that clear?). At sunrise, no less.

Even if the brakes had magically applied at the second the signal had gone red (which is what PTC would roughly do), the train still wouldn't have been able to stop in time.

What a wonderful margin for error - now let's ship all our nuclear waste by train...

As has been mentioned, train travel is FAR safer than vehicle travel.